Choices under Epistemic Pluralism in Economics

Meyenburg, Imko (2018) Choices under Epistemic Pluralism in Economics. International Journal of Pluralism and Economics Education, 9 (4). ISSN 1757-5656

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At the core of the pluralist argument in economics is the rejection of the logical positivists' reductionist 'one size fits all' approach to scientific research. Instead, pluralists argue that there are multiple ways of constructing knowledge and that we cannot decide on the one best methodology or epistemic principle; in short, pluralistic knowledge is all there is. Yet, epistemic pluralism implies the absence of a single conclusive final methodology or epistemological principle, and consequently choice of methods, theories and concepts risk becoming relativistic under pluralism. In the light of the absence of objective choice criteria this paper argues: 1) that choices can be justified through consensuses in intellectual exchanges; 2) that MacIntyrian epistemological crises are a suitable basis for consensus under pluralism; 3) choice under pluralism, understood as migration between different frameworks, becomes necessary for the development of framework-dependent narratives and resulting policy implications.

Item Type: Journal Article
Additional Information: Special Issue on: Pluralism with Purpose Applying a Pluralist Approach to Informing Policy
Keywords: epistemic pluralism, theory choice, economics, schools of thought, policy implications, methodology, relativism, knowledge, epistemological crises, cognitive aims and methodological norms
Faculty: Faculty of Business & Law
Depositing User: Imko Meyenburg
Date Deposited: 30 May 2018 12:55
Last Modified: 09 Sep 2021 18:56

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