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How many selves in emotion experience? Reply to Dalgleish and Power (2004)
journal contribution
posted on 2023-08-30, 13:24 authored by Anthony J. Marcel, John A. LambieT. Dalgleish and M. J. Power (Dalgleish, T. & Power, M.J., 2004. Psychological Review, 111(3), pp.812-19) suggest that J. A. Lambie and A. J. Marcel's (2002) article (Lambie, J.A. & Marcel, A.J., 2002. Psychological Review, 109(2), pp.219-259) implicitly presents a unitary view of self in emotion experience and propose that certain clinical phenomena require multiple selves. This reply summarizes Lambie and Marcel's usages of the term self and examines both Dalgleish and Power's gloss of these and their own usages. This indicates that their own central usage of the term misrepresents Lambie and Marcel and is itself an improper usage. More important, examination of the phenomena claimed to require multiple selves suggests that they do not and that Dalgleish and Power may have misread the relevant clinical literature. Finally, Lambie and Marcel's own conception of dissociative phenomena and multiple selves are outlined, and alternative approaches are sketched. In discussing the usages of the term self and interpretation of cognitive and affective disorders, this reply attempts to clarify certain confusions.
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Refereed
- Yes
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111Issue number
3Page range
820-826Publication title
Psychological ReviewISSN
1939-1471External DOI
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American Psychological AssociationLanguage
- other
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2010-07-27Legacy Faculty/School/Department
ARCHIVED Faculty of Science & Technology (until September 2018)Usage metrics
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