Anglia Ruskin Research Online (ARRO)
Browse

File(s) not publicly available

How many selves in emotion experience? Reply to Dalgleish and Power (2004)

journal contribution
posted on 2023-08-30, 13:24 authored by Anthony J. Marcel, John A. Lambie
T. Dalgleish and M. J. Power (Dalgleish, T. & Power, M.J., 2004. Psychological Review, 111(3), pp.812-19) suggest that J. A. Lambie and A. J. Marcel's (2002) article (Lambie, J.A. & Marcel, A.J., 2002. Psychological Review, 109(2), pp.219-259) implicitly presents a unitary view of self in emotion experience and propose that certain clinical phenomena require multiple selves. This reply summarizes Lambie and Marcel's usages of the term self and examines both Dalgleish and Power's gloss of these and their own usages. This indicates that their own central usage of the term misrepresents Lambie and Marcel and is itself an improper usage. More important, examination of the phenomena claimed to require multiple selves suggests that they do not and that Dalgleish and Power may have misread the relevant clinical literature. Finally, Lambie and Marcel's own conception of dissociative phenomena and multiple selves are outlined, and alternative approaches are sketched. In discussing the usages of the term self and interpretation of cognitive and affective disorders, this reply attempts to clarify certain confusions.

History

Refereed

  • Yes

Volume

111

Issue number

3

Page range

820-826

Publication title

Psychological Review

ISSN

1939-1471

Publisher

American Psychological Association

Language

  • other

Legacy posted date

2010-07-27

Legacy Faculty/School/Department

ARCHIVED Faculty of Science & Technology (until September 2018)

Usage metrics

    ARU Outputs

    Categories

    No categories selected

    Keywords

    Licence

    Exports

    RefWorks
    BibTeX
    Ref. manager
    Endnote
    DataCite
    NLM
    DC