CONCEPTUALISATION AND PSYCHOMETRIC VALIDATION OF A NEW MEASURE OF AMBIVALENT HOMOPREJUDICE TOWARDS GAY MEN

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Presentations

Detailed below are works stemming from this thesis that have been presented at conferences


Abstract

Prejudice towards gay men has almost exclusively been characterised as hostility. However, myriad other groups have been found to be targets hostile and benevolent (i.e., ambivalent) prejudice. Scholars have attempted to conceptualise ambivalent prejudice towards sexual minorities, but they are based on uncertain theoretical foundations. The aims of the current programme of research were, therefore, to develop a novel theory of ambivalent prejudice towards gay men in light of emerging literature, to further develop and nuance the nascent constructs of adversarial, repellent, romanticised, and paternalistic homoprejudice using qualitative methods, to develop a scale with which to measure the endorsement of such prejudice in the United Kingdom, and to provide evidence outlining the measure’s psychometric utility. A series of three empirical studies consisting of a focus group study on heterosexuals \((n = 12)\) and gay men \((n = 10)\), a large-scale survey study \((n = 801)\), and a study of test-retest reliability \((n = 131)\) were undertaken in order to address these aims. The qualitative findings corroborated and elaborated upon the initial theory development, suggesting that it offers a valid theoretical alternative to other theories. The exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, and construct validation produced a multidimensional measure comprising the constructs identified in the earlier theory development and qualitative study. The proposed factor structure demonstrated good model fit and each subscale demonstrated good convergent, discriminant, and known-groups validity as well as good internal consistency and temporal stability. Altogether, these findings challenged competing theories’ accounts of attitudinal ambivalence towards gay men, offered a novel reconceptualization of these attitudes that was well-grounded in both data and theory, and produced a measurement tool with promising psychometric utility. Directions for future research such as further scale validation and behavioural studies are proposed and the implications of these findings on theory in this area is outlined.

Key words: Ambivalence, Prejudice, Gay Men, Attitudes, Scale Development
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<tr>
<td>AHS</td>
<td>Ambivalent Homoprejudice Scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMI</td>
<td>Ambivalence towards Men Inventory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMI-B</td>
<td>Benevolence towards Men Subscale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMI-H</td>
<td>Hostility towards Men Subscale</td>
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<td>AS</td>
<td>Altruism Scale</td>
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<td>Ambivalent Sexism Inventory</td>
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<td>Benevolent Sexism Subscale</td>
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<td>ASI-H</td>
<td>Hostile Sexism Subscale</td>
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<td>ATG</td>
<td>Attitudes towards Gay Men Scale</td>
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<tr>
<td>BIAS</td>
<td>Behaviour from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes Map</td>
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<td>CAN</td>
<td>Causal Attitude Network</td>
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<td>CFA</td>
<td>Confirmatory Factor Analysis</td>
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<td>CFI</td>
<td>Comparative Fit Index</td>
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<td>DREP</td>
<td>Departmental Research Ethics Panel</td>
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<td>EBHS</td>
<td>Essentialist Beliefs about Homosexuality Scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFA</td>
<td>Exploratory Factor Analysis</td>
</tr>
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<td>ESG</td>
<td>Evaluative Space Grid</td>
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<td>FA</td>
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<td>Focus Group</td>
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<td>FREP</td>
<td>Faculty Research Ethics Panel</td>
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<td>GLAAD</td>
<td>Gay &amp; Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation</td>
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<td>GMO</td>
<td>Genetically Modified Organism</td>
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<td>GTM</td>
<td>Gradual Threshold Model</td>
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<td>HPS</td>
<td>Homopositivity Scale</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAT</td>
<td>Implicit Association Test</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>Intra-Class Correlation</td>
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<td>Just World Scale</td>
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<td>Justification-Suppression Model</td>
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<td>KMO</td>
<td>Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Statistic</td>
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<td>LGBT</td>
<td>Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, &amp; Trans</td>
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<td>MAID</td>
<td>Model of Ambivalence-Induced Discomfort</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAR</td>
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<td>MCAR</td>
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<td>Personal Fear of Invalidity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>RCI</td>
<td>Religious Commitment Inventory</td>
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<td>SCM</td>
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<td>Social Desirability Scale</td>
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<td>SLGHRS</td>
<td>Support for Lesbian and Gay Human Rights Scale</td>
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<td>Tucker-Lewis Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPB</td>
<td>Theory of Planned Behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WLSMV</td>
<td>Weighted Least Squares Controlling for Means and Variance</td>
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1. Chapter One

General Overview

The primary aims of this program of research are to develop a theory of ambivalent prejudice towards gay men – incorporating both primary data and extant psychological theories – and to create and validate a new measure of these attitudes. Other scholars (i.e., Walls, 2008; Massey, 2009) have sought to investigate the multifaceted nature of heterosexuals’ attitudes towards gay men, however, neither theory is based on primary data and, therefore, the respective scales emanating from these theories have questionable content validity. These and other issues will be addressed in the present research by: 1) Synthesising a bespoke theory rather than a theory which is an extrapolation of other tangential theories of ambivalent prejudice; 2) Validating the theory and its underlying assumptions using qualitative methods; and 3) Using this theory and empirical findings to develop a psychometric measure of these constructs. In so doing, this thesis will offer a necessary reconceptualization of heterosexuals’ attitudes towards gay men, which will illuminate the under-studied positive attitudes towards gay men and their possible negative connotations, liberate academic understanding and investigation of attitudes towards gay men, and make way for new avenues of scholarly inquiry in the field of LGBTQ psychology.

To orient the reader, the structure of the thesis will be briefly outlined. Chapter Two provides a detailed coverage of the structure, content, and functions of attitudes and introduces the concept of attitudinal ambivalence – the coexistence of positive and negative attitudes towards an attitude target – as well as its antecedents, consequences, and functions that have been discovered in social cognition literature. Chapter Three focuses on the social-cognitive construct of prejudice and delineates old-fashioned and modern conceptualisations of prejudice before exploring how other scholars have conceptualised ambivalent prejudice towards other oppressed groups. The ontological similarities and differences between these groups and gay men is critically examined and it is noted that gay men – moreso than other people under the LGBTQ umbrella –
are targets of a range of benevolent evaluations that other oppressed groups (i.e., women, elderly people, and disabled people) also experience, necessitating further theorising in this area. ‘Homoprejudice’ was advanced as a suitable term that captured the diversity of affect inherent to ambivalence (over other terms that emphasise homonegativity/positivity) while also upholding the social psychological hypothesis that such ambivalent prejudice places the target at some disadvantage – despite its potential to be expressed in superficially positive ways. Ambivalent homoprejudice is theorised to have four components: 1) an envious and begrudgingly tolerant aspect termed adversarial homoprejudice; 2) a contemptuous and disgusted aspect termed repellent homoprejudice; 3) an admiring and aggrandising aspects termed romanticised homoprejudice, and; 4) a sympathetic – yet demeaning – aspect termed paternalistic homoprejudice. This framework is argued to be a nuanced alternative to other theoretical accounts, which do not account for benevolent prejudice and the aforementioned ontological diversity among different oppressed groups. The broader literature concerning heterosexism is also integrated here, incorporating some of the more discursive findings on microaggressions in order to better understand the seeming inconsistency between the expression and the experience of benevolent prejudice and open up additional research avenues from both social-cognitive and social constructionist frameworks.

Chapter Four details a series of homogenous focus groups comprising heterosexuals and gay men, which aimed to corroborate and further refine the concepts identified in the previous chapter. Thematic analysis of these discussions supported the four aspects of homoprejudice identified in the previous chapter and provided further insight into the sociocultural and ontological factors that were argued to motivate them. Findings of particular note include the link between adversarial homoprejudice and the belief that gay men enjoyed undue advantages over heterosexuals; the penalisation of gay men who failed to live up to romanticised ideals by heterosexuals (i.e., the ‘failed gay’); and heterosexuals’ imposing facilitative behaviours towards gay men – particularly in the context of sexuality disclosure. This study addressed the content validity
issues in extant accounts of multidimensional homoprejudice and provided a conceptual base for the ambivalent homoprejudice scale to be formed upon.

Chapter Five details the first of two quantitative investigations into the ambivalent homoprejudice scale. This chapter covers the exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of two large samples of British adults and details the latent factor structure of a pool of items derived from the prior theorising and qualitative analysis. These analyses lent further support to the central thesis that homoprejudice comprises four qualitatively different attitudinal tendencies and ruled out other possibly competing theoretical interpretations of these attitudes. Chapter Six further explores the psychometric properties of the ambivalent homoprejudice scale and demonstrates the scale’s promising convergent and discriminant validity relative to other measures of prejudice, ideologies associated with prejudice, and potentially confounding variables such as social desirability. Known-groups validity is also explored, with scale score comparisons made between genders, different levels of formal educational attainment, and sexual identities. Finally, test-retest reliability was measured to explore this scale’s temporal consistency.

Finally, Chapter Seven delineates the key findings, and theoretical and methodological implications of the thesis. Principally, this program of research offers a substantive and novel account of prejudice towards gay men, with a level of empirical support that is not present in other alternative theories and measures of multidimensional homoprejudice. Limitations are discussed, which frame some recommendations for further research such as the use of more ethnically diverse samples. Finally, other directions for future research are discussed, including the continual validation of the ambivalent homoprejudice scale, behavioural research to explore the links between ambivalent homoprejudice and current concepts in the attitudinal ambivalence literature, and further qualitative inquiry from alternative epistemic stances.
2. Chapter Two

Attitudes and Ambivalence

This chapter will offer an overview of the definitions, content, structure, and functions of attitudes and will introduce attitudinal ambivalence theory as a necessary critique of the assumptions that underpin attitudes. Later, the development of attitudinal ambivalence measurement will be discussed and its use in the research exploring the antecedents and characteristics of attitudinal ambivalence will be presented. The latter sections of this chapter will explore the proposed models of attitudinal ambivalence and consider the potential functions of ambivalence.

2.1 Attitudes and Related Constructs

Over eighty years ago, Allport (1935) notably described attitudes as “the most distinctive and indispensable concept in contemporary social psychology” (p. 798). However, different scholars have offered subtly different descriptions of attitudes, which, in some instances has led to conceptual overlap between ‘attitudes’ and the related constructs of ‘beliefs’, ‘values’, and ‘ideologies’. This can be observed in Rokeach’s (1968) definition of an attitude as “a relatively enduring organisation of beliefs around an object or situation predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner” (p. 112). Within the context of this definition, it is difficult to disentangle the constructs of ‘attitude’ and ‘belief’ beyond suggesting that the former is simply a plural of the latter. To address this, this thesis refers to Eagly and Chaiken’s (1993) widely-cited definition of an attitude as “a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favour or disfavour” (p. 1). In other words, an attitude is an evaluative appraisal of a particular target (e.g., is it good or bad?), unlike a belief, which is concerned with what one accepts to be true, valid, and credible about a target (Harvey, 1986). This theoretical distinction offers clarity when considering related concepts such as stereotypes, defined by Ashmore and Del Boca (1981) as “a set of beliefs about the personal attributes of a group of people” (p. 16). To illustrate,
one may subscribe to the stereotype that gay men are promiscuous (i.e., a belief), but this is relatively independent of whether one (dis)approves of promiscuity (i.e., an attitude).

Stereotypes are discernible from values - “beliefs about desirable or undesirable ways of behaving or about the desirability or otherwise of general goals” (Feather, 1996, p. 222) – because stereotypes pertain to concrete target groups. However, the definitions of attitudes discussed so far make vague reference to an evaluated ‘object’ or ‘entity’, which readily encompasses codes of conduct and shared goals. How, then, are values discernible from attitudes? As will be discussed in more detail later, values have similar content to attitudes; they comprise cognitive contents that recognise a ‘correct’ way of life, affective contents that are positive and negative feelings towards certain ways of life, and behavioural contents whereby individuals act in accordance with their values (Limthanakom, Lauffer, Mujtaba, & Murphy, 2011). Based on the aforementioned definition of a value (and those provided elsewhere), it is also generally agreed upon that a value involves a similar evaluative process to attitudes inasmuch as behaviours and end-states are evaluated positively (e.g., equality) and negatively (e.g., oppression).

However, as compared to an attitude, the ‘entity’ pertaining to a particular value appears to be relatively more nebulous. Whereas values are appraisals of the abstract – prescribed codes of conduct and end-states such as egalitarianism – attitudes are appraisals of the concrete such as people (e.g., individuals and groups), objects (e.g., products), and social realities (e.g., political issues). As will be covered in more detail in the next chapter, positive and negative values prime varying social attitudes (and vice versa), which can potentially lead to attitudinal and value conflict known as ambivalence (Katz & Hass, 1988; Hegarty, Pratto, & Lemieux, 2004).

### 2.2 Attitude Content

Attitudes are commonly argued to have multiple components contributing to an overall evaluative judgement of a particular target (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993): 1) affective information (how one feels about the target); 2) behavioural information (how one has previously behaved towards
the target) and; 3) cognitive information (how one thinks about the target). Altogether, this tripartite (also known as the ‘ABC’) model assumes that affective, behaviour, and cognition collectively produce a consistent summary judgement about a particular target.

Although these three components are suggested to interact substantially when evaluating a target, research has demonstrated that they are empirically distinct attitude components. Breckler (1984) presented 138 undergraduate participants with a live snake (i.e., a physical attitude object) and had them respond to statements tapping affective (e.g., “I feel tense”), behavioural (e.g., “I scream whenever I see snakes”), and cognitive (e.g., “Snakes are soft and smooth”) responses to snakes. Confirmatory factor analysis indicated that the three-factor model (i.e., ABC) demonstrated a superior goodness of fit than did the one-factor model (i.e., attitude as a global construct) and that the three factors were only moderately correlated, suggesting that affective, behavioural, and cognitive attitude components are qualitatively different yet related constructs.

More recent research has sought to elaborate and amend the ABC model of attitudes. Dalege et al. (2016) propose the causal attitude network (CAN) model, which posits that attitudes are networks of interacting evaluative reactions, including affect, behaviours, and cognitions. Individual reactions are graphically represented as nodes which interact with each other in two ways. Firstly, nodes can interact with each other in a causal manner between content categories; an individual may feel anxious around snakes because they believe that snakes are dangerous. Secondly, nodes interact with each other within content categories by clustering in ways that maintain evaluative consistency between related reactions; an individual who believes that snakes are dangerous may also believe, relatedly, that snakes look scary. This preference for attitudinal consistency is argued by Dalege et al. (2016) to be at odds with the preference for accuracy because entirely consistent attitudes are rarely accurate and vice versa. This is theorised to be dealt with through the strategic energy-conserving clustering of evaluatively (in)consistent reactions. Although an individual may believe that snakes are dangerous, they may also believe that snakes
are an important part of their ecosystems; in this instance, they form separate clusters of evaluative reactions but few connections are instantiated between the two (i.e., they activate independently), allowing for a network of evaluative reactions that is both consistent and accurate.

This assertion challenges the assumption transmitted in common definitions of attitudes that they are an overall favourable or unfavourable evaluation because there are many occasions where there can be evaluative conflict between components as well as within them. Contentious societal issues, enjoyable yet harmful behaviours, and polarising individuals are all examples of attitude targets that may elicit competing negative and positive evaluations. Lavine, Thomsen, Zanna and Borgida (1998) analysed the affective and cognitive evaluations of voters towards a number of American presidential candidates running between 1980 and 1992, as well as reported voting behaviour. Almost 17% of the 9,261 participants felt positively and thought negatively about a candidate (A+/C-) or vice versa (A-/C+). In both cases, affect was significantly more predictive of self-reported attitudes than was cognition and accounted for an average of 52% of the variance in overall attitudes as compared to cognition, which explained 19%. Affect was also significantly more predictive of voting behaviour than was cognition and accounted for 26% of the variance in voting behaviour as compared to cognition, which explained 4%. Thus, respondents in the former group held more positive views towards their respective candidates than those in the latter group, due to the relatively stronger influence of affective information. Comparatively, for those respondents who demonstrated no such attitude conflict (i.e., A+/C+ and A-/C-), affective and cognitive information exerted a roughly similar influence on overall candidate attitude and voting behaviour. Similar findings have been documented throughout the literature (Edwards, 1990; Fabrigar & Petty, 1999; Norton, Bogart, Cecil, & Pinkerton, 2005; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999) suggesting that the evaluative reactions in the affective content category are prioritised or weighted more heavily than those in the cognitive content category (i.e., the primacy of affect hypothesis; Zajonc, 1984).
Intra-component (e.g., affective-affective) conflict also challenges the assertion that attitudes are either positive or negative. Exposure to cultural diversity elicits such affective turmoil, prompting disconnection, fear, and anxiety as well as wonder, curiosity, and fascination (Van Leeuwen, 2008). Individuals also tend to endorse multiple core values that – because of their deeply entrenched importance and breadth (Sampson, 1999) – often result in polarised attitudes towards a range of attitude objects such as gay rights (Craig, Martinez, Kane & Gainous, 2005), ethnic minorities (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Katz & Hass, 1988), and political parties (Keele & Wolak, 2006). Given the complexity of attitude content, the assertion that attitudes are a bipolar positive or negative evaluation is unsustainable in light of the research evidence exposing the many areas where individuals simultaneously evaluate an object in positive and negative ways.

2.3 Attitude Structure

Conceptualising attitude structure as bipolar (or not) is of particular relevance to how attitudes are measured. Typically, attitudes are measured using unidimensional scales that assess – at one extreme – absolute subscription to the construct or – at the other extreme – absolute rejection of the construct. Unidimensionality is, thus, commonly seen as the gold standard in psychometrics (Segars, 1997). However, if attitude measurement tools seek to emulate a bipolar attitude structure then it is not immediately clear what attitude exists at a scale midpoint. In practice, scale midpoints are typically used to represent neutrality (i.e., ‘neither agree nor disagree’) but there are numerous other interpretations of this attitudinal position: uncertainty (i.e., inability to identify feelings about the object; Klopfer & Madden, 1980), indifference (i.e., minimal concern for the attitude object; DuBois & Burns, 1975), ignorance (i.e., unable to come to a determination due to lack of competence; DuBois & Burns, 1975), and ambivalence (i.e., oppositional positive and negative evaluations; Wegener, Downing, Krosnick, & Petty, 1995).

One study seeking to demarcate these concepts was conducted by Armstrong (1987) who distributed one of two versions of a survey assessing attitudes towards the school board to 579
students. Attitudes were measured on 5-point Likert scales ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree, however, the scale midpoint was expressed either as ‘undecided’ or ‘neutral’. No significant differences were found between the attitudes in the undecided group and the neutral group, either suggesting that both terms are equally preferable expressions of the same concept or that the terms are not semantically different enough (from a lay perspective) to elicit significantly different attitudinal responses.

Semantic differential scales, which ask participants to rate a stimulus at a single point between two opposing adjectives (e.g., positive – negative), have also been criticised for being insensitive to nuances at the scale midpoint. Kaplan (1972) found that splitting this measure at the midpoint and having participants make separate positive and negative evaluations allowed for a formula to differentiate indifference and ambivalence. Generally, ambivalence increased as a function of the magnitude of difference between positive and negative evaluations whereas indifference was characterised by minimal valence in any direction. Ignorance may also not be an adequate interpretation of attitude scale midpoints because, as discussed earlier, the accuracy of attitudes (that is, how well-grounded they are in objective fact) often comes at the cost of attitudinal consistency and vice versa (Dalege et al., 2016). In this instance, individuals who are not very knowledgeable about an object they are forming an attitude towards may simply engage in biased information processing so as not to disrupt the consistency of that attitude (Jonas, Diehl, & Brömer). Rather, ignorance may be tapped more effectively by non-response, ‘not applicable’ or ‘rather not answer’ response options, or participant feedback.

Finally, Klopfer and Madden (1980) provided definitions of ambivalence¹, neutrality, or uncertainty, or no definition at all to participants before having them respond to two attitude scales with a midpoint. It was found that those participants supplied with the definition for ambivalence

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¹ Ambivalence was defined to the participants as “sometimes you feel one way and sometimes you feel another”. An alternative definition will be offered later in this chapter.
made the most use of the scale midpoints whereas the uncertainty definition resulted in the least use of the scale midpoints, suggesting that ambivalence may be the most preferable interpretation of ostensibly ‘neutral’ responses and that ambivalent attitudes may be far more prevalent than neutral ones.

In attempting to reduce attitudes to a single evaluative point ranging from extremely positive to extremely negative, researchers have overlooked middlemost responses embodying multiple attitudinal positions. This oversight is illustrated particularly well when analysing evaluative space grids (ESG), which measures the intensity of people’s positive and negative attitudes on separate bipolar axes ranging from 1 (not at all positive/negative) to 4 (extremely positive/negative). Larsen, Norris, McGraw, Hawkley, and Cacioppo (2009) asked participants to list ten things they felt ambivalent about (e.g., Bill Clinton, capital punishment, and exercise) and had them respond to eight of these attitude objects in the ESG. Participants also responded to attitude objects deemed by the researchers to be universally positive (e.g., sunshine), universally negative (e.g., terrorism), and universally neutral (e.g., wallpaper). Although the neutral and ambivalent attitude object ratings were both close to 0 (0.67 and -0.06, respectively), implying that they may both constitute middlemost responses on traditional attitude measures, ambivalent attitude objects were rated more positively and more negatively than neutral attitude objects. As such, neutrality is an innocuous (tending towards slightly positive) attitude position, whereas ambivalence is a conflicted attitude position that, as will be explored later, can also be an aversive affective state.

In summary, typical measures of attitudes have allowed ambivalence to masquerade as neutrality and other related concepts because of the enforced bipolarity inherent in their scale construction. The evidence presented here suggests that researchers seeking to tap ambivalence using measurement scales can do so in one of two ways: 1) Using statistical methods, as has been
done with split semantic-differential scales and the ESG; or 2) Operationalising ambivalence by incorporating it into the content of scale items themselves.

2.4 Attitude Function

Attitudes have been argued to serve a number of important functions. Smith, Bruner, and White (1956) propose a tripartite model consisting of object-appraisal, social-adjustment, and externalisation. Attitudes’ object appraisal functions are important because they allow attitude objects to be appraised in positive and negative ways. This is advantageous because it predisposes individuals to seek out beneficial and pleasant attitude objects, while avoiding those that cause harm and discomfort. This is typically borne out in politics whenever self-interest informs political attitudes and voting behaviours (Sears & Funk, 1991).

Attitudes also fulfil social adjustment needs insofar that we identify with people that we have formed positive attitudes towards and disassociate with people that we have formed negative attitudes towards. This implicates both top-down and bottom-up processes; individuals form and join groups based on shared beliefs and attitudes – termed homophily (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001) – yet, equally, arbitrary group membership breeds positive in-group attitudes and negative out-group attitudes (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010). Finally, externalisation serves to defend oneself against internal conflict; Maio and Haddock (2009) refer to an example of an inept golfer developing a dislike of the game because their poor performance threatens their self-esteem. In so doing, the individual externalises their negative attitudes, resulting in more positive evaluations of the self.

Katz (1960) also proposed four functions of attitudes. The utilitarian function is similar to that of Smith et al.’s (1956) object appraisal function insofar that both emphasise how attitudes serve to classify ‘good’ attitudes objects that are pleasant and rewarding and ‘bad’ attitude objects that are unpleasant and detracting. Like Smith et al (1956), Katz (1960) proposes an ego-defensive function, similar to the externalisation function discussed earlier. Katz (1960) also proposed that
attitudes serve a knowledge function because they represent cogent and structured volumes of information about one’s surroundings. Finally, Katz (1960) argues that attitudes perform an important value-expressive function that allows individuals to express their core values and self-concept.

Fundamentally, these proposed attitudinal functions are all underpinned by the same assumption discussed in the previous section – that attitudes are positive or negative – because they are all undermined by attitudinal ambivalence. An ambivalent object appraisal of a potentially beneficial product, for instance, can elicit an approach-avoidance conflict that results in inaction rather than purchase (Penz & Hogg, 2011). Likewise, approach-avoidance conflicts prompted by ambivalence can also become a barrier to closeness (i.e., social adjustment) in intimate relationships (Mikulincer, Shaver, Bar-On, & Ein-Dor, 2010). Because ambivalent attitudes are not especially cogent, this also limits opportunities to engage in effective value expression (Petty, 2006). Finally, ambivalence can produce feelings of discomfort if it is made salient (Newby-Clark, McGregor, & Zanna, 2002), which is at odds with the externalising and ego-defensive functions that ostensibly work to mitigate against such internal conflict.

To summarise, the functions of attitudes proposed by the aforementioned scholars appear to be – more specifically – functions of univalent attitudes. Following a fuller discussion of the maladaptive effects of ambivalence in the next section, this thesis will consider the potential functions of attitudinal ambivalence with regards to empirical research findings.

2.5 The Hallmarks of Ambivalence

2.5.1 Discomfort

As previously alluded to, attitudinal ambivalence can be an uncomfortable and aversive experience. The discomfort brought about by ambivalent attitudes is known as subjective ambivalence (Newy-Clark et al., 2002). By comparison, potential ambivalence – ambivalence
derived mathematically from separate positive and negative univalent attitude measures (Newby-Clark et al., 2002) – often goes unnoticed. Although these constructs are measured in different ways (as will be discussed later) and correlations between the two suggest that they are relatively independent, potential ambivalence can develop into subjective ambivalence when one’s positive and negative attitudes are made equally salient. In one of a series of studies conducted by Newby-Clark et al. (2002), they demonstrated that potential and subjective ambivalence towards abortion initially correlated fairly weakly ($r = .39$). However, when the participants’ juxtapositional positive and negative attitudes were made simultaneously accessible, their scores on potential and subjective ambivalence indices became more strongly correlated ($r = .55$).

Because of this discomfort, ambivalent individuals are motivated to resolve their conflicted attitudinal positions. This may take the form of biased information processing. In one experimental study, Nordgren, van Harreveld, and van der Pligt (2006) induced ambivalence by presenting participants with an article detailing the pros and cons of genetically modified food and recorded the attitudes using a measure of attitudes towards genetically modified food. After this, the participants were assigned randomly to either: 1) A thought listing condition whereby the participants listed their thoughts on genetically modified food, offering ample opportunity to engage in biased information processing and reduce their ambivalence; 2) The waiting condition whereby the participants waited 3 minutes for the next part of the study, offering moderate opportunity to engage in biased information processing; or 3) The cognitive load condition whereby the participants completed a series of difficult anagrams, offering no opportunity to engage in biased information processing. Following this experimental manipulation, the participants completed the attitudes towards genetically modified food questionnaire again. The results showed that the participants in the thought listing condition showed a significant decrease in self-reported ambivalence between initial and subsequent measurement. By comparison, those participants in the waiting condition reported marginally less ambivalence between initial and
subsequent measurement, and those participants in the cognitive load condition showed no significant difference.

Ambivalence reduction could also take the form of response amplification, whereby either the positive or negative evaluation of the attitude object is exaggerated in order to mask ambivalence. Carver, Gibbons, Stephan, Glass, and Katz (1979) demonstrate this phenomenon in a study where participants are exposed to conflicting opinions about Mexican-Americans and then, subsequently, given a transcript of an interview with a member of that group portraying them either positively or negatively. When ambivalence was induced, the participants gave significantly more polarised ratings of the interviewee as compared to those participants who were not exposed to the ambivalence-inducing stimulus. Subsequent studies have replicated these findings with regards to Native Canadians (Bell & Esses, 2002), disabled people (Gibbons, Stephan, Stephenson, & Petty, 1980), and gay men (Bromgard & Stephan, 2006). This latter study involved inviting heterosexual men² to interact with a confederate who was either presented as gay (stigmatised condition) or presumably heterosexual (non-stigmatised condition) in a short personality profile provided to the participants before meeting the discussion partner. The experimenter explained that the interaction would involve either a discussion about dating (high-threat) or about favourite movies (low-threat) and informally asked the participants to “grab an extra chair” to take a seat near the confederate. Before the discussion could begin, the experimenter then asked the participant to return to a private cubicle to complete a measure of subjective ambivalence, ostensibly because they forgot to do this earlier. In actuality, the distance between the confederate’s and the participants’ chair was measured, serving as a measure of latent (dis)comfort towards the confederate. The results showed that the participants felt significantly more ambivalent when anticipating an interaction with the gay confederate than with the heterosexual confederate.

² Because asking the sexuality of participants may have revealed the covert aims of the study, this information was not sought from the participants. The authors acknowledge that a small proportion of the participants may have been gay men, though they contend that this would not have drastically affected the results given the size of this demographic.
However, in the low-threat condition, participants placed their chair significantly closer to the gay confederate than to the heterosexual confederate. Inversely, in the high-threat condition, participants placed their chair significantly further away from the gay confederate than from the heterosexual confederate. By comparison, there was no significant difference between seating distance in the low- and high-threat interactions with the heterosexual confederate. In other words, subjective ambivalence towards gay men was allayed by way of response amplification; comfort was amplified in the low-threat condition and discomfort was amplified in the high-threat condition whereas no such amplification occurred when the target did not induce ambivalence.

van Harreveld, van der Pligt, and de Liver (2009) elaborate on these strategies further in their model of ambivalence-induced discomfort (MAID). Subjective ambivalence is argued to be prompted by dichotomous decision-making, which makes salient one’s underlying potential ambivalence. This tension is augmented by the outcomes of such a decision being ambiguous or uncertain – but typically anticipated to be negative (i.e., the personal fear of invalidity; Kruglanski, 1990). When the choice is not required imminently, ambivalence can be reduced quickly and relatively effortlessly via procrastination (Day, Mensink, & O’Sullivan, 2000). If the choice is time-limited, another strategy to reduce ambivalence is to deny responsibility (e.g., emphasise external pressures), making the outcomes of a potentially wrong decision less attributable to the self (i.e., externalising; Smith et al., 1956). However, if one’s responsibility for the decision cannot be refuted then an ambivalent individual must engage in more cognitively-effortful strategies in order to reduce their discomfort. Ideally, one will make the most ideal choice by carefully and systematically evaluating the available information because this reduces the risk of invalidation. However, if these cognitive resources are not available – either through strict time limitations or cognitive deficit – then less effortful strategies such as biased information processing (Nordgren et al, 2006) and heuristics, such as stereotyping, will be utilised instead.
Overall, there are two broad strategies used to reduce the unpleasant feeling of ambivalence: either distancing oneself from the ambivalence-inducing object or resolving it with varying degrees of thoroughness (Penz & Hogg, 2011). The former distancing strategy has been – rather literally – demonstrated to be associated with ambivalence towards contact with a gay man in the aforementioned study conducted by (Bromgard & Stephan, 2006). However, the latter strategy has not yet been associated with ambivalence towards gay men.

2.5.2 Temporal Instability

As compared to univalent attitudes, ambivalent attitudes are thought to be less stable over time, because they are highly context-dependent (Eagly & Chaiken, 1995). For example, if one has a friend who is witty, fun, unreliable, and feckless, that person’s attitude towards their friend may change depending on the context in which the evaluation is occurring; at a party, that friend’s positive qualities will be made salient whereas, at work, that friends negative qualities will be made salient.

There have been conflicting findings in support of ambivalent attitudes being less stable over time. Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, and Pratto (1992) found a negative correlation between a measure of potential ambivalence and response consistency across two time points, suggesting that less ambivalent attitudes demonstrate greater temporal stability. Also using a measure of potential ambivalence, Lavine (2001) found ambivalent attitudes towards presidential candidates were unstable over time as compared to univalent attitudes. Yet, Armitage and Conner (2000) found no such instability among ambivalent participants (as indicated by a measure of potential ambivalence) despite measuring over an eight-month time period. Such inconsistent findings may be because potential ambivalence does not evoke discomfort and, thus, does not reliably motivate attitudinal change.

The temporal stability of ambivalent attitudes may be better investigated using a measure of subjective ambivalence (i.e., a meta-attitudinal measure). However, Basilli (1996) criticises such
measures on the basis of their poor predictive validity and dependence upon the respondent being consciously aware of their own ambivalent attitudes. This is not an unresolvable problem assuming that potential ambivalence leads to subjective ambivalence; in which case, making a respondent’s potential ambivalence accessible would make subjective ambivalence more salient and, perhaps, a better predictor of temporal instability. However, to date, no such research has been conducted and the relationship between attitudinal ambivalence and temporal inconsistency remains unclear.

2.5.3 Attitude Pliability

Ambivalent attitudes are also argued to be more pliable in the face of persuasive communication, because the integration of such communication grounds pre-existing attitude structures in further knowledge. Armitage and Conner (2000) demonstrate such attitudinal pliancy with regards to ambivalence towards healthy eating. Participants’ ambivalence towards healthy food was measured at baseline and the participants were then randomly assigned to an intervention or control group five months later. While the low-ambivalence participants in the intervention condition did not change their attitudes towards healthy eating as compared to the low-ambivalence participants in the control group, the high-ambivalence participants endorsed significantly more positive attitudes towards healthy eating post-intervention. Furthermore, highly ambivalent individuals are more likely to be influenced by an unreliable communicative source than are univalent individuals (Zemborain & Johar, 2007).

Such pliability has also been demonstrated using priming studies. In a study exploring White Americans’ attitudes towards Black people, Katz and Hass (1988) constructed four scales; two scales tapped positive and negative attitudes towards Black people, and the other two tapped core American values associated with positive and negative racial attitudes, respectively: 1) Egalitarianism, emphasising equality, social justice, and altruism; and 2) The Protestant ethic, emphasising devotion to work, meritocracy, and discipline. The authors found that the participants’ attitudes could be manipulated by having them fill out one of the core value
questionnaires beforehand; those participants who filled out the egalitarianism questionnaire first evidenced more positive attitudes towards Black people, whereas those who filled out the Protestant work ethic questionnaire first evidenced more negative attitudes towards Black people. Likewise, the inverse was also true and exposure to pro- and anti-black attitude scales resulted in increased endorsement of egalitarianism and the Protestant work ethic, respectively. By strategically presenting the attitude scales in a particular order, Katz and Hass (1988) were able to subtly present persuasive communication to the participants and manipulate their attitudes – for better and for worse.

The pliability of ambivalent attitudes has also been found to be moderated by culture. In a cross-cultural study of attitudinal ambivalence, Ng, Hynie, and MacDonald (2012) were able to manipulate European Canadians’ ambivalent attitudes in both positive and negative directions. However, the persuasive messages exposed to the East Asian Canadians were ineffective in changing their ambivalent positions. The authors concluded that East Asian cultures may not engender such an aversion to attitude inconsistency in its citizens as do Western cultures and, as a result of this, Westerners may be more inclined to resolve evaluative inconsistencies whereas East Asians will be more likely to demonstrate chronic attitudinal ambivalence. Ng et al. (2012) propose that this is linked to cultural differences in peoples’ preference for consistency; this and other personality traits that predict ambivalence will be discussed later in this chapter.

2.5.4 Attitude-Intention-Behaviour Relationships

The theory of planned behaviour (TPB; Ajzen, 1991) posits that three factors lead to behavioural intention and, ultimately, behaviour: 1) Perceived behavioural control, concerning the feasibility of the behaviour; 2) Subjective norms, concerning how the behaviour would be judged by significant others, such as friends and family; and 3) Attitudes, the extent to which one evaluates the behaviour in a positive or negative way. Of principle interest is the latter facet, attitudes, which
are typically found to have a strong link to subsequent attitude-relevant behaviour (Glasman & Albarracin, 2006).

However, attitudinal ambivalence has been found to be less predictive of behaviour than are univalent attitudes. In their first of a series of studies, Armitage and Conner (2000) distributed questionnaires at three time points. At time one, participants filled out a questionnaire measuring their attitudes towards eating a low-fat diet. At time two – five months later – the same participants filled out a questionnaire measuring their behavioural intention to eat a low-fat diet. Finally, at time three – a further three months later – participants filled out a questionnaire measuring their healthy-eating behaviours in the last three months. Structural equation modelling and separate groups analysis was used to compare the relationship between attitude, intention, and subsequent behaviour between ambivalent and non-ambivalent participants. Among those participants who were less ambivalent, actioned healthy eating was only partially mediated by intention to eat healthy food. However, among highly ambivalent participants, behavioural intention fully mediated the relationship between attitude and behaviour. Furthermore, the relationship between attitude and behavioural intention was weaker among ambivalent participants than among univalent participants. These findings were also replicated by Conner et al. (2002), altogether suggesting that attitudinal ambivalence is less predictive of behaviour.

Lavine et al (1998) explore the diminished relationship between ambivalence and behaviour further by separately examining conflicting affective and cognitive attitude contents. Using data from national election surveys, the authors identified voters who displayed ambivalent attitudes inasmuch as their affective and cognitive evaluations of a presidential candidate differed in valence. Whereas univalent respondents’ affective and cognitive evaluations correlated equally strongly with their overall attitudes to, for instance, Bill Clinton in the 1992 presidential election (affective $r = .81$, cognitive $r = .79$), affect was more strongly related to overall attitudes towards
Bill Clinton among ambivalent respondents, as compared to cognition (affective $r = .47$, cognitive $r = .08$).

In light of these findings, Conner, Povey, Sparks, James, and Shepherd (2003) proposed that attitudinal ambivalence moderated the relationship among the TPB facets. They measured participants’ subjective norms about, perceived behavioural control over, and attitudes towards healthy eating and calculated potential ambivalence from the latter measure. The correlational findings indicated that high levels of attitudinal ambivalence weakened the relationship between attitude and behaviour and between perceived behavioural control and behaviour. The authors concluded that stronger attitudes (i.e., less ambivalent attitudes) would lead to a greater perception of behavioural control and, as a result, a stronger relationship between attitude and behaviour. On the other hand, ambivalent attitudes undermine the congruency between perceived and actual behavioural control, resulting in a weaker relationship between attitudes and behaviour.

Overall, attitudinal ambivalence appears to undermine many of the presumed functions of attitudes and seems to be, on the face of it, rather maladaptive and inefficient. If ambivalence manifests on an intergroup level between two groups with asymmetric power (e.g., between heterosexuals and gay men), then empirical evidence points towards a number of potential symptoms of this ambivalence. Such individuals may exhibit exaggerated and amplified attitudes towards gay men in line with the ambivalence-amplification hypothesis (i.e., response amplification) or engage in evaluations that vacillate over time. These attitudes would also be less predictive of behaviours towards gay men; ambivalent individuals may be less inclined to cause harm to gay men, but also less inclined to advocate for them. The next section will consider the possible functions of ambivalence and will further explore how they relate to intergroup relations between heterosexuals and gay men.
2.6 Functions of Ambivalence

Despite the many disadvantages to attitudinal ambivalence, some academics have explored the possible utility in endorsing ambivalent attitudes. In a series of experiments, Pillaud, Cavazza, and Butera (2013) demonstrated that attitudinal ambivalence towards controversial attitude objects may serve protective self-presentational functions. Participants were instructed to respond to a questionnaire on their attitudes towards genetically modified organisms (GMOs). After this, they were instructed to answer the questionnaire in a way that would make them be judged in a more positive way by a teacher (the self-enhancement condition) and then answer the questionnaire in a way that would make them be judged in a more negative way by a teacher (the self-depreciation condition). In the first study, scores on a measure of subjective ambivalence were compared between these three groups, and the analysis found that subjective ambivalence was higher in the standard and self-enhancement conditions than in the self-depreciation condition. This trend was also replicated when comparing potential cognitive and affective ambivalence between the two conditions.

Inverse results were found when participants responded to a questionnaire measuring attitudes towards tooth-brushing – a truism that most people agree upon as being a positive thing. When comparing subjective ambivalence across the three conditions, the self-depreciation condition showed significantly higher levels of subjective ambivalence than did the standard and self-enhancement conditions. Just like attitudinal ambivalence towards contentious attitude object facilitates more positive evaluations by others, less ambivalent attitudes towards unambiguously positive attitude objects also facilitate such positive evaluations by others. This was further demonstrated in their final study, where the perceived controversial nature of GMOs was manipulated by the researchers. In the uncontroversial condition, participants were shown a graph suggesting that 89% of the Swiss population were against GMOs and 11% were for them whereas, in the controversial condition, participants were shown a graph suggesting that the Swiss
population were divided on the issue with 51% being against GMOs and 49% being for it. Using the same procedure, the results showed that when the issue of GMOs was rendered uncontroversial, lower levels of potential ambivalence were present in the standard and self-enhancement conditions as compared to the self-depreciation condition. Inversely, when GMOs were presented as a controversial attitude object, higher levels of potential ambivalence were exhibited in the standard and self-enhancement conditions as compared to the self-depreciation condition. Thus, when judging controversial situations, ambivalent individuals may be more readily perceived by others as impartial and knowledgeable on the issue (Maio & Haddock, 2004).

Similarly, Cavazza and Butera (2008) argue that attitudinal ambivalence may also serve adaptive functions that allow ambivalent individuals to resist some forms of persuasive communication when it is important for self-presentation to in-group members. The researchers separately measured direct (e.g., ‘Traffic-restrictive policies are useful to reduce pollution levels in cities’) and indirect (e.g., ‘Using diesel oil should be forbidden because of its polluting effects’) attitudes, and potential ambivalence towards traffic restrictions as a means of reducing pollution and then exposed participants to fictitious survey data suggesting that the in-group majority agreed that traffic restrictions were unrelated to pollution. Participants then indicated their direct and indirect attitudes towards traffic restrictions once more. In line with much of the research findings presented in this chapter, those high in attitudinal ambivalence changed their direct attitudes towards traffic restrictions more than did the participants evidencing low levels of ambivalence. However, ambivalent individuals exhibited significantly less attitude change on the indirect measures than did the non-ambivalent participants. This was theorised to be because of normative conflict (Mugny, Butera, Sanchez-Mazas, & Pérez, 1995); when non-ambivalent individuals disagree with an in-group majority, direct attitude change is not observed because of the desire for attitudinal consistency – by comparison, ambivalent individuals readily adapt to such a scenario. However, desire to maintain similarity with the in-group motivates non-ambivalent individuals to change their attitudes at the indirect level, whereas ambivalent individuals have already adapted at
the direct level and, therefore, have no need to adjust their attitude at the indirect level to attain consistency with the in-group.

In the second of Cavazza and Butera’s (2008) studies, they also measured self-monitoring orientation – the “individual difference in the extent to which individuals can and do monitor their self-presentation, expressive behaviour, and nonverbal affective displays’ (Snyder, 1974, pp. 526-527) – and found the same pattern of results among those high in self-monitoring orientation but not for those low in self-monitoring evaluation, suggesting that the observed attitude changes did serve strategic self-presentational purposes.

Finally, Reich and Wheeler (2016) argue that attitudinal ambivalence can be desirable because it allows individuals to hedge their emotional reactions when they are unable to obtain a desired outcome. The first of the researchers’ series of studies asked graduands to rate the most desired job that they had recently been interviewed for on a split semantic-differential scale and indicate how likely they thought it was that they would get the job. Once the graduands found out whether or not they had gotten the job, they indicated on a survey how good they felt about themselves, given the outcome of the job application. The results showed that as goal-uncertainty increased (i.e., when the probability of getting the job was closest to 50%), potential ambivalence towards the job also increased, whereas ambivalence decreased as goal-uncertainty decreased (i.e., when the probability of getting the job was closest to 0% or 100%). Furthermore, when the graduand was not accepted for the job, those who were highly ambivalent about the position evaluated themselves more positively than those who were not ambivalent towards the job. However, the authors showed that such a strategy is a double-edged sword because, of the graduands who did obtain their ideal job, those who were highly-ambivalent about the position evaluated themselves less positively than did those who were less ambivalent about their ideal job. These findings were also replicated in their second study where goal-certainty was experimentally manipulated by the researchers.
Reich and Wheeler’s (2016) fourth study also demonstrated that individuals actively seek ambivalent options when self-threat is high. Participants were instructed to imagine themselves as a hard-working employee at a company announcing that they would be sending one employee on a subsidised holiday. In the high-threat condition, the participants were told that it was between them and another hard-working employee and that it was a roughly 50% chance they would receive the holiday. In the low-threat condition, the participants were told that the prize draw would be random but that only two people worked at the company, meaning that the desired outcome was equally uncertain but less threatening. After this exercise, participants were invited to read one of three reviews of the resort they could be staying at; two univalent reviews (positive or negative) and one ambivalent review (positive and negative). Analysis revealed that the participants were significantly more likely to choose the ambivalent review when self-threat was high, suggesting that attitudinal ambivalence is indeed a buffer against negative self-evaluations and that such a buffer is actively sought out when goal-uncertainty and self-threat is high.

Extrapolating the aforementioned research findings to ambivalence towards gay men highlights a possible advantage to such an attitudinal position. Ambivalence toward gay men (or, at least, presenting oneself as ambivalent towards gay men) may serve to protect individuals from censure by others. This utility is outlined in the justification-suppression model (JSM; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) – because of external pressures that sanction prejudice (e.g., the United Kingdom’s hate speech legislation, which threatens those who disseminate hate speech with fines), individuals who are anti-gay are compelled to misrepresent their attitudes as more positive than they actually are (i.e., suppression ambivalence). By presenting one’s attitudes as ambivalent, an individual evades censure from others while retaining vestiges of their genuine prejudice, which can be strategically expressed using various non-prejudicial justifications (i.e., equilibrium ambivalence).
2.7 Antecedents of Ambivalence

Attitudinal ambivalence has also been linked to a number of related psychological constructs. One such construct is the need for cognition (NFC), defined by Cohen, Stotland, and Wolfe (1955) as the “need to understand and make reasonable the experiential world” (p. 291). Those with a high NFC tend to be more tentative rather than dogmatic (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), engage in more careful information processing (Cacioppo, Petty, & Morrison, 1983), be less susceptible to heuristics such as the halo effect (Haugtvedt, Petty, & Cacioppo, 1992), and seek out cognitively-effortful tasks (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). Research evidence suggests that a greater NFC is related to less ambivalent attitudes. Thompson & Zanna (1995) measured participants’ NFC and their attitudes towards a range of contentious, ambivalence-inducing issues such as the legalisation of euthanasia. It was found that, as compared to high-NFC participants, those with a low NFC held more ambivalent attitudes. This relationship was argued to exist because those with a high NFC dislike ambiguity and incoherence and, thus, seek out information in order to resolve the ambiguity associated with attitudinal ambivalence. As such, a low NFC does not necessarily cause greater levels of ambivalence but, rather, it inhibits the ability and motivation to engage in the information processing necessary to reduce ambivalence.

A second personality construct related to attitudinal ambivalence is the personal fear of invalidity (PFI) – the desire to avoid mistakes that would have negative consequences or result in negative judgements being made about oneself (Kruglanski, 1990). In the context of lay epistemic theory, PFI represents the ‘unfreezing’ of previously fixed inferences because it motivates individuals to consider alternative lay hypotheses (Kruglanski, 1990). Those demonstrating a greater PFI are less likely to engage in ethnic stereotyping (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983), feel less confident about their judgements (Mayseless & Kruglanski, 1987), and are more comfortable with ambiguity than those with a low PFI (Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002). In contrast to NFC, Thompson and Zanna (1995) found that those participants with a high PFI demonstrated greater attitudinal
ambivalence towards the contentious political issues presented to them than did those with a low PFI. This is because individuals who demonstrate a high PFI associate cognitive closure with a greater risk of making erroneous judgements and attempt to maintain ambiguous and, therefore, versatile attitudinal positions in order to reduce this risk.

Both of these personality traits are potentiated by one’s personal involvement with the attitude object – that is, the extent to which an individual “care[s] about that entity or perceive[s] it as being important” (Hänze, 2001). Thompson and Zanna (1995) found that those with low NFC and high personal involvement were most ambivalent towards the political issues they were presented with. Likewise, they found that those with a high PFI and high personal involvement also demonstrated high levels of attitudinal ambivalence. Importantly, this highlights the conceptual distinction between ambivalence and indifference and a greater need to delineate these concepts as they manifest at measurement scale midpoints (Kaplan, 1972).

Preference for consistency (PFC) – the desire to respond consistently to stimuli, to appear consistent to others, and that others be consistent in their responses (Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995) – has also been linked to attitudinal ambivalence. Using a scale specifically designed to measure PFC, Cialdini et al (1995) found that those high in PFC made more attempts to reduce attitudinal ambivalence, likely because these individuals find attitudinal ambivalence especially uncomfortable – particularly when it is made salient (Newby-Clark et al., 2002).

Research has shown that these constructs mediate the relationship between religious fundamentalism and homophobia, modern racism, benevolent sexism, and hostile sexism (E. Hill, Terrell, Cohen, & Nagoshi, 2010), but the limitations of this research are threefold. Firstly, the measure of anti-gay prejudice used, the homophobia scale (Wright, Adams, & Bernat, 1999), measures a brand of prejudice that appears to be falling out of favour in the West (Twenge, Sherman, & Wells, 2016) and, thus, may not reflect the diversity of heterosexuals’ modern attitudes towards nonheterosexuals. Secondly, no measure of positive attitudes towards gay men was
included, limiting the researchers’ ability to explore how these constructs relate to ambivalence towards gay men. Finally, the research focussed on how religious fundamentalism relates to particular cognitive styles and was not principally concerned with how these cognitive styles relate to ambivalent prejudice or, indeed, attitudes as a whole. The utility of research such as this would be improved if there was a measure capable of tapping attitudinal ambivalence towards gay men, as researchers would be more able to explore how such ambivalence relates to particular cognitive styles.

2.8 Models of Ambivalence

Various models aiming to elucidate attitudinal ambivalence have been proposed. The earliest substantial attempt was made by Priester and Petty (1996), who proposed the gradual threshold model (GTM) of ambivalence. This model is operationalised using split semantic-differential scales and attempts to demonstrate how potential ambivalence transitions into subjective ambivalence. Priester and Petty (1996) argue that dominant (i.e., the stronger of the two evaluative tendencies) and conflicting (i.e., the weaker of the two evaluative tendencies) attitudes differentially predict subjective ambivalence depending on whether one’s conflicting attitudes are above the given threshold of 1. For instance, when an individual rates their positive attitudes as 4 (dominant) and their negative attitudes as 1 (conflicting), high levels of subjective ambivalence are equally well-predicted by greater numbers of conflicting attitudes and fewer numbers of dominant attitudes. However, when an individual’s conflicting attitudes are rated higher than 1, fewer numbers of dominant attitudes no longer reliably predict subjective ambivalence. Higher numbers of conflicting evaluations remain indicative of greater feelings of subjective ambivalence because their additivity in relation to dominant evaluations makes one’s attitude conflict increasingly salient.

A number of problems with the ambivalence index proposed by the GTM exist. Firstly, it is highly sensitive to the number of category options available. For instance, Priester and Petty (1996) used 11-point scales ranging from 0 (no negative/positive thoughts or feelings) to 10
maximum negative/positive thoughts or feelings) and, on this basis, settles upon a threshold of 1. However, the predictive validity of this threshold would most certainly be diminished if, for example, a 100-point scale was used because conflicting evaluations would more easily cross that threshold. Use of the GTM is also limited to split semantic-differential scales, which have steadily fallen out of vogue in the study of ambivalence in favour of Likert scales.

More recently, Petty, Tormala, Briñol, and Jarvis (2006) proposed the past attitudes are still there (PAST) model, which argues that attitudinal change can prompt implicit attitudinal ambivalence whereby a previously-held attitude continues to exert an unconscious evaluative force, despite being consciously rejected. To test this, Petty et al. (2006) induced either a positive or negative attitude towards two characters, Eddie and Phil, by using a classical conditioning paradigm whereby images of the men were paired with either positive images (e.g., puppies) or negative images (e.g., mutilated bodies). Later, (dis)similarity with the two characters were induced by presenting survey responses to a range of social issues alongside pictures of Eddie and Phil that were either congruent or incongruent with the participants’ beliefs. Finally, participants explicit (i.e., self-report) and implicit (i.e., latency between exposure to (in)congruent combinations of stimuli and response) attitudes towards the actors were measured.

The findings from the explicit attitude measures suggested that the participants’ attitudes changed in response to the information most recently presented to them. Similar actors were rated more positively and the magnitude of this change was biggest when a negative attitude was initially conditioned. Inversely, dissimilar actors were rated more negatively and the magnitude of this change was biggest when a positive attitude was initially conditioned. However, results from the implicit attitudinal measure showed that those participants who received congruent information about the actors (i.e., the no attitude change condition) held either positive or negative attitudes towards the actors, whereas those who received incongruent information about the actors (i.e., the attitude change condition) exhibited attitudes close to the midpoint, suggesting that the previously
challenged attitude was implicitly exerting influence over the participants’ subsequent attitudes, but not exerting such a force explicitly. In later studies, Petty and colleagues (2006) also demonstrated that induced attitude change led the participants to feel less confident about their evaluations on an implicit attitude measure (which has been further demonstrated to be embodied as greater mouse cursor ‘pull’ towards unchosen evaluative options; Schneider et al., 2015) and led to greater attitude-relevant information processing (which has also been implicated in ambivalence in Nordgren et al., 2006).

Finally, Song and Ewoldson (2015) proposed the metacognitive model of ambivalence, building on the metacognitive model of attitudes (Petty, 2006; Petty, Briñol, & DeMarree, 2007). Together, these models outline the process of attitude endorsement; attitude objects have various evaluative facets – in other words, they are information-rich – and this information can be evaluated in either positive or negative ways. Healthy eating, for example, can be evaluated positively because of its health benefits but also negatively because of the perceived bland taste of healthy foods. Metacognition (i.e., thinking about one’s thought processes) then allows validity tags (e.g., ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘uncertain’) to be attached to these various evaluative components to assess the strength of their representation in the overall attitudinal evaluation. Thus, when individuals are certain of both positive and negative evaluations of the attitude object, a state of ambivalence is experienced.

Song and Ewoldson (2015) elaborate on this, integrating much of the aforementioned experimental findings into their theory. They propose that evaluative facets of an object each have varying degrees of accessibility and this accessibility is highly context-dependent. Accessibility of certain facets can be moderated by the validity tags attached to other facets; if both a positive and negative facet are tagged as ‘true’ (e.g., an individual being certain that eating healthily is both good for them and that healthy food is bland) then this necessitates the individual accessing additional evaluative facets (e.g., that eating healthily is expensive) in order to provide a clearer evaluation of
the object. Likewise, other evaluative facets can be primed unconsciously, as has been done in many of the aforementioned studies that have induced attitudinal ambivalence in its participants. Conversely, metacognitions are conscious and deliberative and require careful processing in order to be retrieved. As such, by sowing doubt in an individual’s metacognitions about the evaluative facets of an attitude object through exposure to high- and low-credibility arguments, ambivalence can be induced by presenting equally credible positive and negative evaluations, and decreased by discrediting either the positive or the negative evaluation (DeMarree, Briñol, & Petty, 2015).

2.9 Measuring Ambivalence

Because of the prevailing assumption that attitudes adhere to evaluative unidimensionality, attitude measurement has typically enforced this by way of bipolar rating scales such as Likert scales, which require respondents to situate their attitude with one descriptor ranging from strongly positive to strongly negative (Likert, 1932). Similarly, semantic differential scales also impose similar restrictions because they also require respondents to situate their attitude at one point between juxtaposing adjectives (e.g., grumpy-cheerful; Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957). Thurstone scales are also constructed in such a way that each item is ‘tuned’ to tap a particular attitude valence and intensity (Thurstone & Chave, 1929), but such items are typically tuned to measure either positive or negative attitudes.

Kaplan (1972), noting the complexities of unidimensional scale midpoints, offered a correction to the semantic differential technique that facilitated the measurement of ambivalence, as well as additional otherwise neutral-presenting attitudinal positions, such as indifference. By splitting the semantic differential rather than treating them as oppositional and, thus, mutually exclusive, Kaplan (1972) demonstrates how one is able to measure both positive (e.g., cheerful) and negative (e.g., grumpy) evaluations separately and how these interact to form overall ambivalent, neutral, and indifferent evaluations.
Multiple formulaic representations of attitudinal ambivalence have also been proposed. Kaplan (1972) suggests that ambivalence is the difference between total affect (i.e., both the stronger and weaker valences added together) and attitude polarity (i.e., the difference between the stronger and weaker valences). However, Breckler (1994) demonstrates that this index can be simplified as twice the weaker attitude intensity, or $2 \times A_w$, which is undesirable because this means that the index is insensitive to changes in the stronger attitudinal position ($A_s$). Scott (1969) also proposes an ambivalence index equal to $2 \times A_w + 1$ divided by $A_w + A_s + 2$, and Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey, and Eisenstadt (1991) propose, more simply, that ambivalence is equal to $A_w \times A_s$. However, Breckler (1994) highlights problems with both of these in that the former is insensitive to varying intensities of ambivalence and the latter misrepresents univalence as ambivalence. Breckler (1994) argues that two indices fulfil the three requirements that: 1) Ambivalence should increase when $A_s$ is held constant and $A_w$ is increased and be at its strongest when $A_s = A_w$; 2) Ambivalence should decrease when $A_w$ is held constant and $A_s$ is increased, and be at its lowest when $A_s$ reaches its highest value; and 3) When $A_w = A_s$, ambivalence should increase as these ratings increase. The first ambivalence index that meets these three requirements is proposed by Scott (1966) who conceptualise ambivalence as the ratio of $A_w^2$ to $A_s$. The second is proposed by Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin (2014) who conceptualise it similarly to Kaplan (1972) but rather than computing total affect as $A_s + A_w$, they compute it as the mean of $A_s$ and $A_w$ instead. Both formulae are also desirable because one can discern between indifference (which result in lower index scores) and ambivalent attitudes (which result in higher index scores).

These indices are used as measures of potential ambivalence, which individuals are not consciously aware of (McGregor, Newby-Clark, & Zanna, 1999). Armitage and Conner (2002), for example, asked participants “Considering only the positive things about eating a low-fat diet in the future and ignoring the negative things, how positive are those things?” (p. 1423) and an equivalent question substituting “negative” where appropriate. Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin (2014) anecdotally report that participants do not find this task particularly challenging, and Kaplan’s
(1972) findings suggest that the algebraic difference between these separate evaluations correlates strongly with ratings on standard semantic differential scales (between $r_s = .89$ and .97). The drawback to questioning such as this, however, is that they give us limited access to the content of such attitudes. If similar questions pertaining to gay men were asked to participants, the scores would give no insight into how the participant is evaluating gay men in positive and negative ways because they only provide an indication of how intense those evaluations are. One potential way to address this would be to construct a Likert measure of positive and negative attitudes towards gay men to be used in tandem and then computing the chosen ambivalence index from mean scores on those measures. In so doing, we gain a summative measure of attitude intensity that can be used to compute ambivalence while also gaining access to the qualitative content of those attitudes.

Other approaches to measuring ambivalence have involved, simply, asking respondents the extent to which they feel ambivalent, tapping into the construct of subjective ambivalence. This is measured with items such as ‘How conflicted do you feel about X?’ with response scales ranging from ‘Not conflicted at all’ to ‘Completely torn’. Research findings suggest that potential and subjective ambivalence are relatively independent constructs since they demonstrate weak (Priester, & Petty, 1996) to moderate positive correlations (Costarelli & Colloca, 2004). However, as before, these measures only provide insight into the intensity of ambivalence and provide no insight into its content. As also mentioned earlier in this chapter, subjective ambivalence can only be accessed in this way if a respondent is aware of their ambivalent attitudes (Basilli, 1996). As such, the suggested Likert measure of potential ambivalence may be the most preferable way of accessing attitudinal ambivalence, with its principal drawback being the great deal of work that would need to go into its development and psychometric validation.
2.10 Conclusion

This chapter has established that attitudes are traditionally thought to comprise – largely independent – affective, behavioural, and cognitive contents, that attitudes are generally presumed to be either positive or negative, and that attitudes serve important intra- and inter-personal functions. However, attitudinal ambivalence complicates this theorising because there are a range of attitude objects that individuals endorse both positive and negative attitudes towards. Ambivalent attitudes also appear to undermine the proposed functions of attitudes, which may be an artefact of scholars conceptualising the functions of attitudes with univalence – and not ambivalence – in mind. Recent research attempting to explicate the adaptive advantages of attitudinal ambivalence has demonstrated a range of functional advantages of ambivalence over univalence, documenting that it is a desirable attitudinal position when attempting to present oneself in a favourable way to others, when trying to resist persuasive communication, and when trying to protect one’s positive self-evaluation when goal-uncertainty and self-threat is high. The standard measurement of attitudes also appears to be insensitive to ambivalent attitudes, necessitating the development of new and innovative measures. The next chapter will continue these lines of inquiry and further explore the role attitudinal ambivalence plays in prejudice.
3. Chapter Three

Prejudice and Ambivalence

The previous chapter asserted that ambivalence can be useful inasmuch as it preserves positive self-presentation and self-evaluation, and briefly explored how these are particularly useful to individuals who endorse prejudicial attitudes within the context of the JSM (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). This chapter will explore this further and begins with an examination of Allport’s (1954) influential conceptualisation of prejudice and an overview of the main critiques of this definition since its publication, with particular focus on prejudice being defined in terms of negatively-valenced attitudes. Attitudinal ambivalence is integrated into this critique and the concept of ambivalent prejudice is introduced. This is supplemented with a detailed account of research examining racial ambivalence, ambivalent sexism, ambivalence towards disabled people, and ambivalent ageism. The latter section will critique two conceptualisations of ambivalence towards gay men and lesbian women and will propose a new theory of ambivalent homoprejudice as a necessary reformulation of academic thinking in this area.

3.1 Prejudice: An overview

The study of prejudice is deeply embedded in the history of social psychology and became crystallised in Gordon Allport’s (1954) seminal text, *The Nature of Prejudice*, where prejudice was defined as “an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalisation” (p. 9). However, this definition was especially criticised for its suggestion that prejudices arise from inaccurate generalisations (i.e., ‘stereotypes’). How can one adequately adjudicate an (in)accurate stereotype? Jussim, Cain, Crawford, Harber, and Cohen (2009) mount a similar criticism, explaining that such a proviso is logically untenable because delegitimising such generalisations by virtue of their inaccuracy logically leads to an impossible conclusion whereby all beliefs about groups are inaccurate. On the contrary, stereotypes about different groups appear to be rather accurate at the
group-level (Koenig & Eagly, 2014), which is logical because stereotypes must have some informative value in order to persist.

Allport (1954) alludes to such a “kernel of truth” (p. 190) in some stereotypes, referring to an example of an anthropologist studying a Native American tribe and prohibiting his children from mingling with the Natives because many of them suffered from tuberculousis. However, he suggests that, because the anthropologist’s stereotype was based on “rational and realistic grounds” (p. 4), his actions do not amount to prejudice. Subscription to inaccurate stereotypes is argued to be a problematic indicator of prejudice because – at its logical extreme – prejudice could be defensible by virtue of it being evidence-based. This point is illustrated well by the continued ban on sexually-active men who have sex with men (MSM) donating blood in the UK for fear of an increased risk of HIV-infectious donations. Soldan and Sinka (2003) estimated that abolishing lifetime exclusion in favour of the current 12-month deferral model would increase the risk of HIV-infectious donations entering circulation by approximately 60% (though more recent research suggests a much smaller risk increase of up to 5% resulting in one more HIV-infectious donation every 455 years; Davison, Conti, & Brailsford, 2013). Based on such research evidence, deferred donations are upheld for gay men despite relatively few control measures being in place for sexually-active heterosexual men and women. If Allport’s (1954) definition is to be fully subscribed to, evidence-based stereotypes such as this would allow prejudicial behaviours to masquerade as public interest.

A second broad area of criticism of Allport’s (1954) definition of prejudice is concerned with prejudice being depicted as antipathy – a feeling of disliking towards target groups. However, this critique has only more recently been made, because this facet of Allport’s (1954) definition has been “the bedrock on which virtually all prejudice theories are built” (Glick et al., 2000, p.

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3 As of writing, MSM blood donations are prohibited in the UK if the donor has had oral or anal intercourse with another man in the 12 months leading up to donation. Women who have had sex with an MSM in the preceding 12 months are also prohibited from donating blood.
Traditionally, prejudicial attitudes towards myriad out-groups have been characterised by academics as hostile. Notably, ‘old-fashioned’ sexual prejudice towards gay men and lesbian women is couched in the belief that they are sexual deviants, mentally ill, and are a corrupting influence on children and the wider society (Herek, 1984). Traditional racial prejudice towards Black people is denoted by stereotypes pertaining to ineptitude and fecklessness, and behavioural responses such as segregation (Sniderman & Piazza, 1993) and bears many similarities to old-fashioned sexist attitudes towards women, whom would be regarded with less respect and excluded from employment because of their presumed lack of intellect and ambition (Smith & Stewart, 1983).

This focus on hostility also permeates ‘modern’ conceptualisations of prejudice, which emerged in response to the decline in self-reported overt prejudice over time. Aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) posits that improving self-reported attitudes towards ethnic minorities conceal enduring implicit biases and prejudices. One such study investigating this compared self-reported racial prejudice and racially-biased hiring decisions between 1989 and 1999 (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). The authors found that, although self-reported racial prejudice was lower in 1999 than in 1989, the participants in both time points discriminated in their hiring decisions in favour of white candidates over black candidates when an interview excerpt was ambiguous in its indication of how strong the candidate was. This has been further demonstrated by implicit association tests (IAT), which are implicit measures of participants’ automatic associations between attitude targets and evaluative concepts (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). In their third experiment, Greenwald et al. (1998) had white participants categorise names (e.g., ‘Latonya’) representing black and white attitude targets as either ‘black’ (by pressing the left key) or ‘white’ (by pressing the right key). Then, participants were instructed to categorise evaluative concepts (e.g., ‘lucky’) as either pleasant or unpleasant with the left and right keys, respectively. The attitude targets were then paired with the evaluative concepts; in one set of trials participants had to respond with the left key when the stimulus was a black target or a pleasant evaluative concept or
respond with the right key when the stimuli was a white target or an unpleasant evaluative concept. These pairings were then reversed in the second set of trials, which were performed in a randomised order. Within this paradigm, shorter response latencies between stimulus exposure and participant response are indicative of a stronger association between the two categorisation criteria. The IAT results showed that there was greater response latency in the black or pleasant condition than in the black or unpleasant condition, suggesting that the participants more readily associated black targets with negative evaluative concepts than with positive evaluative concepts (and vice versa for white targets). Furthermore, these results occurred in spite of the explicit measures of racial prejudice indicating no such racial bias, suggesting that the IAT was able to penetrate a veneer of egalitarianism and expose underlying biases.

Modern-symbolic racism (McConahay & Hough Jr., 1976) similarly emphasises negatively-valenced attitudes toward Black people. However, rather than overtly derogating Black people, such prejudiced individuals tend to hold four common objections: 1) that racial discrimination no longer impacts Black people’s prospects; 2) that Black people are disadvantaged due to their unwillingness to work as hard as White people; 3) that Black people’s continued demands for change are illegitimate, and; 4) that Black people have received unwarranted advantages (Tarman & Sears, 2005). Similarly, modern homonegativity (Morrison & Morrison, 2003) is argued to be characterised by the belief that: 1) gay men and lesbian women make illegitimate demands for change; 2) discrimination against gay men and lesbian women is a thing of the past, and; 3) that gay men and lesbian women exaggerate the significance of their sexual orientation and ostracise themselves from mainstream culture as a result. Both are considered to be symptomatic of modern prejudice because objections focus on indirect symbolic issues related to the target group rather than to the group itself.

Neo-sexism, defined by Tougas, R. Brown, Beaton, and Joly (1995) as a “manifestation of a conflict between egalitarian values and residual negative feelings toward women” (p. 843) also
bears similarities to aversive racism, inasmuch as both propose that egalitarianism can belie prejudice. Despite it being claimed that there is conflict between hostility towards women and egalitarianism, neo-sexism is still patently expressed as antipathy (though more ambiguously than traditional sexism) as seen in items such as “It is difficult to work for a woman boss” and “Women shouldn’t push themselves where they are not wanted” (Tougas, R. Brown, Beaton, & St-Pierre, 1999, p. 1491). The related theory of modern sexism (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995) echoes the sentiments of symbolic racism and foreshadowed those of modern homonegativity; such prejudice is characterised by the denial of continued discrimination against women, delegitimising the demands women make in the name of equality, and opposing policies aiming to help women such as positive discrimination.

Multitudinous scholars have espoused old-fashioned and modern distinctions to account for Western societies’ seeming liberalisation over time. However, while the extremity of these attitudes appears to have abated over time and their expression appears to have become more clandestine, the valence of these attitudes are enduringly negative. As such, both old-fashioned and modern prejudice are widely known by academics to share many antecedents; social dominance orientation, “the extent to which one desires that one’s in-group dominate and be superior to out-groups” (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994, p. 742) correlates positively with old-fashioned prejudice towards gay men and lesbian women and Black people (Whitley Jr., 1999), and their modern equivalents (Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004). Similarly, higher levels of religious fundamentalism is also predictive of old-fashioned and modern prejudice towards gay men (Morrison, Kenny, & Harrington, 2005), as is right-wing authoritarianism (Altmeyer, 1981), the extent to which individuals demonstrate a willingness to submit to norm-abiding authority and aggress against those who transgress such norms (Basow & Johnson, 2000; Cramer, Miller, Amacker, & Burks, 2013).
Hostile prejudice and discrimination – as they have been conceptualised thus far – have myriad well-documented deleterious consequences for sexual minorities including wage inequality (Drydakis, 2015), homelessness due to running away from home or being ejected from the family home by parents (Rosario, Schrimshaw, & Hunter, 2012), higher rates of suicide ideation, suicide attempts, and self-harm (Balsam, Beauchaine, Mickey, & Rothblum, 2005), being victims of bullying (Patrick, Bell, Huang, Lazarakis, & Edwards, 2013), harassment and physical violence (Huebner, Rebchook, & Kegeles, 2004), and lower self-reported quality of life (King et al., 2003). However, none of these consequences are particularly congruent with the concept of ‘positive’ prejudice that will be advanced later in this chapter. This is arguably because of the restricted ways in which prejudice has been operationalised in the literature. Early challenges to the assumption that prejudice is solely negative focused on attitudes towards disabled people (i.e., Katz, Glass, Lucido, & Farber, 1977; Piliavin, Rodin, & Piliavin, 1969), whom were noted to elicit both positively- and negatively-valenced feelings (as will be discussed later). Furthermore, the aforementioned conceptualisations of prejudice coexisting with egalitarianism must also be ambivalent in nature, given that they are characterised by conflict between oppressive and egalitarian ideals. However, the broad spectrum of groups who trigger ambivalent attitudes and the unique antecedents and consequences of overtly positively-valenced prejudice was not fully recognised in the literature until much later.

This corpus of work, which will be discussed in the following sections, suggests that prejudice can be expressed in positive as well as negative ways and, based on this work, prejudice is henceforth defined as positive or negative attitudes, directed towards individuals by virtue of their group membership (Haddock & Zanna, 1999). This definition can be further nuanced with reference to the theoretical content discussed in the previous chapter to formulate a definition of ambivalent prejudice as positive and negative attitudes – endorsed concurrently or interchangeably – towards groups and individuals by virtue of their group membership.
3.2 Racial Ambivalence

Despite White Americans’ self-reported old-fashioned racism towards Black people appearing to have decreased over time (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997), black Americans evidently continue to experience prejudice and discrimination. Katz and Hass (1988) theorised that this was because prejudice towards black Americans had become ambivalent; that white Americans were becoming increasingly committed to racial equality because they perceived Black people to be disadvantaged while simultaneously endorsing the racist belief that Black people are deviant. This was argued to arise from core American value conflict between communalism, emphasising egalitarianism and humanitarianism, and individualism, emphasising a strong work ethic and meritocracy. As such, feelings of sympathy arising from awareness of racial inequality co-occur with the Protestant ethic, “the right to make one’s own way in life and to succeed on the basis of one’s own individual merit” (Sampson, 1999, p. 97), resulting in ambivalent attitudes towards black people whereby they are seen as unequal in society and deserving of help, but are also seen as not working hard enough to help themselves.

In order to measure these conflicting values, Katz and Hass (1988) constructed four scales: 1) an anti-black scale; 2) a pro-black scale; 3) a Protestant ethic scale, and; 4) a humanitarianism-egalitarianism scale. These were disseminated to participants in randomised pairs of one value questionnaire and one racial attitudes questionnaire, with the first questionnaire acting as a prime for the second. The results suggested that the Protestant ethic items primed greater endorsement of anti-black attitudes (but not pro-black attitudes) and that the humanitarianism-egalitarianism items primed greater endorsement of pro-black attitudes (but not anti-black attitudes). As discussed in the previous chapter, attitude pliancy is a common feature of ambivalent attitudes (Armitage & Conner, 2000), suggesting that White people’s positive and negative attitudes may occur concurrently (i.e., subjective ambivalence) when both communalist and individualist values are salient and accessible, or interchangeably (i.e., potential ambivalence) when one core value is
more salient and accessible than the other – by way of priming, for example (Newby-Clark, McGregor, & Zanna, 2002). Evidence of subjective ambivalence towards Black people is apparent in Katz, Glass, and Cohen (1973), whereby participants engaged in guilt-reductive behaviours in order to reduce the discomfort triggered by an ambivalent attitude target. Participants were classified in terms of their prejudicial and sympathetic attitudes towards Black people (resulting in four combinations of high and low prejudice and sympathy) and were instructed to give their first impressions of a black confederate. They then took part in a fake extrasensory perception task, whereby they were instructed to transmit the image of twenty stimuli to the confederate (of which the confederate ostensibly failed to receive 50% of the time). When the confederate incorrectly received the message, the participants were instructed to administer a strong electric shock. Following this, participants were once again asked to evaluate the confederate. The authors hypothesised that those participants who were highly sympathetic and prejudicial towards Black people (i.e., ambivalent) would denigrate the confederate post-test as a means of reducing the guilt arising from transgressing their sympathetic attitudes and administering electric shocks. Of all the groups, the ambivalent participants were the only ones who rated the black confederate more negatively after administering electric shocks to them, suggesting that derogating targets that elicit ambivalence may be a way to reduce an ambivalent affective state. Within the framework of racial ambivalence proposed by Katz and Hass (1988), derogating Black people as ‘lazy’ may also have guilt-reductive functions because it allows White people to distance themselves from structural oppression.

This ambivalence is commonly observed in discussions about affirmative action, which often gravitate towards simultaneously upholding meritocratic ideals (i.e., a tenet of the Protestant ethic) and endorsing egalitarianism. In doing so, people (rather paradoxically) construe equality as inequality and argue against equality measures as a threat to egalitarianism. This allows prejudiced individuals to reinforce the status quo while appearing non-prejudiced (Augoustinos, Tuffin, & Every, 2005), demonstrating the theorised self-presentational advantages to ambivalent prejudice.
discussed in the previous chapter (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). This was observed in qualitative data collected by Bonilla-Silva and Forman (2000); participants commonly emphasised those people who “worked hard to get where they are” (p. 64) and argued that affirmative action confers unearned benefits onto those who “have done half as much of [sic] what you have” (p. 65). Here, attempts to combat structural racism are reconceptualised as reverse racism against White people on the basis that affirmative action undermines meritocracy and violates the Protestant ethic. Simultaneously, this assertion blames ethnic minorities for their position in society; oppression becomes wilfully reimagined as fecklessness endemic to a particular social group and, as a result, “society crush(es) people, and then penalise(s) them for not being able to stand up under the weight” (Malcolm X in Haley & Handler, 1992, p. 22). These attitudes are particularly pervasive because White people are often unaware of the various unearned privileges that come with having white skin (e.g., “I can be sure that if I need legal or medical help, my race will not work against me”; McIntosh, 1990, p. 33) and the ways in which these privileges tip meritocracy in their favour. As a result, White people are averse to the possibility that their accomplishments are not entirely due to their own hard work because it undermines their sense of achievement (Knowles & Lowery, 2012; Solomona, Porteli, Daniel, & Campbell, 2005). Awareness of privilege also undermines the system justification ideology central to the maintenance of racial ambivalence (Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 2007), because it acknowledges the inequality in structural oppression. Further ‘advantages’ of ambivalent prejudices will be covered in the next section, exploring ambivalent sexism theory.

3.3 Ambivalent Sexism

Ambivalent sexism theory (Glick & Fiske, 1996; 1999) is arguably the most well-known and widely-cited theory of ambivalent prejudice and it has transformed academic and lay understanding of sexism and the maintenance of patriarchy.
Glick and Fiske (1996) situate ambivalent sexism within the framework of Jackman’s (1994) ‘Velvet Glove’ theory of paternalism. Jackman (1994) argues that dominant groups cannot rely solely on force when subordinating other groups because this would lead to resistance and rebellion. Instead, paternalistic ideology offers a way for these goals to be reinterpreted as being for the good of all – include those groups being dominated. Thus, positive feelings towards subordinates become intermingled with exploitation (i.e., ambivalence), resulting in a “coercive energy” (p. 383) that serves to foster deference from subordinate groups.

Glick and Fiske (1996) argue that this asymmetric exchange arises in dyadic relationships between men and women: whereas men possess structural power in political and economic domains, women are seen to possess greater dyadic power over men as wives and romantic partners (Guttentag & Secord, 1983). As such, men exert power over women by making them dependent upon their money and influence while women exert power over men by making them dependent upon their affection and care. Although this relationship appears to be mutually beneficial, men still retain greater structural power than do women. Alongside hostile sexism – drawing on the traditional conceptualisation of prejudice as antipathy (Allport, 1954) discussed earlier in this section – these unique conditions are argued to result in three facets of benevolent prejudice, attitudes that are positive in feeling tone, yet enforce traditional and restricted roles upon women: 1) the belief that men and women possess complementary characteristics (complementary gender differentiation); 2) the desire for heterosexual intimacy and closeness (heterosexual intimacy); and 3) paternalistic beliefs that women should be cherished and protected (protective paternalism).

These three facets are measured by the ambivalent sexism inventory (ASI; Glick & Fiske, 1996), which comprises benevolent items such as “a good woman should be set on a pedestal by her man” (p. 512). Although such a statement appears harmless, it opines that there is an ideal type of woman that complements (rather than competes with) men and offers rewards to those women
in the form of affection and protection. Thus, a woman who embodies patriarchal ideals (e.g., an unemployed housewife who is demure and genteel) is rewarded for her subscription to that ideal whereas those who subvert these expectations (e.g., promiscuous women) are punished. This can be seen in Viki and Abrams (2002), who provided participants with one of two vignettes detailing an acquaintance rape where the victim was either described as a married woman who was being unfaithful or not described at all. Benevolent sexism was measured and it was found that those who scored highest attributed more blame to the married victim than to the control victim. Because the married victim transgressed the patriarchal norm that women should be faithful to their husbands, they were not rewarded with the benevolence afforded to other women but, instead, attracted hostile victim blaming. A similar result is found when comparing a stranger rape vignette with an acquaintance rape vignette; those high in benevolent sexism attribute less blame to the perpetrator in the latter condition and recommend shorter sentences than those low in benevolent sexism, suggesting that those women viewed as promiscuous (i.e., the ‘fallen woman’) are also punished (Viki, Abrams, & Masser, 2004).

Ambivalence towards men has the same theoretical underpinning, although the ambivalence towards men inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1999) measures slightly different concepts. Women are argued to hold hostile attitudes towards men inasmuch as they resent men’s dominance over women (resentment of paternalism), endorse negative stereotypes about men which allow women to positively differentiate themselves from them (compensatory gender differentiation), and express aversion to experiencing heterosexual intimacy and contact with men (heterosexual hostility). However, despite widespread awareness of structural gender-based inequality and the resultant animosity directed at men, women may seek relationships with men in order to vicariously access power. However, in doing so, they reinforce their own disempowerment and men’s empowerment (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Thus, maternalism by women achieves the same ends as paternalism by men; although women may exert power in limited domains by positioning themselves as carers for partners and children who they view as relatively incompetent (e.g.,
“women ought to take care of their men at home, because men would fall apart if they had to fend for themselves”, Glick & Fiske, 1999, p. 536), this too reinforces women’s caregiving roles and justifies men’s economic agency and power.

Hostile and benevolent sexism have been dubbed “complementary justifications for gender inequality” and “an ambivalent alliance” (Glick & Fiske, 2001, p. 109). Where hostile sexism fails (because it prompts resistance), benevolent sexism succeeds because it is less likely to attract censure because it appears to be harmless and it, therefore, less likely to attract censure. Quite the contrary, benevolent attitudes have demonstrable negative effects on women such as mental intrusions related to incompetence (Dumont, Sarlet, & Dardenne, 2010) and long term transition into endorsing hostile sexism towards other women (Sibley, Overall, & Duckitt, 2007). Hostile sexism, on the other hand, is more overt and results in women engaging in collective action against inequality (Becker & Wright, 2011). Further, those women who challenge benevolent sexism are seen as cold and unlikeable by benevolent sexists (Becker, Glick, Ilic, & Bohner, 2011) because rebuking these paternalistic sentiments dispels romanticised patriarchal ideals of women as amiable and gentle (Cikara & Fiske, 2009; Cikara, Lee, Fiske, & Glick, 2009). Thus, paternalistic expressions of prejudice are highly effective at dominating subordinate groups and undermining their attempts at group resistance.

One important difference between ambivalent sexism and racial ambivalence is that the former is dependent upon men and women being roughly equal in group size because of the need for cooperation and intimacy in heterosexual dyads. By comparison, White people outnumber Black people in North America (the cultural context in racial ambivalence is explicitly contextualised; Katz & Hass, 1988) and racial ambivalence is not contingent upon dyadic relationships between the two groups as a result. Indeed, historically, dyadic relationships (and even contact) between White people and Black people have been stigmatised by way of anti-miscegenation and separatist policies.
The relationship between heterosexuals and gay men appears to resemble a composite of these two instances of intergroup relations. Like the proportion of White people to Black people (at least, in the Western contexts under discussion herein), heterosexuals greatly outnumber gay men; recent estimates suggest that gay men comprise approximately 3% of the adult population in the United Kingdom, whereas heterosexuals make up almost 90% (YouGov, 2015). Thus, dyadic relationships between heterosexuals and gay men are not necessary – unlike cooperative relationships between men and women – due to population disproportionality. However, media portrayals of dyadic relationships between gay men and heterosexual women nonetheless depict such relationships as highly desirable. Paulin (1996) discusses the burgeoning trend towards more positive media representations of gay men in film and notes the phenomenon of the “non-threatening gay best friend” (p. 39). For example, Paulin (1996) discusses the relationship between the harassed protagonist of Single White Female, Allison ‘Alli’ Jones, and her gay neighbour, Graham Knox (who comes to the rescue throughout the film), noting that, as compared to the other characters in the film, “Graham is the one character who does not harm Alli and who does not desire Alli” (p. 39).

Beyond the make-believe, psychological research has empirically demonstrated that gay men are typically perceived as non-threatening by women. In their first of a series of studies, Russell, Ta, Lewis, Babcock, and Ickes (2016) found that women participants trusted mating (but not career) advice given by gay men more than they trusted mating advice given by heterosexual men and women. This was found to be due to the perceived lack of gay men’s motivations to sexually deceive women because of their lack of sexual interest in and sexual competition with women. Furthermore, Russell et al.’s (2016) final study demonstrated that women’s salient perceptions of sexual competition with other women predicted greater openness to forming friendships with gay men, but not with heterosexuals or lesbian women. Akin to the stereotyping

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4 Sexual incompatibility is also a factor, however, not all dyadic relationships between men and women are sexualised (i.e., family relationships)
inherent to benevolent sexism, it appears that heterosexuals (particularly women) ascribe a number of idealised traits to gay men that make them highly desirable, which – as will be advanced later in this chapter – may come to resemble a form of benevolent prejudice towards gay men.

3.4 Ambivalent Ableism

Despite the far-reaching influence of Allport’s (1954) definition of prejudice, academics found very early on that attitudes towards (visibly) disabled people were not uniformly negative but that they are also sympathetic. Compared to a person who appears to be drunk, a visibly ill person is more likely to attract help-giving behaviour from bystanders (Piliavin et al., 1969). Wheelchair-users are also more successful than able-bodied confederates at acquiring small sums of money from strangers – regardless of whether they present themselves positively by giving a reason as to why they need the change or negatively by giving no reason at all (Taylor, 1998).

Disability is seen as a legitimate and uncontrollable affliction, triggering sympathetic attitudes and altruism and increasing the motivation to help (Tscharaktschiew & Rudolph, 2015; Weiner, 1980). In much the same way as paternalism permeates sexism (Jackman, 1994), images of disabled people are often exploited on the basis that it is for the greater good because such images evoke sympathy from viewers and elicit altruistic behaviours. Shakespeare (1994) argues that charities abuse pitiful images of physical impairment to generate money, objectifying and dehumanising disabled people while simultaneously claiming to be helping them. This is also seen more widely in media depictions of disability where “syrupy messages infused with pity” also permeate (Haller, Dorries, & Rahn, 2006, p. 63).

One common narrative employed in the media is the ‘overcoming the odds’ trope whereby a disabled person is viewed as inspirational for overcoming adversity. However, the effectiveness of such tropes hinge upon the consumer conflating disability and tragedy; disabled people are only admired when they achieve things they are presumed to be precluded from achieving by their impairment (Oliver, 1996). Peers (2009) similarly exposes the prevalence of such attitudes towards
Paralympians who also subvert passive stereotypes of disabled people: “Without this needy and powerless disabled population, volunteers and experts would not seem so benevolent, empowerment would not seem so necessary, and the discourse of athletes being passive recipients of empowerment would not seem so rational” (p. 658).

Despite this veneer of benevolence, theorists argue that such attitudes conceal latent hostility towards disabled people. Although disabled people may elicit sympathy, disabling impairments evoke fear and hostility from able-bodied people (Söder, 1990). As disabled feminist author Jenny Morris explains, these polarised responses co-occur:

“Our disability frightens people. They don’t want to think that this is something which could happen to them. So we become separated from common humanity, treated as fundamentally different and alien. Having put up clear barriers between us and them, non-disabled people further hide their fear and discomfort by turning us into objects of pity, comforting themselves by their own kindness and generosity” (Morris, 1991, p. 192).

Here, Morris (1991) argues that ambivalence towards disabled people may be motivated by the permeability of (dis)ability; disabled people remind able-bodied people of the fragility of their dominance because the perceived ‘affliction’ of disability can happen to anybody. In turn, this elicits an ambivalent concoction of fear and discomfort at the prospect of being disabled oneself, and sympathy and altruism towards such a purportedly pitiful group of people.

Experimental research also provides evidence in support of these claims. In a series of experiments, Whiteman and Lukoff (1965) found that attitudes towards ‘blindness’ and ‘physical handicap’ were more negative than attitudes towards ‘blind people’ and ‘physically handicapped people’. This may be because disabled people are seen as warm (i.e., disabled people do not have malevolent intentions towards able-bodied people), triggering positive attitudes – yet disabilities are seen to make people incompetent (i.e., disabled cannot compete with able-bodied people because of their impairments), altogether resulting in pitying affect towards disabled people (Fiske,
Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). This is corroborated by Baert (2016), who sent two copies of an application to 768 job vacancies; the first disclosing that the applicant was either blind, deaf, or had autism (which would not have significantly affected their job performance) and the second a control application that disclosed no disability. The disabled candidates were 48% less likely to receive a positive call-back by the employers than the non-disabled candidates, suggesting that when disability is made salient and delineated from the disabled person, able-bodied individuals will be more inclined to engage in harmful – rather than facilitating – behaviours towards disabled individuals.

This pattern may also arise because a disability is seen to have a negative impact on a person’s quality of life (Connally, 1994). This is the disability paradox at work; approximately half of disabled people who report severe limitations in their ability to perform day-to-day activities also report having a good to excellent quality of life, and qualitative research shows that they take pride in themselves and the skills they have retained, and view physical impairment as something that has made them grow as a person (Albrecht & Devlieger, 1999). As such, the most damaging effects of ambivalence towards disabled people is that it has a “tendency to view disability as a continuing tragedy” (N. Weinberg, 1988, p. 152), nullifying disabled people’s personal pride and dignity.

Research has demonstrated reducing this ambivalence may also be achieved in a similar way to reducing racial ambivalence. In a similar methodology as Katz et al (1973), Katz, Glass, Lucido, and Farber (1977) measured participant’s positive and negative attitudes towards disabled people on a split semantic differential scale. They then had participants play the teaching role in a learning task, with a female wheelchair-bound confederate as the learner. Whenever the confederate got an answer wrong, the participants were to administer a loud, noxious noise to headphones that the confederate was wearing. Following the learning task, the participants completed a questionnaire on their impressions of the confederate. The results were similar to the
1973 iteration of this study, where administering punishment to an ambivalent target prompted derogation as a means of guilt-reduction.

Understanding prejudice towards disabled people from an ambivalence perspective is theoretically enlightening because it recontextualises ostensibly positive behaviours towards disabled people, exposing paternalistic behaviours and delineating these from genuinely prosocial ones. Ambivalence towards disabled people accounts for the flaws in defining prejudice as antipathy (Allport, 1954) and moves beyond the conceptualisations of modern prejudice towards people with disabilities that adhere to this assumption (Akrami, Ekehammar, Claesson, & Sonnander, 2006) by integrating benevolent attitudes, providing a more holistic account of ableist attitudes.

As compared to the group boundaries between men and women, and Black people and White people, the group boundary between disabled and able-bodied people is relatively more permeable insofar that able-bodied people can – without significant barriers – transition into a state of disability. Such a transitional process is also one that is typically experienced by individuals coming to realise their nonheterosexuality. Nonheterosexual identity development models often emphasise a period of assumed (or, to some theorists, 'compulsory', Rich, 1980) heterosexuality before an individual begins to notice the ways in which they violate heterosexual norms and conceptualise these violations as indicative of nonheterosexuality (Cass, 1979; Coleman, 1982; McDonald, 1982; Troiden, 1988). Likewise, the construct of homohysteria (Anderson, 2011) – men’s fear of being 'homosexualised' by virtue of their contact with men who violate acceptable masculine behaviours – echoes the fear evoked by contact with disabled people discussed earlier in this section. As well as this, homosexuality was once considered to be a disability, which was treated using (what would now be considered unethical) methods such as aversion therapy (Gold & Neufeld, 1964).
Altogether, it is clear that nonheterosexuals and disabled people have many shared experiences of oppression, which have historically drawn upon the undesirable nature of pathology. To this extent, heterosexuals may also endorse a range of pitying attitudes towards gay men somewhat resembling those levelled at disabled people discussed thus far. Evidence for this can be found in an early taxonomy of attitudes towards nonheterosexuals, the Riddle homophobia scale (Riddle, 1994), which comprises eight nominal categories ranging from ‘repulsion’ – where nonheterosexuality is seen as a crime against nature – to ‘nurturance’ – where nonheterosexuals are believed to be invaluable to society. Riddle (1994) also includes the category of ‘pity’, which is situated in the taxonomy as slightly less negative than repulsion (though negative nonetheless) and represents heterosexual chauvinism and the belief that nonheterosexuals are poor and unfortunate. More recent empirical evidence also suggests that gay men elicit a high amount of pity as compared to other outgroups, with only Native Americans eliciting higher levels of self-reported pity by participants (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Unfortunately, there is little other research exploring possible paternalistic attitudes towards gay men, necessitating further study in this area.

3.5 Ambivalent Ageism

Ambivalent ageism has been recently theorised to arise from conflicting positive and negative stereotypes about the elderly (Cary, Chasteen, & Remedios, 2016). Cary et al. (2016) draw on the stereotype content model (SCM; Fiske et al., 2002) in their theorising, which asserts that outgroups are typically stereotyped along two axes. The communal axis of the SCM comprises warmth (i.e., the outgroup has positive intentions towards my group) at one pole and coldness (i.e., the outgroup has negative intentions towards my group) at the other pole, whereas the agentic axis comprises competence (i.e., the outgroup has the means to action their goals) and incompetence (i.e., the outgroup does not have the means to action their goals). Thus, different outgroups are plotted on these two axes according to their perceived cooperation and competition.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the CAN model of attitudes posits that, in order to strike a balance between attitude accuracy and consistency, positive evaluative reactions must be able to coexist in an attitude network with negative evaluative reactions (Dalege et al., 2016). Similarly, the communal and agentic axes of the SCM operate relatively independently, sometimes resulting in ambivalent stereotype content. Pitying stereotypes are one such example of ambivalent stereotype content, because they comprise the belief that the outgroup is warm (a positive evaluation) and incompetent (a negative evaluation). Fiske et al. (2002) demonstrate that disabled people and elderly people are typically stereotyped in this way and Cary et al. (2016) contend that this may result in benevolent ageism. By comparison, hostile ageism occurs as a result of contemptuous stereotypes arising from perceptions of old people as cold and incompetent and is univalent in its stereotype content.

Based on the behaviour from intergroup affect and stereotypes (BIAS) map (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007), Cary et al. (2016) postulate that hostile and benevolent ageism results in different behavioural responses towards elderly people. Hostile ageism arising from contemptuous stereotypes and affect result in active harm (e.g., assaulting) and passive harm (e.g., excluding) and the consequences of such behaviours are well-documented in the literature, such as social isolation (Cattan, White, & Bond, 2005), diminished efficacy of physical (Hausdorff, Levy, & Wei, 1999) and mental therapy (Small, 1991), and elder abuse and neglect (Harbison, 2008). Benevolent ageism arising from pitying stereotypes and affect results in active facilitation (e.g., assisting) and passive harm. Although the BIAS map advances facilitation as a counterpoint to harm, there is evidence that some facilitating behaviours can nonetheless be harmful. With regards to the elderly, active facilitation typically takes the form of over-accommodating elderly people, which has the unintended consequence of undermining the personal autonomy and confidence of the recipient (Hehman & Bugental, 2015).
Similar to women who do not live up to prevailing stereotypes of women as maternal, elderly people who subvert (in)competence stereotypes appear to be penalised in the warmth domain. Cuddy, Norton, and Fiske (2005) presented participants with a brief description of an elderly man named George and manipulated this description so that it either made him appear incompetent because of his bad memory or made George appear competent because of his perfect memory. Although neither of the descriptions were altered to affect the perceived warmth of George, the incompetent George was rated as significantly warmer than the competent George. Chasteen and Cary (2015) argue that this is because such stereotypes are prescriptive rather than descriptive. Whereas a descriptive stereotype is what one believes is true of a particular group of people, prescriptive stereotypes are what one believes is expected of a particular group of people (North & Fiske, 2013). By demonstrating competency, George violates the prescriptive stereotype of incompetence and is, thus, discredited in the warmth domain for failing to live up to this expectation.

Like stereotypes about elderly people and traditional women, there is some evidence that stereotypes about gay men are prescriptive and that gay men who violate these stereotypes are penalised as a result. Cohen, Hall, and Tuttle (2009) recruited 56 heterosexual participants and had them read descriptions of two gay men students or two lesbian women students – one of which was presented as stereotypical (i.e., transgressing gender norms) and the other as counterstereotypical (i.e., confirming to gender norms). Participants then rated how much they liked the two students they read about. The results showed that the stereotypical lesbian student was rated as less likeable than the counterstereotypical lesbian student by both the men and women participants. This is in line with benevolent sexism; because lesbians who are perceived as masculine violate ‘acceptable’ behaviour for a woman, they do not receive the affection that feminine women do (Glick & Fiske, 1996). However, the men and women participants rated the gay man in different ways; whereas the men liked the counterstereotypical gay man significantly more than the stereotypical gay man, the women liked the stereotypical gay man (marginally; p =
.06) more than the counterstereotypical gay man. This may be related to the literature discussed earlier with regards to gay men being perceived as non-threatening by women (Russell et al., 2015), but further study in this area would need to be conducted in order to assess the extent to which prescriptive stereotypes such as these feed into benevolence towards gay men.

3.6 Ambivalent Prejudice towards Gay Men

In this section, this thesis will further explore the ontological similarities and differences between gay men and other oppressed groups discussed thus far and use the ontological uniqueness of gay men as a starting point for a novel and bespoke theory of ambivalent prejudice towards gay men.

3.6.1 Delineating Prejudice towards Gay Men, Lesbian Women, and Bisexuals

While heterosexuals’ attitudes towards gay men, lesbian women, and bisexuals share some similarities in that they all represent violations of normative sexual identity and practice, they are also qualitatively different. The most well-documented difference between the contents of heterosexuals’ attitudes towards lesbians and gay men is that the former are considered to be masculine and the latter are considered to be feminine. In a study exploring heterosexuals’ stereotypical beliefs about gay men, Massey (2010) demonstrated that heterosexuals believed that gay men and lesbian women transgressed gender norms in both positive and negative ways. For instance, gay men were believed to act like women and, thus, perceived to be weak and flamboyant, but also as sensitive and caring. Inversely, lesbian women were believed to act like men and, thus, perceived as aggressive and having bad hygiene, but also as strong and capable. Based on these stereotypes, it appears that gender norm transgression in gay men is associated with disempowering characteristics, whereas gender norm transgression in lesbian women is associated with relatively more empowering characteristics (Sirin, McCreary, & Mahalik, 2004).
This is possibly compounded by laypeople’s heightened awareness of penetrative and receptive partners in male same-sex sexual behaviour, which is commonly conflated with masculine dominance and feminine submission, respectively (Johns, Pingel, Eisenberg, Santana, & Bauermeister, 2012). Because heterosexuals’ understanding of sex is typically guided by a ‘coital imperative’ (i.e., the privileging of penile-vaginal intercourse as ‘real’ sex; McPhillips, Braun, & Gavey, 2001), lesbians could be less susceptible to having devalued character traits associated with their assumed sexual behaviour than are gay men because a penetrative element to lesbian sexual practice is commonly overlooked (Henderson, 1992). This may explain the pattern of results showing a preference for counterstereotypical (i.e., feminine) lesbian women, yet a slight preference for stereotypical (i.e., feminine) gay men (Cohen et al., 2009). Because traits associated with femininity pose less of a challenge to unequal power structures, gender norm violations among gay men may be more readily embraced than gender norm violations in lesbian women (Wilkinson, 2008). In other words, attitudes towards gay men are more likely than attitudes towards lesbian women to be benevolent, because lesbian women’s perceived gender transgressions would likely attract hostile (hetero)sexist attitudes because they threaten patriarchal ideals.

Paradoxically, however, heterosexuals are commonly reported to hold significantly more negative attitudes towards gay men than towards lesbian women, and this difference is particularly pronounced among heterosexual men (Herek, 1988; Herek, 2000; Herek & Capitanio, 1995; LaMar & Kite, 1998). This is believed to be the case because heterosexual men objectify and overssexualise lesbian women, which has an ameliorative effect on self-reported prejudice because such objectification typically masquerades as mere appreciation (M. Hill & Fischer, 2008; Louderback & Whiteley Jr., 1997; Reichert, 2001). A similar tendency for heterosexual men to endorse more positive attitudes towards bisexual women as compared to gay and bisexual men is also documented in the literature (Herek, 2002; Steffens & Wagner, 2004) and may also result from the same overssexualisation. This seeming paradox in the literature can be reconciled by delineating heterosexuals’ attitudes towards nonheterosexual sexual behaviour and sexual identity. To
illustrate, exposing heterosexual men to male-male sexual intimacy can prompt more negative affect and self-reported prejudice towards gay men (Golom & Mohr, 2011; Mahaffey, Bryan, & Hutchinson, 2005; Hudephol, Parrott, & Zeichner, 2010), and similar results are found when exposing heterosexual women to female-female sexual intimacy, presumably because the oversexualisation element present among heterosexual men does not exist among heterosexual women (Parrott & Gallagher, 2008). It is, thus, important to bear in mind that – although gay men appear to attract particularly scathing reactions because of their assumed sexual behaviours (and the stigma attached to those behaviours), this is only one evaluative axis upon which gay men are judged negatively and it does not nullify the apparent ways in which gay men are judged positively.

Gay men can also be differentiated from lesbian women from an ontological perspective because they are less likely to be ‘doubly-oppressed’ than are lesbian women. To reiterate, lesbians commonly self-identify as women and, thus, constitute an intersection of two oppressed groups in society (Shields, 2008). It is not until racial (Bowleg, 2013), religious (Rahman, 2010), and social class (Embrick, Walther, & Wickens, 2007) categories intersect with sexuality that gay men become oppressed across multiple social axes of difference. Such disproportionate vulnerability is particularly salient when comparing the lifetime risk of gay men and lesbian women developing psychiatric disorders; the latter are significantly more at risk of developing anxiety disorders (e.g., generalised anxiety disorder, simple phobia, and post-traumatic stress disorder), mood disorders (e.g., major depression), neurocardiogenic syncope (i.e., temporary loss of consciousness due to low arterial blood pressure, followed by a slow heart rate; Grubb & McMann, 2001), and substance dependence (Gilman et al., 2001). As compared to mental ill health prevalence in heterosexual men and women (which is roughly equal; Rosenfield & Mouzon, 2013), it would appear that non-heterosexuality particularly increases women’s susceptibility to mental ill health despite social attitudes towards lesbians often being less negative than attitudes towards gay men.
Another drawback of being a member of multiple subordinate groups is intersectional invisibility; because individuals with intersecting identities may not fit the prototype of either group (e.g., a lesbian woman), they become relatively less visible and recognised (Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008). This can be seen in the disproportionate depiction of nonheterosexuals on prime-time television, where gay men consistently outnumber lesbian characters (61% - 20%, GLAAD, 2012; 46% - 30%, GLAAD, 2013; 54% - 28%, GLAAD, 2014; and 47% - 33%, GLAAD, 2015). Many portrayals of gay men in film and TV also revolve around friendships with heterosexual women and some have argued paternalistic sexism is reinvented in these dyads because of the complementary gender differentiation employed therein. Whereas the women in such dyads are commonly presented as vacuous and hysterical, the gay men are positioned as the perfect foil to remedy these character flaws with their supposed sage advice and worldly knowledge (Shugart, 2003). Altogether, this is an important reminder that – despite being an oppressed group in society – gay men (unlike lesbian women) retain a stake in male privilege because they benefit from it (Jacobs, 1997).

Gay men – unlike bisexuals – also have the (relative) advantage of adhering to a more easily comprehensible binary understanding of human sexualities (i.e., heterosexual-homosexual). As a result of this binary, bisexuality is often delegitimised based on the gender of a bisexual person’s current partner. For example, in one of their 71 semi-structured interviews, Better and Simula (2015) interviewed a bisexual woman who was in a monogamous marriage with her husband and found that others read her sexual identity as heterosexual rather than bisexual, thus obscuring an important part of her identity. Bisexual people also experience delegitimisation due to their deviation from a binary understanding of human sexualities in the form of trivialising statements such as “pick a side” (Burke & LaFrance, 2016) and accusations of sexual greed (Rust, 2000).

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5 Sexologists and social constructionists take a more complex view of human sexualities (see Brickell, 2006), whereas this discussion is in reference to the more simplified understandings of human sexualities employed among non-academics (see Johnson, 2004).
Because of this perception, bisexuals are viewed with suspicion and are judged to be untrustworthy, unfaithful, and promiscuous (McLean, 2008) – even by lesbian women and gay men (Welzer-Lang, 2008). As one of McLean’s (2008) participants explains, “Bisexuality’s only visible in a negative way… there are no positive images at all” (p. 161). Given this overwhelming hostility towards bisexual people, they are also unlikely to be targets of benevolent prejudice like gay men are.

3.6.2 Intergroup Relations between Heterosexuals and Nonheterosexuals

In her appraisal of intergroup relations between dominant groups and subordinate groups in the arenas of class, race, and gender, Jackman (1994) offers a number of useful parameters with which to characterise these asymmetric relationships. The first parameter considers the distributive bases for inequality, that is, how does the dominant group secure its dominance by securing its economic wellbeing, social prestige, and control over decision-making? The second parameter concerns how individuals are ascribed to groups and is concerned with how well defined the intergroup boundary is and whether group membership is mutable or heritable.

With regards to the ways in which heterosexuals have secured dominance over nonheterosexuals, this was achieved by colonising the social prestige domain. Heterosexuality is positioned as a social good because it produces the next generation of people and, thus, contributes to the continued success of a society. As such, unions between men and women are encouraged and incentivised, and heterosexuality becomes institutionalised (Heath, 2008). By comparison, homosexuality became institutionalised in the legal and medical arenas; in the United Kingdom, homosexual behaviour between two men was illegal until 1967⁶ and was considered to be a mental illness in the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders until the DSM-III was published in 1973⁷. Thus, homosexuality – particularly between two men – has a deep and ingrained history

⁶ As a caveat, it was still illegal for more than two men to have sex – because it constituted an act of public indecency – until 2003.
⁷ Again, as a caveat, this was replaced by ego-dystonic homosexuality, which remained in the DSM-III until 1987 when the DSM-III-R was published.
of stigma in the United Kingdom, which was further compounded by the height of the AIDS epidemic in the 1980, colloquially referred to as ‘the gay plague’ and ‘gay cancer’ (Flowers & Landridge, 2007).

At odds with this stigma, however, is the boundary between heterosexuality and nonheterosexuality. As alluded to earlier in this section, the heterosexual-homosexual orientation binary is an overly-simplistic interpretation of human sexualities (Brickell, 2006) and, as such, the definitional boundary between ‘straight’ and ‘gay’ is rather poorly defined. For instance, men who have sex with men but who do not identify as gay or bisexual – sometimes colloquially known as ‘being on the down-low’ (Millett, Malebranche, Mason, & Spikes, 2005) – undermine the ability for one group (i.e., heterosexuals) to dominate another (i.e., gay men) on the basis of discrete and well-defined group membership.

Although the differences between, say, racial and gender categories are also simplistic, the criteria upon which these groups are stratified (e.g., skin colour) are typically visible. By comparison, nonheterosexuality is a concealable stigma (Herek & Capitanio, 1996); whereas gay men can ‘pass’ as a member of the dominant group (Johnson, 2002), other groups have relatively less control over others’ ability to identify their subordinate group membership. The concealable nature of nonheterosexuality may influence the content of prejudice directed towards nonheterosexuals. Parallels can be drawn here between nonheterosexuals and people with invisible or mental illnesses; people with invisible illnesses are criticised for having an illegitimate excuse for failing to conform to society’s expectations (Ong-Dean, 2005) and, likewise, gay men are also criticised for not assimilating into mainstream culture (Morrison & Morrison, 2003). The concealable nature of nonheterosexuality also means that attempts to oppress sexual minorities may unintentionally result in ingroup ‘casualties’ who are misidentified as gay, making such acts potentially costly to heterosexuals also (Freeman, Johnson, Ambady, & Rule, 2010).
Gay men can also be delineated from other groups on the basis of the mutability and heritability of group membership. As discussed earlier in this chapter, sexual minority identity development is theorised to proceed from a state of presumed heterosexuality to internalised nonheterosexuality (Cass, 1979; Coleman, 1982; McDonald, 1982; Troiden, 1988). Inversely, some sections of society believe that sexual minorities can undergo sexual orientation conversion therapy to become heterosexual (Tozer & Hayes, 2004), though this has largely been refuted as being ineffectual (J. G. Ford, 2002), and highly unethical and damaging (Jenkins & Johnston, 2004). As such, nonheterosexual group membership can be crudely characterised in terms of a transition from assumed dominant group membership to actualised subordinate group membership – but rarely in the other direction. Because deviation from the dominant group undermines the legitimacy of that group’s dominance, this phenomenon may explain why much of the animosity directed towards gay men revolves around their supposed undermining of dominant (i.e., heterosexual) institutions, such as marriage (Brandzel, 2005). By restricting and delegitimising subordinates’ appropriation of hegemonic institutions, one undermines the subordinate group’s status (Eckelaar, 2014).

The belief that sexuality is mutable is associated with higher levels of old-fashioned prejudice towards gay men (Haslam & Levy, 2006), which supports the assertions made in the previous paragraph. By comparison, essentialist beliefs about gay men may serve to engender tolerance and acceptance – that they were ‘born this way’ and are thus deserving of help (Jang & Lee, 2014). Given that such essentialist beliefs can be reified using stereotyping (Bastian & Haslam, 2006), prevailing stereotypes about gay men pertaining to their perceived kindness and powerlessness may serve to bolster heterosexuals’ acceptance of gay men. Despite these stereotypes’ oppressive consequences, this thesis suggests that they are nonetheless intended in a positive way by well-meaning heterosexuals (see Conley, Calhoun, Evett, & Devine, 2002).
To illustrate, heterosexuals’ endorsement of positive stereotypes about gay men correlates negatively with self-report measures of traditional anti-gay prejudice (Massey, 2010). Further, as has been previously discussed, benevolence is not a necessary component of the oppression of sexual minorities (unlike the oppression of women; Glick & Fiske, 1996) because intergroup relations between these dominant and subordinate groups are qualitatively different. Even if benevolence towards gay men did function in the same way as benevolent sexism (i.e., that it has oppressive intent), such a strategy would be stymied by how few gay men there are in relation to heterosexuals and the concealable nature of nonheterosexuality. Although such attitudes and stereotypes may be well-intentioned and may be indicative of lower levels of prejudice, this does not nullify their microaggressive potential; gay men are nonetheless targets of “brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioural, [and] environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative slights and insults” (Nadal et al., 2011, p. 235).

3.6.3 Multidimensional Heterosexism

Heterosexism is defined by Herek (1992) as “an ideological system that denies, denigrates, and stigmatises any non-heterosexual form of behaviour, identity, relationship, or community” (p. 89). However, Walls (2008a) argues that such a definition focuses exclusively on antipathy, and claims that heterosexism can also be expressed in benevolent as well as hostile ways. Walls (2008a) suggests that hostile heterosexism takes two forms. The first, aversive heterosexism, is the belief that gay men and lesbian women are too politically militant and get too much attention. The second aspect of hostile heterosexism is amnestic heterosexism, the oblivion to and denial of continuing prejudice and discrimination towards gay men and lesbian women. Although these constructs have also been identified elsewhere in the literature (Morrison & Morrison, 2003), Walls (2008a) has defined them in such a way that is it difficult to differentiate the two. Whereas the former is defined as “attitudes, myths, and beliefs that dismiss, belittle, or disregard, the impact of sexual orientation on
life chances” (p. 46, own emphasis), the latter is defined as “attitudes, myths, and beliefs that deny the impact of sexual orientation on life chances” (p. 46, own emphasis). These definitions are unclear because a denial may reasonably be interpreted as dismissive and vice versa. Thus, greater definitional clarity is required with regards to theory development in this area.

The two benevolent components of multidimensional heterosexism are positive-stereotypic and paternalistic heterosexism. The former is defined by Walls (2008a) as “subjectively positive attitudes, myths, and beliefs that express appreciation of stereotypic characteristics often attributed to lesbians and gay men, which function by denying, denigrating, stigmatising, and/or segregating any nonheterosexual form of behaviour, identity, relationship, or community” (p. 28). Here, Walls (2008a) and I agree that such positive stereotypes are only subjectively positive, as has been reiterated throughout this chapter. However, I disagree that such attitudes represent deliberate acts of social stratification with domimative intent. As I have already discussed, the endorsement of positive stereotypes about sexual minorities is associated with less anti-gay prejudice – not more (Massey, 2010). Of course, some individuals may purposely use positive stereotypes as a way of demeaning and segregating sexual minorities (Nadal, Whitman, Davis, Erazo, & Davidoff, 2016), but the malicious intent behind such an act would be difficult – if impossible – to access using a psychometric scale as Walls (2008a) has attempted to do. In other words, the assertion that positive stereotypes about gay men are purposive acts of oppression is unfalsifiable because any and all acts of this nature could be interpreted as supporting this thesis regardless of their subjectively positive tone.

Paternalistic heterosexism, defined by Walls (2008a) as “subjectively neutral or positive attitudes, myths, and beliefs that express concern for the physical, emotional, or cognitive wellbeing of nonheterosexual persons while concurrently denying, denigrating, stigmatising, and or/segregating any nonheterosexual form of behaviour, identity, relationship, or community” (p. 27-28), also suffers from this same problem. How can one adjudicate that a heterosexual’s concern
for a sexual minority’s wellbeing is merely social dominance in disguise? This is an overly uncharitable perspective and one that may dissuade heterosexual allies from supporting LGB causes if they feel they are being miscast as prejudiced. Rather, a fairer and simpler interpretation is that, while some paternalistic behaviours towards sexual minorities may constitute over-accommodation, they are more likely to be missteps by well-meaning heterosexuals than acts of oppression (Conley et al., 2002). Indeed, there is much evidence to suggest that many heterosexuals have prosocial motivations towards sexual minorities. ‘Heterosexual allies’ are seen to have a genuine commitment to justice and civil rights, often frame their commitment to equality in terms of patriotism, religiosity, or morality, and recognise that they can ‘spend’ their privilege to bring about positive change (Russell, 2011). Such individuals are more likely to identify as women, are more educated, and have more gay and lesbian friends (Fingerhut, 2011), which are all factors commonly linked to lower levels of anti-gay prejudice.

Despite this fundamental difference of theoretical assumptions, the constructs identified by Walls (2008a) do hold some merit. While benevolent sexism theory cannot simply be extrapolated to gay men because of the aforementioned differences in intergroup relations, gay men have nonetheless been demonstrated in the literature to be targets of paternalism (Conley et al., 2002) and positive stereotypes (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007). Ostensibly positive stereotyping of minority groups has also been demonstrated to have deleterious effects on group members. For example, Asians exposed to the stereotype that they have superior mathematical abilities experience significant impairments in concentration and resultant mathematical performance, suggesting that making such high expectations salient can cause target group members to suffer performance anxiety (Cheryan & Bodenhausen, 2000). Although research has found that exposing gay men to the stereotype that they are highly fashionable can improve their performance on fashion-related tasks (Cotner & Burkley, 2013), the content of those stereotypes may still stratify that group in undesirable ways. For example, in a field study conducted by Drydakis (2015), they found that gay men job applicants received fewer interviews in traditionally male-dominated fields.
than did heterosexual men. This is likely related to the positive traits associated with gay and heterosexual men; whereas gay men are stereotyped as more warm than competent, heterosexual men are stereotyped as more competent than warm (Kranz, Pröbstle, & Evidis, 2016). While these consequences may not be intended on the individual level, it manifests on the structural level nonetheless.

Multidimensional heterosexism also does not discern between ambivalent attitudes towards gay men and lesbian women. Given that women who transgress gender-normative expectations are punished for going against patriarchal ideals (as discussed earlier in this chapter), how can lesbians – who are commonly seen to subvert acceptable gender norms (Geiger, Harwood, & Hummert, 2006) – be the targets of ‘benevolent’ attitudes such as “Lesbians are more independent than heterosexual women” (Walls, 2008a, p. 49)? It could be argued that nonheterosexuality diminishes a woman’s perceived womanhood to the point where they become mutually exclusive identities (Magee & Miller, 1992) and, thus, targets of mutually exclusive prejudices – but this seems an unlikely explanation. Further issues arise when considering how positive stereotypes may affect gay men and lesbian women in different ways. Because gender transgression is associated with disempowerment in the former group and empowerment in the latter group (Sirin et al., 2004), uniformly oppressive intentions underlying positive gender transgressive stereotypes is also unlikely (Massey, 2010). No substantive attempt has been made to reconcile multidimensional heterosexism towards lesbian women with ambivalent sexism theory, suggesting that Walls’ (2008) extrapolation of ambivalent sexism to fit attitudes towards gay men and lesbian women is in need of further justification.

3.6.4 Polymorphous Prejudice

Massey (2009) integrates queer theoretical perspectives with extant theories of modern prejudice towards sexual minorities to develop polymorphous prejudice theory, which accounts for the multitudinous expressions of positive and negative attitudes towards sexual minorities.
Massey (2009) has identified seven constructs: 1) Traditional heterosexism; 2) Denial of anti-gay discrimination; 3) Aversion towards gay men; 4) Aversion towards lesbians; 5) Valuing the gay rights movement; 6) Resistance of heteronormativity, and; 7) Positive beliefs about gay people. The first four factors are well represented in other scales measuring old-fashioned and modern prejudice towards sexual minorities (see Herek, 1984; Morrison & Morrison, 2003). The latter three are relatively new additions informed by queer-liberationist perspectives, suggesting that merely the absence of negative attitudes towards sexual minorities (i.e., ‘tolerance’; Herek, 1984) does not imply the presence of positive attitudes (Kite & Deaux, 1986).

Massey (2009) argues that positive attitudes involve empowering sexual minorities, resisting heteronormativity as a way of destabilising heterosexist norms, and positively stereotyping as a way of valuing gay men and lesbian women’s differences. This supposition raises a number of issues. On a superficial level, where is the ‘prejudice’ in these facets of polymorphous prejudice? The author argues that there is no prejudice and, indeed, all three correlate negatively with the hostile prejudice subscales, particularly the valuing gay progress subscale ($r = -0.86$). At best, this is simply a linguistic contradiction – at worst, this would imply that traditional social psychological research on prejudice towards sexual minorities is incompatible with the queer-liberationist perspective.

Further, this is not the only theoretical contradiction present in this theory. A primary directive of queer theory is to deconstruct essentialist identity categories by decoupling sexual orientation from attributes and personality traits (Jagose, 1996), yet items such as “gay men are more emotionally available than are heterosexual men” (Massey, 2009, p. 159) serve only to reinforce the essentialism that queer theorists are trying to destabilise. Massey (2009) also claims that rejection of biological explanations of sexual orientation is indicative of queer liberation yet, as discussed earlier, the belief in sexuality as a choice has been ubiquitously associated with higher levels of prejudice towards sexual minorities (Crawford, McLeod, Zamboni, & Jordan, 1999; Herek
& Capitanio, 1995) and is often relied upon as a way to undermine the legitimacy of non-heterosexuals and their demands for change (Herman, 1996).

In addition, there is a wealth of evidence suggesting that positive stereotyping is more damaging that it appears (Cheryan & Bodenhausen, 2000; Czopp, 2008, Gupta, Szymanski, & Leong, 2011) yet the assumption has been made that such attitudes are prosocial based on queer theory without any actual input from the targets of these stereotypes who may be comparatively more vulnerable than the scholars developing the theory. Such qualitative findings have shown that positive stereotyping is not as benign as Massey (2009) claims (Conley et al., 2002; Nadal et al., 2011). Regardless of this evidence, Massey (2009) argues “These qualities, instead of leading to degrading benevolence… may be viewed as truly positive and desirable” (p. 168). This rationale is especially troubling for two reasons. Firstly, internalising positive stereotypes as desirable may contribute to system justification (i.e., that structural inequality is legitimate), giving way to more oppressive outcomes (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Secondly – akin to Walls (2008a) – Massey (2009) fails to differentiate gay men and lesbian women and to appreciate that lesbian women may also be subjected to ambivalent sexism wherein positive stereotyping may also be employed as an oppressive strategy (Glick & Fiske, 1996).

In conclusion, multidimensional heterosexism and polymorphous prejudice can be critiqued in three ways. Firstly, they both misconstrue the motivations behind and consequences of positively-valenced attitudes towards gay men; multidimensional heterosexism posits they have oppressive motivations, which research evidence suggests is not the case, and polymorphous prejudice posits that they have prosocial consequences, which research evidence also refutes. Secondly, both scholar’s theoretical development proceeded with minimal input from laypeople, privileging academic theory over experiential reality. Finally, both theories fail to adequately distinguish between prejudice towards gay men and lesbian women resulting in theoretical inconsistencies with ambivalent sexism, a far more established and well-regarded theory.
3.7 Ambivalent Homoprejudice

This subchapter will advocate using the word ‘homoprejudice’ as a useful way to describe prejudice directed at sexual minorities, regardless of its valence. Finally, ambivalent homoprejudice theory will be proposed as a novel and necessary advancement and correction of extant theory.

3.7.1 ‘Homoprejudice’: A Terminological Clarification

Before entering into the theory development section of this thesis, it is first necessary to clarify the deliberate use of the term ‘homoprejudice’. Social psychologists have employed varying terminology in their investigation of prejudicial attitudes directed towards sexual minorities, contributing to an academic language barrier whereby “positions not only similar but mutually supportive seem alien to one another” (Bruffee, 1986, p. 773). ‘Homoprejudice’ is argued to be a term highly compatible with the wider literature on sexual minority prejudice and the most preferable in light of the aims of this thesis.

‘Homophobia’ (G. Weinberg 1972) has been widely criticised for having undesirable pathologising connotations (Herek, 1984) and research evidence suggests that such attitudes represent prejudice far more than it does phobia (Schiffman, Delucia-Waack, & Gerrity, 2006). Schiffman et al. (2006) further argue that this clinical association risks exonerating prejudiced individuals, framing them as the victim rather than perpetrator. Despite these issues, it is widely used among laypeople to describe sexuality-based prejudice. This is concerning because it allows prejudiced people to downplay their prejudice on the basis that it is not homophobic per se. Discourse analysis of political speeches show that this is commonly relied upon to avoid accusations of prejudice (Burridge, 2004), as can be seen in Baroness Blatch’s objections to repealing Section 28, a piece of UK legislation that prohibited the ‘promotion’ of homosexuality: “It is not homophobic to care about the moral and spiritual education of our children” (Hansard, 2000, p. 119). In disclaiming the label of ‘homophobe’, it becomes challenging from a lay
perspective to adequately label the prejudicial attitudes being endorsed in its place because laypeople do not always have access to the broad lexicon that academics do.

‘Sexual prejudice’, defined by Herek (1984) as “all negative attitudes based on sexual orientation, whether the target is homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual” (p. 19), notably focuses on the negative aspects of sexuality-based prejudice. However, the measure derived from this definition, the attitudes towards lesbians and gay men scale (Herek, 1984), only measures old-fashioned anti-gay prejudice, which is less prevalent in the UK than in other countries (McDermott & Blair, 2012). Given sexual prejudice’s synonymy with hostile old-fashioned anti-gay prejudice, this terminology was deemed unsuitable for the present theory development. Usage of the term ‘homonegativity’ (Morrison, Parriag, & Morrison, 1999) herein would also be counterproductive and confusing when trying to define ambivalent attitudes that are both negative and positive.

Finally, the utility of the term ‘heterosexism’ is similarly limited by its negative connotations; if benevolent attitudes towards gay men do, as theorised, have positive motivations, then how can they arise from an ideological system that actively seeks to deny, denigrate, and stigmatise gay men? In arguing that benevolent attitudes do have oppressive motivations, Walls (2008a) proposes changing Herek’s (1992) definition to “an ideological system that denies, denigrates, stigmatises and segregates any nonheterosexual form of behaviour, identity, relationship, or community” (p. 26-27, author’s emphasis), yet the addition of ‘segregates’ does little to allay the negative connotations central to academic definitions of heterosexism.

‘Homoprejudice’ is, thus, the most appropriate term for this thesis for a number of reasons. Its most useful asset is that it is unvalenced and accommodates both hostile and benevolent expressions of prejudice towards gay men, challenging the traditional and limited view of prejudice as antipathy (Allport, 1954). The term ‘homoprejudice’ also retains its relevance to the prejudice literature and Allport’s (1954) claim that “the net effect of prejudice is to place the object of prejudice at some disadvantage not merited by his own misconduct” (p. 9). The intentionality of a
prejudicial display is, thus, irrelevant – it is the way in which the target group (in this case, gay men) interprets it and is affected by it that is important (Nadal et al., 2011). Finally, this term also makes explicit the realist epistemology drawn upon in this thesis, which situates homoprejudice as held rather than done (the latter of which is better captured by the term ‘heterosexism’).

3.7.2 Ambivalent Homoprejudice Theory

What Walls (2008a) and Massey (2009) have both identified is that attitudes towards gay men are multifaceted, challenging traditional conceptualisations of prejudice as antipathy (Allport, 1954). Researchers have also identified that attitudes towards gay men can be subjectively ambivalent insofar that individuals overtly report feeling ‘conflicted’ and having ‘mixed feelings’ towards gay men and individual differences in this ambivalence tap subtle and less objectionable prejudice (Hoffarth & Hodson, 2014). What theorists have not been convincing about are the origins and contents of such ambivalent attitudes.

An initial point to consider is why are attitudes towards gay men ambivalent? Indeed, it would be simplistic to offer only one explanation because people may be ambivalent for a number of reasons. One potential reason is value conflict, akin to the theorised origins of racial ambivalence (Katz & Hass, 1988). Findings from the political science literature have revealed multitudinous value conflicts moderating support for gay rights and attitudes towards gay men (Craig et al., 2005; Callahan & Vescio, 2011). Religious individuals may also struggle to reconcile their religious beliefs about nonheterosexuality with their desire to be egalitarian (Bean & Martinez, 2014). Similarly, Hegarty et al. (2004) demonstrate value conflict between heterocentrism – taking the traits of heterosexuals as descriptive and prescriptive of all sexual identities – and egalitarianism. Although such an ambivalent individual may endorse egalitarian ideals, they are stymied by the upholding of heterocentric ideals, resulting in preferential treatment of heterosexuals (Hegarty et al., 2004).
Another possibility is that ambivalence towards gay men is a consequence of ambivalence towards (heterosexual) men (Glick & Fiske, 1999). As has already been discussed, heterosexual women endorse more positive stereotypes about gay men than do heterosexual men (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007; Massey, 2010). Given that women's hostile attitudes towards men arise due to a rejection of paternalism (Glick & Fiske, 1999), gay men may be stereotyped in more benevolent ways by women because they are seen as more trustworthy than heterosexual men (Russell et al., 2015). However, given that gay men still play a part in the maintenance of patriarchy (Shugart, 2003), women may still retain negative attitudes towards them. This is a particularly enlightening interpretation given that ambivalent sexism theory (Glick & Fiske, 1996; 1999) cannot very well explain ambivalent sexist attitudes toward sexual minority men and women because of its dependence on heterosexual intimacy.

Alternatively, ambivalent attitudes towards gay men may occur due to the diverse range of subcultures within this social group. For instance, the stereotype content of ‘gay men’) is both moderately warm and competent (Fiske et al., 2002; Asbrock, 2010). However, further examination of gay men’s stereotype content reveals that different gay subtypes are stereotyped in different ways. For instance, gay men in the leather/biker subculture are stereotyped in contemptuous ways, effeminate gay men are stereotyped in pitying ways, activists are stereotyped in envious ways, and stereotypes about artistic gay men approach the admiring quadrant of the SCM (Clausell & Fiske, 2005). These findings suggest that individuals may endorse ‘unconflicted’ ambivalence (see Glick & Fiske, 1996) whereby gay men are subtyped into liked and disliked groups. As such, hostile attitudes may be directed towards subtypes of gay men who are stereotyped as contemptible or envied whereas benevolent attitudes may be directed towards admired or pitied subtypes.

This can be further substantiated using the BIAS map (Cuddy et al., 2007). As has already been discussed, the BIAS map posits that different configurations of warmth and competence stereotypes about certain groups result in different behavioural manifestations of harm and
facilitation towards that group. Gay men have been documented in the literature to experience the entire catalogue of these behaviours. Active harmful behaviours towards gay men take the form of verbal gay-bashing (Bahns & Brancombe, 2011) and physical abuse (Meyer, 2012), whereas passive harmful behaviours towards gay men consist of social exclusion (Hammack & Cohler, 2011) and disownment (Reczek, 2015). Likewise, active facilitation of gay men includes defending them from and challenging anti-gay attitudes (Lapointe, 2015), and passive facilitation takes the form of coveting them as friends (Worthen, 2013). These findings appear to be a useful foundation upon which to characterise the contents of ambivalent homoprejudice as contemptuous, envious, admiring, and pitying.

Contemptuous forms of homoprejudice towards gay men are well documented in the literature. Gay men are stereotyped as incompetent due to their perceived weakness (Massey, 2010) and femininity (Madon, 1997), and also stereotyped as cold due to their association with disease (Grenfell et al., 2011), promiscuity (Kunda & Oleson, 1995), and their supposed subversion of traditional values (Clarke, 2001). These stereotypes are thus used to justify harm against gay men. For instance, anti-gay lobbying efforts typically make use of demonising imagery and depravity narratives (Irvine, 2005), sometimes refer to a conspiratorial ‘gay agenda’ (McCreanor, 1996) or frame gay rights as ‘propaganda’ (Burridge, 2004), and pejorative language about gay men often draws upon their perceived dirty sexual practices (Peel, 2005). I term this old-fashioned brand of homoprejudice ‘repellent homoprejudice’ and define it as a constellation of hostile attitudes towards gay men comprising contempt, disgust, and moral indignation.

Envious forms of homoprejudice are also well-documented in the literature – though their envious content is somewhat concealed. Envy proper, defined by Smith and Kim (2007) as “feelings of inferiority, hostility, and resentment caused by an awareness of a desired attribute enjoyed by another person or group of persons” (p. 46) can be evident in people’s opposition to gay men. Although there are an array of areas where gay men are unequal to heterosexuals, the
battle for equality is often framed as an orchestrated push towards ‘special privileges’ (Brewer, 2003) and many believe that gay men are treated better than heterosexuals in the UK (YouGov, 2014). In actuality, heterosexuals benefit from taken for granted privileges, which these envious attitudes fail to account for (Wildman & Davis, 1995; Case & Stewart, 2010).

Envy has also been implicated in prejudice towards other minority groups including Asians (Lin, Kwan, Cheung, & Fiske, 2005) and women (Glick, Diebold, Bailey-Werner, & Zhu, 1997). Further, experimental research indicates that malicious envy can be differentiated from benign envy (which is experienced somewhat as admiration) by examining attentional biases. Crusius and Lange (2014) demonstrate that malicious envy results in attentional biases towards an envied person rather than the envied object that person possesses, suggesting that this brand of envy does not reflect a desire to ‘level-up’ by gaining the envied object but rather to level the other person down by causing that person harm. In the context of heterosexuals’ envy of gay men’s perceived ‘special privileges’, individuals may deny feeling envious of these perceived advantages on the basis that they do not desire them. Instead, such an individual would exhibit their envy by attempting to harm or discredit the envied group (i.e., gay men). This is evidenced in many of the scales used to measure these modern aspects of hostile homoprejudice. For example the aversive heterosexism subscale of the multidimensional heterosexism inventory taps heterosexuals’ beliefs that “there is too much attention given to gay men on television and in the media” (Walls, 2008a, p. 49). The modern homonegativity scale also appears to tap heterosexuals’ concern for (un)fairness with items such as “If gay men want to be treated like everyone else, then they need to stop making such a fuss about their sexuality/culture” (Morrison & Morrison, 2003, p. 25). I term these attitudes ‘adversarial homoprejudice’, drawing on Glick et al.’s (2000) description of hostile sexism as “an adversarial view of gender relations in which women are perceived as seeking to control men, whether through sexuality or feminist ideology” (p. 764), and I define these attitudes as envious beliefs that gay men exaggerate the significance of their sexuality and their experiences of prejudice in order to obtain undue advantages over heterosexuals.
Admiration of gay men’s perceived positive character traits also appears to be increasingly studied in the literature. Gay men are perceived as having traits associated with warmth, such as emotional sensitivity and being sociable, as well various competencies and skills, such as a keen sense of fashion and interior design aesthetic (Conley et al., 2002; Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007; Walls, 2008a; Massey, 2009; 2010, Mohr, Chopp, & Wong, 2013; Cotner & Burkley, 2013). As has been discussed so far, these stereotypes are embodied in depictions of gay characters in the media and, for many people, this will likely be their only contact with gay men (Linneman, 2008). While these traits may appear positive to the person ascribing them, they have negative implications for gay men. For instance, subscription to the stereotype that gay men are more affluent than heterosexuals negatively predicts support for gay rights because such a high level of perceived competence undermines their status as a disadvantaged group (Hettinger & Vandello, 2014). Stereotypes such as these constrain self-expression (Cover, 2004) and may potentially pressure gay men into living up to them, given the friendship and trust afforded to those who do (Worthen, 2013; Russell et al., 2015), though more investigation would be required to see if this is the case. I term these attitudes ‘romanticised homoprejudice’ in reference to the tendency to view attitude objects more fondly than they are in reality (e.g., individuals may romanticise colonialism, Wall, 1997), and I define it as the subscription to exaggerated positive stereotypes about gay men, which consequently imagine away gay men’s structural disadvantage and misrepresent their lived experiences.

Finally, pitying affect towards gay men has received relatively little academic attention. The prevalent belief that gay men suffer from mental illness (Boysen, Fisher, Dejesus, Vogel, & Madon, 2011) and an increasing awareness of sexuality-based inequality may elicit sympathetic and pitying feelings towards gay men (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). These feelings of pity towards gay men is a significant predictor of gay rights support among heterosexuals (Cottrell, Richards, & Nichols, 2010), suggesting that pity towards gay men may motivate facilitating behaviours. However, Conley et al. (2002) document accounts of sexual minorities being over-accommodated and infantilised,
akin to that experienced by the elderly (Hehman & Bugental, 2015). Thus, pity may be interpreted as benevolence when nonheterosexuality is treated like a ‘personal tragedy’ for gay men (Corbett, 1994). As a result, a well-intentioned prosocial gesture intended to comfort or defend a gay man may cause passive harm, transmitting patronising sentiment that undermines one’s gay-affirmative identity, which may have disempowering and oppressive consequences (Thurlow, 1987). As such, I term these attitudes ‘paternalistic homoprejudice’, drawing on similar nomenclature as Glick and Fiske (1996) and Walls (2008a), and I define them as sympathetic attitudes towards gay men that simultaneously overstate gay men’s powerlessness, transmitting patronising messages and undermining personal autonomy and pride.

In summary, there are four theorised facets of ambivalent homoprejudice towards gay men, as suggested by the SCM (Fiske et al., 2002) and the BIAS map (Cuddy et al., 2007): 1) Repellent homoprejudice, which expresses contempt, disgust, and moral indignation towards gay men; 2) Adversarial homoprejudice, envious beliefs that gay men receive undeserved privileges as compared to heterosexuals; 3) Romanticised homoprejudice, a benevolent component characterised by the idealisation of gay men based on prevailing stereotypes; and 4) Paternalistic homoprejudice, stifling and overbearingly sensitive attitudes espoused by well-meaning heterosexuals who consequently make gay men feel belittled, demeaned, and infantilised (see figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1: A graphical representation of ambivalent homoprejudice theory, mapped on to the SCM and BLAS map.

Altogether, these four constructs represent an encompassing and nuanced account of heterosexuals’ complex attitudes towards gay men and gay men’s varied experiences of – often unintended – prejudice. However, given that the two benevolent components of this theory – romanticised and paternalistic homoprejudice – represent relatively new lines of inquiry in a field dominated by hostile characterisations of homoprejudice, primary data will be needed to investigate these nascent constructs further.
3.8 Prejudice and Ambivalence: Summary

This chapter has built upon the previous chapter by integrating attitudinal ambivalence theory as a way to critique and reformulate academic understanding of prejudice towards gay men. Theories of ambivalence towards women, men, Black people, disabled people, and elderly people were used to demonstrate the utility of ambivalence frameworks in literature on prejudice as well as to highlight the fundamental differences and similarities between different intergroup relations. Extant theories of ambivalence toward sexual minorities were described and three broad areas of improvement were identified: 1) That the motivations and consequences of benevolent attitudes towards gay men must be evidenced; 2) That theory should be sensitive to the experiential differences between gay men and lesbian women with regards to prejudice, and; 3) That greater efforts must be made to gather perspectives from laypeople, rather than relying on a purely academic theoretical perspective. Finally, ambivalent homoprejudice theory was proposed as a coupling of hostile (repellent and adversarial homoprejudice) and benevolent (romanticised and paternalistic homoprejudice) attitudes towards gay men, and posited that benevolent attitudes are endorsed by otherwise well-intentioned heterosexuals who are often unaware of the more negative messages such attitudes can convey.
4. Chapter Four

Qualitative Exploration of Ambivalent Attitudes towards Gay Men

The previous chapter established that hostile attitudes towards gay men (i.e., Herek, 1984; Morrison & Morrison, 2003) do not provide an exhaustive account of homoprejudice towards gay men. More recent research suggests that homoprejudice may also be experienced in benevolent forms characterised by overprotectiveness and paternalism (Walls, 2008a) and ‘favourable’ stereotyping (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007), and that this is linked to pitying and admiring affect (Cuddy et al., 2007). More specifically, hostile prejudice was conceptualised as repellent homoprejudice that express contempt, disgust, and moral indignation towards gay men and adversarial homoprejudice, which is linked to the belief that gay men received undue benefits due to their minority status. On the other hand, benevolence was characterised as positive attitudes that are intended as positive due to their superficially positive feeling tone, but may nonetheless be interpreted as negative by gay men. This took the form of romanticised homoprejudice; the subscription to admiring and aspirational stereotypes about gay men that transmit microaggressive message and trigger discomfort, and paternalism; protective and sensitive attitudes that may unintentionally make targets feel patronised and undermined.

The present chapter adopts an iterative approach to theory development and, ultimately scale development, aiming to supplement the literature review conducted thus far and address the criticisms identified in the previous chapter. This is achieved by way of a focus group study involving gay men and heterosexual men and women exploring positive and negative attitudes towards gay men. Four themes are identified, largely corroborating the theory development present in the previous chapter. Limitations and implications for scale development are discussed.
4.1 Limitations of Previous Research

Previous research investigating benevolent attitudes towards gay men has typically been approached from a post-positivist perspective insofar that the emerging theory is validated with a quantitative measure explicitly designed for such a purpose (i.e., Walls, 2008a). Although this approach may be a useful tool for assessing how well data ‘fit’ prescribed theory (that is, it indicates the extent to which deductive theory development has been successful in capturing a particular phenomenon; Clark & Watson, 1995), it also hampers the ability of theoretical constructs to be organically drawn from data. Such an approach ultimately privileges scale development over theory development (Hogan, 2007), which is especially problematic when the theory is only in a nascent stage of development.

Rather, I argue that a systematic approach to scale development is required in order to fully conceptualise the phenomena under investigation and prepare them for operationalisation in scale form. To this end, I refer to Luyt’s (2012) framework for mixing methods in quantitative measure development, validation, and revision. The first stage of this framework comprises three levels. The first level involves defining the background concept, that is, “the broad constellations of meaning and understandings associated with a given concept” (Adcock & Collier, 2001, p. 531). The previous chapter developed definitions of four broad facets of ambivalent homoprejudice towards gay men in light of extant empirical and theoretical literature; this chapter aims to nuance these constructs further using primary data. The second level involves developing the systematised concepts, described by Luyt (2012) as a “narrower or more specified set of subordinate concepts that underlie the background concept” (p. 299). The principal research question at this juncture is: beyond the scope of the contents of repellent, adversarial, romanticised, and paternalistic homoprejudice identified thus far, how else may these attitudes be expressed? Luyt (2012) identifies focus group methodology as a useful aid to identifying and conceptualising these systematised concepts because the operationalisation (i.e., scale items) of these concepts can use
the terminology and rhetoric employed in group discussion (Nassar-McMillan & Borders, 2002). As a result of this approach, the operationalisation of these concepts in scale form (the third level of this process, which is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5) will demonstrate enhanced content validity because the items will tap a greater breadth and depth of the background concept.

4.2 Qualitative Inquiry

Qualitative methods are a particularly advantageous tool when attempting to capture a rich understanding of people’s beliefs about and attitudes towards various contentious issues (Zorn, Roper, Broadfoot, & Weaver, 2006). The detail lost in the reductionist scale development process is retained in the exhaustive data transcription process, which is particularly valuable in research areas where secondary sources are scarce.

Furthermore, conducting qualitative analysis before constructing a psychometric measure allows ideas and concepts which had not been anticipated by the researcher to be integrated into subsequent scale development (Hinkin, 1995) resulting in a more ‘complete’ measurement tool. This is an extremely important consideration for researchers to make when seeking to create measures of attitudes that they do not endorse themselves. Likewise, those researchers that are the targets of such attitudes may come to rely on their own lived experience and introduce bias when generating their scale items. Qualitative research is also advantageous in addressing the latter issue because it emphasises the importance of reflexivity; an introspective account of the epistemological and ontological factors that may influence the way in which data collection and analysis was conducted (Mauthner & Doucet, 2003). By acknowledging, or ‘bracketing’, these factors, the qualitative research process becomes more transparent and the researcher gains additional insight into the subtle ways in which they may be influencing the data and its analysis (Ahern, 1999). I engage in this process later in this chapter.

Finally, the use of qualitative research with a view to developing an attitude measurement tool is a useful way to actively involve the targets of these attitudes (i.e., gay men) in the theory
and subsequent scale development. Not only does this empower the group by privileging their views over those groups whose representation in society is comparatively larger but it will also enhance the content validity of one’s systematised concepts, resulting in an initial item pool with greater “comprehensiveness and representativeness” (Yaghmaie, 2003, p. 25) than one generated without such input.

Focus group methodology was decided to be a particularly useful way to collect such data because of the emphasis on investigating inter-participant interactions (Kitzinger, 1994). Group discussion of potentially controversial subject matter may cause participants to (dis)agree with each other or elaborate on each other’s points, providing interesting interactional sequences to analyse. Further to this, deliberate focus group composition can manufacture a group dynamic whereby heterosexual participants (who may be reticent to talk about their attitudes towards gay men) outnumber the gay facilitator, fostering an environment where participants may be more willing to share their thoughts and feelings during the discussion. Inversely, gay men will be more empowered to talk about the issues that are important to them without heterosexuals overruling their lived experiences, stymying the ability of the facilitator to elicit further data from them.

4.3 Purpose of Study 1

Exploring heterosexuals’ potentially mixed beliefs, thoughts, and feelings about gay men as well as gay men’s own experience of repellent, adversarial, romanticised, and paternalistic homoprejudice will address a considerable void in this area of research. To date, no such exploratory qualitative study into positively- and negatively-valenced prejudice towards gay men exists. Such a methodological approach is also be a useful way of bridging the gap between the different epistemic stances that have been drawn upon thus far, as qualitative data can be readily interpreted from both realist and relativist perspectives, allowing for diversity of academic inquiry. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to: 1) Corroborate and nuance the background concepts pertinent to ambivalent homoprejudice as outlined in the previous chapter; 2) Elaborate and add
to the systematised concepts identified thus far; 3) Examine the relationship between these concepts; and 4) Investigate the reported consequences of endorsing or being the target of ambivalent homoprejudice.

4.4 Method

4.4.1 Reflexive Statement

Before proceeding with a description of how this study was carried out, I will briefly engage in the process of reflexive bracketing whereby I will “be honest and vigilant about [my] own perspective, pre-existing thoughts and beliefs, and developing hypotheses [and] … recognise and set aside (but not abandon) [my] a priori knowledge and assumptions” (Starks & Trinidad, 2007, p. 1376). To this end, I include a brief personal statement below:

I (the first author) am a 24-year old White gay man and have come from a working class background. Throughout my childhood and adolescence, I was exposed to a great deal of anti-gay sentiment. My most extreme experience of this occurred when I was 10 years old when my upstairs neighbour – who became an acquaintiance of my father – was arrested and imprisoned for luring a gay man away on what was ostensibly a date, and kicking him to death. For the interested reader, the victim’s name was Lee Harvey. Nowadays, I rarely experience the hateful anti-gay climate that I experienced when I was younger, but I have grown increasingly conscious of the ways in which I am positively stereotyped by people who I consider to care a great deal about me. My own experiences of a diverse range of reactions to my sexual orientation, thus, fuels my interest in this topic and my assertion that benevolent homoprejudice is largely unintentional is not just from an academic perspective, but also from a personal one.

4.4.2 Participants

Twelve heterosexual participants (3 men and 9 women) between the ages of 18 and 50 years ($M = 25.3$) participated in 3 focus groups (consisting of one group of five discussants, one
group of four discussants, and one group of three discussants). Ten gay male participants between the ages of 19 and 52 ($M = 31.2$) participated in 4 focus groups (consisting of three groups of two discussants and one group of three discussants). Of the heterosexual participants, ten were white, one was black, and one was Asian. All of the gay men were white. The highest level of education attained was a Masters level degree, and the lowest level of education attained was the British A-level school leavers’ qualification. The participant pool included undergraduate and postgraduate students, and skilled and unskilled professionals. Focus group composition was segregated insofar that heterosexuals and gay men took part in separate discussions. While some researchers may argue that heterogeneous focus groups offer opportunities to explore disagreement between focus group discussants (Hollander, 2004), it is argued here instead that the structural asymmetry between gay men and heterosexuals would stifle the discussion. For example, heterosexual discussants may feel reticent if there are equal numbers of gay and heterosexual discussants. Similarly, the presence of heterosexuals in this forum may make the gay discussants feel reluctant or unable to share their personal experiences. It is for this reason that the focus groups were segregated in this manner.

4.4.2.1 Sampling

Participation was solicited in a variety of ways. Heterosexual participants were recruited from local social media community pages ($n = 4$) and online message boards (e.g., Gumtree; $n = 2$), as well as from the psychology department in exchange for course credit ($n = 6$). Gay participants were recruited from gay-oriented social media pages ($n = 5$), local message boards ($n = 1$), from the psychology department in exchange for course credit ($n = 1$), and from geospatial social networking apps (e.g., Grindr; $n = 3$), which have proven to be an excellent source of prospective gay male participants for researchers elsewhere (Burrell et al., 2012; Usher et al., 2014).
4.4.3 Procedure

Participants were seated around a table in a meeting room at a university in the East of England and invited to read an information sheet detailing their participation in the study and a consent form to sign copies of. One copy of the consent form was retained by the participant in the event that they wanted to withdraw from the study. Further, the facilitator (first author) verbally explained that the participants would be voice-recorded, that personally-identifying information (names, locations, etc.) would be replaced in the transcript, and that participants could withdraw at any time without penalty or consequence. In order to facilitate open discussion, participants were encouraged to be respectful of other participants and their right to confidentiality, as well as to listen and interact with each other during the course of the focus group. This research obtained ethical approval from the Faculty Research Ethics Panel (FREP), the authority delegated by the University to assess ethical adherence in high-risk research.

Two semi-structured topic guides were developed in order to guide the group discussions – one for the gay men focus groups and one for the heterosexual focus groups. The focus groups were organised in this way in order to facilitate both samples feeling comfortable about sharing with the group and to reduce, as much as possible, the motivation to control prejudiced reactions (Dunton & Fazio, 1997). The first part of the topic guide in both gay and heterosexual groups focused on two vignettes detailing a strained interaction between a heterosexual and a gay man. Vignettes have been shown to be particularly useful tools when researchers want to encourage openness to discussion and self-disclosure on issues where social desirability may otherwise limit such data being elicited (Borrill, Lorenz, & Abbasnejad, 2012).

Specifically, these interactions would be interpreted from an academic perspective as ‘microaggressive’; that is, they contained “brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioural, or environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative slights and insults towards members of oppressed groups” (Nadal, 2008,
p. 23). The first vignette described an ostensibly positive interaction that made a gay character feel uncomfortable:

James is an 18-year-old openly gay man and is moving in to student halls of residence for his first year of university. While moving in, he strikes up a conversation with his new neighbour, Diane. Wanting to be open with everyone from the outset, he drops into conversation that he’s gay and Diane reacts enthusiastically, exclaiming “Awesome! I’ve always wanted a gay friend! My cousin’s gay, you’d look totally cute together!”

James goes along with it, not wanting to spoil a potential friendship, but the comments make him feel uncomfortable.

Although Diane’s intentions were, on the face of it, positive and prosocial, it was experienced as a dehumanising and exoticising microaggression by James. Sexual minorities commonly document being targets of these microaggressions (Nadal et al., 2011). Comments such as these may be symptomatic of romanticised homoprejudice, and identification with the vignette was anticipated to lead to the group elaborating on other potentially benevolent aspects of homoprejudice.

The second vignette detailed a relatively more hostile exchange between a gay man named Yotam and another heterosexual person, Yasmin:

Later in the year James meets Yotam, another gay student on his course, and they start dating each other. After a month of dating, they decide that things are going to well that they should be introduced to each other’s friends. James brings Yotam along to a night out and his friends get along with Yotam very well. As James’s friends drink more, they become bolder in the topics they talk about around the pair and one friend, Yasmin, asks them “Soooo… Who does what when you… Y’know what I mean”.

Although James tries to evade the topic, Yotam tells Yasmin to mind her own business and Yasmin later remarks to James that she doesn’t like Yotam because he is “Moody”.
This vignette also taps a number of microaggressions that sexual minorities commonly experience. In a similar fashion to the first vignette, this interaction also employs exoticising microaggressions – though in this instance, it is by way of intrusive and oversexualised questioning. Secondly, it conveys the assumption that intimacy between men only serves to emulate the penetrative and receptive elements of sex between men and women. This was also anticipated to prompt further discussion about hostile aspects of homoprejudice. On the face of it, it may make sense to have employed four vignettes encompassing the four facets of ambivalent homoprejudice, but this was avoided for two reasons. The first reason was simply that there would not have been enough time to cover four vignettes in sufficient detail. The second justification was that including four vignettes explicitly tapping the four theorised components of ambivalent homoprejudice may have been overly leading. For these reasons, the topic guide was restricted to two vignettes that tapped the broader concepts of hostile and benevolent homoprejudice.

The second part of both the heterosexual and gay focus group discussions focused on findings from a YouGov poll (2014), which asked 1,958 British adults ‘Do you think that gay people in the UK are generally treated equally, better, or worse than straight people?’. This was included in a package alongside the vignettes and provided to the participants. During the focus groups, this question was clarified and participants were asked how they thought specifically gay men were treated in relation to heterosexuals in the UK and to draw on their own experiences of this. The participants were then encouraged to discuss the findings of the survey and the ways in which they thought gay men were treated equal to, worse than, and better than heterosexual people. Where heterosexual participants identified gay men being treated better than heterosexuals, they were asked to consider the extent to which envy characterised this perception. Given that adversarial homoprejudice is theorised to arise from perceptions of gay men being (unjustly) treated better than heterosexuals, discussion about this issue was anticipated to arise from this line of questioning. Similarly, heterosexual participants were encouraged to talk about pitying affect if they believed that gay men were treated worse than heterosexual. Likewise, discussion about gay
men’s disadvantage and reported sympathetic attitudes towards gay men were anticipated to arise from this line of questioning. Inversely, gay participants were asked if they could recall instances where they felt envied or pitied by heterosexuals by virtue of their perceived relative (dis)advantages. Data discussions such as this have also been found to be an effective way of encouraging discussion about topics that participants may be inclined to present themselves in a socially desirable way (Borrill et al., 2012).

The final section of the focus group introduced the concept of microaggressions to heterosexual participants and asked them to categorise statements considered microaggressive in Nadal et al. (2011) as microaggressive or not. They were then asked if they could recall instances of using such statements and whether gay men should excuse them as simply benign mistakes. This was included in order to assess the reported intentionality of such comments. For the gay focus groups, participants were introduced to the concept of benevolent prejudice (adapted from Glick & Fiske, 1996) and were provided with a number of examples arising from prior theory development and from the facilitator’s personal experience. Participants were encouraged to recall any similar experiences of what they deemed to be benevolent prejudice. Further, participants were asked how they appraised this benevolence and how such attitudes made them feel in order to ascertain whether exposure to benevolence fuels similar psychological dilemmas to those identified in the microaggression literature (Sue, 2010). For transparency and brevity’s sake, the topic guides are included as Appendices 1 and 2.

The focus group discussions lasted between 90 and 120 minutes and, upon completion, participants were debriefed and invited to supply an email address that the researcher could use to send a £15 shopping voucher as a token of appreciation for their time. In the event that a participant was enrolled on the psychology course, they were offered course credit instead. Participants were then thanked for their time and advised that they would soon receive their remuneration.
4.4.4 Data Analysis

The facilitator transcribed the focus group recordings verbatim (i.e., inclusion of conversational features such as false starts and paralinguistic cues such as “erm” were included). Halcomb and Davidson (2006) suggest that the case in favour of verbatim transcription is a poor one, given the increasing demands it places on the transcriber and the seemingly negligible pay-off. However, in the present study, the aspects of speech that might be erased during the production of a ‘clean’ transcript, such as false starts, may potentially be indicative of ambivalence insofar that it could represent a rapid shift from positive to negative evaluative positions. QSR NVivo 10 was used to organise the data and facilitate the analytic process. The order in which the transcripts were coded was randomised. The data were subject to thematic analysis as outlined in Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006), who propose a top-down (i.e., theory-driven or deductive) and bottom-up (i.e., data-driven or inductive) dual coding procedure. This method of analysis was chosen for two reasons. Firstly, there was enough identified research in the literature to rule out an entirely inductive grounded theory approach. Secondly, the previous chapter critiqued other approaches to this topic on the basis that they prioritised theory over data; addressing this critique necessitates an analytic approach that privileges both.

The first stage is integral to all qualitative analyses; a “careful reading and re-reading of the data” (Rice & Ezzy, 1999, p. 258), which is initiated in the transcription process and repeated with each iteration of coding. Next, the development of the coding manual begins. This began with a template of theory-driven codes identified a priori, which were labelled, defined, described as they were anticipated to arise in the data, and categorised according to their conceptual discreteness (see table 4.1). These were entered into NVivo as nodes and applied to a single transcript by the first author and first supervisor who identified meaningful units of text for each code, and no notable differences in interpretation were reported. The other six transcripts were then coded in this manner in the aforementioned randomised order.
Next, the data were summarised around the main discussion points. Not only did this facilitate the development of themes, but this also highlighted epistemological differences between the two groups’ perceptions of what was ‘reality’ and ‘truth’. As can be seen in table 4.2, gay men’s exclusion from blood donation was not brought up in any of the heterosexual focus groups, but was brought up in three of the four gay focus groups. Clearly, there are epistemological and ontological difference between the heterosexual and gay male participants in this instance; the two groups may have differing knowledge about the issues affecting gay men, may be differently able to access these issues, or may attach differing levels of importance to these issues (Krueger, 2014). Sue (2010) has identified that reality clashes such as these are integral to how microaggressions are differentially understood by privileged and oppressed groups. As such, this approach provides important insight into how ostensibly positive attitudes and behaviours can be interpreted as more malevolent than intended in the present qualitative analysis.

During the process of summarising the data, the transcripts were coded again, this time using data-driven codes applied to units of text with recurring meaning throughout the transcript. These codes were defined and described in NVivo, and approximately 150 codes were applied to over 1300 units of text. The coded data were then summarised around the research aims set out at the beginning of this chapter. This provided an initial thematic template to be developed throughout the analysis as well as a means of assessing the validity of the concepts identified in the previous chapter by way of their emergence (or lack, thereof) in the focus group discussions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code 1</th>
<th>In-text label</th>
<th>Warmth</th>
<th>Are gay men’s motives towards heterosexuals positive?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Kind, amicable, humorous, sociable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: A theory-driven code in the ‘Stereotype Content Model and Behaviour from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes Map’ category alongside its definition and description
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discussion point</th>
<th>FG1 (Het)</th>
<th>FG2 (Het)</th>
<th>FG3 (Gay)</th>
<th>FG4 (Gay)</th>
<th>FG5 (Gay)</th>
<th>FG6 (Het)</th>
<th>FG7 (Gay)</th>
</tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.2: A single discussion point summarised across the seven focus groups**
Finally, the identified themes were corroborated by scrutinising their constituent codes to ensure they were a faithful representation of the data. The themes were then clustered to form second-order themes, as can be seen in Table 4.3.

### 4.5 Findings

The heterosexual participants expressed a range of hostile and benevolent attitudes towards gay men. Particularly prevalent in focus groups one and two were attitudes resembling the previously theorised concept of adversarial homoprejudice, a hostile and envious facet of ambivalent homoprejudice couched in the belief that gay men receive undeserved privileges as compared to heterosexuals. Such attitudes typically drew on the belief that gay men are no longer oppressed, that gay men make illegitimate demands for change, and that gay men’s ostentatiousness was their downfall, akin to modern homonegativity (Morrison & Morrison, 2003). However, other abstract hostilities towards gay men beyond the scope of modern homonegativity also emerged in the data, including the belief that gay men use accusations of prejudice to achieve their goals and that heterosexuals are silenced by gay men’s sensibilities.

To a lesser extent, repellent attitudes that express contempt, disgust, and moral indignation towards gay men also emerged in the analysis. Data provided by the gay participants suggest that many of these attitudes arise in the workplace and in schools and that they revolve around religious objections and perceptions of sexual deviance among gay men. Some gay participants also reported suffering verbal and physical violence, which they attributed to their sexuality.

Benevolent attitudes reflecting aspects of homopositivity (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007) and positive-stereotypic heterosexism (Walls, 2008a) also emerged in the analysis and resembled the previously identified concept of romanticisation, the enthusiastic admiration for gay men. These positive stereotypes about gay men tapped warmth (e.g., funny) as well as competence (e.g., affluent), yet were critiqued by gay participants for misrepresenting their lived experience, excluding gay men who fail to live up to them, and dehumanising gay men as accessories.
Finally, paternalism emerged in the analysis similar to its prior conceptualisation as stifling and overbearingly sensitive attitudes espoused by well-meaning heterosexuals who consequently make gay men feel belittled, demeaned, and infantilised. Many of the heterosexual participants evidenced prosocial motivations towards gay men characterised by the belief that they are wrongfully disadvantaged in society and, thus, need help and protection. However, some of the behavioural manifestations of these sympathetic attitudes were interpreted as patronising and demeaning by the gay participants, and elicited psychological conflict.

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Table 4.3: A graphical representation of the thematic structure; (D) denotes deductive codes, (I) denotes inductive codes.
4.5.1 Theme 1: Adversarial Homoprejudice

Based on the SCM (Fiske et al., 2002) and the BIAS map (Cuddy et al., 2007), adversarial homoprejudice was theorised to be envious affect towards gay men arising from evaluations of gay men as cold (i.e., that they have negative intentions towards heterosexuals) and competent (i.e., that they have the means to achieve their goals) and that this envy results in passive facilitation (e.g., including) and active harm (e.g., attacking).

The ascriptions of coldness traits to gay men was particularly prevalent in focus group one; Grace, a heterosexual woman, described gay men as “quite offensive” (FG1; 105), “loud and brash… and outspoken” (FG1; 137), “intimidating” (FG1; 140), “annoying” (FG1; 465) and recalled individuals who would “bitch about you to his friends” (FG1; 142) and be critical, “that dress is really ugly, oh don’t worry honey, you can change” (FG1; 572). Fiona, a heterosexual woman, repeated and expanded upon Grace’s description of gay men as offensive and annoying, claiming “they [gay men] don’t have a filter” (FG1; 560). Fiona further claims that “they’re [gay men] also quite weird with girls… they’ll grab your boobs or your bum” (FG1; 574-575). Luca, a heterosexual man, corroborates this, recalling “they was [sic] like a couple and I was working like part time and they grabbed my arse, one of them… they were just complimenting me and I don’t want it” (FG1; 583-585). Cold traits were also discussed in focus group two; Lara, a heterosexual woman, spoke of gay men being exclusionary, “I have seen people and they’ve been very serious and they say if you’re straight, you’re white, and you’re happy with your gender, I don’t wanna know you” (FG2; 689-691) and also reiterated the perceptions of gay men as loud and imposing in the first focus group, “If they’re being flamboyant and maybe overly exposing themselves… like walking around in skimpy clothes and shouting… shut up, go away and put some clothes on” (FG1; 897-899).

Traits such as these were commonly used to blame gay men for heterosexuals’ lack of social acceptance of gay men and the most extreme instance of victim blaming was shared by
Hakeem, a heterosexual man. He first begins with a minimising statement to the gay facilitator, “don’t take it personally” (FG2; 563) before continuing, “I don’t think gay men will ever be accepted overall… I think the more you fight for it [equality], the more you try to shove it down people’s throats… if you keep putting it out there, people are gonna resist more… I think it’s just becoming a vicious circle there, and every time you shove it down our throats, we get more aggressive” (FG2; 563-567). Hakeem later continues, “you never see a heterosexual parade, but you only see the gay parade and once I see that gay parade I’m like, okay, why are you – because you are exposing your gayness to me – it’s, you’re shoving it down my throat in some way, so that means… you’re gonna take my reaction towards it” (FG2; 571-574). This sentiment was echoed by Tim, a gay man, “I’m not saying I’ve got anything against people who are really sort of in your face camp, but I do think they do a disservice to the rest to us who aren’t like that really and it’s not helping society move forward because people are still seeing people like that and saying ‘look at- look at them, urgh’ and I inwardly am thinking ‘yes, I know what you mean’” (FG3; 913-916).

Not only does this perspective place an onus on gay men to police their identities in order to be accepted, but it also shares victimhood with heterosexuals who are depicted as justifiably responding to gay ‘aggressors’ in hostile ways. As Sue (2010) describes it, “this interpretation not only has the perpetrator “blaming the victim,” but it also has the perpetrator “playing the victim”!” (p. 53).

Competence traits were also ascribed to gay men – particularly by the participants in focus group one. Many of the aforementioned cold traits were argued by the participants to be justified by gay men on the basis of sexuality. Returning to the sexual assaults discussed earlier, Fiona reasons that gay men use their sexuality as a way of minimising such a harmful behaviour, “they think they can do what they want… and it’s fine because they’re gay so it’s not actually sexual” (FG1; 574-576). This is followed up later by an interaction between Fiona and Luca, who claim that challenging such a behaviour would result in them being labelled as a homophobe, compelling
them to acquiesce (which may loosely be interpreted as passive facilitation in the form of tolerance) to inappropriate behaviours:

“Fiona: If you see like a guy at a pub at the bar grabbing the waitress’s arse-

Luca: You would hit them

Fiona: Yeah, they’d make such a big deal out of it whereas a gay guy can just do it and be like ‘oh I was just joking’

Luca: If I would have done that, he would have said it’s against us

Fiona: It would be homophobic” (FG1; 586-591)

While Fiona, Grace, and Luca seemed to be alluding to gay men using accusations of prejudice as weapons against heterosexuals, Clare, the other heterosexual participant in this focus group, instead alluded to an attribution bias explanation of gay men having a keen sense of perceived prejudicial slights. On the topic of questions about gay sexual practice, Clare argued “I think because we have a stereotype about them [gay men], they have a stereotype about us – that we only ask these questions because they’re gay and not because they’re your friends and that’s what you do with your friends” (FG1; 298-300) and, in response to this, Grace ponders “I guess it could be a defence” (FG1; 307). Indeed, Sue (2010) has argued elsewhere that such hypervigilance is a defensive microaggressive stressor leading to a cultural mistrust of majority groups by oppressed groups. However, taken to its logical extreme, Sue (2010) suggests that this hypervigilance could result in “marginalised group members… seeing] racism, sexism, and heterosexism everywhere… externalising all their failings and avoiding responsibility for their own actions” (pp. 103-104), which may explain the claims that gay men use their sexuality to excuse behaviour deemed inappropriate.

As well as claiming that gay men used their sexuality to excuse cold personality traits, the majority of participants in focus group one also claimed that gay men used their sexuality to get
special privileges at work. Grace argued “at work, they [gay men] suck up – it’s a personality trait – they suck up to the manager… a lot of people wouldn’t get away with that, or they get like privileges” (FG1; 327-328). Fiona later elaborates on this perception of workplace inequality, claiming “if the gay employee does something wrong, the boss might feel like he can’t say something because it’ll be like ‘oh, you’re doing this because I’m gay’ so I feel they kinda use it as an advantage sometimes” (FG1; 337-340). These perceptions of outgroup advantage were coupled with the denial of societal heterosexism. Luca claimed “In London, everybody is okay with it [homosexuality] and you don’t see worse [treatment], everybody is happy with gay people” (FG1; 504-505) and, when asked whether or not they felt that gay men were oppressed in the United Kingdom, Grace, Fiona, and Luca all responded in the negative.

Altogether, these evaluations of gay men as being cold and competent – for some – were associated with feelings of malicious envy. When asked whether they envied the perceived advantages discussed in the focus group, Grace and Fiona initially responded in the negative, before shortly clarifying:

“Grace: I think if they get away with the things that we’ve spoken about like [negative] comments, I’m not jealous of that because I’m not that kind of person that would wanna make-

Fiona: It’s not jealous, it’s just you kinda feel like that it’s a bit unfair they should have it but you don’t want it” (FG1; 624-627)

Rather than desiring the perceived advantages of being a gay man that Fiona and Grace identified throughout the focus group and attempting to ‘level-up’ their own status to attain them, they instead argue that gay men should be ‘levelled-down’ by removing their perceived exemption from criticism (i.e., malicious envy; Crusius & Lange, 2014). Gay participants also noted subtle – potentially envious – slights from heterosexual colleagues at work related to perceptions of favouritism. Jim, a gay man, recalls “you might get the odd office bitchiness where sorta, somebody will sit there and say… ‘you’ll get away with anything because she likes the gays’” (FG5; 914-916)
and another gay participant, Neil, similarly reports perceptions of favouritism at work, “I just got a promotion at uni and my boss is gay and the general assumption from some of my friends is that I got that because he fancies me rather than on my own merit, whereas I would like to believe – and I do believe – that I got it because I’m good at my job” (FG7; 695-697). Rather than the active harm towards envied targets that is to be expected within the context of the BIAS map, these demeaning comments are more representative of passive harm in the form of relational aggression (e.g., gossiping; Crothers, Lipinski, & Minutolo, 2009). This passive manifestation of aggression towards gay men may be related to the previously-identified concerns that heterosexuals who outwardly criticised gay men would be accused of prejudice, potentially suppressing the active harm hypothesised by the BIAS map.

To summarise, adversarial homoprejudice is characterised by evaluations of gay men as both aggressive and socially and sexually manipulative, resulting in the belief that gay men’s ostentatious behaviours are their downfall, that they no longer experience prejudice, and that gay men actually receive preferential treatment, special privileges, and free passes by virtue of their sexual orientation. These perceptions of illegitimate outgroup advantage appear to elicit envious affect and passive harm rather than active harm, contrary to the predictions of the BIAS map (Cuddy et al., 2007).

### 4.5.2 Theme 2: Repellent Homoprejudice

Repellent homoprejudice – theorised to be contempt, disgust, and moral indignation towards gay men – also emerged in the data. Cold traits were also implicated here but rather than these traits portraying gay men as an annoyance as was seen in the previous theme, gay men’s negative intentions towards heterosexuals appeared to be framed in terms of sexual deviance. Carl, a gay man, recalled a gay friend’s experiences of prejudice in light of their contact with children at work, “A friend of mine, a teacher – a primary school teacher – he would be nervous about beingouted because… people still conflate homosexual behaviour with suspect sexual tendencies”
Jim also spoke of a gay friend’s experiences in teaching, “as I said, you know, a gay teacher, well, he’s a gay teacher, he wants to teach children, he must be a paedophile, and that’s literally the jump that’s made in three steps and, you know, it’s completely as far from the truth as possible” (FG5; 632-634). Oliver – himself a childcare assistant – voiced similar concerns about connotations of sexual deviance when he was passed over for work in favour of a female staff member, “I kinda got this sense, oh no, it’s like, it’s more appropriate for a woman to look after them… but I think perhaps I got a sense that it was like, we can’t have you because, you know, I’m homosexual” (FG4; 741-744). Later, Oliver talks about a more overt experience of discomfort with his sexuality in the workplace, “I had a boss recently, that was it, I was talking with a colleague about my upcoming wedding and that, and I could see he was so uncomfortable and his behaviour, once he found out – maybe he didn’t know I was gay – once he found out I was marrying my fiancé, my husband… his attitude towards me and the way he spoke to me, I definitely felt he was homophobic” (FG4; 751-754).

Gay men were also found to be oversexualised by heterosexuals. Oliver recalls challenging a friend’s perceptions of gay men’s sex lives, “you all go to leather clubs and BDSM and I’m like, that’s a very, like, minor niche, you can’t say like all gay guys are into that, like, a lot of heterosexual people are into that” (FG4; 445-446). Paul, a gay man, also reports an experience of oversexualisation from his daughter, “she’s got two friends in the house that are gay and, you know, she decided that I couldn’t stay in her digs because there were two other gay men in the house and obviously- they have daddy issues, she said… while she’s accepting and she’s a wonderful girl, she’s still making that kind of assumption that just because I’m gay I’m gonna try and shag both her friends” (FG3; 208-212). Jim also recalls being propositioned by a heterosexual friend in a toilet, “I’ve been, you know, to the pub in the gents and I’ve gone to the loo and, you know, one of my so-called friends next to me has turned around and sorta left it [his penis] hanging there going ‘I’d bet you’d like a bit of this’” (FG5; 330-332). Paradoxically, Jim later reports that heterosexual friends have felt threatened in toilets in gay venues, “I’ve been out with straight
friends in a gay pub because we’ve ended up in a gay pub after a pub crawl and then it’s ‘come to
the loo with me’ and I go ‘why?’ and they go ‘because I don’t wanna go by myself’ and you sit
there thinking it’s just a toilet, just go. I said ‘if you’re that embarrassed, go in the cubicle’, ‘no, no,
no, just come because, you know, I’ll feel safer’ (FG5; 901-904). This fear was also reported by
Naima, a heterosexual woman, who spoke about her experiences of going to a gay club with a
heterosexual male friend, “there’s this club in London called Heaven and it’s a gay club and we’re
all like saying we should go there, we should go there, and he was like I don’t wanna go to a gay
club, I don’t wanna go because I don’t want all the guys to hit on me” (FG6; 517-519).

Incompetence characteristics were also associated with gay men. Hakeem – who has a
fighting background – talks of his own friendship circle’s attitudes towards gay men, “If we come
to a confrontation [with a gay man] and we’re like ‘no, don’t do that or don’t say that’, he’d be like
‘what’s he gonna do? He’s gay’, so you would assume because he’s gay, he’s weak, he’s almost-
you’d put him like he’s almost worthless” (FG2; 169-171). Hakeem’s discussion about gay men
being associated with weakness continued as he discussed a cage fight between a gay man and a
heterosexual man, “during the ring when you have to stand in front of each other and the ref is
talking to you, the other guy gave him a smooch just because he was gay and he just winked at him
like, it’s like- the whole thing is like you’re mine, you’re my toy now in the ring, ‘cause you’re gay”
(FG2; 178-181). This culture also led to passive harm, as Hakeem explains, “If you’re gay, you’re-
even the coach will probably not wanna train you, he doesn’t wanna be associated with you because
they don’t think fighting is much of a feminine thing” (FG4; 182-183). Jane, a heterosexual woman,
also reiterated perceptions of incompetence among gay sportsmen, “certain football teams and
managers might not want to buy that player… if their preconceptions of someone who is
homosexual is that they’re weaker” (FG4; 508-510).

Traits such as weakness and femininity may be gleaned from heterosexuals’ knowledge of
receptive (colloquially referred to as ‘bottoming’) and penetrative (colloquially referred to as
‘topping’) sex roles among gay men. Grace pondered, “I wonder who goes on top and who’s on bottom because you associate it with certain personality traits” (FG1; 254) and Oliver describes this as trying to “heterosexualise us” (FG4; 428-429). Whereas, penetrative sex roles were often conflated with masculinity, receptive sex roles were often conflated with femininity, as Oliver explains, “I’m the woman, he’s the man, or like someone’s dominant, someone’s sub, or someone’s top and someone’s bottom” (FG4; 428-430). Paul also reiterates this association, “they’re making a further judgement on you, you know, if you’re a top maybe you’re more masculine, if you’re a bottom, maybe you’re more of a girl” (FG3; 332-333) and this is also echoed in an interaction between Neil and another gay participant, Howard:

“Howard: … They assume that if you are a bottom then you’re less of a man and you’re a lot more feminised whereas if you’re a top then it’s a lot more masculine…”

Neil: It’s almost Roman, isn’t it? [laughs] It doesn’t matter where you stick it as long as you’re the one sticking it” (FG7; 401-405).

Indeed, anal sex seems to be a sticking point even for heterosexuals who appear accepting of gay men, as Jane explains, “my mum she says, you know, she seems generally quite accepting of people being gay but I had a riding instructor who used to be gay [sic] and she said ‘oh, he’s so lovely, I can’t believe you’d wanna have anal sex’ [laughs]… it’s very common, a lot of people are almost okay with people being gay but they don’t wanna think about what they do in the bedroom” (FG2; 212-216). Jane later returns to this topic, pointing out a diverse range of sexual expressions beyond coitus “there are lots of gay men who don’t, you know, have anal sex, they just pleasure each other and do other things… people are very, very fixated on anal sex and that’s almost like, you know, what the biggest anger is… they sort of tie it in with AIDS” (FG2; 364-368). However, for Hakeem, the legitimacy of homosexuality appears to hinge upon this coital imperative, “for guys, we understand sex as one thing and it’s only penetration… so when someone says I’m gay but my sexual, you know, routine with my partner is not anal sex… my mind would come into
such a stupid question like why would you need him there? You know, why can’t you just do it by yourself?” (FG2; 373-376). This perspective is corroborated by Jim, who recalls his discussions about sex with heterosexuals, “The biggest shock to a lot of people I’ve found, you know, if you’re having an open and a frank conversation and you kinda sit there and say well, you know, there’s a lot of gay guys who don’t do anal sex and they go ‘yeah, well you must do, how do you have sex?’ and you go ‘you don’t have to have anal sex to have sex with someone’- ‘yeah, but, you can’t be having gay sex then if you’re not having anal sex” (FG5; 410-414).

Gay identities were also delegitimised by rejecting biological essentialism, as Hakeem explains, “when you say something like that ‘he, it’s not the choosing to be gay’ [sic] they’d be like, come on, that doesn’t make sense and they argue against it scientifically saying there’s nothing wrong with their bodies and they look at the DNA and all that so they say it’s their choice… there is no way to convince them or to have them look at it, they’re always hateful towards them” (FG2; 188-192). By framing nonheterosexuality as a conscious choice, negative attitudes towards gay men can be externalised as gay men’s character flaws and, thus, victim blaming. Inversely, biological essentialism can also be wielded as a means of medicalising and pathologising gay identities, as can be seen in the following exchange between Hakeem and Lara:

“Lara: Well if the cause, well not cause, but the reason why people are gay is a biological reason and a defect, then I don’t think it’s wrong to say that it’s something that has gone wrong if it is abnormal to how people are meant to-

Hakeem: Yeah, but I wouldn’t call it a ‘defect’ either because ‘defect’ is also saying it’s wrong” (FG2; 1041-1044)

Gay participants reported experiences of both active (e.g., attacking) and passive harm (e.g., excluding) in the focus groups. Oliver, recalls a microaggressive interaction between him and an uncle, “he sent us a card on the day [of their wedding] saying ‘congratulations on your civil partnership’ and used language which I, like, found homophobic because it’s not acknowledging
that… me and Larry are married” (FG4; 643-646) and reasons that it may have religious motivations, “to my uncle, my homophobic uncle, to him, a wedding’s only a wedding if it’s in a church and the church of his religion” (FG4; 710-711), which was a theme that also continued into Oliver’s experiences of workplace bullying, “I had a boss ages ago who was an Evangelical Christian, he would vocally express his homophobia from time to time” (FG4; 745-746). Matt, another gay participant, also recalls experiences of bullying at school, “I came out when I was in year 12 and I think I got bullied about being gay before I even came out” (FG3; 350-351) and Liam also spoke of being excluded at school for being gay, “they try and kick you out of groups but they do it really discreetly… they’re obviously not comfortable with it” (FG3; 93-96). Other participants spoke of more extreme experiences; Jim, for example, recalled being a target of verbal abuse while with his partner, “I’ve walked home on a Sunday afternoon with my significant other half and we’ve been arm in arm… suddenly some chav will come by in a car and literally, deliberately slow down, hang out the car, and you’ll get a torrent of abuse just because it’s two men walking sort of arm in arm” (FG5; 68-71) and Howard spoke of his experience of physical abuse, “I’ve been beaten up for being gay, which was definitely dehumanising” (FG7; 667).

In summary, repellent homophobia emerged in the data as it was initially theorised. Gay men are associated with a range of incompetent and cold traits, and these latter traits are qualitatively different to those cold traits found to be associated with adversarial homophobia. Together, they resulted in contemptuous attitudes towards gay men, revolving around sexual disgust and religious objections, and gay participants reported experiences of active and passive harm in line with the BIAS map.

4.5.3 Theme 3: Romanticised Homophobia

Romanticised homophobia was theorised to be the admiration of gay men based on prevailing warmth and competence stereotypes, which exoticise and misrepresent the lived experiences of gay men. Gay men were perceived as competent in a range of stereotypical ways by
the participants. Chris, a heterosexual man, noted their sartorial finesse, “I dunno if this is just my internalised stereotype, but they’ve always been really… very good at knowing what shirts to put on someone else” (FG2; 745-746), which was reiterated by Luca, “I like them because they dress nice” (FG1; 787). Oliver expands upon these competence stereotypes, citing expectations that he helps his friends with interior design, “interior design is a good example, interior design- me and Larry have just bought a place and Jill’s like ‘oh, you have to help us with our house and give us advice’” (FG4; 377-378), which was similarly reported by another gay participant, Mark, “I have a flat here… and then they’re [his friend] like sitting inside and they’re like ‘oh it’s gorgeous! I should have expected it would be gorgeous, you’re gay and everything’. No, I just know how to match black and white… it’s not really hard, but they’re like ‘I could never do this well’ and I’m like, well you’re just an idiot” (FG5; 764-770).

On the face of it, these appear to be complimentary, however, Oliver highlights the disappointment that heterosexuals experience whenever he fails to live up to such lofty expectations, “People can be disappointed sometimes… like ‘come on let’s go clothes shopping’ and it’s like- I hate clothes shopping” (FG4; 63-65). Consequently, the strategy employed by many of the gay men in order to challenge positive stereotypes was self-deprecation. Paul explains, “I think we’ve got that label where we’re supposed to be good at fashion and things like that, which you can tell that’s one thing I’m terrible at” (FG3; 123-124), and this sentiment was also reiterated by Neil, “Well I have no fashion sense at all, so that’s another stereotype broken” (FG7; 134), Mark, “They think we know how to dress, to be fair, you can see what I’m wearing, you know, I can’t dress to save my life” (FG5; 41-42), and Howard, “Most of the qualities that are automatically assumed on homosexuality for gay males is [sic] usually good… I feel I genuinely don’t live up to a lot of them [laughs]” (FG7; 781-783). This strategy may be preferable, due to the dangers of more confrontational ways of challenging these stereotypes. For instance, there was an indication from Hakeem that he would respond negatively to a gay man who challenged such assumptions in a more confrontational way, “If he said something like ‘I find that offensive’ or something small,
I'll apologise, but if he makes such a big thing out of it, I think that's what would put me on the defensive and would make me also challenge” (FG2; 103-105).

The failure to live up to positive stereotypes came to be labelled as the “failed gay” (FG4; 66) by Carl, the “failed homosexual” (FG7; 794) by Neil, and “not gay enough” (FG4; 67) by Oliver. Elsewhere, Howard recalls, “I’ve just been called, like, oh you’re the worst gay, you’re terrible at it” (FG7; 182) and Neil also recalls such critique from heterosexuals:

“Neil: It’s very- when you get told you’re practically straight
Facilitator: Have you been told you’re practically straight?
Neil: Oh God yes, always in jest but obviously that comes from somewhere” (FG7; 184-186)

Conversely, gay men may also feel uncomfortable about living up to such stereotypes, as Oliver explains, “In some ways I feel I am quite stereotypically gay… you can feel bad for living up to that… thinking back in my own friendships… it can feel like I am a cliché” (FG4; 179-182)

Gay men were also associated with a range of warmth characteristics by some of the heterosexual participants. Luca claimed that, “in general, gay men are more friendly” (FG1; 80-81), Fiona described gay men as “happy and enthusiastic” (FG1; 705), “entertaining” (FG1; 737), and “sassy and outgoing” (FG1; 76) and Katie, a heterosexual woman, suggested that gay men are perceived as “more caring [and] more in touch with [their] emotions” (FG6; 144) than are heterosexual men. These perceptions appeared to motivate contact between gay men and heterosexual women because heterosexual men were seen as relatively more dangerous, as Emma, a heterosexual woman, explains, “I remember feeling safer going to gay clubs in Toronto… we didn’t have to worry about where out drinks were, you know” (FG6; 169-171). This sentiment was also expressed by Katie, “As a woman you can- there’s lots of guys, you know, you might not be able to trust them… but if you know he’s gay, then maybe you think well okay so he’s, he’s not going to be aggressive” (FG6; 165-168). Gay men similarly documented women’s perceptions of
safety in these dyads, as Matt explains, “A lot of friends I’ve had over the past few years that they’ve – girls especially – they feel more comfortable around gay men than straight men” (FG3; 139-140). Liam later elaborates on this, noting the lack of sexual compatibility between gay men and heterosexual women, “maybe it’s also the fact that it’s to do with sexual attractions maybe, ‘cause like getting changed in front of someone who is straight, you might be like oh they might fancy me” (FG3; 154-156) and Howard also highlights the lack of sexual competition within this dyadic relationship, “it’s basically having all the qualities of a friend who’s a girl but without any competitiveness in that area, so if we’re both looking for a boyfriend, for example, very rarely is it gonna be the same person you’re after” (FG7; 141-143).

Positive stereotypes about gay men and gay male/heterosexual female dyads were also related to media contact with gay men. Emma quotes a line from ‘Sex and the City’, regaling gay men, “The only thing I can think about is ‘Sex and the City’ where Samantha says something like ‘gay men know what’s important: cocktails, compliments, and cocks’” (FG6; 148-149; the true quote actually refers to ‘clothes’ rather than ‘cocktails’). Earlier in the focus group, Emma also discussed ‘Kickass’ where the eponymous hero, Kickass, must inadvertently pretend to be gay in order to get closer to his love interest, Hit-Girl, “He wants to get to know this girl and he totally has a crush on her, but she thinks he’s gay and that’s how they get to know each other, she’s like ‘oh, I’ve always wanted a gay friend’” (FG6; 94-96). Paul also noted how the media has influenced mainstream perceptions of gay men and alluded to its historical origins, “I think a lot of it, I think, comes from 60s, 70s, 80s media that played on those social stereotypes, you’re old enough to remember ‘Are you Being Served? With John Inman?’ (FG3; 660-661). The character Paul was referring to, Mr. Humphries, was well-known on British television at the time as “the smiling sales assistant, ever ready to whip out his tape measure, go down on his knees, and measure up any browsing male customer” (Healy, 1995, p. 243). Paul also cites a more contemporary influence, “‘Queer Eye for the Straight [Guy]?’ (FG3; 124-125), a show featuring the ‘Fab Five’ who “offer guidance in their respective areas of expertise to a hapless heterosexual man in search of style as a
special occasion in his life approaches” (Hart, 2004; p. 245). The aforementioned areas of expertise, food and wine, grooming, interior design, fashion, and culture all appear to feed into the positive stereotypes discussed in the focus groups.

Together, desires for a gay man as a friend because of their perceived skillset and relatively more benign nature in comparison to heterosexual men may result in the transmission of exoticising messages, as Emma points out, “it’s just quite reductionist, so a gay, I’ve wanted a, like you’ve wanted a ferret or something [laughs] you know? Like it just seems to be really objectifying and not seeing them as a full person” (FG6; 22-24). This sentiment was echoed by Jim, who felt that “gay men have become a bit more of an accessory to women now” (FG5; 21-22), and by Howard who said, “I feel like we’re being used as an accessory, like a handbag or like a Paris Hilton Chihuahua” (FG7; 128). Two of the gay participants also raised the sexual exoticisation of gay men by heterosexual women, as Liam explains, “I think a lot of friends who are women, they really, really like find gay people- gay men kissing hot” (FG3; 284-285) and Oliver discusses, “Apparently loads of heterosexual women watch gay porn… my friend Sara, he said- she said like I only watch male on male gay porn and I was like, oh my goodness, I can’t believe you watch gay porn all the time!” (FG4; 541-544). Given the linkages between heterosexual pornography consumption and attitudes condoning violence against women (Hald, Malamuth, & Yuen, 2009), this finding may also be indicative of gay men’s association with safety by heterosexual women and may feed into the benevolence that has been documented thus far.

Altogether, positive stereotypes about gay men place gay men in an intractable position; the gay participants often criticised themselves in order to refute such positive stereotypes – perhaps because refuting them in a less ambiguous manner would lead to reprisals – yet some also felt wary about living up to them. Gay men also experienced criticism from heterosexuals for what Neil described as “betraying their gay charge” (FG7; 794-795). As well as this, ostensibly positive stereotypes about gay men transmit subtly negative messages, as Neil explains, “It was generally
assumed that I would be a more pleasant housemate because I would be less messy and I would be more aware of my own personal hygiene... It makes me feel great because I think, oh, they think I’m clean and tidy and healthy and nice, that’s great, but of course it comes from them basically saying [I’m] not a normal man” (FG7; 772-777).

To summarise, romanticised homoprejudice largely emerged in the data as it was described in the initial theory development. Gay men are associated with a range of stereotypical competencies, such as being fashionable, and warmth traits such as gentleness. Attempts to challenge these stereotypes reported by the gay participants typically revolved around self-deprecation, echoing the self-directed ridicule identified by Raley and Lucas (2006) with regards to gay-themed humour in popular media. The traits ascribed to gay men also appeared to be linked to media portrayals of gay men and a phenomena termed here as ‘heterosexual safety’ (akin to the concept of heterosexual intimacy in ambivalent sexism theory; Glick & Fiske, 1996) whereby gay men are evaluated by heterosexual women as non-threatening because they do not elicit the sexual discomfort that heterosexual men do (though this is obviously caveated by an individual’s experiences of contact with gay men, given the documented experiences of sexual assault discussed in a previous section). While this resulted in passive facilitation, such as associating with gay men, this also resulted in passive harm because such stereotypes were interpreted as dehumanising and exoticising, and because those gay men who did not conform to them were seen as failures. This is a divergence from the BIAS map, because admired groups should theoretically not experience harm from allied groups and should instead experience active and passive facilitation (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007) These findings suggest that facilitating behaviours need to be interpreted from multiple standpoints – while facilitation may appear beneficent on the part of the facilitator, it may be interpreted less positively be the person being facilitated (Hehman & Bugental, 2015).
4.5.4 Theme 4: Paternalistic Homoprejudice

Paternalistic homoprejudice was initially conceptualised as stifling and overbearingly sensitive attitudes espoused by well-meaning heterosexuals, which consequently belittle gay men. These attitudes were theorised to arise from perceptions of gay men as incompetent (e.g., disadvantaged in society) and warm (e.g., benign), resulting in active facilitation, such as defending and protecting, and passive harm, such as undermining and demeaning.

Many of the heterosexual participants drew upon perceptions of outgroup (i.e., nonheterosexual) disadvantage, particularly with regards to sexuality-based violence, as Jane explains, “I don’t have to worry if I walk... holding my partner’s hand, whereas homosexual people, if the wrong person see them, they could, you know, be beaten up” (FG2; 446-450). Emma further highlights that “Matthew Shepard was in my generation” (FG6; 86) and that her awareness of anti-gay behaviour elicits negative affective responses, “If a friend had told me a story where they were discriminated against, I would definitely, I’d probably feel anger and- and frustration” (FG6; 547-548). Naima also discusses her desire for greater acceptance of nonheterosexuals, “if they [gay men] want to go travel around, a lot of other countries aren’t as tolerant as England, so it’s like, you know, to go out there and not be discriminated by, it’s much worse out there than it is here so, definitely, I wish it wasn’t like that” (FG6; 541-543).

Together, awareness of outgroup disadvantage, experiences of anger and frustration in response to this disadvantage, and the desire to redress this disadvantage all motivate sympathetic attitudes and active facilitation. This often took the form of protective behaviours; Jane recalls an instance of her mother standing up for a (assumed) gay man being harassed in a betting shop, “this jockey had obviously decided that he was [gay]… and he kept going ‘do you fancy him?’… and my mum just sorta turned to this jockey and went ‘are you jealous or unhappy? Why don’t you leave him alone?’” (FG2; 220-223) and Tara also recalls defending a gay friend who suffered bullying at a Catholic school, “on quite a few occasions I did start – not fights, but – arguments, and quite
heated debates about the way they were speaking about my friend” (FG2; 146-147). Active facilitation in the form of what came to be termed by Emma as “counterweight[ing]” (FG6; 53) was also found. Given an awareness of gay men’s negative experiences of prejudice and discrimination and a desire to uphold one’s egalitarian ideals, one may attempt to counteract gay men’s negative lived experiences by being positive, as Katie explains, “people, well, try to be sort of liberal-minded and accept people for who they are, so they don’t want to be prejudiced but they slightly overreact sometimes because it’s kind of- you know that person’s going to be getting a lot of negativity, so you kind of go a bit the other way, you just want to be positive” (FG6; 216-219). Howard also appears to allude to such a reaction, and highlights its patronising connotations, “people were trying very hard to kind of either adopt or try and present themselves as quite liberal and quite understanding… it comes across as incredibly patronising” (FG7; 40-42)

Although such help-giving behaviours appear to have prosocial motivations, they can nonetheless be interpreted as patronising and demeaning. Neil recalls his experiences of working with a protective manager when he first came out, “she practically mothered me because she assumed that I’d fall to pieces every time I was challenged… it was this need to be taken care of because, because I was less of a man and I wasn’t able to stand my ground and I needed a mother figure to look after me because, obviously, I was more emotional and all these things, which I wasn’t” (FG7; 813-816). Neil implicates the same perceptions of incompetence that were discussed earlier in this chapter: weakness. Indeed, within the context of the stereotype content model, the defining difference between pitiful and contemptible outgroups are the differential associations with warmth and coldness, respectively (Fiske et al., 2002), so a degree of overlap between these two constructs with regards to incompetence is to be expected.

Imposing paternalistic behaviours were also implicated in the coming out process for two of the gay participants. As Paul recalls, “When I first came out, the first person I told was my brother who’s 9 years older than me and he didn’t react, and the first thing he said afterwards was
‘do you want me to talk to mum and dad?’ to which my answer was ‘I’m fucking 40, I can talk to my own parents’” (FG3; 564-566). Although Paul’s brother had possibly meant to ease the perceived burden of sexuality disclosure, his proposed intervention was interpreted as infantilising by Paul. Liam also voiced his concerns about heterosexuals’ understanding of the coming out process, “sometimes you feel like you’re entitled [sic] to let people know that you’re gay, otherwise it’ll come across that you’re ashamed” (FG3; 930-931) and he goes on to talk about an interaction with his counsellor where this association was made, “they were like, if you don’t tell people, if you’re not out with it, some people might see that as you being ashamed of who you are” (FG3; 934-936). Given the dangers one may face when coming out, valorising sexuality disclosure as a moral imperative problematises non-disclosure rather than the oppressive forces that create it (Rasmussen, 2004). The coming out imperative also transmits the message that there are restricted ways in which one can be a happy and healthy gay man, which are contingent upon disclosing to heterosexuals (McLean, 2007).

Some of the gay participants also reported matchmaking behaviours by heterosexuals and highlighted the negative inferences they drew from such facilitation, as Neil explains, “I don’t think I’ve ever necessarily wanted anybody to help me find somebody and I never want anyone to assume I needed [sic] somebody and that kind of assumption can make you feel maybe slightly more insecure about yourself because you might give off a vibe that you can’t portray yourself as a strong independent person” (FG7; 55-58). Oliver suggests that this may arise from heterosexuals’ awareness of the relative size of the gay populations, “at a party I went to… it was kind of like well you two should be a couple because there’s not many [gay men] out there kinda thing… they think they’re being nice but at the same time, they are being like quite funny” (FG4; 54-56) and later in the focus group, Oliver recalls another example of matchmaking and explains its more demeaning connotations, “she was like ‘I want them to be boyfriends’, it was almost for her and it’s like oh, then I’ve got two little gays that I can take out with me” (FG4; 206-207). Luca also recalls his past attempt at matchmaking and exposes its paternalistic underpinnings, “I’ve wanted to be the
matchmaker between two gay people, it was wrong [laughs], but my intentions was [sic] right and I wanted something nice but it was like too much, I was thinking too much for them and it was wrong” (FG1; 679-681).

In summary, paternalistic homoprejudice emerged in the data similar to how it was conceptualised in terms of the SCM and BIAS map. Gay men were perceived as incompetent inasmuch as they are disadvantaged in relation to heterosexuals, and they were not believed to have negative intentions towards heterosexuals. These perceptions elicited sympathetic attitudes towards gay men and sympathetic individuals expressed frustration towards continuing inequality and sought out ways to redress is (i.e., facilitation). However, a recurring pattern among these facilitating behaviours is that they undermined their target’s autonomy and personhood; gay men were compelled to disclose their sexuality for their own good (even if they did not want to), were spoken up for yet seemingly denied a voice themselves, and were shoehorned into potential romantic relationships without regard for personal preferences. Though these behaviours often had altruistic motivations, these findings highlight their relatively more demeaning connotations – in other words, they caused passive harm.

4.6 Limitations

There are several limitations to be discussed. Firstly, the focus groups were facilitated by a gay man who may have been identified as such by the participants. Although this may have made the gay participants more willing to share their experiences, this may have caused the heterosexual participants to control their prejudiced reactions. In one focus group (FG1) the participants endorsed markedly more hostile and benevolent attitudes than those participants in the others and it is not clear whether they were simply more prejudiced participants or whether they didn’t perceive the facilitator’s identity. However, in one focus group (FG2), one participant actively attempted to allay the facilitator’s potential discomfort before voicing hostile views and it is uncertain to what extent the facilitator’s identity inhibited other participants’ responses.
Secondly, the participants were sampled in a relatively affluent city in England. Since the participants identified age and identity security as potential factors that moderate the harm caused by benevolent homoprejudice, poverty may also be another factor, given that it compounds sexual minority men’s mental ill health (Diaz, Ayala, Bein, Henne, & Marin, 2001). Unfortunately, this sampling strategy was unable to investigate this effectively. Furthermore, the ethical approval gained before undertaking this study restricted the sample to adults, whereas adolescents may be more vulnerable to benevolent homoprejudice due to their relatively less developed sexual identity. In light of the potential risk factors identified by the participants, eliciting participation from young men and boys coming to terms with their sexual orientation could have provided further insight. In addition, there was a disappointing ethnic mix in the sample – particularly among the gay men, where there were no non-white participants. This may have occurred because one sampling strategy used to solicit participation from gay men was via geospatial social networking applications aimed at gay men, which have been implicated in racial prejudice (Callander, Holt, & Newman, 2015). Black participants may have been underrepresented in this sample as a result of them being a stigmatised and, thus, underrepresented demographic in such applications. Investigating ambivalent homoprejudice using a more diverse sample would allow the research to further explore the ontological arguments advanced herein.

4.7 Conclusions

Four themes were identified during data analysis: 1) Adversarial homoprejudice, an expansion of the modern homonegativity literature (Morrison & Morrison, 2003) incorporating envious affect; 2) Repellent homoprejudice, resembling much of the literature on ‘homophobia’ and ‘sexual prejudice’ (Herek, 1984); 3) Romanticised homoprejudice, encompassing prevailing warmth and competence stereotypes (e.g., ‘homopositivity’; Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007) disseminated by contemporary Western media and their microaggressive connotations; and 4) Paternalistic homoprejudice, the prosocial desire to protect gay men from harm in light of their
relative disadvantage, while simultaneously (and unintentionally) reinforcing unequal structural relations between heterosexuals and nonheterosexuals. The qualitative findings further demonstrated that adversarial, repellant, romanticised, and paternalistic attitudes towards gay men are generally consistent with envious, contemptuous, admiring, and pitying affect within the context of the stereotype content model (Fiske et al., 2002) and that these feelings correspond with discrete combinations of active and passive harmful and facilitating behaviours (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007).

Adversarial homoprejudice was linked to the belief that gay men were cold (i.e., that they had negative intentions towards the ingroup) and competent (i.e., that they had the means to action those intentions). These stereotypes were related to the belief that prejudice towards gay men was a thing of the past and, by extension, the belief that gay men got preferential treatment akin to the perception of reverse inequality. The behavioural manifestations of this also fit well within the BIAS map (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007) inasmuch as such envious affect emerged in the data as passive facilitation (e.g., begrudgingly associating with gay men) and active harm (e.g., scapegoating and victim blaming). However, envious affect was also associated with passive harm (e.g., gossiping), which the BIAS map does not hypothesise. This discrepancy may be because the BIAS map does not take account of the suppressive forces that inhibit overt expressions of prejudice (see the justification suppression model; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). One such suppressive force may be the unique way in which gay competence was characterised by the participants. As compared to how competence in other envied outgroups such as Jews and Asians are typically conceived (e.g., wealth and intelligence, respectively), gay men’s stereotyped competencies were more socially manipulative in nature, revolving around the perception that gay men used accusations of homophobia to achieve their goals. This perception would necessitate more passive harmful behaviours because active harm would be more easily recognisable by gay men as malicious and labelled as homophobic, furthering gay men’s perceived goals.
Repellent homoprejudice also demonstrated good conceptual fit inasmuch as it was associated with cold and incompetence stereotypes and related to active and passive harm. Further, the data reiterated many of the trends documented in research on this old-fashioned brand of homophobia elsewhere; gay men were oversexualised (Kunda & Oleson, 1995), were feminised (Madon, 1997), and associated with sexual deviance (Angelides, 2005). Given these unremarkable findings and the breadth of literature already devoted to this construct, they will not be discussed further.

Romanticised homoprejudice emerged in the data as warmth and competence stereotypes pertaining to gay men’s fashion, tasteful interior design, and favourable personality traits, and these motivated facilitating behaviours, commonly voiced in the data as the desire for a ‘gay best friend’. Elsewhere in the literature, gay men have also been found to be associated with culinary skill (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007), creativity (Massey, 2009), and emotional availability (Walls, 2008a). Gay men were also perceived by most of the women participants to be sexually non-threatening and non-competitive (as has been found elsewhere; Russell, Ta, Lewis, Babcock, & Ickes, 2015), motivating gendered desires for a ‘gay best friend’ as was theorised in an earlier chapter. Although these favourable stereotypes are gender transgressive (i.e., they subvert traditional ‘sex roles’; Bem, 1974), there was little indication in the data that this combination of gay male stereotypes resembled the ‘warm-but-dumb’ stereotype levelled at women who are ascribed these same traits (Fiske, 2012).

This may be evidence of intersectionality, which was argued in the previous chapter to influence gay men’s unique experiences of prejudice. Gay men experience sexuality-based oppression and gender-based privilege and, while heterosexist oppression detracts from male privilege (as can be seen in the early pathologising of homosexuality as a failure of masculinity; Coston & Kimmel, 2012), male privilege also ameliorates one’s experiences of heterosexist oppression – in other words, intersecting identities are mutually constitutive (Bowleg, 2013). The
effect of this intersectionality can be seen in contemporary media portrayals of gay men and how they relate to their heterosexual counterparts; whereas heterosexual women are portrayed as childish and irrational, their gay foils display worldliness and competence and they take on a quasi-parental role within that dyad (Shugart, 2003). Gay men are similarly depicted in this paternalistic way in relation to heterosexual men in shows such as \textit{Queer Eye for the Straight Guy}, which juxtaposes gay men’s stereotyped skillset with the purported ineptitudes of a heterosexual man in need of help from the show’s cast, ‘the Fab Five’ (Hart, 2004). Such depictions of gay men are far better described as aspirational than pitiful and this arguably derives from male privilege because portraying gay men as superior in these contexts nonetheless maintains the patriarchal assertion that men at large are superior.

Particularly illuminating were the ways in which gay men interpreted these ostensibly positive stereotypes as microaggressions and how they challenged them, which has received relatively little academic attention (though see Nadal et al., 2011). Gay participants expressed concerns that the aforementioned stereotypes and the trope of the ‘gay best friend’ that resulted from them were dehumanising and exploitative. Further, those men who do not live up to these expectations – ‘the failed gays’ – reported being criticised by heterosexuals for their purported failings, yet confessing to one’s ‘failed gay’ status appeared to be the most accessible and least confrontational way in which these stereotypes could be challenged. This is a novel finding in the area, and one that has great importance with regards to improving wellbeing among gay men.

Research has established that gay men (as compared to heterosexual men) are particularly prone to making social comparisons against idealised images of the male physique in the media (Levesque & Vichesky, 2006) and that such comparisons may be associated with disordered eating and body dissatisfaction among gay men (Kaminski, Chapman, Haynes, & Own, 2005). Similarly, long-term exposure and attendance to romanticised stereotypes about gay men may lead to feelings of failure, life dissatisfaction, and social exclusion by heterosexuals – particularly among those gay men in the nascent stages of their sexual identity development (see Cass, 1984). ‘The failed gay’
also has worrying implications for those fleeing sexuality-based persecution, because successful asylum often hinges upon evidencing such stereotypes in order to validate one’s sexual identity (Morgan, 2006).

Paternalistic homoprejudice was coded in the data as perceptions of gay men as incompetent, but this coding occurred in tandem with neither warmth nor coldness. This is in contention with the SCM because paternalistic prejudice should be associated with pitying affect arising from incompetence and warmth stereotypes (Fiske et al., 2002). However, one subtle caveat to this can be found in their description of paternalistic stereotypes: “Paternalistic stereotypes portray out-groups that are neither inclined nor capable to harm members of the in-group” (p. 879). Believing that an out-group is disinclined to harm one’s in-group does not necessarily imply that the out-group is warm – only that the out-group is not cold. Regardless of this discrepancy, heterosexuals appear to actively facilitate gay men by protecting them from harm and assisting them with important decisions relating to their sexuality (e.g., sexuality disclosure). On the other hand, these behaviours can be interpreted as infantilising and demeaning, causing passive harm and supporting the assertion that this can be accurately described as paternalistic.

Akin to Walls’s (2008) description of paternalistic heterosexism as “subjectively neutral or positive attitudes, myths, and beliefs that express concern for the physical, emotional, or cognitive well-being of [gay men]” (pp. 27-28), paternalistic homoprejudice is similarly founded upon these concerns. However, there was no evidence in the present study suggesting that such concerns were “concurrently denying, denigrating, stigmatising, and/or segregating any nonheterosexual form of behaviour, identity, relationship, or community” (Walls, 2008a, p. 28). Rather, these concerns could be more accurately described as inflated and exaggerated, resulting in overzealous behavioural facilitations (see Conley et al., 2002) that are imposing and demeaning rather than mundanely altruistic. This theoretical assertion is especially important because it further contends that if paternalism is not a vehicle for heterosexist oppression, then hostile and benevolent aspects
of ambivalent homoprejudice are not complementary justifications for sexual inequality (unlike ambivalent sexism theory; Glick & Fiske, 2001). In this regard, ambivalent homoprejudice is truer to more traditional notions of ambivalence, focusing on the attitudinal level and its behavioural consequences rather than on the ideological level and its oppressive motivations.

Altogether, these findings illuminate a void in the literature on multidimensional attitudes towards gay men and elaborate upon the background and systematic concepts identified in the previous chapter. Given this important theoretical insight, the identified constructs are now well-enough formulated to be operationalised as a selection of scale items that adequately sample from the content categories under investigation (Luyt, 2012). The next chapter will elaborate on this item generation process, will further examine the psychometric properties of the multidimensional heterosexism inventory (Walls, 2008a) and polymorphous prejudice scales (Massey, 2009), and will detail the exploratory and confirmatory factor analytic techniques used to construct the ambivalent homoprejudice scale.
5. Chapter Five

Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analyses of the Ambivalent Homoprejudice Scale

The previous chapter detailed the use of qualitative methodology to characterise four distinct attitudinal tendencies towards gay men in the UK: 1) Repellent homoprejudice; 2) Adversarial homoprejudice; 3) Romanticised homoprejudice; and 4) Paternalistic homoprejudice. However, qualitative methods do not offer a consistent way with which to measure the co-endorsement of hostile and benevolent homoprejudice. Thus far, it has only been demonstrated that attitudes towards gay men are multifaceted. In order to assert that attitudes towards gay men are also ambivalent, the development of a new psychometric measure of these attitudes is necessary. As such, this chapter will first critique two other measures of multifaceted prejudice towards gay men in order to identify weaknesses in the literature that can be addressed in the present scale development process. The rest of the chapter presents the first part of this process, that is, ascertaining the factor structure of a selection of questionnaire items derived from the qualitative analysis by conducting exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on one sample ($N = 500$) and then corroborating this factor structure alongside other competing factor structures by conducting confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on another sample ($N = 301$). For clarity’s sake, these studies are delineated as study 2a and study 2b, respectively.

5.1 The Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory and Polymorphous Prejudice Scale

Chapter 3 engaged in a critical analysis of two other theories of multidimensional prejudice towards gay men: multidimensional heterosexism (Walls, 2008a) and polymorphous prejudice (2009). Here, this process is continued and the issues in the scales derived from these theories, namely, the multidimensional heterosexism inventory (MHI; Walls, 2008a) and the polymorphous prejudice scale (PPS; Massey, 2009) are addressed.
The first area of critique concerns the content validity of these two scales. Mokkink et al. (2010) define content validity as “The degree to which the content of an… instrument is an adequate reflection of the construct to be measured” (p. 743). One way to assess content validity is by simply appraising the measure at face value – does the instrument qualitatively appear to be an adequate reflection of the construct to be measured (Mokkink et al., 2010)? Given that an item pool can be, theoretically, infinite because a construct can be observed in an infinite number of ways (Yaghmaie, 2003), another way to assess content validity is to appraise whether or not an adequate number of items were generated and retained before and after factor analysis.

In generating their items, Walls (2005; 2008) and Massey (2009) do not refer to any primary empirical data specifically exploring hostile and benevolent attitudes towards gay men. Walls (2005; 2008) derives their items from an extrapolation of ambivalent sexism theory and the social dominance literature. Likewise, Massey (2009) extracts and/or rewords items from other measures of hostile homophobia, racism, and sexism, and refers to the queer and feminist literature in their item generation process. Although such an approach places fewer demands on the researcher to collect their own primary data, the risk is that the generated items may only provide a limited representation of the underlying construct. The researcher can also not justifiably deviate too far from these sources because items generated on this basis may not reflect the construct at all (as will be demonstrated in a later discussion regarding paternalistic heterosexism). These issues can be allayed somewhat by having a panel of experts generate the items, which both Walls (2005; 2008) and Massey (2009) do. However, neither scholar provide sufficient details as to the credentials of these collaborators. Altogether, the consequences of this approach is that the generated items will likely only reflect what has already been discovered. As such, this is not just an issue of content validity, but also of novelty.

While Walls’s (2005; 2008) and Massey’s (2009) item generation process demonstrate a similar level of theoretical sampling of the constructs, the two approaches differ with regards to
their numerical sampling of the constructs. Whereas Walls (2005; 2008) conducted EFA with 23 items, ultimately resulting in a 23-item measure, Massey (2009) conducted two EFAs: one on 79 items measuring negative attitudes towards gay men and another on 73 items measuring positive attitudes towards gay men, ultimately resulting in a 70-item measure. Of course, a longer measure will require a greater breadth of sampling of the content categories than will a shorter measure. However, one should always generate more items than they will ultimately need, because it allows the researcher to select those items that consistently and most effectively tap the underlying construct (DeVellis, 2012). Ultimately, a balance must be struck between quality and quantity with regards to item generation.

The consequence of an over-sampled item pool is that it may result in an unwieldy measure that fatigues respondents. The 70-item PPS is unnecessarily comprehensive given that many of its items bear resemblance to those seen in more widely-used measures of hostile homoprejudice – namely, the attitudes towards gay men scale (ATG; Herek, 1984) and the modern homonegativity scale (Morrison & Morrison, 2003). However, by comparison, the consequences of under-sampling the content categories are arguably more problematic. This issue can be observed in the paternalistic heterosexism subscale of the MHI. Each of the seven items in this subscale begin: “I would prefer if my SON/DAUGHTER NOT be homosexual because…” (Walls, 2008a, p. 48, author’s capitalisation). Because of their negative phrasing, these items may have produced an artefactual factor (Spector, Van Katwyk, Brannick, & Chen, 1997). The extent to which parental locus of control (Campis, Lyman, & Prentice-Dunn, 1986) and other potentially confounding factors obscure the intended meaning of this subscale has also not been considered. It is even possible that these items measure the general aversion to having a homosexual child, which contradicts what Walls (2005; 2008) claims this subscale actually measures. Without any alternatives to these items, one has no way of discerning how well they represent the underlying construct or whether the construct could be better represented using different items.
The MHI (Walls, 2005; 2008) also suffers from having no confirmatory analysis in support of the factor structure proposed by the EFA. Although DeVellis (2012) notes that obtaining the same factor structure from two EFAs can be compelling evidence in support of the stability of a given factor structure because of the lack of model constraints imposed by the researcher, Walls (2005; 2008) obtains two different factor structures in their two analyses. The first EFA produced a 3-factor solution comprising apathetic, positive-stereotypic, and paternalistic heterosexism. However, the second EFA produced a 4-factor solution that split the apathetic heterosexism factor into aversive and amnestic heterosexism. In their papers, Walls (2005; 2008) does not actually acknowledge this as a methodological problem. Inversely, Massey (2009) obscures the quality of their 79- and 73-item EFAs by not reporting it in adequate detail, despite notably including items with worryingly low factor loadings.

In summary, there are two areas of improvement that can be addressed in the present scale development. The first area of improvement identified is that the present scale development must convincingly demonstrate good content validity. To a large extent, this has been addressed in Chapters 3 and 4 already. This will be further demonstrated in this chapter using a comprehensive item pool based on the theory development and empirical findings documented thus far. The second area of improvement identified is that the present scale development must demonstrate greater analytic rigour and transparency. This will be addressed in this chapter by offering the reader a detailed account of: 1) The item generation and reduction processes; 2) The rationale informing factor and item retention; and 3) Potential alternative and competing factor structures.

If the theory development and empirical findings documented thus far are a valid representation of ambivalent homoprejudice towards gay men, the items should load onto four factors resembling the themes identified in Chapters 3 and 4. As such, the research question to be answered herein is: Does a large-scale sample produce the same facets of repellent, adversarial,
romanticised, and paternalistic homoprejudice advanced thus far and are these facets stable across different samples?

5.2 Study 2a Methods

5.2.1 Item Generation

DeVellis (2012) recommends a systematic process of scale item generation. Firstly, an extensive literature review of attitudes towards gay men was conducted, resulting in an initial deductive conceptualisation of ambivalence towards gay men. This model was used to guide the topics under discussion in a subsequent qualitative study of heterosexuals’ attitudes towards gay men, and gay men’s experiences of positively- and negatively-valenced attitudes (as covered in Chapter 4). This approach was particularly advantageous because it led to well-defined background and systematic concepts, and allowed concepts otherwise not well-covered in the literature, such as the ‘failed gay’ and gay men’s explicit warmth- and competence-related stereotypes to emerge, resulting in a more adequately-sampled item pool.

In order to create the initial item pool, a panel of experts (N = 7, consisting of a professor, three senior lecturers, and three postgraduate researchers including the first author) drawn from two universities – the first author’s home institution and a large public university in Canada – were enlisted. This panel consisted of academic researchers in the fields of psychometric test construction, gender, attitudinal ambivalence, and sexuality. Four of the experts were gay (three men and one non-binary), one was a heterosexual man, and two were heterosexual women. An abridged thematic analysis was provided to the panel, detailing the aforementioned themes and providing illustrative quotes from the qualitative data upon which item generation could be based. An initial pool of 562 items were generated between the experts. The panel then met and agreed to reject items that: 1) made an implicit assumption about the gender and/or sexuality of the respondent (e.g., ‘All the men that I fancy turn out to be gay’); 2) did not pertain immediately to the research area (e.g., ‘I admire the fact that lesbian women are so committed to monogamy’);
and 3) were duplicates or worded very similarly. Further, the panel agreed upon a number of phrasing conventions: 1) Avoidance of the word ‘homosexual’ to reduce item ambiguity and the priming of more negative responses (see Rios, 2013); 2) Avoidance of the first person, reducing the respondents’ motivation to control prejudiced reactions (Dunton & Fazio, 1997); and 3) Phrasing items in a suitable way for Likert scaling along a 7-point strongly agree-strongly disagree continuum. Based on this meeting, 163 of the items were rejected and others were reworded to fit the phrasing conventions. The remaining items were grouped thematically and coded based on the themes and nodes emanating from the previous qualitative analysis. Those items that could not be coded using the pre-existing nodes, indicating that they corresponded poorly with the qualitative findings, were rejected ($N = 19$). The nodes also provided an indication of content validity, prompting the retention of a varied sample of 96 items; 24 items for each facet of homoprejudice. Specifically, items referred to: aversion towards contact with gay men (1 item), gay men’s contact with children (3 items), pathology (2 item), disgust (4 items), immorality (3 items), tolerance (3 items), mutability of nonheterosexuality (2 items), religious intolerance (2 items), sexual disgust (3 items), violence (1 item), advice-giving (6 items), ‘failed gay’ (4 items), friend material (5 items), heterosexual intimacy (2 items), positive stereotypes (7 items), altruism (5 items), counterweighting (3 items), fragility (3 items), incompetence (4 items), protection (4 items), sympathy (5 items), heteronormative assimilation (3 items), denial of inequality (5 items), fear of prejudicial accusations (4 items), reverse inequality (4 items), maintenance of the status quo (5 items), and the weaponisation of nonheterosexuality (3 items). The factor structure of this 96-item iteration of the ambivalent homoprejudice scale (AHS-96; see Appendix 4) was explored.

5.2.2 Participants

5.2.2.1 Sample Size

EFA is generally regarded as requiring a large sample size. Although some studies have advocated for the use of EFA on smaller samples (i.e., $N < 50$) and evidenced their reliable usage
(de Winter, Dodou, & Wieringa, 2009), this is not a popular custom in the psychological community. Indeed, multiple systematic reviews of the use of EFA in academic research have been particularly critical of studies for their perceived low sample size (Ford, MacCallum, & Tait, 1986; Osborne & Costello, 2009). Small samples subjected to EFA may fail to converge at all (i.e., the analysis fails and the software produces an error message) or may provide a solution with misspecified variables (e.g., items loading onto incorrect factors; Schmitt, 2011).

Despite the concerning consequences of low sample size in EFA, there is no single agreed-upon standard for sample size. Common rules of thumb regarding sample size for EFA, such as taxonomies describing different sample sizes or participant to variable ratios as acceptable or otherwise (Comfrey & Lee, 1992; Gorsuch, 1983, and many others) have largely fallen out of vogue because of their lack of credibility (MacCallum, Widaman, Zhang, & Hong, 1999; Osborne & Costello, 2009) and poor performance in practice (Rouquette & Falissard, 2011). Rather, there is a present emphasis on first testing the ‘strength’ of the data – in other words, the suitability of the data for EFA, as measured by metrics such as the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of sphericity (which will be reported later in this chapter). If these analyses suggest that the data are unsuitable for EFA, then it would be advisable to collect more data until EFA becomes a viable analysis.

5.2.2.2 Demographics

801 British adults completed the AHS-96, which was randomly split; 500 participants’ data were reserved for the initial exploratory factor and reliability analyses (Study 2a) and 301 participants’ data were reserved for the subsequent confirmatory factor and reliability analyses (Study 2b). Separate demographics for these samples can be seen in table 5.1. A further, 75 participants identifying as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or ‘other’ also completed the survey. These results were retained for known-groups validity analyses and will be discussed in Chapter 6.
Alongside the AHS 96, all 801 participants completed a selection of randomly assigned measures for use in the validation testing (Study 2c). Because the validity testing pertains to the entire sample (due to the random assignment of validation measures), these measures and results will also be covered in Chapter 6.

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Study 2a (N = 500)</th>
<th>Study 2b (N = 301)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max</td>
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<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>On special occasions</td>
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<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Now and then</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1: Participant demographics for Study 2a and Study 2b

5.2.2.3 Sampling

A number of recruitment streams were used to solicit participation. Participation was solicited from students and staff in a number of universities across the United Kingdom by way of blanket emails and poster displays. Online advertisements were also taken out on popular social media and online bulletin boards, and a press release was issued resulting in the research being featured in a number of UK news outlets in print, online, and on TV. A prize draw to win one of six £15 shopping vouchers was offered as an incentive to take part.
5.2.2.4 Exclusively vs. Mostly Heterosexuals

Research findings support a discrete sexual identity category between exclusive heterosexuality and bisexuality; non-exclusive heterosexuality or those who identify as ‘mostly heterosexual’ (Vrangalova & Savin-Williams, 2012). Savin-Williams and Vrangalova (2013) found that such individuals report low levels of same-sex sexual attraction and behaviour, represent a substantial proportion of the population, remain stable in their self-categorisation over time, and report that such an identity is personally meaningful to them. Perhaps for these reasons, data supplied by ‘mostly heterosexuals’ are often omitted from factor analyses principally interested in heterosexuals’ attitudes (see Morrison & Morrison, 2003).

However, no research evidence exists to suggest mostly heterosexuals and exclusive heterosexuals differ in terms of their attitudes towards gay men – at least, not in a structural sense that would compromise the present analysis. Mostly heterosexuals could potentially evidence less intense prejudiced attitudes and more affirmative attitudes towards gay men due to their openness to nonheterosexual potential. If this is the case, then their inclusion may enrich the analysis, rather than undermine it. To confirm this, two factor analyses were run in order to compare the latent factor structure of exclusive heterosexuals’ and both exclusive and mostly heterosexuals’ attitudes towards gay men. Both factor analyses produced similar factor structures, suggesting that the mostly heterosexual data would be appropriate to include in the analysis (see Goodman & Moradi, 2008).

5.2.3 Materials and Procedure

The survey was administered using the Qualtrics survey platform and consisted of an information sheet that described the survey as ‘a study of positive and negative attitudes towards gay men’, a consent form, demographic questions asking the participants’ gender, age, sexual orientation, race, and country of residence, the AHS-96, a selection of other validation measures (which will be reported in more detail in Chapter 6), a debrief sheet, and spaces to enter an email
with which to enter into the prize draw and/or consent to being contacted for a test-retest study. The survey took approximately 15-30 minutes to complete. This study received ethical approval from the Departmental Research Ethics Panel (DREP), the designated departmental authority that confers ethical approval to low-risk research projects.

5.3 Data Analytic Strategy

5.3.1 Factor Analysis vs. Principal Component Analysis

In reducing a large number of variables down to a smaller, more meaningful and condensed set of variables, researchers have a choice between principal component analysis (PCA) and factor analysis (FA). The biggest difference between the two analytic techniques are the assumptions made about the resulting components/factors. In PCA, the principle components are assumed to be caused by the observed variables (i.e., item scores) whereas, in FA, the factors are assumed to indicate the presence of latent variables that are causing the variance in the observed variables (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2014). Because PCA does not make this theoretical assumption about the relationship between observed and latent variables and simply seeks to reduce large numbers of variables to smaller numbers of variables, it is unsuitable for scale development (DeVellis, 2012). Given the general assumption that attitudes (i.e., unobservable latent variables) affect item responses (i.e., the observed variables), factor analysis was concluded to be the more appropriate statistical technique.

5.3.2 Missing Data

In order to ascertain whether those who submitted partial responses differed from those who responded in full, Little’s Missing Completely at Random (MCAR) test (Little, 1988) was used to analyse non-response in the whole sample (N = 801). Ideally, statistical non-significance (p < .05) is desired because this indicates that missing values are not caused by any observed (e.g., gender) or other missing variables (i.e., that the data are MCAR). The Little’s test was significant,
indicating that non-response was systematic. In order to discern whether or not this pattern of non-response was ignorable because missingness could be attributable to non-missingness on other variables (i.e., missing at random; MAR) or non-ignorable because missingness could be attributable to missingness on other variables (i.e., missing not at random; MNAR), the separate variance 𝜉-tests were inspected. Missingness on one variable did not appear to be attributable to missingness on other variables, so the data were assumed to be MAR and, thus, could be dealt with using maximum likelihood (ML) estimation (Enders, 2001) built into the MPlus structural equation modelling software used to run the analysis.

5.3.3 Factor and Item Retention

Factor retention was guided by the use of parallel analysis, detailed in O’Connor (2000). This technique generates a random data set of 𝑥 variables and 𝑦 cases of the same dimensions as the collected data set (in this instance, 96 variables and 500 cases) and performs an exploratory factor analysis on this data. If a factor in the observed data set is substantive, its eigenvalue should exceed that of its corresponding factor garnered from the randomly generated data at the 95th percentile. As compared to the Kaiser criterion whereby factors with an eigenvalue of 1 or more are considered for retention, parallel analysis tends not to overestimate the number of factors to retain when large numbers of variables are factor analysed (Hayton, Allen, & Scarpello, 2004).

Guidance from R. Worthington and Whittaker (2006) suggests only retaining items with factor loadings of .5 or greater and items with cross-factor loadings of less than .32. Further item reduction was performed by examining each factor for redundant items. This may be indicated by items correlating excessively with each other (e.g., by > .9; Field, 2009) or by being similarly-worded, in which case the item with the lower factor loading was deleted. Item redundancy may also be indicated by a prospective deletion having a negligible or even augmentative effect on the scale’s internal consistency when deleted.
5.4 Study 2a Results

5.4.1 Preliminary Results

The suitability of the sample for factor analysis was tested using Bartlett’s test of sphericity and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy on both multiple and individual variables. Bartlett’s test of sphericity tests the null hypothesis that the correlation matrix is an identity matrix whereby each variable correlates perfectly with itself and not at all with any other variable, rendering the data inappropriate for factor analysis. Bartlett’s test of sphericity was statistically significant, $X^2(4560) = 30545.56, p < .001$, indicating that the data were suitable for factor analysis. The KMO test calculates the ratio of the squared correlation between variables to the squared partial correlation between variables and the test statistic can range between 0 (indicating that the partial correlations are large relative to the correlations and that the data is unsuitable for factor analysis) and 1 (indicating that the partial correlations are small relative to the correlations and that the data is suitable for factor analysis). A test statistic of .5 or more is considered to be adequate for factor analysis (Kaiser, 1974). The KMO statistic for the present data was .96, considered to be ‘superb’ under Hutcheson and Sofroniou’s (1999) naming conventions. Finally, an examination of the KMO statistics for each individual variable in the anti-imaging matrix found no items with a KMO statistic of less than .5 (values ranged from 8.32 to 9.81).

The items on all of the scales were examined for normality. Very few of the items evidenced both acceptable skewness and kurtosis ($< .80$ and $< 3$, respectively; Tabachnik & Fidell, 2014). This tendency was particularly evident in items comprising an overt expression of prejudice, which were often positively skewed and leptokurtic, together indicating that there was a high level of peakedness towards the lower scores on these items. Following Log10, square root, and reciprocal transformations, skewness and kurtosis were still at unacceptable levels. Given that such attitudes appear to be in decline in the Western world, floor effects among these items may be
unavoidable. As such, a robust estimation method available in the MPlus structural equation modelling software version 6.12 (Muthén & Muthén, 2011), weighted least squares controlling for means and variance (WLSMV), was used. This estimator has been recommended elsewhere as “the best option for modelling categorical or ordered data” (Proitsi et al., 2011) because it does not make assumptions about normality.

### 5.4.2 Exploratory Factor Analysis

Parallel analysis was conducted using SPSS syntax provided by O’Connor (2000). The analysis produced five hypothetical 95th percentile eigenvalues (2.07, 1.99, 1.93, 1.88, and 1.85) that were exceeded by their corresponding true eigenvalues in the factor analysis (37.97, 11.47, 4.14, 2.94, and 2.10) and a sixth hypothetical eigenvalue (1.81) that exceeded its corresponding true eigenvalue (1.75), suggesting the retention of five factors. Thus, the EFA was initially conducted forcing a five-factor solution. An inspection of the rotated matrix revealed that the fifth comprised items with factor loadings below the .5 cut-off set herein (relevant absolute loadings ranged from .31 to .49). The items loading on this factor appear to tap selectivity in choosing gay friends based on their fulfilment of romanticised expectations of gay men (i.e., the failed gay). However, items such as “Gay men who aren’t fashionable have not succeeded as a gay person”, which loaded onto this factor, also loaded strongly (i.e., > .5) onto the first factor, which resembled repellent homoprejudice. Given the apparent ambiguous wording of the items loading most strongly onto the fifth factor, the analysis was re-run forcing a four-factor solution.

Given the possibility for positive and negative attitudinal substrates to correlate positively with each other (i.e., ambivalence), the analysis was conducted using a geomin rotation ($\delta = 0$). This oblique rotation method is advantageous because it allows the factors to correlate with each other (reflecting the complexities of the underlying factors), but provides a more easily interpretable solution than other oblique rotations (Sass & Schmitt, 2010). The factor correlation
matrix showed an above-marginal correlation (i.e., > .32; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014) between the two hostile factors and between the two benevolent factors, supporting this analytic decision.

The aforementioned item reduction criteria were applied to every iteration of the factor analysis, with deletion priority given to those items with low factor loadings (< .50), then to items with high cross-loadings (≥ .32), then to excessively-correlating items (r ≥ .90), and finally to items with unclear, confusing, or ambiguous wording. A snapshot of the initial 96-item factor analysis and each item’s subsequent deletion record is included as Appendix 4.

5.4.2.1 Further Item Reduction and Internal Consistency

Cronbach’s alpha coefficients, factor loadings, and item wordings were consulted in order to identify further opportunities for item reduction. Items resulting in higher or largely preserved alpha coefficients were deleted from each factor. In the event that the deletion of one of two items would result in the same alpha coefficient post-deletion (i.e., a ‘tie’), the item with the lowest factor loading was deleted. Raubenheimer (2004) recommends retaining no fewer than three items in a subscale when multiple factors are extracted, in order to preserve the factor’s internal consistency. Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, and Strahan (1999) similarly suggest retaining between four and six items per factor. Conceptual breadth is also another important factor in deciding item retention; whereas narrow and concrete constructs can be measured adequately using single item measures (Bergkvist & Rossiter, 2007), broader constructs require greater numbers of items in order to be adequately captured (W. Bearden & Netemeyer, 2011). Further, this latter demand must also be balanced with the need for scale brevity in order to mitigate against participant fatigue (Netemeyer et al., 2002). Based on these criteria, six items for each factor were sought for retention, resulting in a 24-item scale comprising items 3, 8, 10, 16, 20, 23, 30, 37, 39, 41, 42, 44, 50, 54, 55, 68, 69, 70, 74, 79, 81, 82, 84, and 94.

The parallel analysis was re-run to reflect the change in the final EFA’s parameters from 96 variables to 24. This produced four hypothetical 95th percentile eigenvalues (1.51, 1.42, 1.36,
and 1.32) that were exceeded by their respective true eigenvalues (8.37, 5.08, 2.72, and 1.33) and a fifth hypothetical eigenvalue (1.28) that exceeded its corresponding true eigenvalue (.69), supporting the retention of the 4-factor solution, which explained 64.87% of the variance. Subscale items and factor loadings can be seen in table 5.2.

These four factors resemble the constructs of repellent, romanticised, paternalistic, and adversarial homoprejudice towards gay men, respectively, which were previously identified in Chapters 3 and 4. Items 3-23 tap the construct of repellent homoprejudice, which conveys disgust towards gay men, disapproval of sexual intimacy between men, and the belief that gay men are mentally defective. Items 30-44 tap the construct of romanticised homoprejudice, which enforces stereotypes pertaining to gay men’s supposed sociability and compatibility with women. Items 50-70 tap the construct of paternalistic homoprejudice, which express the need to compensate for gay men’s ostensibly tragic existence by way of helping them and being kind to them. Finally, items 74-94 tap the construct of adversarial homoprejudice, the beliefs that gay men complain too much about how they are treated, that they are overly-sensitive to perceived slights, and that they use accusations of prejudice to silence heterosexuals.

The mean scores on each subscale were also inspected to check for floor or ceiling effects. These results suggested floor effects in the repellent homoprejudice subscale, which had a minimum possible score of 1 and a mean score of 1.47 (SD = .94). However, further inspection of the ranges of each item within this subscale revealed that the higher rating, 7, was also utilised by some participants. Rather than an issue with the subscale itself, it appears that most of the participants simply endorse low levels of repellent homoprejudice. The other subscales performed relatively better with regards to mean scores. Participants endorsed moderate levels of romanticised (\(M = 2.86, SD = 1.02\)), paternalistic (\(M = 3.50, SD = 1.16\)), and adversarial homoprejudice (\(M = 3.05, SD = 1.23\)), which were relatively closer to the scale midpoint of 4 (see
Again, the ranges of each item in these subscales were inspected and this revealed that participants utilised both the upper and lower response bounds of their constituent items.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
<th>Factor 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. Gay men should be banned from working with children</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Gay men are revolting</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Gay men are immoral</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Gay men should seek therapy to treat their condition</td>
<td>1.0*</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Physical intimacy between two men is against nature</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Gay men are a blight on society</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Gay men are a great source of gift ideas</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Every friendship circle needs a sassy gay friend</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Everyone needs a gay best friend</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. Behind every great woman is a fabulous gay best friend</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. Gay men know what turns a good night out into a great night out</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. A gay man will never fail to make their friends laugh</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. It’s important to help gay men because they’ve been through so much</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54. People should be nice to gay men because of the tough time they have</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55. Gay men have it rough, so everyone needs to do what they can to make up for it</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68. People should feel sorry for gay men because of their struggles</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69. Gay men deserve sympathy for all that they go through</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70. It’s hard to imagine how gay men cope with everything they have to go through</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74. Gay men need to stop making such a fuss about their sexuality</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79. Gay men exaggerate the amount of prejudice they experience</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81. One cannot say anything about gay men without being accused of prejudice</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82. Many people are afraid of criticising gay men for fear of being accused of being prejudiced</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84. Gay men readily perceive criticism as prejudice</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94. It seems gay men always find some new issue to complain about</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2: Loadings on factor: 1) Repellent; 2) Romanticised; 3) Paternalistic; and 4) Adversarial homoprejudice.

*Oblique rotated factor loadings are regression coefficients and can be larger than 1 in magnitude. If this is caused by negative residual variance (i.e., a Heywood case; Kolenikov & Bollen, 2012), this can suggest model misspecification or that the sample size is not large enough (Jöreskog, 1999). The residual variance for item 16 was .07 (the other items also had positive residual variances), meaning that this is not a Heywood case.
Next, reliability checks were performed. Internal consistency was analysed using Cronbach’s alpha ($\alpha$). These analyses showed that the repellent ($\alpha = .93, 95\% \text{ CI } = .92 - .94$), adversarial ($\alpha = .88, 95\% \text{ CI } = .86 - .90$), romanticised ($\alpha = .84, 95\% \text{ CI } = .81 - .86$), and paternalistic homoprejudice ($\alpha = .88, 95\% \text{ CI } = .86 - .90$) subscales demonstrated good internal consistency.

Together, the higher measures of reliability produced by the repellent homoprejudice subscale as compared to the other subscales indicates potential item redundancy. To investigate this further, average inter-item correlations between the repellent homoprejudice subscale items were consulted. As compared to the average inter-item correlation in the adversarial ($r = .54$), romanticised ($r = .46$), and paternalistic homoprejudice ($r = .56$) subscales, the average inter-item correlation in the repellent homoprejudice subscale ($r = .71$) was substantially higher. Clark and Watson (1995) suggest that ideal average inter-item correlations for narrow constructs such as those measured by the AHS subscales should fall in the range of .40 and .50, suggesting that the repellent homoprejudice subscale suffers from item redundancy. This apparent redundancy will be addressed in the discussion section.

5.5 Study 2a Discussion

This chapter previously criticised the development of the MHI (Walls, 2008a) and the PPS (Massey, 2009) as lacking in content validity and not providing a transparent account of the statistical rigour therein. The methodology of Study 2a addressed the first of these issues; the content validity of the AHS was assured by generating scale items based on the theorising detailed in Chapter 3 and on the empirical findings detailed in Chapter 4, and a surplus of prospective items were generated so as to demonstrate that the latent construct had been adequately sampled from. The second of these issues was addressed in Study 2a by providing an account of the criteria used to retain (or delete) items and factors, and every item’s initial factor loading.
The results of Study 2a suggest that the AHS demonstrates a multidimensional factor structure consistent with the previous theorising and empirical findings which asserted that ambivalent homoprejudice towards gay men comprises repellent, adversarial, romanticised, and paternalistic homoprejudice. Although these factors share certain stereotype contents (i.e., both repellent and adversarial homoprejudice emphasise gay men’s perceived coldness), the present findings support the thesis that these are discrete subdomains of ambivalent homoprejudice.

Examination of each subscale’s descriptive statistics showed that the participants endorsed moderate levels of adversarial, romanticised, and paternalistic homoprejudice towards gay men. However, the repellent homoprejudice subscale suffered from floor effects, which has also been demonstrated elsewhere with regards to a similar measure of old-fashioned homoprejudice, Herek’s (1984) ATG (Morrison & Morrison, 2003). This is most likely due to such attitudes becoming less acceptable in Western cultural contexts (Twenge, Sherman, & Wells, 2016), highlighting the need for alternative measures – such as the other AHS subscales – able to capture different dimensions of homoprejudice.

Reliability analyses suggest that the AHS demonstrates good internal consistency. However, the disproportionately high Cronbach’s alpha coefficient and average inter-item correlation of the repellent homoprejudice subscale suggest that this subscale also suffers from item redundancy. This has also been found elsewhere in studies using the ATG; McDermott and Blair (2012), for example, cite Cronbach’s alphas ranging from .81 to .96, with the upper bound suggesting item redundancy here. Despite these findings, closer inspection of the repellent homoprejudice item wordings does not flag up any overly repetitious themes. For instance, the belief that homosexuality is unnatural (i.e., a scientific perspective) cannot necessarily be equated with the belief that homosexuality is immoral (i.e., a sociocultural perspective). From a content validity perspective, these items should be retained because each item taps the underlying construct
in qualitatively different ways. For this reason, no items were omitted from the repellent homoprejudice subscale at this stage.

Together, the findings covered thus far represent a promising advancement in the homoprejudice literature and attest to the successful theorising and data analysis covered in Chapters 3 and 4. Study 2b aims to extend these findings by assessing the stability of the AHS’s factor structure in a second sample using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and providing additional reliability analyses.

5.6 Study 2b Methods

5.6.1 Participants

As covered in Section 5.2.2, 301 of the 801 participants were randomly sampled for the CFA. The demographics of these participants can be found in that section in table 5.1.

5.6.2 Materials and Procedure

The same materials and procedure used in Study 2a were used in Study 2b. These are detailed in Section 5.2.3.

5.6.3 Data Analytic Strategy

CFA is a multivariate statistical technique belonging to a collection of statistical methods known as structural equation modelling (SEM). CFA tests *a priori* theoretical hypotheses by assessing how well the researcher’s proposed model fits the data, thus providing a means of assessing a scale’s construct validity. For this reason, it is an integral step in the latter stages of scale development after exploratory factor analysis has been conducted (T. Brown, 2006; MacCallum & Austin, 2000), because it demonstrates the stability of a factor structure across different samples.

Unlike EFA, which does not control for error variance (e.g., measurement error) and creates ‘phantom’ factors (i.e., scree) in an attempt to explain the maximum possible variance, in
CFA the researcher can model relatively error-free latent variables by accounting for this error. As well as this, the fit indexes garnered through CFA allow the researcher to compare the fit of multiple competing models in order to assess which latent variables best explain the observed variables (Schreiber, Nora, Stage, Barlow, & King, 2006).

Numerous fit indices were consulted to evaluate the appropriateness of each proposed model. The chi-square is an absolute fit index that “assesses the magnitude of discrepancy between the sample and fitted covariances matrices” (Hu & Bentler, 1999, p. 2) and indicates poor fit when it is statistically significant because this signifies a significant difference between the proposed matrix and the sample it is being fitted to. However, this index is extremely sensitive to large sample sizes, resulting in inflated false negatives. Wheaton, Muthén, Alwin, and Summer (1977) propose using the normed chi-square, \( Q \), by dividing the chi-square value by the degrees of freedom. Numerous thresholds have been suggested (see Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008) but Tabachnick and Fidell (2014) offer the most conservative threshold, suggesting that a chi-square/degrees of freedom ratio of <2 indicates excellent model fit.

The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) – a widely-used measure of model fit – was also consulted. Values close to .06 are considered to indicate good model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). As well as this, the lower bound of the 90% confidence interval should ideally be close to 0 (indicating perfect fit), whereas the upper bound should ideally not exceed .08 (Hooper et al., 2008).

The comparative fit index (CFI), which can range from 0 to 1, was also consulted as a measure of good fit. Byrne (1994) suggests that a CFI of >.93 indicates acceptable model fit. Finally, the Tucker-Lewis index, another comparative fit index, was consulted and Hu and Bentler (1999) suggest that values >.95 indicated acceptable model fit.
5.6.4 Proposed Models

Four models will be tested in order to explore any other unforeseen factor structures underlying the AHS. The first model to be tested will be a unidimensional factor structure with the underlying latent variable defined as ambivalence towards gay men. In this model, all 24 items will be forced to load onto this single factor. Scale unidimensionality – that is, when all scale items load onto a single factor – has been described as a “top priority in scale development” (Herche & Engelland, 1996), presumably because such unidimensionality appeals to the Ockhamist notion that a simpler proposition is preferable to a more complex one. Not only is ascertaining whether a measure is unidimensional or multidimensional important from a validity perspective, but it is also important from a reliability perspective; though a set of items may reliably measure a construct, a reliability index does not indicate what construct the items are actually measuring (Hattie, 1985). In other words, the four AHS subscales may have demonstrated similarly high levels of reliability because they all measure the same underlying construct of ambivalence towards gay men.

The second proposed model is a 2-factor model representing the agentic axis of the SCM (Fiske et al., 2002). Given that contemptuous, envious, admiring, and pitying stereotypes share certain stereotype contents (e.g., both repellent and paternalistic homoprejudice tap perceptions that gay men are incompetent), it is a possibility that the AHS is tapping gay men’s perceived (in)competence. As such, this model consists of the repellent and paternalistic homoprejudice subscales loading onto the theorised latent variable of incompetence and the adversarial and romanticised homoprejudice subscale loading onto the theorised latent variable of competence. Alternatively, the AHS subscales may be tapping the communal axis of the SCM, comprising warmth and coldness stereotypes (Fiske et al., 2002) about gay men. Given that the ambivalent sexism inventory taps benevolence (i.e., warmth) and hostility (i.e., coldness) towards women (Glick & Fiske, 1996), such a factor structure might also underlie the AHS – especially since the hostile and benevolent homoprejudice factors positively correlated with each other. As such, this
model consists of two factors: warmth – made up of the romanticised and paternalistic homoprejudice subscales – and coldness – made up of the repellent and adversarial homoprejudice subscales.

The final model that will be tested is the 4-factor model proposed by the EFA, comprising the repellent, adversarial, romanticised, and paternalistic homoprejudice subscales loading on separate factors. If this factor structure is stable and valid, then it should retain its dimensionality across different samples and demonstrate good model fit.

5.7 Study 2b Results

MPlus structural equation modelling software (Muthén & Muthén, 2011) was used to analyse the data using the WLSMV estimator, as was outlined in Section 5.4.1.

5.7.1 Model Fit

5.7.1.1 The 1-Factor ‘Ambivalence Towards Gay Men’ Model

The 1-factor model with all 24 AHS items loading onto a single factor representing general ambivalence towards gay men demonstrated poor model fit; $\chi^2 (252) = 3251.75, p < .001; Q = 12.90, RMSEA = .20 (90\% CI: .19 - .21), CFI = .56, TLI = .52$. These findings suggest that ambivalent homoprejudice is most likely a multidimensional construct that is inadequately characterised by a single latent variable. The path diagram of this model is shown in figure 5.5.

5.7.1.2 The 2-Factor ‘Competence-Incompetence’ Model

This 2-factor model, with the adversarial and romanticised homoprejudice subscales loading onto a ‘competence’ factor and the repellent and paternalistic subscales loading onto an ‘incompetence’ factor demonstrated better model fit than the 1-factor model, but also did not reach any of the goodness-of-fit thresholds; $\chi^2 (251) = 2764.58, p < .001; Q = 11.01, RMSEA = .18 (90\% CI: .18 - .19), CFI = .64, TLI = .60$. It is, thus, unlikely that the AHS only measures
stereotypes of gay men as either competent or incompetent. The path diagram of this model is shown in figure 5.6.

5.7.1.3 The 2-Factor ‘Warmth-Coldness’ Model

This 2-factor model, with the romanticised and paternalistic homoprejudice subscales loading onto a ‘warmth’ factor and the repellent and adversarial subscales loading onto a ‘coldness’ factor demonstrated a markedly improved model fit as compared to the previous two models, with all fit indexes marginally below the thresholds necessary to assert adequate goodness-of-fit; \(\chi^2\) (251) = 1264.43, \(p < .001\); \(Q = 5.04\), RMSEA = .12 (90% CI: .11 - .12), CFI = .85, TLI = .84. On this basis, it is likely that the agentic and communal dimensions of the SCM in isolation do not provide a nuanced account of ambivalent homoprejudice and the AHS’s latent variables. The path diagram of this model is shown in figure 5.7.

5.7.1.4 The 4-Factor ‘Ambivalent Homoprejudice’ Model

The 4-factor model advanced on the basis of the EFA, comprising the four 6-item subscales pertaining to repellent, adversarial, romanticised, and paternalistic homoprejudice demonstrated good model fit on all of the aforementioned fit indices: \(\chi^2\) (246) = 459.80, \(p < .001\); \(Q = 1.87\); RMSEA = .054 (90% CI: .046, .061); CFI = .97; and TLI = .97. By comparison, neither of the 2-factor models, nor the 1-factor model met any of the aforementioned goodness-of-fit thresholds, suggesting that the 4-factor model of ambivalent homoprejudice towards gay men is a theoretically and statistically sound model. The path diagram of this model is shown in figure 5.8.

5.7.2 Descriptive Statistics

With the multidimensionality of the AHS supported by the findings from the CFA, the descriptive statistics of the four subscales were once again consulted. As was also found in Study

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9 Because it was not necessary to covary any of the items in my analyses to improve model fit, I have not graphically represented error terms on the path diagrams.
2a, the repellent homoprejudice subscale exhibited floor effects with its low mean score ($M = 1.50, SD = .88$) whereas the participants endorsed moderate levels of adversarial ($M = 3.09, SD = 1.16$), romanticised ($M = 3.03, SD = 1.03$), and paternalistic homoprejudice ($M = 3.45, SD = 1.12$; see figure 5.9.

![Figure 5.2: Mean scores for the repellent, adversarial, romanticised, and paternalistic homoprejudice subscales (N = 301)](image)

5.7.3 Reliability Analysis

The four subscales were once again analysed for reliability using Cronbach’s alpha. These analyses showed that the repellent ($\alpha = .89$, 95% CI = .87 - .91), adversarial ($\alpha = .85$, 95% CI = .82 - .87), romanticised ($\alpha = .83$, 95% CI = .79 - .86), and paternalistic homoprejudice ($\alpha = .84$, 95% CI = .81 - .87) subscales demonstrated good internal consistency.
Figure 5.3: Path diagram for the proposed 1-factor ‘general ambivalence towards gay men’ model. Zeros precede all decimals.
Figure 5.4: Path diagram for the proposed 2-factor ‘competence-incompetence’ model. Zeroes precede all decimals.
Figure 5.5: Path diagram for the proposed 2-factor ‘warmth-coldness’ model. Zeroes precede all decimals.
Figure 5.6: Path diagram for the proposed 4-factor model of ambivalent homophobia towards gay men. Zeros precede all decimals.
5.8 Study 2b Discussion

The results of study 2b provide further evidence in support of the proposed multidimensionality of prejudice towards gay men. Four different factor structures were imposed on the data: a 4-factor model discerning between repellent, adversarial, romanticised, and paternalistic homoprejudice, as well as three other competing models tapping the agentic and communal models of the SCM (Fiske et al., 2002) and general ambivalence towards gay men. The CFA results showed that the 4-factor model informed by the prior theory development, qualitative findings, and EFA demonstrated excellent model fit, whereas the other models did not meet any of the fit index thresholds. As well as this, each subscale once again demonstrated favourable internal consistency.

As was also seen in Study 2a, floor effects were observed in the repellent homoprejudice subscale. Similar results have been found elsewhere in Canadian, Irish, and North American research contexts (Morrison & Morrison, 2003; Morrison et al., 2005; McDermott & Blair, 2012) with regards to the ATG (Herek, 1984) and this is likely due to the apparent decline in self-reported old-fashioned homoprejudice towards gay men in the West (Twenge, et. al., 2016). Of the entire sample of 801 participants, only 29 (3.62%) of them had a mean score of at least 4 (the scale midpoint) on the repellent homoprejudice subscale. This may be partly due to the demographics of the sample, which was predominantly female, white, well-educated, and secular, which have all been related to lower levels of old-fashioned anti-gay prejudice (Rowatt, LaBouff, Johnson, Froese, & Tsang, 2009; Petersen & Hyde, 2010; Whitley, Jr., 2009).

However, the mean scores on the other three AHS subscales suggest that homoprejudice is not necessarily in decline, as many others have suggested (McCormack, 2013; Plummer, 2014; Twenge et al., 2016). Rather, the present findings suggest that prejudice towards gay men is taking more covert and positively-valenced forms that – on the face of it – appear legitimate or even beneficent but nonetheless nullify gay men’s experiences of prejudice and discrimination (Nadal
et al., 2011), enforce prescriptive stereotypes (Conley et al., 2002), and undermine feelings of sexual pride (Corbett, 1994). This further highlights the need to reconceptualise and operationalise homoprejudice as both benevolence and hostility in order to more holistically capture the changing nature of homoprejudice towards gay men.

Although the stability of the AHS’s factor structure has been established, further exploration of the AHS’s construct validity (Study 2c) and test-retest reliability (Study 3) is required in order to assure its psychometric utility. These studies will be detailed in the next Chapter.
6. Chapter Six

Additional Psychometric Assessment of the Ambivalent Homoprejudice Scale

6.1 Purpose of Study 2c

Construct validity is defined by Mokkink et al. (2010), as “The degree to which the scores of an… instrument are consistent with hypotheses (for instance with regard to internal relationships, relationships to scores of other instruments, or differences between relevant groups) based on the assumption that the… instrument validly measures the construct to be measured” (p. 743). The internal relationship between the items of the AHS items was demonstrated in Chapter 5 by way of EFA (Study 2a) and CFA (Study 2b). Study 2c thus aims to provide evidence that the AHS behaves logically in relation to construct-relevant attitudinal and personality measures (i.e., convergent and discriminant validity), and that different groups of people theorised to score differently on the AHS do, in fact, score differently (i.e., known-groups validity).

Many published measures of old-fashioned homoprejudice towards gay men exist, including the ATG (Herek, 1984), which has been alluded to throughout this thesis. The ATG is often referred to as a “gold standard” measure of old-fashioned homoprejudice (Morrison, Morrison & Franklin, 2009, p. 525). It is, thus, a good benchmark against which the repellent homoprejudice subscale – also a measure of old-fashioned homoprejudice – can be compared in order to assess its construct validity. Likewise, the modern homonegativity scale (MHS; Morrison & Morrison, 2003) is a widely-used measure of modern hostile homoprejudice and is, accordingly, a good benchmark against which the adversarial homoprejudice subscale – also a measure of modern hostile homoprejudice – can be judged against. The homopositivity scale (HPS; Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007), a measure of the endorsement of positive stereotypes about gay men that has received limited attention to date also appears to be a suitable measure of the romanticised homoprejudice subscale’s construct validity.
Given the novelty of paternalistic homoprejudice in the literature, there exist no validated scales with which to directly assess the construct validity of the paternalistic homoprejudice subscale. However, given that paternalistic homoprejudice exaggerates gay men’s negative lived experiences and that adversarial homoprejudice nullifies those lived experiences, the construct validity of the former could be evidenced by how it behaves in relation to the latter. The construct validity of the paternalistic homoprejudice subscale could also be assessed by examining its relationship with other potentially related measures, such as the support for lesbian and gay human rights scale (SLGHRS; Ellis, Kitzinger, & Wilkinson, 2003) and other political ideologies, such as social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Zakrisson, 2005).

The validity of the AHS can also be assessed by comparing the scores on each subscale between groups theorised to score differently. As discussed in the previous chapter, the present sample was predominantly female, white, well-educated, and secular – all demographics found to be associated with lower levels of homoprejudice (Rowatt, LaBouff, Johnson, Froese, & Tsang, 2009; Petersen & Hyde, 2010; Whitley, Jr., 2009). By splitting the sample into separate demographics (e.g., men and women) and comparing their scores on the AHS, hypothesised differences should be observed, attesting to the AHS’s sensitivity to individual differences.

Given the large number of validation scales included in this study (16 in total), this thesis takes the unorthodox approach of stating the hypotheses in Section 3.3 after the psychometric properties of each of the scales used to validate the AHS are detailed in Section 3.2. This presentation order should make the rationale behind the hypotheses far clearer to the reader as compared to the alternative, where the hypotheses are presented without the necessary theoretical insight into the measures they pertain to.
6.2 Study 2c Methods

6.2.1 Participants

This study uses the same 801 heterosexual participants detailed in the previous chapter, but their results are pooled in the present analysis\(^\text{10}\). The demographics of this pooled sample can be seen in table 6.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Study 2c (N = 801)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Min</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>31.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>11.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Study 2c (N = 801)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sexuality</th>
<th>Study 2c (N = 801)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exclusively heterosexual</td>
<td>629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly heterosexual</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Study 2c (N = 801)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCSEs/O-levels</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS/A-levels</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master's degree</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctoral degree</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Study 2c (N = 801)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious service attendance</th>
<th>Study 2c (N = 801)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On special occasions</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Now and then</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1: Heterosexual participant demographics for Study 2c.

A further 75 nonheterosexual participants also completed the survey and were retained for known-groups analyses. The demographics of this sample can be seen in table 6.2.

\(^{10}\) Due to the random assignment of validation scales, which gives the researcher a greater diversity of hypotheses to test (Rye & Meaney, 2010) it was necessary to pool the Study 2a and 2b samples at this stage in order to maintain statistical power.
Table 6.2: Nonheterosexual participant demographics for Study 2c.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Study 2c (N = 75)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Min</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>31.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>13.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexuality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusively Gay/Lesbian</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mostly Gay/Lesbian</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bisexual</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCSEs/O-levels</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS/A-levels</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master's degree</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctoral degree</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious service attendance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On special occasions</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Now and then</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.2.2 Materials and Procedure

In addition to the aforementioned demographic questions regarding the participants’ age, gender, country of residence, sexual orientation, highest educational attainment, and religious service attendance, participants were also randomly assigned to complete between one and three\(^{11}\) of the following additional measures. Question order was randomised. Some measures have been rescaled as a 7-point Likert scale ranging from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree) for the sake of response consistency for the participants; research evidence suggests that this does not

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\(^{11}\) At the beginning of testing, participants completed only 1 additional validation measure. This was gradually increased to 2, and then to 3 additional measures according to the varying research demands.
compromise the data (Dawes, 2008). It will be explicitly stated which measures have been rescaled in their respective sections.

6.2.2.1 The Ambivalence towards Men Inventory (AMI; Glick & Fiske, 1999) is a 20-item measure of ambivalent attitudes towards men. In the present study, 179 women between the ages of 18 and 72 (M = 34.54, SD = 13.21) completed this measure. Ten items measure hostile attitudes towards men (AMI-H) and tap resentment of men’s paternalism towards women (e.g., “Most men pay lip service to equality for women, but can’t handle having a woman as an equal”, p. 536), compensatory gender differentiation (e.g., “When it comes down to it, most men are really like children”, p. 536), and heterosexual hostility (e.g., “A man who is sexually attracted to a woman typically has no morals about doing whatever it takes to get her in bed”, p. 536). The other ten items measure benevolence towards men (AMI-B) and tap maternalism (e.g., “Men are mainly useful to provide financial security for women”, p. 536), complementary gender differentiation (e.g., “Men are less likely to fall apart in emergencies than women are”, p. 536), and heterosexual intimacy (e.g., “Women are incomplete without men”, p. 536). This measure was rescaled from a 6-point to a 7-point Likert scale with the addition of a ‘Neither agree nor disagree’ option. Subscale scores are derived separately for each of these subscales by averaging the scores on each 10-item subscale, with response options ranging from 1 (low hostility and benevolence) to 7 (high hostility and benevolence).

Glick & Fiske (1999) report alphas between .81 and .86 for the hostility towards men subscale and between .79 and .83 for the benevolence towards men subscale. The present study found alphas of .86 (95% CI: .82 - .89) and .87 (95% CI: .85 - .90) for the hostile and benevolent subscales, respectively. Research using this measure in England has shown positive correlations between the hostile and benevolent subscales for men (r = .55) and women (r = .78), demonstrating its validity as a measure of ambivalence, though the strength of this association differs cross-culturally; for instance, women’s benevolence and hostility towards men are less
strongly correlated in Peru ($r = .19$; Glick et al., 2004). Ambivalence towards men is correlated with gender inequality indices in 16 nations, including the United Kingdom (Glick et al., 2004), because such attitudes position men as naturally and rightfully dominant.

**6.2.2.2 The Altruism Scale** (AS; Rushton, Chrisjon, & Fekken, 1981) is a 20-item measure of the tendency to perform altruistic acts and help others (e.g., “I have given directions to a stranger”, p. 297). One item, “I have made change for a stranger” (p. 297) was omitted, due to its unclear wording, resulting in a 19-item measure. In the present study, 27 men and 58 women between the ages of 18 and 69 ($M = 31.01$, $SD = 11.75$) completed this measure. Responses were coded on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from ‘Never’ to ‘Very often’ and item scores were averaged, with item response options ranging from 1 (low frequency of altruistic behaviours) to 5 (high frequency of altruistic behaviours). Rushton et al. (1981) report alpha coefficients between .78 and .87, and the present study reports a Cronbach’s alpha of .86 (95% CI: .81, .90). Furthermore, Rushton et al. (1981) report that high scores on the AS predict signing up for organ donation, and other real-world altruistic behaviours.

**6.2.2.3 The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory** (ASI; Glick & Fiske, 1996) is a 22-item multidimensional measure of hostile and benevolent attitudes towards women. In the present study, 84 men completed this measure; no women completed this measure. The hostile sexism subscale (ASI-H) comprises eleven items measuring adversarial attitudes towards women (e.g., “Women seek to gain power by getting control over men”, p. 512) and the remaining eleven items tap benevolent sexism (ASI-B) comprising protective paternalism, the belief that women should be protected and lauded by men (e.g., “A good woman should be set on a pedestal by her man”, p. 512); complementary gender differentiation, the belief that men and women have separate yet complementary characteristics (e.g., “Many women have a quality of purity that few men possess”, p. 512); and heterosexual intimacy, the desire for men to be romantically intimate with women (e.g., “Every man ought to have a woman whom he adores”, p. 512). Subscale scores are derived.
separately for each of these subscales. This measure was rescaled from a 6-point to a 7-point Likert scale with the addition of a ‘Neither agree nor disagree’ option. Subscale scores are derived separately for each of these subscales by averaging the scores on each 11-item subscale, with item response options ranging from 1 (low hostility and benevolence) to 7 (high hostility and benevolence).

Glick and Fiske (1996) report acceptable Cronbach’s alpha levels between $\alpha = .80$ and $\alpha = .92$ for the hostile sexism subscale and between $\alpha = .73$ and $\alpha = .85$ for the benevolent sexism subscale. The present study found alphas of .93 (95% CI: .90, .95) and .86 (95% CI: .81, .90) for the hostile and benevolent sexism subscales, respectively. Research using the ASI in England has shown the two subscales to be moderately positively correlated for men (.31), yet negatively correlated for women (-.51), demonstrating its validity as a measure of men’s ambivalent sexism, though the strength and direction of these correlations differ substantially cross-culturally (Glick et al., 2000). Despite the ostensibly positive attitude content of benevolent sexism, the ASI has been found to be associated with rape myth acceptance (Chapleau, Oswald, & Russell, 2007) and disparaging attitudes towards rape survivors (Sakalli-Uğurlu, Yalçın, & Glick, 2007).

6.2.2.4 The Attitudes towards Gay Men Scale (ATG; Herek, 1984) is a 38-item unidimensional measure of condemning (e.g., “Homosexual behaviour between two men is just plain wrong”, p. 51) and tolerant (e.g., “It would be very easy for men to have a conversation with a man I know to be gay”, p. 51) attitudes towards gay men. In the present study, 22 men and 60 women between the ages of 18 and 63 ($M = 31.60$, $SD = 11.27$) completed the ATG. This measure was rescaled from a 5-point Likert scale to a 7-point scale and item scores were averaged, with item response options ranging from 1 (low levels of sexual prejudice) to 7 (high levels of sexual prejudice). One item, “The growing number of gay men indicates a decline in American morals” (p. 51) was reworded to reflect the British research context. Herek (1984) does not report reliability
of the 38-item iteration of this scale, although the 10-item version obtained an acceptable alpha of .89 in Herek (1988). The present analysis yielded an acceptable alpha of .90 (95% CI: .86, .93).

The ATG correlates positively ($r = .57$) with the ‘Hate’ subscale of the lesbian, gay, and bisexual knowledge and attitudes scale for heterosexuals (LGB-KASH; R. Worthington, Dillon, & Becker-Schutte, 2005). Inversely, the ATG is negatively correlated ($r_s = -.35$ to -.45) with positive contact with gay men (Herek, 1988).

6.2.2.5 The Essentialist Beliefs about Homosexuality Scale (EBHS; Haslam & Levy, 2006) is a 15-item multidimensional measure of the belief in: 1) The defining features of homosexuality (seven items; e.g., “Knowing that someone is homosexual or heterosexual tells you a lot about them”, p. 483); 2) The biological bases of homosexuality (five items; e.g., “Homosexuality and heterosexuality are innate, genetically based tendencies”, p. 483); and 3) The historical and cultural universality of homosexuality (two items; e.g., “Homosexuals have probably existed throughout human history”, p. 483). One item, “Bisexual people are fooling themselves and should make up their minds” (p. 483) was omitted, due to its reference to bisexuality, which was not immediately relevant to the present study. In the present study, 26 men and 34 women between the ages of 18 and 59 ($M = 28.80$, $SD = 10.74$) completed the EBHS. Items was rescaled from a 9-point Likert scale to a 7-point scale and item scores were averaged, with item response options ranging from 1 (low endorsement of essentialist beliefs about homosexuality) to 7 (high endorsement of essentialist beliefs about homosexuality).

The authors do not cite any measures of reliability in their paper, however, the present data suggests that the first and third subscales evidence poor reliability ($\alpha = .01$ & Spearman-Brown coefficient = .30; 95% CI: .09, .68) respectively). This is potentially due to two reasons. Firstly, the first subscale is derived from a number of unusually low factor loadings (as low as .48, explaining as little as 23% the variance in its latent factor; Tabachnik & Fidell, 2014). Secondly, the third subscale is composed of only two items, making inconsistent response patterns far more salient.
than in scales with larger numbers of items. As such, the present study will only analyse data in the second 5-item subscale, which evidenced acceptable internal consistency ($\alpha = .81; 95\% \text{ CI: .71, .87}$) and best represents current biological determinist arguments about the aetiology of human sexuality (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). Greater scores reflect greater endorsement of biological essentialist beliefs about nonheterosexuality.

6.2.2.6 The Homopositivity Scale (HPS; Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007) is a 9-item measure of positive stereotypical beliefs about gay men (e.g., “Most gay men have a flawless sense of taste”, p. 89). In the present study, 33 men and 49 women between the ages of 18 and 65 ($M = 29.48, SD = 10.90$) completed the HPS. Items were rescaled from a 5-point Likert scale to a 7-point Likert scale and item scores were averaged, with item response options ranging from 1 (low homopositivity) to 7 (high homopositivity). The authors report alpha coefficients between .72 and .85, indicating acceptable internal consistency and the present study demonstrates a similarly acceptable Cronbach’s alpha ($\alpha = .94; 95\% \text{ CI: .91, .96}$). The scale’s convergent validity is also demonstrated inasmuch as homopositivity correlates moderately positively with benevolent sexism but not with hostile sexism. Greater endorsement of positive stereotypes about gay men is also associated with greater exposure to gay men in the media (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007).

6.2.2.7 The Global Just World Scale (JWS; Lipkus, 1991) is a 7-item scale measuring the belief that the world is, generally, a fair and just place (e.g., “I feel that people get what they are entitled to have”, p. 1173). In the present study, 29 men and 46 women between the ages of 18 and 63 ($M = 29.12, SD = 10.66$) completed this measure. The JWS was rescaled from a 6-point Likert scale to a 7-point scale and items scores were averaged, with item response options ranging from 1 (strong belief that the world is unjust) to 7 (strong belief that the world is just). Lipkus (1991) cites an acceptable alpha coefficient of .83, indicating a psychometrically sound scale, and the present analysis yields an alpha of .83 (95\% CI: .77, .88) in support of this. Greater endorsement in the belief in a just world is associated with greater internal locus of control – the belief that the
self is agentic and can control its own fate (i.e., that the world is just) – suggesting favourable convergent validity (Lipkus, 1991).

6.2.2.8 The Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale (MCPRS; Dunton & Fazio, 1997) is a unidimensional 17-item measure of the extent to which individuals are concerned by being perceived as prejudiced (e.g., “In today’s society it is important that one not be perceived as prejudiced in any manner”, p. 319) and the exercising of restraint to avoid disputes (e.g., “I always express my thoughts and feelings, regardless of how controversial they might be”, p. 319). One item, “If I were participating in a class discussion and a Black student expressed an opinion with which I disagreed, I would be hesitant to express my own viewpoint” (p. 319) was reworded to refer to ‘a gay man’ instead. In the present study, 31 men and 74 women between the ages of 19 and 63 (\( M = 33.36, SD = 12.67 \)) completed the MCPRS. This measure was rescaled from a 6-point Likert scale to a 7-point scale and item scores were averaged, with item response options ranging from 1 (low motivation to control prejudice reactions) to 7 (high motivation to control prejudice reactions). The authors cite an acceptable internal consistency of .81, and the present analysis yields an alpha of .75 (95% CI: .68, .82), corroborating this. Elsewhere, Akrami and Ekehammar (2005) found that the relationship between explicit and implicit measures of prejudice can only be detected once the motivation to control prejudiced reactions is controlled for.

6.2.2.9 The Modern Homonegativity Scale (MHS; Morrison & Morrison, 2003) is a unidimensional 12-item measure of the belief that: 1) gay men and lesbian women make illegitimate demands for change (e.g., “Many gay men use their sexual orientation so that they can obtain special privileges”, p. 25); 2) discrimination towards gay men and lesbian women no longer occurs (e.g., “Gay men do not have all the rights they need” (reverse-coded, p. 25); and 3) gay men and lesbian women exaggerate the significance of their sexuality and prevent themselves from being accepted by wider society as a result (e.g., “Gay men should stop shoving their lifestyle down other people’s throats”, p. 25). In the present study, 27 men and 58 women between the ages of 18 and
79 (M = 29.14, SD = 12.75) completed the MHS. This measure was rescaled from a 5-point Likert scale to a 7-point scale and item scores were averaged, with item response options ranging from 1 (low modern homonegativity) to 7 (high homonegativity). The authors demonstrate a good level of internal consistency, citing alphas ranging between .90 and .91, and the present analyses yields an acceptable alpha level of .90 (95% CI: .86, .93).

The MHS evidences a moderate to strong positive correlation with measures of old-fashioned anti-gay prejudice, yet scores on the MHS are consistently higher than those on measures of old-fashioned prejudice, suggesting that modern prejudice is more societally acceptable than old-fashioned prejudice (Morrison & Morrison, 2003). Furthermore, men evidence significantly higher levels of modern homonegativity than do women, as is also the case with old-fashioned homonegativity (Morrison & Morrison, 2003; McDermott & Blair, 2012). Higher levels of modern homonegativity has also been found to predict seating preference with or away from a visibly gay person (Morrison & Morrison, 2003).

6.2.2.10 The Multidimensional Heterosexism Inventory (MHI; Walls, 2008a) is a multidimensional 23-item measure of heterosexuals’ positive and negative attitudes towards gay men and lesbian women with four subscales: 1) Paternalistic heterosexism (MHI-Pa), the preference for heterosexual children out of concern for the child’s wellbeing (e.g., “I would prefer my son not be homosexual because it would be unfairly harder for him to adopt or have children”, p. 48); 2) Aversive heterosexism (MHI-Av), akin to modern homonegativity (e.g., “Gay men should stop shoving their lifestyle down everyone’s throat”, p. 48); 3) Amnestic heterosexism (MHI-Am), the denial of continued prejudice and discrimination towards gay men and lesbian women (e.g., “Gay men are treated as fairly as everyone else in today’s society”, p. 49); and 4) Positive-stereotypic heterosexism (MHI-Po), the endorsement of positive stereotypes about gay men and lesbian women (e.g., “Gay men are more compassionate than heterosexual men”, p. 49). For the purposes of the present study, items pertaining to lesbians were either reworded where
possible or omitted entirely where rewording would not have been consistent with prevailing stereotypes about gay men (e.g., “Lesbians (gay men) are better than heterosexual women (men) at auto maintenance and repair”, p. 49). One further item was reworded to refer to the United Kingdom rather than North America. Based on these criteria, 16 items (4 paternalistic, 6 aversive, 4 amnestic, and 2 positive-stereotypic) pertaining to gay men were used. In the present study, 35 men and 50 women between the ages of 18 and 72 \((M = 30.35, SD = 11.72)\) completed the MHI. This measure was rescaled from a 6-point Likert scale to a 7-point scale and item responses were averaged, with item response options ranging from 1 (low levels of heterosexism) to 7 (high levels of heterosexism).

All of the subscales evidence acceptable levels of internal consistency in Walls (2008a), with alpha coefficients ranging from .79 to .94. In the present analysis, the paternalistic, aversive, and amnestic, subscales produced acceptable Cronbach’s alpha levels of .86 (95\% CI: .82, .91), .92 (95\% CI: .89, .94), .73 (95\% CI: .62, .81). The 2-item measure of positive-stereotypic heterosexism towards gay men also demonstrated acceptable internal consistency (Spearman-Brown coefficient = .74, 95\% CI: .59, .83). Aversive and amnestic heterosexism have been found to be positively correlated with political conservatism, and heterosexual women appear more likely to endorse positive stereotypes about gay men than are heterosexual men (Walls, 2008a), which has been echoed elsewhere with regards to the homopositivity scale (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007). The paternalistic heterosexism subscale behaved inconsistently in the series of studies conducted by Walls (2008a) and limited evidence for its validity exists. For the sake of completeness, and to compare the construct of paternalistic heterosexism with the construct of paternalistic homoprejudice forwarded in this thesis, it was included nonetheless.

6.2.2.11 The Polymorphous Prejudice Scale (PPS; Massey, 2009) is a 70-item measure of a range of positive and negative attitudes towards gay men and lesbian women. Given that some of these constructs were already captured exhaustively by other scales, such as the MHS and the
ATG, only a selection of 6 of the PPS items from the positive beliefs subscale (e.g., “Straight men have a lot to learn from gay men about being friends to women”, p. 159) were retained. In the present study, 27 men and 55 women between the ages of 18 and 58 ($M = 31.20$, $SD = 11.56$) completed the PSS. Massey (2009) does not clarify how the PPS is scaled, so they were scaled here as a 7-point Likert scale. Item scores were averaged, resulting in total scores ranging from 1 (low endorsement of positive beliefs about gay men) to 7 (high endorsement of positive beliefs about gay men). One of the items, “The plight of lesbians and gay men will only improve when they are in important positions within the system” (Massey, 2009, p. 159) was reworded to omit the reference to lesbian women, as it was outside the scope of this investigation. Massey (2009) cites a Cronbach’s alpha of .86 for this subscale and a test-retest reliability of .67. The present analysis yielded an alpha coefficient of .87 (95% CI: .82, .91). The positive beliefs subscale correlates negatively with the ATG, and positively with the valuing of gay rights progress and resistance of heteronormativity (Massey, 2009).

6.2.2.12 The Religious Commitment Inventory (RCI; E. Worthington et al., 2003) is a 10-item measure of the importance attached to one’s religious beliefs and communities (e.g., “my religious beliefs lie behind my whole approach to life”, p. 87). In the present study, 62 men and 148 women between the ages of 18 and 79 ($M = 33.10$, $SD = 12.70$) completed the RCI, which was administered to approximately half of the participants who did not respond ‘Never’ to the demographic question ‘How often do you attend religious services?’. Responses were coded on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from ‘Not at all true of me’ to ‘Totally true of me’ and were averaged, with item response options ranging from 1 (low religious commitment) to 7 (high religious commitment).

E. Worthington et al. (2003) cites acceptable internal consistency, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .93, and good convergent and discriminant validity. In the present study, an alpha coefficient of .97 (95% CI: .96, .97) was found, corroborating that of E. Worthington et al. (2003). Furthermore,
the RCI correlates with a number of other measures of religious commitment (E. Worthington et al., 2003), but this measure possesses additional utility because it does not implicitly allude to exclusively Judeo-Christian beliefs and practices.

6.2.2.13 The Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWA-short version; Zakrisson, 2005) is a unidimensional 15-item measure of conventionalism (e.g., “The “old-fashioned ways” and “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live”, p. 870), authoritarian aggression (e.g., “Our country needs a powerful leader, in order to destroy the radical and immoral currents prevailing in society today”, p. 870), and authoritarian submission (e.g., “Our forefathers ought to be honoured more for the way they have built our society, at the same time we ought to put an end to those forces destroying it”, p. 870). In the present study, 22 men and 58 women between the ages of 18 and 69 (\(M = 32.56, SD = 13.04\)) completed this measure. Responses were scored on a 7-point Likert scale and then averaged, with item response options ranging from 1 (low levels of RWA) to 7 (high levels of RWA).

Zakrisson (2005) reports that the RWA demonstrates acceptable internal consistency, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .72 and it an acceptable level of internal consistency is reported herein (\(\alpha = .89\); 95% CI: .85, .92). Right-wing authoritarianism has been found elsewhere to predict anti-gay prejudice (Laythe, Finkel, & Kirkpatrick, 2001).

6.2.2.14 The Social Dominance Orientation Scale (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) is a 16-item measure of the preference for inequality among social groups (e.g., “If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems”, p. 763). In the present study, 28 men and 51 women between the ages of 18 and 63 (\(M = 33.42, SD = 13.11\)) completed this measure. Responses were scored on a 7-point Likert scale and then averaged, with item response options ranging from 1 (low levels of SDO) to 7 (high levels of SDO).

Those with a high SDO tend to 1) be men; 2) seek professional roles that enhance unequal hierarchies; and 3) be more prejudiced and support ideologies that reaffirm hierarchical inequality.
(Levin et al., 2012; Pratto et al., 1994; Whitley, Jr., 1999). Furthermore, Pratto et al. (1994) demonstrate that the scale has acceptable internal consistency ($\alpha = .83$), which has also been demonstrated in the present analysis ($\alpha = .91$; 95% CI: .87, .93). More recently, SDO has been delineated into SDO-dominance – the preference for groups to dominate others – and SDO-egalitarianism – the preference for unequal intergroup relations – which have both been associated with ideologies and aggression that legitimise inequality (Ho et al., 2012).

6.2.2.15 The Social Desirability Scale (SDS-short form; Reynolds, 1982) is a 13-item measure of the tendency to present oneself in a favourable manner by over-reporting desirable qualities (e.g., “I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable”, p. 122) and by under-reporting undesirable qualities (e.g., “I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favours of me”, p.122). In the present study, 38 men and 59 women between the ages of 18 and 63 ($M = 33.03$, $SD = 12.03$) completed the SDS.

The 13-item short form of the scale demonstrates acceptable reliability (Kuder-Richardson Formula 20 = .76). Although the SDS typically utilises dichotomous (i.e., yes/no) responses, the present study used the same 7-point strongly agree to strongly disagree continuum in order to mitigate against some of the undesirable statistical properties of dichotomous response scales (see Preston & Colman, 2000). This adjustment did not undermine the reliability of the scale ($\alpha = .78$, 95% CI: .71, .84). Items were then averaged, with item response options ranging from 1 (low social desirability) to 7 (high social desirability).

The SDS has traditionally been used as a measure of impression management, but a more recent perspective suggests that the SDS may tap interpersonally oriented self-control, whereby those scoring highly demonstrate high levels of self-control in social contexts (Uziel, 2010). Based on this interpretation the SDS may be seen as a similar measure to the MCPRS, but measuring a more macro-level of interpersonal control.
6.2.2.16 The Support for Lesbian and Gay Human Rights Scale (SLGHRS; Ellis et al., 2003) is a multidimensional 25-item measure of support for: 1) social and political rights of sexual minorities (e.g., “Gay male couples should be legally permitted to marry, just as heterosexual couples are”, p. 130); 2) freedom of expression by sexual minorities (e.g., “A person’s sexual orientation should not block that person’s access to basic rights and freedoms”, p. 131); and 3) privacy of identity for sexual minorities (e.g., “A man’s homosexuality should not be raised as an issue in a court of law, unless the case under consideration directly relates to homosexual acts”, p. 131). In the present study, 31 men and 50 women between the aged of 19 and 58 (M = 31.09, SD = 10.96) completed the SLGHRS. Many of the items were adapted to refer specifically to gay men and omit references to lesbian women.

The authors do not report any reliability statistics, and subsequent research has refuted the tripartite factor structure, arguing in favour of a unidimensional 14-item scale of global SLGHRS instead, which demonstrates acceptable reliability (α = .86; Morrison & McDermott, 2009). The present study reports a Cronbach’s alpha of .93 (95% CI; .90, .95) for this 14-item iteration of the SLGHRS and the results reported here are based on this alternative scale. The SLHRS was rescaled from a 5-point Likert scale to a 7-point scale and item scores were averaged, with item response options ranging from 1 (low support for gay men’s human rights) to 7 (high support for gay men’s human rights).

6.2.3 Parametric vs. Nonparametric Data Analysis

The analysis of non-parametric data with parametric tests violates the theory of admissible statistics (Stevens, 1946) stating that the measurement level of the data should inform the choice of statistical test. Yet, parametric statistical analyses are routinely used to analyse ordinal Likert scales based on three justifications. The first justification is that – while individual items measure a latent variable at the ordinal level – the averaging of multiple related items produces a measurement scale that is interval and, thus, suitable for Pearson correlations (Carifo & Perla,
The second justification is that – when treating Pearson and Spearman coefficients of the same variables as raw data and correlating them – both coefficients correlate almost perfectly, indicating that Pearson’s may be the more advantageous choice for its greater statistical power (Norman, 2010). The third and final justification is that Pearson correlations have been found to be robust even when measurement level and distribution assumptions are violated (Havlicek & Peterson, 1976).

However, this is disputed in O’Brien (1979), who demonstrates how skew and the number of rank categories have compounding implications on the robustness of Pearson correlations. In a normally distributed sample of ordinal data, average Pearson coefficients and number of rank categories demonstrate a curvilinear relationship, with the lowest average coefficients being found at four categories. On the other hand, when the data are positively skewed (as is the case in the present data), average Pearson coefficients decrease as the number of rank categories increases. To reiterate, in positively skewed ordinal data sets, Pearson correlations become less sensitive to ‘true’ relationships as the number of rank categories increases. Given that the present study used 5- and 7-point Likert scales and the data are positively skewed, O’Brien’s (1979) findings suggest that a Pearson correlation could underestimate the true correlations by approximately .06. Abdullah (1990) also suggests that Spearman’s Rho is more robust to outliers (of which there are many in these data) than is Pearson. As such, Spearman was used for the correlational analyses between the AHS and the aforementioned measures assessing convergent and divergent validity, and between the AHS subscales. For similar distributional reasons (see Knapp, 1990), non-parametric tests of difference will also be used in the known-groups analyses. For transparency, equivalent analyses using parametric alternatives are included in Appendix 5.
6.2.4 Hypotheses

6.2.4.1 Repellent Homoprejudice

Because both are measures of old-fashioned homoprejudice, the repellent homoprejudice subscale is hypothesised to correlate positively with the ATG. Given that the ATG correlates positively with the MHS (Morrison & Morrison, 2003), repellent homoprejudice is also hypothesised to correlate with the MHS. Further, repellent homoprejudice is hypothesised to correlate positively MHI-Am, MHI-Av, and adversarial homoprejudice, which resemble the MHS in their modern homonegative item contents. The ATG has been found to correlate negatively with the endorsement of positive stereotypes about gay men (M. Brown & Groscup, 2009). As such, repellent is hypothesised to be negatively correlated with measures of positive stereotypes about gay men – namely, the HPS, PPS, MHI-Po, and the romanticised homoprejudice subscale. Given that MHI-Pa and paternalistic homoprejudice convey concern for sexual minorities’ wellbeing, they are hypothesised to correlate negatively with repellent homoprejudice.

The repellent homoprejudice subscale is also hypothesised to correlate positively with ideologies (SDO, RWA, and JW) that have been associated with higher-levels of anti-gay prejudice elsewhere (Hettinger & Vandello, 2014; Stones, 2006; Tsang & Rowatt, 2007). Religiosity has also been found to be positively correlated with anti-gay attitudes (for a meta-analysis, see Whitley, Jr., 2009), so the RCI is hypothesised to be positively correlated with repellent homoprejudice. Inversely, repellent homoprejudice is hypothesised to be negatively correlated with views that affirm and support gay men (the EBHS and SLGHRS), as has been found by Ellis et al. (2003), and Haslam and Levy (2006). Right-wing political ideology also appears to predict lower levels of altruism (Zettler & Hilbig, 2010), so repellent homoprejudice is hypothesised to be negatively correlated with altruism. Researchers have also documented associations between anti-gay attitudes and ambivalent sexism (Nagoshi et al., 2008) and ambivalence towards men (Sakallı-Uğurlu & Uğurlu, 2016), and similar positive correlations are hypothesised between repellent
homoprejudice and the ASI and AMI. The SDS and MCPRS should ideally be unrelated to any of the subscales because such a null-relationship indicates that the measure is not susceptible to respondents’ positive self-presentation concerns.

Heterosexual men are routinely found to endorse more hostile attitudes towards gay men than do heterosexual women (Herek, 1988; Herek, 2000; LaMar & Kite, 1998; Petersen & Hyde, 2010). As such, heterosexual men are hypothesised to evidence significantly higher levels of repellent homoprejudice than heterosexual women. Greater levels of hostility towards gay men have also been linked to lower levels of formal education (Rowatt, LaBouff, Johnson, Froese, & Tsang, 2009; Simoni, 1996), so repellent homoprejudice is hypothesised to be significantly higher among participants with less formal educational experience than participants with more formal educational experience. Given that nonheterosexuals are the targets of homoprejudice, the nonheterosexual sample are hypothesised to score significantly lower than the heterosexual participants on all of the AHS subscales.

6.2.4.2 Romanticised Homoprejudice

Because the HPS, PPS, and MHI-Po are all measures of positive stereotypes about gay men, the romanticised homoprejudice subscale is hypothesised to correlate positively with these measures. Romanticised homoprejudice is also hypothesised to correlate positively with the MHI-Pa and paternalistic homoprejudice due to their similar positive valence. Given the aforementioned negative correlation between the ATG and the endorsement of positive stereotypes about gay men (M. Brown & Groscup, 2009), romanticised homoprejudice is hypothesised to correlate negatively with the ATG and the repellent homoprejudice subscale. In light of research suggesting that those who endorse high levels of homopositivity endorse low levels of modern homonegativity (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2008), romanticised homoprejudice is hypothesised to correlate negatively with the MHS, and other similar measures (MHI-Av and the adversarial homoprejudice subscale). Walls (2008b) has shown that the endorsement of positive stereotypes about gay men is
positively correlated with the denial of continued prejudice and discrimination against sexual minorities. As such, just world beliefs and amnestic heterosexism should also be positively correlated with romanticised homoprejudice, because such romanticisation minimises and denies the oppressive experience of nonheterosexuals.

Furthermore, Walls (2005) also found that positive-stereotypic heterosexism is positively correlated with social dominance orientation, and reasoned that this reflected the maintenance of sexual orientation stratification and hierarchy legitimising beliefs. However, the previously reported qualitative findings showed no indication that such oppressive motivations underlie the romanticised homoprejudice. As such, SDO was hypothesised to be unrelated to romanticised homoprejudice. No research has explored the relationship between RWA and the endorsement of positive stereotypes about gay men and there are no compelling justifications for believing that they should be related. As such, romanticised homoprejudice and RWA are also hypothesised to be unrelated. Religiosity – as measured by quest and fundamentalism – has been found to be unrelated to homopositivity (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007), so religious commitment is hypothesised to be unrelated to romanticised homoprejudice. Walls (2005) also found that positive-stereotypic heterosexism is unrelated to support for lesbian and gay human rights, and a similar non-significant correlation between romanticised homoprejudice and the SLGHRS is hypothesised also.

Although no research has studied the relationship between the endorsement of positive stereotypes about gay men and essentialist beliefs about sexuality, a positive correlation is hypothesised on the basis that the former reifies the latter (Bastian & Haslam, 2006). Based on the hypothesised negative relationship between repellent homoprejudice and altruism, altruism is hypothesised to be positively correlated with romanticised homoprejudice. Morrison and A. Bearden (2007) found that homopositivity is also positively correlated with ambivalent sexism, and a similar positive correlation between the ASI and romanticised homoprejudice is also
hypothesised. Finally, given that gay men are men nonetheless, romanticised homoprejudice is hypothesised to correlate positively with the AMI.

Women have been found to endorse more positive stereotypes about gay men than do men (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007). As such, women are hypothesised to score significantly higher on the romanticised homoprejudice scale than will men. Research on heterosexuals who ally themselves with LGBT causes and groups suggests that such individuals tend to be more highly educated, endorse a range of positive – but astereoptyic – attitudes towards sexual minorities (Fingerhut, 2011), and are more critical of stereotypical portrayals of gay men than those who do not identify themselves as allies (Goldstein & Davis, 2010; Stotzer, 2009). As such, more formally educated respondents in the present sample are hypothesised to evidence significantly lower levels of romanticised homoprejudice than will less formally educated respondents.

6.2.4.3 Paternalistic Homoprejudice

Little research has explored the relatively new concept of paternalism towards gay men. Walls (2008a) found that paternalistic heterosexism is negatively correlated with political conservativism. On this basis, paternalistic homoprejudice is hypothesised to be negatively correlated with prejudicial views typically associated with conservativism (i.e., ATG, MHS, MHI-Am, MHI-Av, and repellent and adversarial homoprejudice). Paternalistic homoprejudice is also hypothesised to be positively correlated with other measures that transmit ostensibly positive sentiment towards gay men (the HPS, PPS, MHI-Pa, MHI-Po, and the romanticised homoprejudice subscale). Walls (2005) also found that paternalistic heterosexism was positively correlated with social dominance orientation. However, social dominance did not emerge in the theme of paternalistic homoprejudice during the qualitative analysis. As such, the two are hypothesised to be unrelated.

No research has studied the relationship between paternalism towards gay men and right-wing authoritarianism and there is no reason to hypothesise that the two would be related.
Likewise, there is no research evidence to suggest that paternalistic homoprejudice should be related to the EBHS, so no relationship is hypothesised between the two. There is also no research studying the relationship between paternalism towards gay men and ambivalence towards men or ambivalent sexism. Because paternalistic homoprejudice is conceptualised differently to the concepts of paternalism and maternalism in ambivalent sexism theory, no relationship is hypothesised between paternalistic homoprejudice and either measure of ambivalent sexism. Given that just world beliefs contend that the world is fair, they are hypothesised to be negatively correlated with paternalistic homoprejudice because the latter emphasises that the world is not fair to gay men. Likewise, if paternalistic homoprejudice is associated with facilitating behaviours in order to redress such inequality, it may be linked to altruism on a more general scale. As such, a positive correlation is hypothesised between paternalistic homoprejudice and the AS.

The potential relationship between religiosity and paternalism towards gay men in unclear. Because religiosity appears to be related to higher levels of anti-gay prejudice, one might expect religiosity to be negatively correlated with paternalistic attitudes towards gay men. However, religiosity could equally engender a ‘love they neighbour’ response in particularly committed individuals, leading to a positive correlation between religious commitment and paternalistic homoprejudice. Research has also indicated that religious individuals delineate their negative attitudes towards the ‘sin’ (i.e., homosexual behaviour) and their positive attitudes towards the ‘sinner’ (i.e., the homosexual person; Mak & Tsang, 2008; Rosik, Griffith, & Cruz, 2007). Given that paternalistic homoprejudice taps perceptions of societal disadvantage among gay men, rather than the behaviours associate with being gay, a positive correlation is hypothesised between religious commitment and paternalistic homoprejudice. Likewise, because paternalistic homoprejudice is concerned with the disadvantage experienced by gay men, this is hypothesised to be positively correlated with the SGLHRS.
Given that paternalistic homoprejudice conveys sympathetic attitudes towards gay men and that women appear to endorse more tolerant attitudes towards gay men than do heterosexual men, women are hypothesised to score significantly higher than men on the paternalistic homoprejudice subscale. Likewise, more formally educated respondents are hypothesised to endorse greater levels of paternalistic homoprejudice than those who are less formally educated due to a greater awareness of societal inequality.

### 6.2.4.4 Adversarial Homoprejudice

Given the similarities between the adversarial homoprejudice subscale and the MHS, MHI-Am, and MHI-Av, these measures are hypothesised to be positively correlated. Given the aforementioned positive correlation between the ATG and the MHS (Morrison & Morrison, 2003), adversarial homoprejudice is also hypothesised to correlate positively with the ATG and with repellent homoprejudice. Considering adversarial homoprejudice consists of claims that gay men use their sexuality to get special treatment, it is hypothesised to be correlated negatively with paternalistic homoprejudice and MHI-Pa because the latter perspectives refute that gay men get special treatment. Also, given the aforementioned negative relationship between homopositivity and modern homonegativity (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007), adversarial homoprejudice is hypothesised to correlate negatively with the HPS, PPS, MHI-Po, and romanticised homoprejudice.

Research has found that the belief in a just world is negatively correlated with support for gay rights (Hettinger & Vandello, 2014). As such, adversarial homoprejudice is hypothesised to correlate positively with the JWS, because the contention that gay men do not need more rights may hinge on the perception that the world is a just place. Similarly, the aforementioned research on the relationship between ambivalent sexism, ambivalence towards men, religiosity, social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, and anti-gay prejudice informs the hypotheses that adversarial homoprejudice will be positively correlated with the ASI, AMI, RCI, SDO and
RWA, respectively. Inversely, adversarial homoprejudice is hypothesised to be negatively correlated with the SGLHRS, AS, and with the EBHS, based on the aforementioned research associating political conservatism and hostility towards gay men with less support for gay rights, less altruistic behaviour, and rejection of sexuality essentialism.

Finally, based on the aforementioned research noting gender and educational differences in the endorsement of hostility towards gay men, women and more formally educated respondents are hypothesised to score significantly lower than men and less formally educated respondents on the adversarial homoprejudice subscale. Given the large number of convergent and discriminant validity hypotheses (90 in total), they have been tabulated in Table 6.3 for clarity’s sake.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Repellent</th>
<th>Romanticised</th>
<th>Paternalistic</th>
<th>Adversarial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Repellent</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanticised</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paternalistic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversarial</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMI-B</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMI-H</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASI-B</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASI-H</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATG</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBHS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JWS</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCPRS</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHS</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHI-Am</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHI-Av</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHI-Pa</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHI-Po</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>RCI</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
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<td>RWA</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLGHRS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.3: Convergent and discriminant validity hypotheses. + = positive correlation, - = negative correlation, x = no correlation.
6.3 Study 2c Results

6.3.1 Correlations between AHS Subscales

Based on the research suggesting that attitudes towards gay men are particularly gendered, the subscale correlations were analysed separately for men and women. Spearman’s Rho with 1000 bootstrap samples was used to analyse the data because of the widespread violations of normality.

As hypothesised, repellent and adversarial homoprejudice correlated positively for both men and women. Adversarial and paternalistic homoprejudice correlated negatively, as hypothesised, but this relationship was weaker among women and the confidence interval for this correlation (-.188 -.009) suggests a possible type-I error being made here, due to the confidence interval containing zero. Paternalistic and repellent homoprejudice did correlate negatively as hypothesised, but this did not reach significance for either group (though the confidence intervals in both groups only marginally contain zero). Romanticised and paternalistic homoprejudice correlated positively for both groups, as hypothesised.

Contrary to the hypothesis that romanticised homoprejudice would be negatively correlated with repellent and adversarial homoprejudice, the analysis showed these constructs were actually correlated positively (see Table 6.4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Repellent</th>
<th>Romanticised</th>
<th>Paternalistic</th>
<th>Adversarial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Repellent</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.172**</td>
<td>-.111</td>
<td>.569**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanticised</td>
<td>.232**</td>
<td>[.051,.295]</td>
<td>[.239,.020]</td>
<td>[.469,.655]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paternalistic</td>
<td>-.073</td>
<td>.308**</td>
<td>[.256,.481]</td>
<td>-.251**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversarial</td>
<td>[.154,.004]</td>
<td>[.227,.390]</td>
<td>-.091*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.4: Correlational analyses between the AHS subscales. Zeros precede all decimal points. Brackets contain bias-corrected accelerated 95% CI. *p<.05, **p<.01, † confidence interval suggests false positive. Men’s results are shown above the diagonal; women’s results are shown below the diagonal.

12 A type-I error (alternatively known as a false positive) may be indicated by a significant result with a confidence interval that contains zero. This pattern of results suggests that the null hypothesis has been incorrectly rejected.
These findings suggest the endorsement of potential ambivalence towards gay men and that the content of this ambivalence is a combination of romanticised homoprejudice and either repellent or adversarial homoprejudice (or, indeed, both of these hostile subdomains of homoprejudice). However, a problem with this interpretation is that a positive correlation may also found when participants disagree with both constructs, possibly suggesting indifference or even outright rejection of these attitudes, given the negative inferences that can be drawn from them.

In order to test which combination of romanticised, repellent, and adversarial subscales tapped potential ambivalence, an index of ambivalence proposed by Thompson et al. (2014) was used:

\[
\left( \left( \frac{\text{Attitude}_P + \text{Attitude}_N}{2} \right) - | \text{Attitude}_P - \text{Attitude}_N | \right) + 3
\]

Where \text{Attitude}_P is the average score on the positive attitudinal measure (romanticised homoprejudice) and \text{Attitude}_N is the average score on the negative attitudinal measure (repellent or adversarial homoprejudice).

This formula computes the difference between attitude intensity (derived from the mean of \text{Attitude}_P and \text{Attitude}_N) and attitude polarity (derived from the absolute difference between \text{Attitude}_P and \text{Attitude}_N), and then finally adds a constant of 3 to eliminate negative values. The scores on this index thus range from 1 (not at all ambivalent) to 10 (extremely ambivalent). This formula evidences the three desirable properties of an ambivalence index (Breckler, 1994; as discussed in Chapter 2). Thompson et al. (2014) also demonstrate the construct validity of this index; with regards to ambivalent attitudes towards euthanasia, AIDS, capital punishment, abortion, and punitive drink-driving laws, those with a high personal fear of invalidity (a personality trait positively associated with ambivalence) score higher on this index whereas those with a high
need for cognition (a personality trait negatively associated with ambivalence) score lower on this index.

First, this formula was applied to romanticised \((\text{AttitudeP})\) and repellent \((\text{AttitudeN})\) homoprejudice. This index was not normally distributed (Skewness = 1.18, Kurtosis = 2.62) and only 64 (7.99%) of the participants scored above the midpoint of 5 \((Mdn = 3.5, Rng = 1.26 – 8.34)\). On this basis, it was concluded that the positive correlation between romanticised and repellent homoprejudice was due to participants being likely to disagree with both rather than agreeing with both. Repellent homoprejudice was then substituted with adversarial homoprejudice and the index was computed again. This time, the index was normally distributed (Skewness = -0.05, Kurtosis = .01) despite neither constituent subscale being normally distributed and 369 (46.07%) of the participants scored the scale midpoint or higher \((Mdn = 4.84, Rng = 1 - 8.34)\).

In order to investigate this further, the ambivalent homoprejudice index was correlated with the validation measures using Spearman’s Rho with 1000 bootstrap samples. Ambivalent homoprejudice was found to be positively correlated with benevolence towards men \((r = .34, p \leq .01, 95\% \text{ CI: } .18 - .48)\), hostility towards men \((r = .32, p \leq .01, 95\% \text{ CI: } .18 - .45)\), benevolent sexism \((r = .49, p \leq .01, 95\% \text{ CI: } .31 - .63)\), homopositivity \((r = .52, p \leq .01, 95\% \text{ CI: } .33 - .68)\), just world beliefs \((r = .24, p \leq .05, 95\% \text{ CI: } .01 - .46)\), modern homonegativity \((r = .22, p \leq .05, 95\% \text{ CI: } .00 - .45)\), paternalistic heterosexism \((r = .23, p \leq .05, 95\% \text{ CI: } .01 - .44)\), aversive heterosexism \((r = .48, p \leq .01, 95\% \text{ CI: } .26 - .64)\), the polymorphous prejudice positive beliefs subscale \((r = .40, p \leq .01, 95\% \text{ CI: } .20 - .56)\), and social dominance orientation \((r = .26, p \leq .05, 95\% \text{ CI: } .02 - .46)\). Importantly, this index was also uncorrelated with the motivation to control prejudice reactions \((r = .00, p = \text{n.s.})\) and social desirability \((r = .03, p = \text{n.s.})\). These findings will be considered further in the discussion section.
6.3.2 Subscale and Validation Measure Correlations

Spearman’s Rho with 1000 bootstrap samples was used to analyse the relationships between the AHS subscales and the aforementioned validation measures. For reference, these results are tabulated in Table 6.5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Repellent</th>
<th>Romanticised</th>
<th>Paternalistic</th>
<th>Adversarial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMI-B</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>.549**</td>
<td>.206, .475</td>
<td>-.148, .162</td>
<td>.362, .601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMI-H</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>.419**</td>
<td>.241, .515</td>
<td>.006, .282</td>
<td>.279, .570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>-129</td>
<td>.217*</td>
<td>.200</td>
<td>-2.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASI-B</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>.582**</td>
<td>.107, .415</td>
<td>.009, .374†</td>
<td>-.445, .052</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASI-H</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>.392**</td>
<td>.260*</td>
<td>-.348**</td>
<td>.549**</td>
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<td>ATG</td>
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<td>-.328, .090</td>
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<td>.009, .374†</td>
<td>-.445, .052</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBHS</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>.558**</td>
<td>-.220</td>
<td>-.162</td>
<td>-.420**</td>
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<tr>
<td>HPS</td>
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<td>-.428, .026</td>
<td>-.421, .132</td>
<td>-.596, -.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JW</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>.197</td>
<td>.622**</td>
<td>.305**</td>
<td>.222*</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCPRS</td>
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<td>.457, .747</td>
<td>.080, .505</td>
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<td>-.096, .453</td>
<td>-.504, .125</td>
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<tr>
<td>MHI-Am</td>
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<td>.628**</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>-.342**</td>
<td>.765**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHI-Pa</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>.355**</td>
<td>-.116</td>
<td>-.238*</td>
<td>.444**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHI-Po</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>.648**</td>
<td>-.220</td>
<td>-.162</td>
<td>.815**</td>
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<td>-.057, .348</td>
<td>-.371, -.012†</td>
<td>.717, .876</td>
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<td>PPS-Adj</td>
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<td>.160, .554</td>
<td>-.076, .341</td>
<td>-.067, .370</td>
<td>.225, .568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.014</td>
<td>.514**</td>
<td>.312**</td>
<td>.141</td>
</tr>
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<td>RWA</td>
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<td>.610**</td>
<td>.322, .673</td>
<td>.069, .517</td>
<td>-.089, .356</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>.630**</td>
<td>.214, .624</td>
<td>.253, .640</td>
<td>.028, .502</td>
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<tr>
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<td>98</td>
<td>.097</td>
<td>.435**</td>
<td>.362**</td>
<td>.379**</td>
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<td>SLGHRS</td>
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<td>-.206, .518</td>
<td>-.301, .211</td>
<td>-.052, .489</td>
<td>-.823, -.564</td>
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</table>
Table 6.5: AHS subscale correlations with validation measures. Zeroes precede all decimal points. Brackets contain bias-corrected accelerated 95% CI. *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, † confidence interval indicates a false positive, †† confidence interval indicates a false negative.

6.3.2.1 Ambivalence towards Men

As predicted, benevolent attitudes towards men were positively correlated with repellent ($r_{[179]} = .55, p \leq .01$), romanticised ($r_{[179]} = .348, p \leq .01$), and adversarial homoprejudice ($r_{[179]} = .49, p \leq .01$), and were uncorrelated with paternalistic homoprejudice. Likewise, hostility towards men was also positively correlated with repellent ($r_{[179]} = .419, p \leq .01$), romanticised ($r_{[179]} = .38, p \leq .01$), and adversarial homoprejudice ($r_{[179]} = .43, p \leq .01$), but was also unexpectedly correlated with paternalistic homoprejudice ($r_{[179]} = .15, p \leq .05$).

6.3.2.2 Altruism

As predicted, altruism was negatively correlated with repellent and adversarial homoprejudice, but did not reach significance in either instance. Also as predicted, altruism was positively correlated with romanticised and paternalistic homoprejudice, but this relationship was only significant in the former instance ($r_{[87]} = .22, p \leq .05$). However, an inspection of the confidence interval for the latter correlation shows that both upper and lower bounds are positive, suggesting that rejecting this marginally non-significant result ($r_{[87]} = .20, p = .06$) may result in a type-II error being made.\(^{13}\)

6.3.2.3 Ambivalent Sexism

As predicted, benevolent sexism was positively correlated with repellent ($r_{[84]} = .58, p \leq .01$), romanticised ($r_{[84]} = .61, p \leq .01$), and adversarial homoprejudice ($r_{[84]} = .234, p \leq .05$), and was unrelated to paternalistic homoprejudice. Hostile sexism was also positively correlated

\(^{13}\) A type-II error (alternatively known as a false negative) may be indicated by a non-significant result with a confidence interval that does not contain zero. This pattern of results suggests that the experimental hypothesis has been incorrectly rejected.
with repellent \( (r; [84] = .392, p \leq .01) \), romanticised \( (r; [84] = .26, p \leq .05) \), and adversarial homoprejudice \( (r; [84] = .55, p \leq .01) \) as predicted. Contrary to the initial hypothesis, hostile sexism was negatively correlated with paternalistic homoprejudice \( (r; [84] = -.35, p \leq .01) \).

### 6.3.2.4 Attitudes towards Gay Men

As predicted, the ATG was positively correlated with repellent \( (r; [82] = .56, p \leq .01) \) and adversarial homoprejudice \( (r; [82] = .51, p \leq .01) \) and negatively correlated with paternalistic homoprejudice \( (r; [82] = -.24, p \leq .05) \). Unexpectedly, the ATG was not significantly correlated with romanticised homoprejudice.

### 6.3.2.5 Essentialist Beliefs about Homosexuality

As predicted, the EBHS was negatively correlated with repellent \( (r; [60] = -.42, p \leq .01) \) and adversarial homoprejudice \( (r; [60] = -.42, p \leq .01) \) and was uncorrelated with paternalistic homoprejudice. Contrary to the predicted positive correlation between essentialist beliefs about homosexuality and romanticised homoprejudice, the results instead indicated a nonsignificant negative correlation between the two constructs.

### 6.3.2.6 Homopositivity

As predicted, homopositivity was positively correlated with romanticised \( (r; [82] = .62, p \leq .01) \) and paternalistic \( (r; [82] = .31, p \leq .01) \) homoprejudice. Unexpectedly, the HPS and the adversarial homoprejudice subscale were positively correlated \( (r; [82] = .22, p \leq .05) \), though this is consistent with the positive correlation between adversarial and romanticised homoprejudice discussed earlier. The hypothesised negative correlation between the HPS and repellent homoprejudice was refuted, and a marginally nonsignificant positive correlation between the two was found instead.
6.3.2.7 Just World Beliefs

As predicted, the belief in a just world was positively correlated with repellent ($r$ [75] = .29, $p \leq .05$), adversarial ($r$ [75] = .33, $p \leq .01$), and romanticised homoprejudice, but this was marginally nonsignificant in the latter instance. Subsequent inspection of the confidence interval of the latter correlation (.01 - .45) indicate that rejecting this result may result in a type-II error. Finally, contrary to the hypothesised negative correlation between just world beliefs and paternalistic homoprejudice, the two constructs appear to be unrelated.

6.3.2.8 Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions

As hypothesised, the MCPRS was unrelated to repellent and romanticised homoprejudice. However, it was positively correlated with paternalistic homoprejudice ($r$ [105] = .28, $p \leq .01$) and negatively correlated with adversarial homoprejudice ($r$ [105] = -.33, $p \leq .01$).

6.3.2.9 Modern Homonegativity

As predicted, modern homonegativity was positively correlated with repellent ($r$ [86] = .63, $p \leq .01$) and adversarial homoprejudice ($r$ [86] = .77, $p \leq .01$), and negatively correlated with paternalistic homoprejudice ($r$ [86] = -.34, $p \leq .01$). Modern homonegativity and romanticised homoprejudice were negatively correlated as initially hypothesised but this was nonsignificant.

6.3.2.10 Multidimensional Heterosexism

As predicted, amnestic heterosexism was positively correlated with repellent ($r$ [85] = .36, $p \leq .01$) and adversarial homoprejudice ($r$ [85] = .44, $p \leq .01$). The predicted negative correlation between amnestic heterosexism and romanticised homoprejudice was not supported, and the predicted negative correlation with paternalistic homoprejudice was in the right direction but was marginally nonsignificant.
Aversive heterosexism also correlated positively with repellent ($r_{85} = .65, p \leq .01$) and adversarial homoprejudice ($r_{85} = .82, p \leq .01$), as predicted. The predicted negative correlation between aversive heterosexism and paternalistic homoprejudice was found, but it did not reach significance. However, further inspection of the confidence interval (-.37 - -.01) suggests that rejecting this finding may result in a type-II error being made. The hypothesised negative correlation between aversive heterosexism and romanticised homoprejudice was not support and a marginally positive correlation was found instead.

Paternalistic heterosexism did not behave as expected in many ways. It correlated positively with repellent ($r_{85} = .37, p \leq .01$) and adversarial homoprejudice ($r_{85} = .41, p \leq .01$) and was uncorrelated with romanticised and paternalistic homoprejudice.

Finally, positive-stereotypic heterosexism correlated positively with romanticised ($r_{85} = .51, p \leq .01$) and paternalistic homoprejudice ($r_{85} = .32, p \leq .01$) as hypothesised. However, the hypotheses that positive-stereotypic heterosexism would be negatively correlated with repellent and adversarial homoprejudice were not supported.

6.3.2.11 Polymorphous Prejudice

The positive beliefs polymorphous prejudice subscale was positively correlated with romanticised ($r_{82} = .43, p \leq .01$), paternalistic ($r_{82} = .46, p \leq .01$) as hypothesised. Contrary to the predicted negative correlation between the PPS and adversarial homoprejudice, the two were actually positively correlated ($r_{82} = .28, p \leq .05$). This is consistent with the earlier findings indicating positive correlations between the endorsement of positive stereotypes about gay men and modern hostile attitudes towards gay men.

However, it is unusual that the PPS should correlate more highly with paternalism than with romanticisation, given the highly stereotypical content of the PPS’s items. Further examination of the PPS showed that one item, “The plight of gay men will only improve when
they are in important positions in the system” (Massey, 2009, p. 159), on the face of it, does not
tap prevailing stereotypes about gay men. Indeed, this item’s reported factor loading by Massey
(2009) is only .49, as compared to the other items used in the PSS with reported factor loadings
between .73 and .58.

To explore this further, the aforementioned item was removed to form an adjusted PPS
(PPS-Adj). This adjustment attenuated the correlations between the PPS and AHS to the extent
that: 1) the adjusted PPS was more strongly associated with romanticised homoprejudice ($r_{[82]} = .44, p \leq .01$) than with paternalistic homoprejudice ($r_{[82]} = .36, p \leq .01$), as should be expected; and 2) the strength of the positive correlation between the PPS and adversarial homoprejudice
became stronger ($r_{[82]} = .38, p \leq .01$).

6.3.2.12 Religious Commitment and Attendance

As hypothesised, religious commitment correlated positively with repellent ($r_{[210]} = .35, p \leq .01$) and adversarial homoprejudice ($r_{[210]} = .27, p \leq .01$) and was uncorrelated with
romanticised homoprejudice. Religious commitment correlated with paternalistic homoprejudice
in the predicted direction, but this was marginally non-significant. Similarly, attendance at religious
services was positively correlated with repellent ($r_{[801]} = .27, p \leq .01$) and adversarial homoprejudice ($r_{[801]} = .19, p \leq .01$), but not with romanticised or paternalistic homoprejudice.

6.3.2.13 Right-Wing Authoritarianism

As predicted, right-wing authoritarianism correlated positively with repellent ($r_{[80]} = .61, p \leq .01$) and adversarial homoprejudice ($r_{[80]} = .64, p \leq .01$), and was unrelated to romanticised homoprejudice. Contrary to the initial hypothesis, right-wing authoritarianism was negatively
correlated with paternalistic homoprejudice ($r_{[80]} = -.30, p \leq .01$).
6.3.2.14 Social Dominance Orientation

As predicted, social dominance orientation correlated positively with repellent \( r_{[79]} = .63, p \leq .01 \) and adversarial homoprejudice \( r_{[79]} = .52, p \leq .01 \) and was not correlated with romanticised or paternalistic homoprejudice.

6.3.2.15 Social Desirability

As predicted, the motivation to present oneself in socially desirable ways was not correlated with repellent, paternalistic, and adversarial homoprejudice. Social desirability was found to be positively correlated with romanticised homoprejudice \( r_{[98]} = .21, p \leq .05 \), however, an inspection of the confidence interval \((-0.04 - 0.44)\) suggests that this accepting this result may result in a type-I error.

6.3.2.16 Support for Gay Men’s Human Rights

As predicted, support for gay men’s human rights was negatively correlated with repellent \( r_{[82]} = -.69, p \leq .01 \) and adversarial homoprejudice \( r_{[82]} = -.72, p \leq .01 \), positively correlated with paternalistic homoprejudice \( r_{[82]} = .27, p \leq .05 \), and was uncorrelated with romanticised homoprejudice.

6.3.3 Known Groups Validity

Another method of assessing construct validity is by way of known groups validity; an assessment of the extent to which different groups known to differ in levels of a construct do, in fact, differ.

6.3.3.1 Gender and Homoprejudice

Mann Whitney tests were used to compare differences across gender. As hypothesised, men \( (Mdn = 1.17) \) endorsed significantly greater levels of repellent homoprejudice than did women \( (Mdn = 1.00; U = 57,046, p \leq .01, r = -.17) \). Men \( (Mdn = 3.33) \) also endorsed significantly greater
levels of adversarial homoprejudice than women \((Mdn = 2.83)\) as predicted \((U = 54,917.50, p \leq .01, r = -.18)\). Inversely, women \((Mdn = 3.00)\) endorsed significantly greater levels of romanticised homoprejudice than did men \((Mdn = 3.00; U = 61,537, p \leq .01, r = -.11)\), also as predicted. There was no significant difference in the endorsement of paternalistic homoprejudice between men \((Mdn = 3.50)\) and women \((Mdn = 3.67; U = 67,876, p = n.s.)\), disconfirming the hypothesis that women would be more paternalistic than men.

### 6.3.3.2 Education and Homoprejudice

Four one-way Kruskall-Wallis tests with post hoc Dunn’s tests were used to explore attitudinal differences between different levels of educational attainment. Only two participants reported having no formal educational attainment and were excluded from these analyses. The first analysis comparing endorsement of repellent homoprejudice across different levels of educational attainment revealed a significant difference between the groups \((\chi^2[4] = 27.00, p \leq .01)\). Post hoc analyses found that those educated at doctoral level \((Mdn = 1.00)\) scored significantly lower on the repellent homoprejudice subscale than those educated at GCSE/O-level \((Mdn = 1.33, Dunn’s test = 197.49, p \leq .01)\), A/AS-level \((Mdn = 1.17, Dunn’s test = 146.77, p \leq .01)\), bachelor’s level \((Mdn = 1.00, Dunn’s test = 109.30, p \leq .01)\), and master’s level \((Mdn = 1.00, Dunn’s test = 101.38, p \leq .01)\).

The second analysis comparing endorsement of romanticised homoprejudice across different levels of educational attainment revealed a significant difference between the groups \((\chi^2[4] = 20.21, p \leq .01)\). Post hoc analyses found that those educated at GCSE/O-level \((Mdn = 3.50)\) scored significantly higher than those educated at AS/A-level \((Mdn = 3.00, Dunn’s test = 144.37, p \leq .05)\), bachelor’s level \((Mdn = 2.83, Dunn’s test = 159.09, p \leq .01)\), master’s level \((Mdn = 3.00, Dunn’s test = 138.49, p \leq .05)\), and doctoral level \((Mdn = 2.50, Dunn’s test = 235.62, p \leq .01)\). Those educated at master’s level also scored significantly higher than those educated at doctoral level \((Dunn’s test = 97.14, p \leq .05)\).
The third analysis comparing endorsement of paternalistic homoprejudice across different levels of educational attainment also revealed a significant difference between the groups ($\chi^2[4] = 13.23, p \leq .01$). Post hoc analyses revealed that those educated at master’s level ($Mdn = 3.83$) scored significantly higher than those educated at AS/A-level ($Mdn = 3.33$, Dunn’s test = -63.23, $p \leq .05$).

The final analysis comparing endorsement of adversarial homoprejudice across different levels of educational attainment revealed a significant difference between the groups ($\chi^2[4] = 37.81, p \leq .01$). Post hoc analyses found that the respondents qualified at doctoral level ($Mdn = 2.17$) scored significantly lower than those qualified at GCSE/O-level ($Mdn = 3.50$, Dunn’s test = 205.20, $p \leq .01$), AS/A-level ($Mdn = 3.17$, Dunn’s test = 180.02, $p \leq .01$), bachelor’s level ($Mdn = 3.17$, Dunn’s test = 146.34, $p \leq .01$), and master’s level ($Mdn = 2.67$, Dunn’s test = 97.07, $p \leq .05$). Those educated at master’s level also scored significantly lower than those educated at AS/A-level (Dunn’s test = 82.95, $p \leq .01$).

### 6.3.3.3 Sexuality and Homoprejudice

Mann Whitney tests were used to compare differences across sexuality (heterosexual vs nonheterosexual). As hypothesised, heterosexuals ($Mdn = 1.00$) endorsed significantly greater levels of repellent homoprejudice than did nonheterosexuals ($Mdn = 1.00$; $U = 22,797$, $p \leq .01$, $r = -.13$). Heterosexuals ($Mdn = 3.00$) also endorsed significantly greater levels of romanticised homoprejudice than nonheterosexuals ($Mdn = 2.33$) as predicted ($U = 25,250$, $p \leq .05$, $r = -.08$). As was also predicted, heterosexuals ($Mdn = 3.00$) endorsed significantly greater levels of adversarial homoprejudice than did nonheterosexuals ($Mdn = 2.33$; $U = 22,521$, $p \leq .01$, $r = -.12$). However, there was no significant difference in the endorsement of paternalistic homoprejudice between heterosexuals ($Mdn = 3.67$) and nonheterosexuals ($Mdn = 3.50$; $U = 29,448.50$, $p = n.s.$), disconfirming the hypothesis that heterosexuals would score higher than nonheterosexuals.
6.4 Study 2c Discussion

These analyses aimed to assess the AHS’s convergent, discriminant, and known-groups validity, and the findings suggest that the AHS, for the most part, behaves as one would expect in relation to other personality and attitudinal measures. Repellent and adversarial homoprejudice correlate positively with measures of both old-fashioned and modern homoprejudice and with measures of ambivalent sexism, as expected, as well as with ideologies commonly implicated in anti-gay prejudice (i.e., RWA, SDO, JW, and religiosity). Inversely, they correlated negatively with support for gay rights and with the biological essentialist beliefs that typically underpin this support (Jang, & Lee, 2014).

Romanticised homoprejudice also correlates positively with similar measures of the subscription to positive stereotypes about gay men (i.e., the HPS, PPS, and positive-stereotypic heterosexism), as well as with ambivalent sexism measures, as has been found elsewhere (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007). Importantly, romanticised homoprejudice did not correlate with social dominance orientation, contrary to Walls’s (2008) assertion that such positive stereotypes serve social dominative purposes. Indeed, Walls’s (2008) multidimensional heterosexism scale also behaved unexpectly inasmuch as paternalistic heterosexism correlated positively with repellent and adversarial homoprejudice, but not with paternalistic homoprejudice. Because all of the paternalistic heterosexism items voice the reluctance to parent a gay child due to the disadvantage he would experience, it may be that these items are unintentionally tapping the general aversion to having a gay child rather than the concerns about inequality. By comparison, paternalistic homoprejudice correlates negatively with measures of hostile prejudice towards gay men (i.e., the ATG & MoHS), suggesting that the item wording does not obscure the intended sympathetic meaning of this subscale. As well as this, all four of the AHS subscales behave as expected among different participant demographics, as was demonstrated in the known-groups analyses of gender, educational attainment, and sexuality.
Furthermore, none of the AHS subscales correlate with social desirability, suggesting that the AHS is not confounded by positive self-presentation concerns. On the other hand, adversarial homoprejudice is positively correlated with the motivation to control prejudiced reactions. However, given that those who take on such adversarial views may believe that gay men use accusations of prejudice to gain unfair advantages and special privileges, this is not entirely unexpected. Nonetheless, such attitudes may be elucidated via the use of indirect attitude measures such as the IAT. The motivation to control prejudiced responses also correlated positively with paternalistic homoprejudice, though this is also unsurprising given that paternalistic individuals may seek to shield gay men from the prejudice expressed by others.

Finally, adversarial homoprejudice correlated positively with measures of positive stereotypes about gay men, with the exception of positive-stereotypic heterosexism, which may be due to the latter measure only containing two items. Given the consistent relationship between adversarial homoprejudice and romanticised homoprejudice, prejudice towards gay men can be reasonably described as ambivalent. This was investigated further using an ambivalence index proposed by Thompson et al. (2014) and the findings suggested that this index was a useful measure of individual differences in ambivalent homoprejudice inasmuch as it could discern between ambivalent and univalent individuals, was normally distributed, and was uncorrelated with measures of self-presentational concerns (i.e., the MCPRS and SDS).

The positive correlation between positive and negative attitudinal substrates (with regards to gay men) is a novel finding that is inconsistent with previous literature. For instance, Walls (2008a) found no correlation between positive-stereotypic and apathetic (a single-factor iteration of amnestic and aversive) heterosexism. A possible explanation for this is that ambivalent homoprejudice may be culture-bound. To date, all of the research exploring attitudinal ambivalence towards gay men has been conducted in a North American or Canadian context, with research in the latter context also revealing signs of subjective ambivalence towards gay men.
(Hoffarth & Hodson, 2014). As compared to North America, the United Kingdom and Canada currently have superior gay rights records (Carroll, 2016) and are more secular countries (Norris & Inglehart, 2011). Given that adversarial homoprejudice consists of envious beliefs that gay men use their sexuality to get undue advantages, the emergence of attitudinal ambivalence towards gay men may be necessitated by significant gay rights progress in a particular cultural context in order for perceptions of reverse inequality to develop. Similarly, conflict between adversarial and romanticised homoprejudice may also be contingent upon stereotypical portrayals of gay men in mass media, given that such depictions appear to inform positive stereotypes about gay men (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007). A future direction, then, is to perform a cross-cultural validation of the AHS in order to ascertain whether these findings hold within different sociopolitical contexts.

Nonetheless, the ambivalence index offers a novel and indirect way of assessing attitudinal ambivalence towards gay men – at least with regards to the United Kingdom. A similar mathematical approach to measuring ambivalence towards gay men has been attempted elsewhere (Hoffarth, 2013), but was not successful because the index used only correlated positively with its negative attitudinal substrates and did not correlate positively with its positive attitudinal substrates (derived from the PPS; Massey, 2009). As was evidenced in Studies 2c and 3, the index of ambivalence advanced in this thesis is positively correlated with both positive and negative attitudes towards gay men, suggesting that it is indeed sensitive to ambivalent homoprejudice. The success in this instance is likely due to the selective approach taken when choosing which measures the index should be derived from. Whereas Hoffarth’s (2013) index was derived from three of the negative PPS subscales (aversion toward gay men, traditional heterosexism, and aversion toward lesbians) and two of the positive PPS subscales (positive beliefs and resist heteronormativity), the index used herein was derived from adversarial and romanticised homoprejudice.
The selectivity employed in Study 2c was both empirically and theoretically justified. The index derived from romanticised and repellent homoprejudice performed poorly, despite the two subscales being positively correlated. Given that Hoffarth’s (2013) index was similarly derived from old-fashioned anti-gay attitude measures in the PPS, this is possibly why the index did not perform as expected. By comparison, the index derived from romanticised and adversarial homoprejudice performed well and this is arguably because the two are both modern aspects of homoprejudice that arise from contiguous sociocultural factors (e.g., significant gay rights progress and enhanced media visibility).

The ambivalence index advanced in Study 2c further suggested that almost half of the heterosexual sample endorsed ambivalent attitudes towards gay men and that this ambivalence was associated with ambivalence towards men at large. This relationship hints that ambivalence towards gay men may be a theoretical extension of ambivalent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996; 1999) – at least, with regards to women’s attitudes towards gay men. Because gay men are members of a group that have traditionally subordinated women, this may evoke feelings of resentment. On the other hand, given that ambivalent sexism revolves around heterosexual intimacy, women may also associate gay men with safety, given their lack of sexual threat and competition (Russell et al., 2015).

These studies are not without their limitations. Most notably – and much the same as in the previous qualitative study (Study 1) – there was a distinct lack of racial diversity among the participants. This made attitudinal comparisons across different racial categories impossible and ruled out a further opportunity to validate the scale in light of research detailing racial differences in the endorsement of homoprejudice (Lewis, 2003). Future use of the AHS should seek to attain a more ethnically diverse sample so that further known-groups validity can be established. Given the large number of validation scales included in the survey, it was also not possible to include additional scales measuring other potentially related measures such as the personal fear of invalidity.
scale (Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, & Moskowitz, 2001) without also necessitating an increasingly large and harder to obtain sample size. As such, future research assessing the psychometric properties of the AHS should include these measures in order to provide a more holistic view of the AHS’s construct validity.

Given that ambivalent attitudes have been found to be less stable than univalent attitudes and that attitude measures only take a ‘snapshot’ of a respondent’s opinions at that time, it is unknown whether ambivalent homoprejudice is a stable construct over time. Test-retest reliability for the AHS has also not been reported yet. As such, study 3 aimed to collect a second measure of the AHS from the same heterosexual participants in Study 2a-c and use this data to assess the AHS’s temporal consistency.

6.5 Study 3 Methods

6.5.1 Participants

Of the 801 participants in the previous study, 378 of them agreed to be contacted at a later date to take part in the survey again. Of these, 131 participants (37 men and 94 women), ranging in age from 18 to 79 ($M = 33.33, SD = 13.03$) completed the survey between 10.20 days and 233.64 days after initially completing it. Their demographics resemble that of the broader sample inasmuch as this sample was also well-educated, primarily identified as exclusively heterosexual, and were almost exclusively white. Participants were offered an entry into a £15 shopping voucher prize draw as thanks for taking part.

6.5.2 Measures

The participants once again completed the 96-item AHS (only the 24-item AHS was analysed, however) and the MCPRS as a measure of self-presentation bias.
6.6 Study 3 Results

6.6.1 Test-Retest Reliability

Intra-class correlations (ICC) estimates were calculated using SPSS based on an average-rating ($k = 6$), absolute-agreement, 2-way mixed-effects model.

A high degree of consistency was found between the time 1 and time 2 measures of repellent homoprejudice. The average measures ICC was .96 (95% CI: .95 - .97), $F (2, 130) = 28.175, p \leq .01$. A high degree of consistency was also found between the time 1 and time 2 measures of romanticised homoprejudice. The average measures ICC was .83 (95% CI: .76 - .88), $F (2, 130) = 5.31, p \leq .01$. A high degree of consistency was similarly found between the time 1 and time 2 measures of paternalistic homoprejudice. The average measures ICC was .80 (95% CI: .71 - .86), $F (2, 130) = 4.88, p \leq .01$. A high degree of consistency was similarly found between the time 1 and time 2 measures of adversarial homoprejudice. The average measures ICC was .92 (95% CI: .88 - .94), $F (2, 130) = 11.88, p \leq .01$. Finally, an acceptable degree of consistency was found between the time 1 and time 2 ambivalence indices derived from romanticised and adversarial homoprejudice. The average measures ICC was .78 (95% CI = .68 - .84), $F (2, 130) = 4.44, p \leq .01$.

Based on naming conventions outlined by Koo and Li (2016), which uses the 95% confidence interval as a reference point, the repellent homoprejudice subscale demonstrates excellent (ICC >.90) test-retest reliability, the romanticised homoprejudice subscale demonstrates good test-retest reliability (ICC >.75), the paternalistic homoprejudice subscale demonstrates moderate (ICC >.50) to good test-retest reliability, the adversarial homoprejudice subscale demonstrates good to excellent test-retest reliability, and the ambivalence index demonstrates moderate to good test-retest reliability.
6.6.2 Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions

Spearman rank correlations with 1000 bootstrap samples were used to analyse the relationship between the AHS subscales and the MCPRS. The MCPRS was not correlated with any of the AHS subscales or the index of ambivalent homoprejudice (see table 6.6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MCPRS</th>
<th>Repellent</th>
<th>Romanticised</th>
<th>Paternalistic</th>
<th>Adversarial</th>
<th>Ambivalence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.6: Correlations between the motivation to control prejudiced reactions scale and the AHS. Brackets contain 95% bias-corrected accelerated confidence intervals

6.6.3 Ambivalent Homoprejudice Index

The ambivalence index provided by Thompson et al. (2014) was once again used to calculate potential ambivalence derived from average scores on the romanticised and adversarial homoprejudice subscales. As was found in Study 2c, this index was normally distributed (Md = 4.75, Rng = 2.12 – 7.83, Skewness = .02, Kurtosis = -.13).

Spearman rank correlations with 1000 bootstrap samples were used to analyse the relationship between the ambivalent homoprejudice index and the AHS subscales. The index was positively correlated with repellent ($r_{[127]} = .32$, 95% CI: .14 -.49, $p \leq .01$), romanticised ($r_{[127]} = .41$, 95% CI: .24 -.56, $p \leq .01$), and adversarial homoprejudice ($r_{[127]} = .53$, 95% CI: .34 -.72, $p \leq .01$), but was unrelated to paternalistic homoprejudice.

6.7 Study 3 Discussion

This study aimed to evaluate the temporal stability of ambivalent homoprejudice using intra-class correlations and to further assess the measure’s robustness to positive self-presentation concerns. These findings suggest that the AHS evidences between moderate and excellent test-retest reliability and that it is not biased by respondents’ desire to inhibit prejudice reactions. Taken together with the findings of study 2c, the AHS demonstrates a range of desirable psychometric properties; there is a high degree of internal consistency between the items, equivalent halves of
each subscale correlate well, the subscales behave consistent with ambivalent homoprejudice theory and logically in relation to other attitude measures, are (largely) robust to self-presentation concerns, and measures constructs that appear to be stable over time.

Research elsewhere has found that ambivalent attitudes towards healthy eating are no less stable over time than univalent attitudes towards healthy eating (Armitage & Conner, 2000), and these findings suggest that the index of ambivalent homoprejudice is also stable over time. Based on these findings, it appears that ambivalent homoprejudice is not a transient affective state as is felt ambivalence. Instead, ambivalent homoprejudice appears to be a chronic tendency. Further research should thus investigate whether such ambivalence represents a long-term transition from prejudicial to affirmative attitudes, or whether it is linked to stable, long-term personality traits that predispose attitudinal ambivalence toward a diverse range of targets.

6.8 Conclusion

Studies 2c and 3 provide further evidence in support of the favourable psychometric utility of the AHS. The subscales are positively correlated with similar subscales and behave logically in relation to theoretically (ir)relevant attitudinal and ideological constructs. For instance, the assertion advanced in this thesis that benevolence towards gay men does not serve social dominative functions (contrary to Walls’s, 2008 claim that it does) was supported because social dominance orientation was unrelated to the romanticised and paternalistic homoprejudice subscales. Finally, the AHS also demonstrates good internal consistency (as measured by Cronbach’s alpha) and temporal stability (as measured by ICCs). Altogether, the AHS is a measure that is grounded in extent theory and primary data, demonstrates a stable factor structure that demonstrates good fit in different samples, behaves as expected in relation to other attitudinal and personality measures, and does so reliably.
7. Chapter Seven

General Discussion

7.1 Overview of Thesis

Prejudice towards sexual minorities has almost exclusively been conceptualised in terms of hostility. Key terms in the literature such as ‘sexual prejudice’ (Herek, 2000) and ‘homonegativity’ (Hudson & Ricketts, 1980) refer solely to the range of negative attitudes towards gay men and it is only more recently that positive stereotypes about and paternalistic attitudes towards gay men have emerged in the literature (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007; Massey, 2009; Walls, 2008a). As such, the term ‘homoprejudice’ was advanced in order to explain this shifting attitudinal tendency. Although this term valence-free, it nonetheless maintains that such attitudes are prejudicial (i.e., that they are aimed at individuals because of their group membership and that it disadvantages those individuals). Thus far, the consequences of such benevolent attitudes have been largely overlooked, with isolated studies in the microaggression literature pointing towards their exoticising and infantilising messages (Conley et al., 2002; Nadal et al., 2011). However, there was little other available evidence to suggest that such ‘positive’ attitudes are damaging in a similar manner to how benevolent sexism and ageism has been found to legitimise inequality (Glick & Fiske, 1996; Cary, Chasteen, & Remedios, 2016).

There were also conflicting theoretical viewpoints vis-à-vis the nature of ambivalence towards gay men. Whereas Walls (2008a) argues that positive-stereotypic and paternalistic heterosexism serve social dominative purposes because they legitimise gay men’s lesser societal status relative to heterosexuals, Massey (2009) argues that positive stereotypes about gay men are valued outgroup differences and indicate greater societal acceptance of gay men. The former perspective relied upon the assumption that heterosexuals’ motivations for endorsing benevolent attitudes towards gay men were malicious; little evidence was found in support of this in the present corpus of work. Likewise, the latter perspective relied upon the assumption that
benevolence had no ill effects on gay men, yet evidence suggesting just the opposite has been presented in this thesis. Arguably, both of these perspectives were disadvantaged because the former privileged theory over data and the latter privileged heterosexuals’ self-reported attitudes towards gay men over gay men’s lived experiences of prejudice. These problems then persisted with regards to their respective scale development; because content validity was compromised, items with low factor loadings were included in the polymorphous prejudice scale and the paternalistic heterosexism scale’s item wording obscures their intended meaning.

For these reasons, the aims of this thesis were to: 1) Develop a theoretical explanation of ambivalence towards gay men that draws on the present literature on positive and negative attitudes towards gay men; 2) test and nuance this model using qualitative enquiry; and 3) develop a psychometrically-sound scale with which to measure this construct. Each stage of this process will be summarised in turn.

7.1.1 Theory Development

In Chapter 2, the research literature on attitudes and attitudinal ambivalence was presented, with a particular focus on the antecedents, consequence, models, and functions of ambivalence. Attitudinal ambivalence is sometimes an uncomfortable attitudinal position comprising both positive and negative evaluations of the attitude object. It is associated with stable personality traits such as the personal fear of invalidity (Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002) as well situational factors such as personal involvement with the issues (Thompson & Zanna, 1995). In the face of persuasive communication, ambivalent attitudes become unstable but, without such intervention, they remain as stable over time as univalent attitudes (Armitage & Conner, 2000). However, compared to univalent attitudes, ambivalent attitudes are less predictive of behaviour (Conner et al., 2003).

Chapter 3 provided an overview of prejudice, how attitudinal ambivalence has been conceptualised in the prejudice literature, and advanced ambivalent homoprejudice as a means of explaining seemingly conflicted attitudes towards gay men. Specifically, the chapter explored racial
ambivalence (Katz & Hass, 1988), ambivalent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996), ambivalent ableism (Söder, 1990), ambivalent ageism (Cary, Chasteen, & Remedios, 2016), the ontological similarities and differences between these groups and gay men, and how these ontological factors may motivate ambivalent homoprejudice. One important factor are the intersecting identities of ‘gay’ and ‘man’ and how they influence experiences of prejudice (Bowleg, 2013). Another potential cause of ambivalent homoprejudice is the diverse range of gay ‘subtypes’, which are stereotyped and evaluated in both positive and negative ways (Clausell & Fiske, 2005). A desexualised reconceptualization of heterosexual intimacy (normally a sexualised aspect of ambivalent sexism) between gay men and heterosexual women was also identified, which may particularly motivate women’s benevolence towards gay men. Societal factors such as media representation were also conceptualised as vehicles for benevolent stereotypes about gay men.

Ambivalent homoprejudice was further characterised using the SCM (Fiske et al., 2002) and the BIAS map (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007), and four attitudinal tendencies were delineated: 1) Repellent homoprejudice, comprising cold and incompetent stereotypes (i.e., contempt), and active and passive harm; 2) Romanticised homoprejudice, comprising warm and competent stereotypes (i.e., admiration), and active and passive facilitation; 3) Paternalistic homoprejudice, comprising warm and incompetent stereotypes (i.e., pity), and active facilitation and passive harm; and 4) Adversarial homoprejudice, comprising cold and competent stereotypes (i.e., envy), and passive facilitation and active harm.

7.1.2 Study 1

In Study 1, a qualitative investigation of the proposed model of ambivalent homoprejudice was conducted in order to provide primary evidence in support of it, as well as to add necessary nuance as the data dictated. Homogenous focus groups were conducted with gay men and heterosexual men and women. During the thematic analysis, four themes were identified, which resembled the patterns of contempt, envy, pity, and admiration towards gay men documented in
Chapter 3. Repellent homoprejudice was characterised by the belief that gay men were cold (i.e., that they had negative intentions towards heterosexuals), such as the belief that gay men preyed on children for sex, and that they were incompetent (i.e., that they lacked the resources or character to actions those intentions), such as the belief that gay men are physically weak. These stereotypes were associated with harmful behaviours towards gay men such as social exclusion (i.e., passive harm) and verbal and physical abuse (i.e., active harm).

Inversely, romanticised homoprejudice was couched in the belief that gay men were warm (e.g., that they were empathetic) and competent (e.g., that they possessed certain skillsets, such as fashion taste). These qualities appeared to motivate the desire for a ‘gay best friend’ (i.e., passive facilitation) – particularly by women. However, the consequences of this was that those who did not live up to the aforementioned positive stereotypes embodied ‘the failed gay’, who are derided and excluded (i.e., passive harm). This unexpected divergence from the BIAS map, which posits active and passive facilitation towards admired outgroups, was reasoned to be because the BIAS map only takes into account how the ingroup interpret their behaviours and not how those behaviours might be differently interpreted by the outgroup. This alludes to the importance of shifting towards an understanding of homoprejudice as ambivalent because it moves away from interpreting the intentions underlying a given attitude or behaviour and instead privileges the target’s experience of those phenomena.

Paternalistic homoprejudice was not found to be associated with warmth stereotypes, but nor was it associated with coldness stereotypes. However, paternalistic homoprejudice was associated with the belief that gay men experienced disadvantage and suffering (i.e., incompetence), and paternalistic individuals wished to redress this by way of active facilitation (e.g., defending gay men from prejudicial comments). On the other hand, reports from gay men suggested that these could be interpreted as demeaning and patronising (i.e., passive harm) and that these facilitating behaviours appeared to undermine the agency of the person being defended. Finally, adversarial
homoprejudice was associated with the belief that gay men were cold (e.g., aggressive in pursuing their perceived agenda) and competent (e.g., they received preferential treatment because of their sexuality), and this was associated with passive facilitation (e.g., associating with or tolerating gay men) and active harm (e.g., scapegoating). As well as this, adversarial homoprejudice was also associated with passive harm, such as gossiping, and it was argued that adversarial individuals may seek to suppress their prejudice (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) to stop gay men from using accusations of prejudice as ‘weapons’. Overall, the qualitative findings largely corroborated the prior theoretical development, filled a gap in the literature regarding paternalism towards gay men, and offered some important theoretical nuances that had not been covered elsewhere in the literature.

7.1.3 Studies 2a and 2b

In study 2a, a measure of ambivalent homoprejudice was constructed using EFA and its dimensionality was assured using CFA in Study 2b. Based on the findings in Study 1, a panel of experts generated 562 potential scale items, which were collaboratively reduced to 96 items that captured the domains of repellent, adversarial, romanticised, and paternalistic homoprejudice. This measure was disseminated to prospective research participants via Qualtrics and participation was solicited from 801 respondents. These data were randomly split with 500 respondents being reserved for the exploratory analysis and the other 301 respondents being reserved for the confirmatory analysis.

The results of Study 2a suggested that a four-factor solution comprising repellent, romanticised, paternalistic, and adversarial homoprejudice with 24 items – 6 on each factor – and each subscale demonstrated acceptable internal consistency (α = .93 - .84). This model was then subjected to CFA in Study 2b in order to assess its good fit in a separate sample and to compare its fit with three other possible models: 1) A unidimensional factor structure with all 24 items loading onto a single ‘ambivalence’ factor; 2) A two-factor model tapping the agentic axis of the
SCM, with the repellent and paternalistic homoprejudice subscales loading onto an ‘incompetence’ factor and the adversarial and romanticised homoprejudice subscales loading onto a ‘competence’ factor; and 3) A two-factor model tapping the communal axis of the SCM, with the repellent and adversarial homoprejudice subscales loading onto a ‘coldness’ factor and the romanticised and paternalistic homoprejudice subscales loading onto a ‘warmth’ factor. The four-factor model derived from the EFA demonstrated excellent model fit, whereas the other three did not meet any of the goodness-of-fit thresholds, suggesting that ambivalent homoprejudice is best characterised as contemptuous, envious, pitying, and admiring attitudes towards gay men, and not in terms of benevolence and hostility as has been employed elsewhere with regards to ambivalent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996) and ambivalent ageism (Cary et al., 2016). Overall, the EFA corroborated the initial theory development and previous qualitative analysis delineating repellent, adversarial, romanticised, and paternalistic homoprejudice, and the CFA confirmed the good fit of this factor structure in a separate sample, attesting to the stability of this theoretical and factorial framework.

7.1.4 Studies 2c and 3

In Study 2c, the convergent, discriminant, and known-groups validity of the AHS was assessed, and the test-retest reliability of the AHS was examined in Study 3. The AHS was correlated with a wide array of personality, attitudinal, and behavioural measures, and the subscales performed as expected for the most part. Repellent and adversarial homoprejudice correlated with similar measures of anti-gay prejudice and with other measures associated with anti-gay prejudice. Likewise, romanticised homoprejudice correlated with similar measures of positive stereotypes about gay men and, importantly, not with markers of hostile prejudice, supporting the theoretical claim from the outset that such attitudes do not have oppressive intentions. Similarly, paternalistic homoprejudice correlated negatively with markers of prejudice and positively with support for lesbian and gay human rights. Again, these attitudes do not intend to be demeaning or patronising, but they have the potential to be interpreted as such.
A positive correlation was found between repellent and romanticised homoprejudice and adversarial and romanticised homoprejudice, and the latter relationship was echoed in the positive correlation between adversarial homoprejudice and other measures of positive stereotypes about gay men, supporting the central thesis that attitudes towards gay men are ambivalent. This was investigated further by calculating an ambivalence index from these positive and negative AHS subscales. This investigation suggested that potential ambivalence computed from average scores on the romanticised and adversarial homoprejudice subscales – but not between the romanticised and repellent homoprejudice subscales – produces an index that discerns between ambivalent and univalent participants, correlates positively with both positive and negative attitudes towards gay men, and is insensitive to social desirability and the motivation to control prejudiced reactions. The AHS also behaves logically among different groups known to endorse differing levels of homoprejudice. For example, men endorsed higher levels of repellent and adversarial homoprejudice than women, but women endorsed higher levels of romanticised homoprejudice than men.

In Study 3, a subset of the participants from Study 2a and 2c completed the AHS a second time and also completed the MCPRS as a follow-up measure of self-presentation concerns. The 95% confidence intervals for ICCs used to assess test-retest reliability indicated that the AHS demonstrates between moderate and excellent temporal consistency, providing further evidence that the AHS is a psychometrically sound instrument. The results further suggested that MCPRS was uncorrelated with the AHS subscales and the ambivalence index derived from romanticised and adversarial homoprejudice, further suggesting that the AHS is robust to participants’ motivation to present themselves in a favourable manner.
7.2 Overall Implications

7.2.1 Theoretical Reconceptualisation of Prejudice towards Gay Men

The present findings necessitate a reconceptualisation of prejudice towards gay men as a multidimensional construct comprising both negative and positive attitudes. Research findings suggest that ‘homophobia’ is on the wane in the Western world (Clements & Field, 2014; Twenge et al., 2016), leading some scholars to claim that it is of declining significance to sexual minorities (McCormack, 2013). Therein lies the risk of labelling prejudice towards gay men as ‘homophobia’; this term captures the old-fashioned construct of repellent homoprejudice, which the present research findings do indeed suggest is in decline. However, the findings presented in this thesis suggest that other subdomains of homoprejudice – adversarial, romanticised, and paternalistic – still persist in the United Kingdom. Academics must be reactive to the changing nature of homoprejudice – as have they have achieved with regards to sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996; 1999) and ageism (Cary et al., 2016) – or we risk blinding ourselves to the realities of the communities psychologists seek to help.

Although other scholars have attempted to characterise attitudes towards gay men as a multifaceted construct (Walls, 2008a; Massey, 2009), myriad flaws in their theoretical interpretation of ambivalence were presented in Chapter 3. Ambivalent homoprejudice is advanced as an alternative theoretical framework that aligns well with current theorising on the microaggressive contents of privileged groups’ behaviours towards oppressed groups (Sue, 2010). While heterosexuals’ motivations towards gay men may be becoming increasingly benign, the ways in which they display their good intentions by way of exoticising stereotypes and demeaning accommodation are nonetheless perceived as negative (Conley et al., 2002; Nadal et al., 2011; Sue, 2010). Furthermore, the everyday occurrence of subtle prejudice means that sexual minorities may not be able to find respite from it, which may have an additive impact on their wellbeing (Jewell, McCutcheon, Harriman, & Morrison, 2012).
While the deleterious consequences of hostile homoprejudice detailed in Chapter 3 have been well documented and are relatively obvious, the consequences (intended or otherwise) of romanticised and paternalistic homoprejudice have been under-researched and are relatively more nebulous. The available literature documents sexual minorities’ feelings of distress upon exposure to microaggressions (Nadal et al., 2011) and frustration in response to being positively stereotyped or patronised (Conley et al., 2002). However, the vast majority of research in the area has focused on data provided by heterosexuals (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007; Walls, 2008a; Massey, 2009) and, as a result, provides limited insight into the effect these events have on sexual minorities. The qualitative findings discussed in Chapter 4 build upon those of Nadal et al (2011). The positive stereotyping of gay men can result in self-exclusion by gay men who are uncomfortable with such stereotyping and the derision of gay men who do not live up to such these stereotypes. Likewise, paternalistic homoprejudice – while well-meaning – undermines gay men’s autonomy and agency, particularly with regards to the important personal choice to disclose their sexual orientation or to remain ‘in the closet’.

Not only is a theoretical advancement such as this important in an academic context, but it is also be enlightening in a lay context; if an individual who endorses positive stereotypes about gay men could ‘tune in’ to its more negative interpretation, then such perspective-taking could be an effective empathetic prejudice-reduction technique (Vescio, Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003). Like ambivalent sexism theory (Glick & Fiske, 1996; 1999), ambivalent homoprejudice has the potential to transform the academic landscape of LGBTQ psychology.

7.2.2 The Ambivalent Homoprejudice Scale

Along with a novel and necessary reconceptualisation of prejudice towards gay men, this thesis also offers a new tool with which to measure the multifaceted nature of homoprejudice: the ambivalent homoprejudice scale. Alongside hostile prejudice towards gay men, which is captured by many of the extant scales used to investigate homoprejudice such as the ATG (Herek, 1984)
and the MHS (Morrison & Morrison, 2003), the AHS also measures benevolent homophobia, which is relatively less well-captured by existing attitude measures.

The series of studies documented in this thesis evidenced the factor structure of the AHS, which corresponds with the conceptual distinction between repellent, adversarial, romanticised, and paternalistic homophobia advanced in Chapters 3 and 4. Furthermore, each of the subscales demonstrate acceptable levels of internal consistency and test-retest reliability, suggesting that the AHS subscales reliably measure their underlying constructs. Likewise, the AHS subscales are positively correlated with similar and conceptually related measures, and different groups that have been found to score differently on similar measures also score differently on the AHS subscales.

The AHS's most novel property, however, is its use of an ambivalence index that is easily interpretable, normally distributed, reliable, and valid. Unlike other measures of ambivalent prejudice, which infer ambivalence from a positive correlation between hostile and benevolent subscales (Glick & Fiske, 1996; 1999; Cary et al., 2016), the ambivalence index employed herein can discern between individuals who are ambivalent or not ambivalent. Respondents score low (below the midpoint of 5) on the index when they endorse one valence but not the other or they endorse neither hostility nor benevolence (i.e., not ambivalent) whereas they score higher (5 or more) as they endorse increasing levels of both hostility and benevolence (i.e., ambivalent). This index is also useful because it allows the researcher to investigate the intensity of a given respondent’s ambivalent homophobia because scores closer to 10 represent greater levels of ambivalence than scores closer to 5. The utility of this is that future researchers have a psychometrically validated tool with which to stratify their samples and draw comparisons between groups who are highly ambivalent towards gay men and groups who are not. Within a UK context, the findings presented in this thesis suggest that almost half of the participants endorsed ambivalent attitudes towards gay men to some degree, suggesting a major avenue for further
research on ambivalent homoprejudice. The AHS thus provides interested scholars with the tools necessary to investigate this.

7.2.3 Scale Development Best-Practice

The present scale development consisted of a number of stages: 1) Initial theory development; 2) Qualitative enquiry and theoretical adaptation; 3) Item generation and exploratory factor analysis; 4) Confirmatory factor analysis; and 5) Validity and reliability testing. As compared to two similar measures – the multidimensional heterosexism scale (Walls, 2008a) and the polymorphous prejudice scale (Massey, 2009) – the development of the AHS has arguably been more rigorous at every stage and offers some guidance with regards to scale development best practice.

From the inception of this thesis, it was clear that there were few academic resources available because homoprejudice is predominantly characterised in terms of hostility. At the time of Walls’s (2008) and Massey’s (2009) conceptualisations of their respective theories, there were even fewer resources; the sexual orientation microaggressions literature – which this thesis draws extensively on – did not emerge until 2009 in the form of an unpublished doctoral thesis on sexual orientation microaggressions in psychotherapy, which was later published in 2011 (Shelton & Delgado-Romero, 2011). Voids in academic knowledge such as this must not be overlooked when conducting scale development because, as was discussed in Chapter 5, content validity becomes compromised. In this context, theory development alone is also not adequate because it privileges educated (and thus, empowered) narratives over others, nullifying others’ lived experiences. The qualitative methods employed in Study 1 demonstrated this; the heterosexual participants’ endorsement of positive stereotypes were not motivated by social dominance, as Walls (2008a) argues, and were not interpreted as appreciative by the gay participants as Massey (2009) argues. In both cases, social dominative and queer accounts of these phenomena were incompatible with the data collected and, as a result, each author’s respective interpretations of their scale scores are
potentially flawed. Future scale development researchers should take care that they have adequately conceptualised their latent variables before embarking upon measuring them (DeVellis, 2012), as has been done here.

Another issue concerns the item generation and factor analytic procedures used in the creation of Walls’s (2008) and Massey’s (2009) scales. In the former’s scale development, the factor analysis was conducted on a rather small pool of 23 items whereas, in the latter instance, many of the items were iterations of items from other scales – some of which were extrapolated from tangential scales measuring sexism and racism. Procedures such as these simply compound the content validity issues discussed earlier and result in poorly-sampled item pools. Poorly-loading items are indicative of such a problem, as can be seen in Massey’s (2009) inclusion of a number of items “due to theoretical interest” (p. 155) that loaded less than the recommended .50 (R. Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). The paternalistic heterosexism subscale’s unexpected positive correlation with repellent and adversarial homoprejudice is also indicative of content validity issues; because Walls (2008a) did not investigate this construct adequately, they were thus unable to sample adequately from the infinite ways in which it could be expressed (Yaghmaie, 2003). The scale development procedure adopted herein further emphasises the necessity for theoretical clarity; scale developers and their collaborators engaged in the item generation process should know enough about the theorised latent variables to evaluate the item pool’s content validity before subjecting them to exploratory analyses.

The final scale development issue illuminated by this thesis, which future scholars must improve upon is the confident and competent use of confirmatory factor analysis. Walls (2008a) did not include this important step in their scale development, opting for two exploratory factor analyses instead. Although DeVillis (2012) notes that obtaining the same factor structures from exploratory analyses on different samples indicates that the factor structure is probably more than just a “recurring quirk” (p. 155), Walls’s (2008) two exploratory factor analyses resulted in two
different factor structures. Subsequent confirmatory analyses could have indicated which factor structure demonstrated better fit and which scale items were undermining goodness of fit. Fortunately, Massey (2009) did conduct a confirmatory factor analysis. However, their use of maximum likelihood estimation on ordinal data – as compared to the WLSMV estimation used in this thesis – can lead to less precise loading estimates and over-rejection of correctly-specified models (Beauducel & Herzberg, 2006).

As a caveat to this latter point, factor analysis is not an exact science. For example, multiple oblique rotations may have been appropriate for the EFA conducted in Study 2a; while the present investigation employed geomin rotation, other oblique rotations such as target rotation would have also been appropriate (Browne, 2001). The critique here is not that Walls (2008a) and Massey (2009) are not adhering to strict structural equation modelling rules but, rather, that their respective justifications for their analytic decisions are unconvincing. Future scale developers must consult the available literature when deciding upon the parameters of their EFA and CFA because the results potentially attest to the veracity of the factor structure and, by extension, the theory informing it.

7.3 Limitations

Although limitations were covered in each individual chapter, several limitations common to all of the studies will be reiterated here.

First, all the samples were primarily white and well-educated, and there were more women than men. Given that prejudice towards gay men is tempered by racial identification (Lewis, 2003), educational attainment (Rowaat, LaBougg, Johnson, Froese, & Tsang, 2009), and gender (Herek, 2000), the lack of diversity within these samples limits the generalisability of the findings beyond the scope of this research. It can be concluded that attitudes towards gay men were ambivalent among the respondents based on the index of ambivalence derived from the romanticised and adversarial homoprejudice subscales, but the lack of diversity in the survey sample limited the
degree to which levels of ambivalence could be compared between different demographics – particularly with regards to ethnicity. Future usage of the AHS should solicit participation from a more diverse sample in order to provide a more holistic account of the demographics of those who endorse conflicted attitudes towards gay men. Similarly, further qualitative research on ambivalent homoprejudice should seek a more ethnically diverse sample and challenge the notion that “‘gay’ equals ‘white’” (Han, 2007) so that the effect of intersectionality on ambivalent homoprejudice can be more thoroughly investigated (Bowleg, 2013). Because of this lack of diversity in the focus groups, the construction of the scale items may only reflect concerns by White gay men and overlook other groups, such as Asian gay men, who are noted to face unique stigmas that White gay men do not (Han, 2009).

As well as this, the cross-sectional nature of these data mean that the correlations between the AHS and the validation measures do not tell us anything about causality. For example, does greater endorsement of romanticised and paternalistic homoprejudice cause one to perform more altruistic behaviours, or is the opposite true? What factors mediate this relationship? If the attitudinal and behavioural measures were collected at different time points, structural equation modelling could be used to explore this relationship. On the other hand, longitudinal methods increase the likelihood of participant drop-out and, thus, measurement error (Wolke et al., 2009). The random assignment of validation scales also largely limits the ability to perform other predictive analyses such as multiple regression. A future direction would thus be to perform predictive analyses to further explore the potential antecedents and consequences of ambivalent homoprejudice.

A further limitation is the omission of some important validation measures. Although the present research used 16 validation measures – a great deal more than is typical in scale validation research – this necessitated an increasingly large sample size in order to maintain statistical power while also mitigating against participant fatigue. As such, personality traits associated with
ambivalence – as measured by scales such as the personal fear of invalidity scale (Thompson, Naccarato, Parker, & Moskowitz, 2001) – could not be included without also having to source greater numbers of participants, limiting insight into other potential factors that lead to ambivalent homoprejudice. Media contact with gay men, which has been shown to correlate with positive stereotypes about gay men (Morrison & A. Bearden, 2007) was also not measured, and future research should study this relationship further.

Finally, it is prudent to acknowledge the disadvantages of the nonparametric statistical analyses used in this programme of research. As discussed in Chapter 6, the use of parametric tests on Likert (i.e., ordinal) data is a contentious issue among academics. For the sake of transparency, both parametric and nonparametric correlational analyses were conducted, though the nonparametric analyses have only been referred to up until this point. A comparison of the two sets of analyses does indeed reveal that the nonparametric tests produced more false negatives than did the parametric tests, as was argued by Norman (2010). However, the parametric tests produced more false positives than did the nonparametric tests. Clearly, the issue of power in (non)parametric testing is not quite as clear-cut as has been represented in the literature to date. While the false negative results created by nonparametric testing may make aspects of this work a casualty of the publication bias against null findings (Ferguson, & Heene, 2012), equally, the false positive results created by parametric testing risks adding to the replication crisis currently undermining the field of social psychology (Earp & Trafimow, 2015). A resolution to this issue is beyond the remit of this thesis (and, as forecasted by Norman, 2010, a long way off), but it suffices to say that the use of parametric testing in this thesis was both correct and (paradoxically) inadvisable.

7.4 Directions for Future Research

This thesis illuminates an under-researched area in the literature and the findings point towards a number of interesting research directions and improvements for future scholars. The
first direction concerns the broader application of attitudinal ambivalence principles to ambivalent homoprejudice as it manifests on a behavioural level. Secondly, researchers should seek to validate the AHS cross-culturally and explore cultural differences in the endorsement of ambivalent homoprejudice. Finally, the potential to measure ambivalent homoprejudice implicitly is discussed.

7.4.1 Behavioural Research

With the development of new measures come opportunities to use these measures in studies exploring the behavioural consequences of ambivalence towards gay men. Given that attitudinal ambivalence can induce discomfort (Clark et al., 2002), future research should investigate whether ambivalent homoprejudice – as measured by the innovative ambivalence index provided in this thesis – induces similar feelings of discomfort and whether ambivalent individuals engage in similar self-soothing strategies, such as biased information processing of gay rights issues and response amplification towards gay individuals.

If ambivalent homoprejudice is as pliable as other ambivalent attitudes, then these findings could be used to develop interventions to steer ambivalent individuals towards more uniformly affirmative attitudinal positions. Given the diminished relationship between attitudes and behaviour among ambivalent individuals (Armitage & Conner, 2000), this could also help mobilise greater political advocacy for sexual minorities. This may be particularly fruitful with regards to religious individuals who often have difficulty reconciling their religious beliefs and attitudes towards homosexuality (Bean & Martinez, 2014).

7.4.2 Scale Validation

Scale validation is an iterative process requiring replications using different participants, different measures of construct validity, and different cultural contexts. The United Kingdom has made significant advances with regards to gay rights, feeding the perception that gay men no longer experience discrimination and that they get special treatment over heterosexuals (YouGov, 2014).
Likewise, gay men are widely portrayed in the media consumed in the United Kingdom, and many of these portrayals utilise positive stereotyping in their characterisation. Within this cultural context, it is logical that residents of the United Kingdom may endorse ambivalent attitudes towards gay men based on these sociocultural factors. However, it is not yet known how the AHS performs in other countries. Future research using the AHS cross-culturally should: 1) Translate it for use in other countries where necessary; 2) conduct confirmatory factor analysis to assess its goodness-of-fit among different populations; 3) measure subscale correlations and compare ambivalence cross-culturally; and 4) situate interpretations within each country’s unique sociocultural context.

7.4.3 Implicit Measurement of Ambivalent Homoprejudice

Another direction for further research is exploring the feasibility of measuring ambivalence towards gay men using implicit methods. As discussed in Chapter 2, one implicit measurement tool that could be able to access ambivalence is the IAT (Greenwald & McGhee, 1998), which has been used to detect the latent influence of an old attitude after a new attitude has been primed (Petty et al., 2006). The IAT could be used in tandem with the AHS in order to further study ambivalence towards gay men using self-report and implicit measures.

Schneider et al. (2015) document another novel method of assessing ambivalence implicitly by measuring computer cursor trajectories. When participants rated ambivalent targets, such as abortion and euthanasia as either positive (on one side of the computer screen) or negative (on the opposing side), there was greater cursor ‘pull’ towards the unchosen response option. By comparison, when univalent targets such as happiness were evaluated, there was no cursor ‘pull’ towards the unchosen response option (Schneider et al., 2015). Presenting participants with images of different subtypes of gay men and measuring cursor trajectory in relation to positive and negative response options could provide researchers with another route into tapping ambivalence towards gay men.
7.4.4 Further Qualitative Inquiry

A final direction for future scholars to take would be to further investigate ambivalent homoprejudice as it arises in everyday speech from alternative epistemic stances. The qualitative methodology herein adopted a realist stance to understanding the phenomena, in line with the large body of social-cognitive literature drawn upon in Chapters 2 and 3. However, these constructs are also readily investigable from a range of other paradigms. For example, repellent and adversarial homoprejudice capture aspects of mundane heterosexism (Peel, 2001), which was explored from a discursive perspective that rejects the essentialism of attitudes endorsed in this thesis. Likewise, positive stereotypes about gay men have been critiqued from a social constructionist stance by Cover (2004), who argues that even self-stereotyping by sexual minorities can serve only to reinforce the discourses (and, by consequence, realities) constructed by heterosexuals.

Absent in the literature, however, is a substantive investigation of paternalism towards gay men. Although some research has explored sexual minorities’ paternalistic interpretations of heterosexuals’ speech (Conley et al., 2003; Nadal et al., 2011), no research to date has empirically investigated how that paternalism manifests in speech. Given the potential disjunct between the expression and experience of paternalistic homoprejudice, this construct in particular appears to be worthy of specific investigation – particularly from more critical discursive and social constructionist stances.

7.5 Conclusion

This thesis has presented a novel and holistic interpretation of prejudice towards gay men, which was necessary because ostensibly positive attitudes towards gay men have been overlooked in the literature in favour of research on negative attitudes towards gay men. A theory of ambivalent homoprejudice was developed, which detailed the ontological and sociocultural factors contributing to it and its potential content, and this theorising was corroborated in a subsequent...
qualitative study. From this, a measure of ambivalent homoprejudice tapping repellent, romanticised, paternalistic, and adversarial homoprejudice was developed, and this measure demonstrated a range of useful psychometric properties. The limitations of competing theories outlined earlier in the thesis were supported by these findings and directions that scholars can take this research in have been discussed, including the cross-cultural validation of the AHS and the use of the AHS in behavioural studies. Such research will be fundamental in further understanding the phenomena of ambivalent homoprejudice and the factors that have motivated the transition from old-fashioned to modern hostile and benevolent attitudes towards gay men.
References


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**Appendix 1**

**Heterosexual Focus Group Topic Guide**

1) Rapport:

Thank you for agreeing to participate in today’s focus group. Firstly, I’m inviting you to be as open and honest as possible. I’m not here to make judgements about you as individuals based on your contribution here and, likewise, I would encourage you all to be respectful of each other’s contributions – one of the best and most helpful ways you can do this is by talking with each other about the points you all raise over the course of the focus group. Everything you say here – I won’t disclose what you say to anyone outside of my research team, except in the form of anonymised quotes that will not make you identifiable. In the interest of getting open and honest discussion from you, please respect this confidentiality also. Is this okay with everyone?

Before we go on to the actual discussion, I think it would be a good idea to break the ice a bit and get everybody more comfortable speaking among the group so I would like you to
say your name (or use a pseudonym) and tell us all about why you wanted to take part in this study.

2) Orienting:

Thank you for sharing a little bit about yourselves. We’ll be discussing a few different things during this focus group. We’re going to start off by looking at two vignettes – short stories involving some interactions between straight people and gay people – and we’ll discuss them as a group. After that we’ll then look at some data collected recently from the general public looking at how they think gay people are treated nowadays. Lastly, we’ll be talking a bit about things called ‘microaggressions’, which I will define later.

3) Vignettes:

We’ll be discussing two vignettes together and each will be looking at some interactions between gay people and straight people and then we’ll be discussing what happened, and taking different perspectives in discussing the interaction and what it may mean for different people.

Vignette 1:

James is an 18 year old openly gay man and is moving in to student halls of residence for his first year of university. While moving in, he strikes up a conversation with his new neighbour, Diane. Wanting to be open with everyone from the outset, he drops into conversation that he’s gay and Diane reacts enthusiastically, exclaiming “Awesome! I’ve always wanted a gay friend! My cousin’s gay, you’d look totally cute together!”

James goes along with it, not wanting to spoil a potential friendship, but the comments make him feel uncomfortable.

a) Why might James feel uncomfortable about Diane’s comments?
b) Is James’s discomfort justified? Why?
c) If you were Diane and James challenged what you said, how would you react?
d) Why might Diane specifically want a gay friend?
e) Have you heard or made these kinds of comments in real life? How do you feel about these kinds of comments?

Vignette 2:

Later in the year James meets Yotam, another gay student on his course, and they start dating each other. After a month of dating, they decide that things are going so well that they should be introduced to each other’s friends. James brings Yotam along to a night out and his friends get along with Yotam very well. As James’s friends drink more, they become bolder in the topics they talk about around the pair and one friend, Yasmin, asks them “Soooo… Who does what when you… Y’know what I mean”

Although James tries to evade the topic, Yotam tells Yasmin to mind her own business and Yasmin later remarks to James that she doesn’t like Yotam because he is “moody”

a) Why did Yotam react in the way he did?
b) Was Yotam’s reaction justified? Why?
c) If you had asked Yasmin’s question to a gay couple and had been told to mind your own business, how would you react?
d) Have you heard or asked these kinds of questions in real life? How do you feel about these kinds of questions?

e) Should gay people be more laid back about these kinds of questions? Why?

4) Data Discussion

Now we’ll talk about some data that was collected by YouGov shortly after the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act (2013) came into force in March 2014. 1,958 British adults were asked ‘Do you think that gay people in the UK are generally treated equally, better, or worse than straight people?’

a) Before we look at how these respondents answered, how do you think gay people are treated in relation to straight people and why? Can you provide some examples?

Now we’ll take a look at how the 1,958 respondents answered: in the UK, 42% said that gay people were treated equally to straight people, 33% said that gay people were treated worse than straight people, 11% said that gay people were treated better than straight people, and 14% said that they didn’t know.

a) Let’s first look at the 42% of people who said that gay people were treated equally to straight people in the UK. What does sexual orientation equality look like to you?

b) If you believe gay people do not yet have equality, how far do we have to go before reaching equality? How many more rights do gay people need?

c) Now let’s look at the 33% of people who said that gay people were treated worse than straight people in the UK. In what ways are gay people treated worse than straight people?

d) Do you feel a degree of pity for gay men because of their mistreatment by others? In what ways?

e) Now we’ll turn to the 11% of people who said that gay people were treated better than straight people in the UK. Have you ever felt that a gay man has been treated better than you on the basis of his sexuality? Why?

f) Do you sometimes think that gay men have it easier than straight people? Why? Can you give any examples?

g) Do you feel a degree of envy towards gay men because of these examples? In what ways?

5) Microaggressions

Finally, we’ll talk about things called ‘microaggressions’. Before I provide a definition, does anybody want to try and guess what a ‘microaggression’ is?

Definition: “Brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioural, or environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative slights and insults towards members of oppressed groups” (Nadal, 2008, p. 23)

a) Microaggressions are directed towards members of oppressed groups. Do you believe that gay men are oppressed in society? Why?

b) Returning briefly to the vignettes we looked at earlier, do you believe that Diane’s and Yasmin’s comments were microaggressive? Why?

c) I’ll provide you with some examples of things that some researchers consider to be microaggressive. For each one, I’d like to know whether you agree or disagree that it is microaggressive and why
- Using phrases such as “that’s so gay”
- Asking a gay man, if you find him too flamboyant, to “tone it down”
- Assuming that gay men have some qualities (e.g. fashionable) and lack others (e.g. sporty)
- Treating gay men as if they are ‘exotic’ and being in awe of how they differ to you
- Expressing discomfort at talking about male homosexuality
- Downplaying how significant anti-gay sentiment is to gay men
- Being preoccupied with the sexual aspects of gay men
d) Can you recall any examples of when you have used microaggressions towards gay men – intentionally or unintentionally – perhaps similar to the examples you have in front of you? Elaborate. Were you challenged about your comments?
c) Do you feel that people should be excused when they accidentally use microaggressions that upset gay men? Why?

Appendix 2

Gay Focus Group Topic Guide

1) Rapport:

Thank you for agreeing to participate in today’s focus group. Firstly, I’m inviting you to be as open and honest as possible. I’m not here to make judgements about you as individuals based on your contribution here and, likewise, I would encourage you all to be respectful of each other’s contributions – one of the best and most helpful ways you can do this is by talking with each other about the points you all raise over the course of the focus group. Everything you say here – I won’t disclose what you say to anyone outside of my research team, except in the form of anonymised quotes that will not make you identifiable. In the interest of getting open and honest discussion from you, please respect this confidentiality also. Is this okay with everyone?

Before we go on to the actual discussion, I think it would be a good idea to break the ice a bit and get everybody more comfortable speaking among the group so I would like you to
say your name (or use a pseudonym) and tell us all about why you wanted to take part in this study.

2) Orienting

Thank you for sharing a little bit about yourselves. We'll be discussing a few different things during the focus group. We're going to start off by talking about some data collected recently from the general public looking at how they think gay people are treated nowadays. I'll also have you respond to their opinions and share how you believe that you are treated in relation to heterosexuals and lesbian women. We'll then explore your views on ‘benevolent’ attitudes towards gay men, which I'll explain to you.

3) Vignettes:

We'll be discussing two vignettes together and each will be looking at some interactions between gay people and straight people and then we'll be discussing what happened, and taking different perspectives in discussing the interaction and what it may mean for different people.

Vignette 1:

James is an 18 year old openly gay man and is moving in to student halls of residence for his first year of university. While moving in, he strikes up a conversation with his new neighbour, Diane. Wanting to be open with everyone from the outset, he drops into conversation that he's gay and Diane reacts enthusiastically, exclaiming “Awesome! I've always wanted a gay friend! My cousin’s gay, you’d look totally cute together!”

James goes along with it, not wanting to spoil a potential friendship, but the comments make him feel uncomfortable.

a) How often do you encounter reactions like Diane’s?
b) How do reactions like Diane’s make you feel about yourself? (Separate into gay friend/gay cousin components) Why?
c) Have you ever challenged somebody who reacted in this way? Why? How was this received?
d) In your opinion, are gay people seen to have qualities that makes them better ‘friend material’ than straight people? What qualities? How do you feel about these assumptions?
e) Is Diane’s reaction okay because she was just trying to be nice, despite making James feel uncomfortable? Why?

Vignette 2:

Later in the year James meets Yotam, another gay student on his course, and they start dating each other. After a month of dating, they decide that things are going so well that they should be introduced to each other’s friends. James brings Yotam along to a night out and his friends get along with Yotam very well. As James’s friends drink more, they become bolder in the topics they talk about around the pair and one friend, Yasmin, asks them “Soooo… Who does what when you… Y’know what I mean”

Although James tries to evade the topic, Yotam tells Yasmin to mind her own business and Yasmin later remarks to James that she doesn’t like Yotam because he is “moody”
a) How often do you encounter comments like Yasmin’s?
b) How do questions like Yasmin’s make you feel about yourself and your sex life?
c) Have you ever challenged questions like Yasmin’s (like Yotam did)? Why? How was this received?
d) Do you believe that straight people are often preoccupied with the sex lives of gay men? Why? Examples?
e) What do you believe is the intent behind these kinds of questions? Are straight people just trying to be nice or are they simply being insensitive?

4) Data Discussion

Now we’ll talk about some data that was collected by YouGov shortly after the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act (2013) came into force in March 2014. 1,958 British adults were asked ‘Do you think that gay people in the UK are generally treated equally, better, or worse than straight people?’

a) Before we look at how these respondents answered, do you believe that your sexuality means that you are treated worse than, better than, or the same as heterosexuals? Why? Can you provide some examples?

Now we’ll take a look at how the 1,958 respondents answered: 42% said that gay people were treated equally to straight people, 33% said that gay people were treated worse than straight people, 11% said that gay people were treated better than straight people, and 14% said that they didn’t know.

a) Let’s look first at the 42% of people who said that gay people were treated equally to straight people in the UK. What does sexual orientation equality look like to you?
b) If you believe gay people do not yet have equality, how far do we have to go before reaching equality? How many more rights do gay people need?
c) Now let’s look at the 33% of people who said that gay people were treated worse than straight people in the UK. In what ways do you feel you are treated worse than straight people on the basis of your sexuality?
d) Do you feel pitied by straight people? Can you provide any examples of times where this pity has made you feel inferior or lesser? Prompts: babied? Undermined? Dehumanised?
e) Now we’ll turn to the 11% of people who said that gay people were treated better than straight people in the UK. Have you ever felt that you are treated better than straight people because of your sexuality? Why? How do you respond to the suggestion that you are treated better than straight people because of your sexuality?
f) Do you sometimes feel envied by straight people? Can you provide any examples of times where this envy has been unrealistic?

5) Benevolent Prejudice towards Gay Men

Now we’ll be looking at so-called ‘benevolent’ prejudice. I’ll assume you all have an idea about what prejudice is but does anybody here know what benevolence is and what, together, benevolent prejudice might be?

Whereas ‘benevolence’ is usually associated with kindness and other positive emotions, some researchers have put forward the idea that benevolent attitudes towards certain minority
groups can be prejudicial. Here is a quote from them that I have adapted for our talk about benevolent attitudes towards gay men:

“[Benevolent homoprejudice is] a set of interrelated attitudes towards [gay men] that are [prejudicial] in terms of viewing [gay men] stereotypically and in restricted roles but that are subjectively positive in feeling tone (for the perceiver)... We do not consider benevolent [homoprejudice] a good thing, for despite the positive feelings it may indicate for the perceiver, its underpinnings lie in traditional stereotyping and [heterosexual] dominance [(e.g., heterosexuality being the ‘gold standard’)], and its consequences are often damaging.”

Adapted from Glick and Fiske (1996)

To give you an idea of the kinds of things I’m interested to hear about, I’ll give you an example from my own personal experience: I once stayed at my best friend’s house and closed the curtains (which were tied up in a very tidy and ornamental way) in the bedroom to go to bed. The next day my best friend’s Mum noted that I’d left the curtain closed and, when I offered to fix it, she said not to worry because she had a certain tidy and symmetrical way she liked to do it. She then suddenly changed her mind and said “actually, you’re gay, you’ll know what to do with them”.

a) Can you think of any occasions when straight people make these kinds of ‘nice’ assumptions about you because of your sexuality? How do these kinds of assumptions make you feel?

b) Can you think of any occasions when straight people come across as overprotective, overbearingly nice to you, or overly helpful towards you because of your sexuality? Prompt: people saying “I’ve always wanted a gay friend!” or trying to set you up with someone. How do these behaviours make you feel?

c) Can you think of any occasions when straight people impose themselves on spaces which are typically meant for gay men such as gay bars, clubs, groups, meetings, or job posts meant for gay men? How does this make you feel?

d) Can you think of any occasions when straight people have seemingly been in awe of your sexuality, as if you’re an ‘exotic’ outsider? Prompt: people ‘taking an interest’ by asking invasive, intimate, or inappropriate questions about your sex life or suggesting that they are like an ‘honourary gay’. How does this make you feel?

e) Can you think of any occasions when straight people have said that you have it easier or receive special benefits because of your sexuality? How does this make you feel?

f) Can you think of any occasions when straight people have been overwhelmed you with assurances that they are not prejudiced, that they consider gay people equal to straight people, or that your sexuality is ‘fine’ with them? How does this make you feel?

g) When straight people make unrealistic assumptions about you (e.g. that you’re highly fashionable), do you feel that your self-esteem takes a hit or that you feel negative about yourself? In what ways?

h) When these comments and behaviours are directed at you, do you feel as if you are a target of prejudice or do you think the person is just trying to be nice? Why? Are good intentions an excuse?
Appendix 3

The AHS-96

1. Gay men need to stop shoving their sexuality down everyone's throats
2. Gay men need to stop making such a fuss about their sexuality
3. Gay men would be accepted if they complained less about their rights
4. Prejudice towards gay men is a thing of the past
5. Gay men have all the rights they need
6. Discrimination towards gay men no longer exists
7. Gay men exaggerate the amount of prejudice they experience
8. Gay men have achieved equality
9. One cannot say anything about gay men without being accused of prejudice
10. Many people are afraid of criticising gay men for fear of being accused of being prejudiced
11. Most employers are too scared to reprimand gay men for fear of reprisal
12. Gay men readily perceive criticism as prejudice
13. Gay men use their sexuality to obtain special privileges
14. Gay men get too much attention nowadays
15. It's unfair to have gay pride when there is no such thing as straight pride
16. Upstanding people are being held hostage by gay men's political correctness
17. Gay men should be satisfied with all the rights they've got
18. Gay men are like broken records when it comes to complaining about their rights
19. Gay men complain too much about how they are treated
20. Give gay men an inch and they'll take a mile
21. It seems gay men always find some new issue to complain about
22. Gay men use their sexuality as a weapon to get what they want
23. Gay people use their sexuality to get undue advantages
24. Gay men make claims of prejudice to work the system
25. Gay men need someone to speak up for them
26. It's important to help gay men because they've been through so much
27. Gay men often need a shoulder to cry on
28. Gay men should be helped by those stronger than them
29. Gay men need help standing up for themselves
30. People should be nice to gay men because of the tough time they have
31. Gay men have it rough, so everyone needs to do what they can to make up for it
32. It's important to be kind to gay men because of all the pain they go through
33. There are many areas in life that gay men are simply ill-equipped to handle
34. Gay men are emotionally fragile
35. Gay men are not suited to working in business because it's too cut-throat
36. Gay men are oblivious to their susceptibility to sexually-transmitted infections
37. Many gay men would make reckless life choices without the guidance of others
38. Gay men lack the maturity that other people possess
39. Gay men need saving from themselves
40. It's important that straight people stand up for gay men
41. Gay men need defending from comments about their sexuality
42. Gay men need reassuring that they are accepted by others
43. Gay men need to be taken care of in social settings
44. People should feel sorry for gay men because of their struggles
45. Gay men deserve sympathy for all that they go through
46. It's hard to imagine how gay men cope with everything they have to go through
47. Being gay is a heavy burden for a man
48. It's upsetting to think about how difficult gay men's lives are
49. Gay men are great at giving relationship advice
50. Gay men have a lot to teach others about being sexually adventurous
51. Straight men could learn a thing or two about personal grooming from gay men

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52. It's easy to talk to a gay man about personal problems
53. A gay man should be able to advise their friends on what to wear
54. Gay men are a great source of gift ideas
55. A gay man who does not like clothes shopping is not 'good' at being gay
56. Gay men who aren't fashionable haven't succeeded as a gay person
57. There is little point in having a gay friend if he can't help you with fashion
58. Some gay men are terrible at being gay
59. Gay men make great friends
60. Gay men bring unnecessary drama to friendship circles
61. Every friendship circle needs a sassy gay friend
62. Gay men are likely to bitch about you behind your back
63. Everyone needs a gay best friend
64. Compared to most men, gay men have a better understanding of women
65. Behind every great woman is a fabulous gay best friend
66. Gay men know what turns a good night into a great night out
67. There's little point in having a gay friend if he doesn't enjoy partying
68. A gay man will never fail to make their friends laugh
69. Few people have quicker wits than a gay man
70. Gay men are generally more entertaining than straight people
71. Gay men are more in touch with their emotions than other men
72. Gay men are often like 'one of the girls'
73. The thought of close contact with a gay man is unsettling
74. Gay men are predatory
75. Gay men should be banned from working with children
76. Children are corrupted by gay men's lifestyles
77. Gay men should not be allowed to give blood because they will spread disease
78. Sex between two men is gross
79. Gay men are repulsive
80. Gay men are revolting
81. Gay men are disgusting
82. Gay men are immoral
83. It's wrong to be a gay man
84. Society should be more tolerant of gay men
85. It should be illegal to be a gay man
86. Being gay is a choice
87. Many gay men just haven't met the right woman yet
88. Gay men should seek therapy to treat their condition
89. Gay men are perverted
90. Gay men are sinful
91. Sex between two men is an affront to religious teachings
92. Physical intimacy between two men is against nature
93. Being gay involves dirty sexual practices
94. The thought of two men having sex is disgusting
95. Gay men are a blight on society
96. Gay men deserve the violence they experience
## Appendix 4

### 96-Item Rotated EFA and Deletion Order

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## Appendix 5

### Alternative Parametric Analyses

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*Repellent values are adjusted for Romanticised, Paternalistic, and Adversarial scales.*

**Significance levels:**
- .05
- .01
- .001

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*Repellent values are adjusted for Romanticised, Paternalistic, and Adversarial scales.*

**Significance levels:**
- .05
- .01
- .001