ANGLIA RUSKIN UNIVERSITY

ANTI-SPECIESIST THEORY AND ACTION: DISMANTLING THE (HU)MAN

AGNES TRZAK

A thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Anglia Ruskin University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Submitted: September 2015
Acknowledgements

This thesis amalgamates my interpretations of the many conversations I had whilst doing the research for it. Although I cannot possibly give credit where credit is due, this is an attempt at acknowledging most of the people who in one form or another can be found in this work.

First of all I would like to extend my gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Patricia MacCormack. I am aware that it is an exception, and thus I am incredibly honoured, to get the opportunity to work with someone who defies phallogocentrism and speciesism within the setting of neoliberal humanities to such an extent. The questions asked and the guidance offered were indispensable to the completion of this work and remain significantly influential beyond.

Thanks are also due to Prof. Farah Mendlesohn and Dr. Sean Campbell whose feedback allowed me to progress with my work, and especially Dr. Tina Kendall whose personal words of encouragement were greatly appreciated. I am also grateful for the supervision and the professional opportunities provided by Dr. Joss Hands. Further, I also thank Prof. Dr. Rosi Braidotti and Dr. Iris van der Tuin for facilitating the most stimulating summer school as well as their dedication to each and every one of us students offered during the programme.

A big part of Michelle and Nick is also in this thesis. Our intense and sublime friendship and our shared experiences within and beyond this process of (not) becoming academics have inspired my thinking exceptionally.

I am also grateful to the staff at Anglia Ruskin University who provided me with food and an immaculate campus and who ensured my safety during the hours spent there. My thanks also extends to the Anglia Ruskin University Students’ Union and their great effort in facilitating campus activism, particularly everybody who made the Vegan Society possible. It is here that I could find my way of doing activism which had an enormous effect upon my thinking. Further, the Anti-Speciesist Women’s group offered an incredible platform for all the radical ideas which influenced this work tremendously. I am grateful to Dr. Lisa Kemmerer and Dr. Carol Adams who encouraged the onset of this group and more so for their continuous redefining of the origin of animal liberation.

In my activist family I found my drive and bonded with some of the most excellent revolutionaries, such as Agata, Alissa, Amy, Andy, Daniela, Emily, Lauren,
Michelle, Milda, Natalie, Raffa, Sophie, Yvonne and everyone who remains unnamed but whose intelligence has had a major impact upon my thinking and being. A big part of everybody from IARC 2014 is in this work, too. It is here where I first could envision a possible materialisation of the post-revolutionary world, due to the fantastic organising team.

Thanks are also due to my students, whose curiosity, enthusiasm and disbelief gave me hope.

A humble thank you also to Joan Court, who truly is an inspiration.

I also must express deep gratitude to Elecia and Sammi, who gave me a home in times most needed - figuratively and literally - and whose warmth, generosity and convictions are one of a kind.

This work would have not been possible without my whole family, whose unconditional support, love and care-packages know no bounds. Deepest thanks to my confidante and chosen family Alex as well as my parents. Their hard work, patience, intelligence and love, which makes my thinking possible, often goes unappreciated.

Najszczersze podziękowania dla rodziców. Ich ciężka praca, cierpliwość, inteligencja i miłość, wykreowały mój światopogląd i moją pracę, co często było niedoceniane, a za co jestem wdzięczna.

Lastly, I am indebted to all the animals, whom I owe everything. They remind me of the urgency and importance and simultaneously the insignificance this thesis bears.
ANGLIA RUSKIN UNIVERSITY
ABSTRACT

FACULTY OF ARTS, LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

ANTI-SPECIESIST THEORY AND ACTION: DISMANTLING THE (HU)MAN

Agnes Trzak

August 2015

I explore opportunities for political activism from a feminist anti-speciesist perspective. I reconcile the two often separated fields of academia and activism by examining theoretical conceptualisations of political action and their application to lived realities. I specifically focus on depicting processes of objectification utilised by the dominant culture. I offer a feminist critique of normative discourses regarding political action and counter-cultural organising, that are based on our understanding of the Public Sphere as an arena of rationality, debate, diplomacy and equality. I expose public sphere discourse as a means of reproducing dominant processes of objectification and othering.

In other words, I argue that our understanding of political action in fact contributes to the hierarchical categorisation of all life and thus the exclusion of the minoritarian from political action. This is due to the fact that our understanding of the political is utterly based on an anthropocentric masculinist, or what I term (hu)man world view. To allow for a truly non-hierarchical and just socio-political economy, I urge not only to include human identity dimensions such as gender, disability, race and class in our political thinking, but also to extend our consideration to other species, and thus make our resistance not only a feminist, anti-racist, anti-classist and anti-ableist one but also an anti-speciesist one.

I do so by exploring Patricia MacCormack’s conceptualisation of the ahuman; a state of divorcing resistance to normativity from a focus on the oppressed and shifting towards a definition and dismantling of the privileged, (hu)man. I arrive at this conclusion by exploring possibilities of emancipation, which, I argue, are found in dismantling the majoritarian subject instead of actively improving the minoritarian position. I thus suggest to move away from a phallogocentric humanist system of signification, based on representation and instead work towards the undoing of (hu)man texts.

Key words: feminism, ahuman, activism, critical animal studies, speciesism, public sphere
## Contents

### Introduction
- The Process of Objectification 2
- Placing my Work and Methods in Context 14
### Chapter Summaries 26

### Chapter One: A Genealogy Of the Public Sphere 29
- 1.1. Gendered Division of Labour 32
- 1.2. Democratic Freedom in Classical Athens 44
- 1.3. Public Space and The Modern Right to the City 53

### Chapter Two: Postmodernism as a Passage to Social Justice 67
- 2.2. Rupturing the (Hu)man Economy of Signification 79

### Chapter Three: Animal Others 91
- 3.1. The Animal as Kyriarchal Object 94
- 3.2. Interconnections Between Speciesism and Other Forms of Oppression 104

### Chapter Four: Uncovering Speciesism and the (Hu)man 132
- 4.1. Imperceptible Object / Imperceptible Subject 133
- 4.2. Deconstructing the (Hu)man 146

### Conclusion 161

### Glossary 166

### Bibliography 169

### Appendix A 194
Introduction

Combining activism and scholarship, this thesis interrogates conceptions of social justice. The purpose of this work is twofold: Firstly, I examine traditional conceptualisations of political action which are based on democracy and equality that are manifest within a canonical understanding of the public sphere. I critique this historical understanding of activism and its contemporary configurations, as being inherently anthropocentric and masculinist. Secondly, I advocate for social justice in terms of liberation encompassing anti-speciesism. It is significant to note that whilst it is true that much social justice work neglects species hierarchies, there is indeed a growing number of scholars and activists, following utilitarian, anarchist and/or feminist philosophies, who draw attention to speciesism as part of an entangled structure of oppression. This work is firmly situated in the context of the latter. However, I additionally contribute to a field that has, as of yet, attracted limited attention from scholars and activists alike. That is, the undoing of the human self in the context of its relation with other species. My work is, thus, to be precise, concerned with exposing the subject, that is the masculinist human, who I later define as the (hu)man. This entails that my work does not focus on the Other and the improvement of their conditions, instead I show the fallacy in doing so and advocate for the undoing of the subject.

This thesis explores two central research questions. I firstly ask: ‘To what extent is the public sphere as a conceptualisation of political action and especially counter-hegemonic activism appropriate to a politics of emancipation?’ This question is addressed within the first two chapters, where I argue against a traditional conceptualisation of the public sphere as the arena for political action. Whilst critiquing this approach to counter-cultural organising and active disruption of hegemonic structures, I also offer alternatives. A pertinent second question is therefore: ‘What theoretical and practical alternatives are more suitable for an activism that concerns itself with all Others, including nonhuman species?’ To respond to this question I explore concepts of (specifically human) privilege as well as oppression (specifically that of animals) in the last two chapters.

Before I elaborate on the contribution to knowledge my work makes and the methods used to answer the research questions, I outline the process of systematic objectification, as my work is informed by my own understanding of the subject constructing its objects. The final section of this introduction offers an outline of the
contents of each chapter. It is also worth noting that, as I am combining an activist
and scholarly approach in my work, I find it useful to include a glossary (p.154), with
words that are used predominantly in either activism or the academy, but are useful
in informing both, from my perspective, mutually inclusive, spheres. As my work
discusses oppression, I not only write of structural injustice but, at times, instances
of physical violence towards bodies. These examples serve to elucidate the
interconnection between structural expressions of violence and their physical
consequences. This stresses the urgency of my critique of activism. Although these
descriptions do not lie at the crux of my argument, and for self-care reasons could
be omitted by the reader without compromising the work to a significant extent, it is
important to bear witness and acknowledge the lived realities that lie beyond our
own scope of embodiment.

The Process of Objectification

The Process of objectification is deeply entrenched in the system of
oppressive hierarchies that Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza terms ‘kyriarchy’(1992)\(^1\).
Schüssler Fiorenza proposes the term as an extension of patriarchy ‘because it
describes more accurately the patriarchal constitution of ancient and modern
societies’ (1998: 204). In classical Greece, women as statutory minors referred to
their husbands as fathers, as kyríos (i.e. master, lord).

Kyriarchy combines all social systems that are based on the
institutionalisation of oppression and privilege derived from our identity dimensions.
Kyriarchy thus can be understood as an umbrella term for the rule of what is
perceived as absolutely masculine over that which is decoded as absolutely
feminine or not sufficiently masculine or feminine, thus leading to sexism, as well as
pastoralism (‘where men control non-human animals’) (Kemmerer 2011: 16).
Additionally, I propose that kyriarchy also encompasses different forms of sexism
(hetero- and cis-sexism oppressing persons who identify on the MOGAI Spectrum -
Marginalised Orientations, Gender Identities and Intersex) as well as ableism (ability
over disability), classism (high economic and educational status over a lower one),
nationalism (manifesting itself in xenophobic privileging of a nation’s ingroup
towards the ‘foreign’ outgroup), racism (the supremacy of white people over other
racial identities) and ageism (the privileging of younger - not too young - persons

\(^1\) The etymology of the word kyriarchy implies the rule and reign (archē) of a lord or master (kyrios).
over older ones). To clarify, kyriarchy allows for those who identify with privileged sides of each of these systems of discrimination to receive a platform so as to become perceptible. The concept of gaining a platform is discussed in more detail in Chapter Two whilst privilege is explicitly explored in Chapter Three.

To negotiate and establish positions of privilege and oppression, we rely on a system of communication. I argue that within kyriarchy, the established way of expressing is a phallocentric one. Phallocentrism, as a concept combines the connotations of phallocracy, that is the domination of the masculine over all else, with those of a systematic, logical, and as Judith Butler puts it, ‘masculinist signifying economy’ (Butler 2010: 18). Thus, it is the discursive system that produces the paradigms of kyriarchy. As an order of signification phallocentrism relies on representation which utilises dichotomies to create meaning and so creates the absolute symbolic and material demarcation of the self from the other, the mind from the body, culture from nature, the male from the female, the true from the illusionary, the right from the wrong, the civilised from the primitive and so on (Haraway 1991: 177; see also Hassan 1985 123 f.; Harvey 1992; Irigaray 1985a, 1985b; Hayles:1999: 44). The phallogical order creates hierarchical divisions between that which complies with the systematic categorisation and that which resists this, or any type of organisation. It necessitates the maintenance of a normative symbolic and material code as well as the suppression of the deviant. The normative subject is the one that communicates using what Michel Foucault terms the proper ‘enunciative function’ (Foucault 1997). Only through mastering the correct way of articulation and expression, by applying the correct symbols and assembling them correctly in time and space, does one emerge as a subject, as only then one is able to participate in discourse formation. This concept does not concern itself exclusively with spoken or written language but also with all other media, that is anything that facilitates expression. Of course, this entails the automatic reproduction of a preset array of rules and it notably limits the possibility for abnormalities to emerge. I shall return to the concept of the enunciative function in more detail in Chapter Two.

Phallocentrism oppresses the alternately enunciating individual who thus becomes the object. The non-phallogical body is prevented from signifying and thus only enters the economic exchange as a commodity (Irigaray 1985a). The normative body must use, abuse, exchange, exploit, navigate, manipulate and kill the deviant - symbolically as materially -, so as to justify and maintain its own
significance, its own value, status, transcendence and divinity (Irigaray 1985a; Braidotti 2002; Adams 2010). The hierarchical stratification of all bodies according to ability, sex, race, species, class and so on, intensified in modernity through the Cartesian and Darwinian perceptions of life and its value, and the priority of rational thought, inherited from the Enlightenment, allow for the objectification of all that diverges from the absolute phallogical divine, sacred, inviolable and whole. Phallogocentrism is modelled on the texts produced by the kyriarchal and unattainable figures of god, the lord, the father, the son and the brother in human form.

This figure reflects righteousness and truth, be it a truth derived from religious belief or scientific logic. The kyriarch’s truth establishes an order and dictates the value of life based on compliance with these, (hu)man ideals. I introduce the concept of the (hu)man to represent the one who occupies the subject position. As the subject, one complies with the masculinist signifying order and is thus, of course, human. Whereas I use human as an indicator of species belonging in this work, my concept of (hu)man implies the privileged position of the masculine and the human in eurocentric society. Whilst the human is also an animal, the term animal is only used for animals who are not human. This is firstly, to acknowledge the anthropocentric social construction of both the human and the animal (and with it the construction of the (hu)man) and secondly, so as to avoid grouping humans and non-humans in one category. This is crucial in not only recognising difference, but more so in acknowledging the guilt and responsibility all of us, as humans, carry towards other species, within a speciesist world (MacCormack 2014: 7).

The (hu)man represents the ultimate and at the same time essential and normal, standardised person, whom all others are measured against based on the quantitative commensurability with him. In other words, personhood is assessed based on the number of a body’s and mind’s characteristics that reflect and conform with those of the phallic emblematic man. This symbol of the divine figure however, is in turn produced by projecting the human perception of the self upon society. A god is then nothing more than a reflection of this image which ultimately creates an unattainable anthropomorphic character that can only be attested to through transcendence (Feuerbach 1881). Thus the value of all non-normative bodies is relative to that of the phallic standard, which requires the deviant to be exchanged as a commodified object, who is thus prevented from participation in discourse
formation and remains unknowledgable, unable to use the enunciative function so as to act. The objectified Other is ultimately imperceptible.

Donna Haraway writes about the contemporary phallogocentric system: ‘White Capitalist Patriarchy [...] turns everything into a resource for appropriation, in which an object of knowledge is finally itself only matter for the seminal power, the act, of the knower’ (1991: 197). Knowledge is the condition of the phallocratic and arises from the inspection, examination, definition, categorisation, penetration, dismemberment and dissection of the object (Irigaray 1985a; Braidotti 1994: 66 f.; Adams 2010;). Haraway continues: ‘Here, the object both guarantees and refreshes the power of the knower, but any status as agent in the productions of knowledge must be denied the object’ (1991: 197 f.). It is this process that creates the object, the thing, the resource, and opposes it to the ‘human knower’ (ibid.). The scientist, the student of knowledge (scientia), who thus is the knower and the omniscient phallic subject, is always privileged in phallocratic discourse formation. He defines, delineates and explains all unknown as well as unscientific matter by means of systematic structuralisation, as Jacques Derrida states in Writing and Difference: ‘If we appear to oppose one series to the other, it is because from within the classical system we wish to make apparent the noncritical privilege naively granted to the other series by a certain structuralism. Our discourse irreducibly belongs to the system of metaphysical oppositions’ (Derrida, 2001: 22).

One within these oppositions represents the objective, rational truth, while the other opposes it as a result of ignorance and lacking scientificity. The concept of scientific truth, as an incontestable fact, is deeply rooted in the hegemonic system of signification, creating what Foucault calls ‘epistemes’ (1980) to order the construction and binary categorisation of knowledge. He writes, ‘the episteme is the ‘apparatus’ which makes possible the separation, not of the true from the false, but of what may from what may not be characterised as scientific’ (1980: 197). Modernity's insistence on the scientific production of meaning has created this system of epistemes in which the enunciative function of a certain episteme (Foucault 1997: 6, 88 ff.) has to be mastered in order for the (hu)man to become a potent actor in the formation of discourse. To be powerful, able and perceptible, is to know ‘the relation between signifier and signified’ (Foucault 1997: 89) and thus to distinguish between the subject and the author of a text (Foucault 1997: 95). Further, power lies in the ability to contextualise the referent, (Foucault 1997: 96 ff.) as well as in appropriately choosing a medium to communicate this referent
(Foucault 1997: 100 ff.). Foucault precisely depicts the conditions of appearance, of being visible and able to construct texts systematically so as to be a social (hu)man within a phallocratic materiality.

Closer attention must be paid here to what is signified and what is referred to in a phallogical mode of discourse and how exactly power is being exerted to the point of oppression and annihilation of the Other, through proper use of the enunciative function. I propose three ways in which the rules of the enunciative function eliminate all non-conforming bodies: Firstly, patriarchal discourse formation is based on the objectification of the Other which functions as the inception of knowing. The Other is to be objectified so as to be identified, categorised, relativised and commodified as a currency of knowledge. Through this, the object can be made impotent and will thus automatically be made imperceptible. Making imperceptible operates as the second mechanism of the phallogocentric enunciative function. Through it, the object is unable to participate within hegemonic discourse formation as they are now undetectable within the patriarchal structures. Extermination of the deviant is the last function of the proper enunciative function, in which the non-(hu)man and their genealogy is completely erased from discursive memory. These three mechanisms are not separate from each other and are often combined. It is when one uses these three function in order to create the Other, that oneself is defined more as a subject.

I shall now explain more closely what is meant by each of the three functions of proper discourse formation and what their purpose is, before proposing a counter-methodology to writing texts that lie outside kyriarchy. Writing on objectification, Martha Nussbaum proposes that objectification, ‘the seeing and/or treating of someone as an object’ who in fact is not a thing (1995: 251) can be achieved through any and all of the following notions:

1. Instrumentality: The objectifier treats the object as a tool of his or her purposes.
2. Denial of autonomy: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in autonomy and self-determination.
3. Inertness: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in agency, and perhaps also in activity.
4. Fungibility: The objectifier treats the object as interchangeable (a) with other objects of the same type, and/or (b) with objects of other types.
5. Violability: The objectifier treats the object as lacking in boundary-integrity, as something that it is permissible to break up, smash,
break into.
6. Ownership: The objectifier treats the object as something that is
owned by another, can be bought or sold, etc.
7. Denial of subjectivity: The objectifier treats the object as something
whose experience and feelings (if any) need not be taken into ac-
count’ (Nussbaum 1995: 257).

Nussbaum states that not always is an objectified Other exposed to all seven of the
above conditions, however any combination of these notions causes a living
individual to be perceived as thinglike and inanimate (1995: 257 ff.). This process of
de(hu)manising all bodies that do not comply to the hegemonic order reflects my
understanding of objectification, as I argue that ultimately phallogical discourse is
produced in such a way as to undermine and annihilate the deviant completely.
Before the extermination of the objectified Other, the phallicratic enunciative
function ensures the imperceptibility of the former non-conforming body.

Phallogocentrism must indeed ensure the imperceptibility of non-conforming
bodies, their languages, their herstories, memories and genealogies, so as to
detach the Other from their sentience, vitality and activeness. The function of
objectification is to turn an individual body into a commodity, a replaceable product
that emerges only at the will and labour of the kyriarchal engineer, designer,
constructor, merchant and consumer. It is his role to know how to assemble and
disassemble the finished product, how to utilise it and how to devalue the
commodity on the market by creating not only the supply, but at the same time also
the demand for it. Thus, the process of objectification includes not only the
production but also the consumption of a commodity. This is echoed by Carol
Adams when she proposes ‘a cycle of objectification, fragmentation, and
consumption, which links butchering and sexual violence in our culture’ (2010: 73).
Adams equals the knower to the oppressor who prevents the objectified from
expression by denying them the ‘freedom to say no’ (ibid.). This method of
objectification allows for ‘fragmentation, or brutal dismemberment, and finally
consumption’ (ibid.; Green 2013: 21). It is through consumption that the formerly
minoritarian, that is the deviant and non-dominant body is devoured by
phallogocentrism and assimilated by the system of its language.

As Adams states:

‘Consumption is the fulfillment of oppression, the annihilation of will,
of separate identity. So, too with language: a subject first is viewed,
or objectified, through metaphor. Through fragmentation the object is
severed from its ontological meaning. Finally, consumed, it exists only through what it represents. The consumption of the referent reiterates its annihilation as a subject of importance itself (2010: 73).

The non-normative subject is turned into a complacent object by subtracting individual value from the Other, so as to increase the significance of the self. This is manifested in, for instance, racial, gender and species relations where the dominant group (white, cis, male humans) as the normative subject defines itself and thus remains supreme through removing the specificity of the now dividuated other, who is so objectified. The value of the object thus does not lie in the affective relations this body creates, maintains, augments or chooses to discontinue. As an object, deprived of liveliness and agency, the object cannot enter such relationships, instead their value is now determined by comparison to other commodities, as Luce Irigaray writes in This Sex Which Is Not One (1985b): ‘[The object’s] value is never found to lie within itself. And the fact that it is worth more or less is not its own doing but comes from that to which it may be equivalent (Irigaray 1985b: 176). The process of objectification denies the former individual autonomy, agency and will. To be part of the system of social relations governed by the phallocentric model of the enunciative function all non-conforming bodies must be produced in such a way as to make possible the effortless exchange of them between the power holders. Only an inert, fungible and violable body is desirable within a phallocentric economy, as Irigaray reminds us: ‘Commodities, as we all know, do not take themselves to market on their own [...]. The use, consumption, and circulation of their sexualised bodies underwrite the organization and the reproduction of the social order, in which they have never taken part as “subjects”’ (Irigaray 1985b: 84).

Thus the objectified Other is turned into what Adams calls the ‘absent referent’ (2010), who is only existent within relations between the (hu)man subjects. Their affective and material individuality, uniqueness, femininity, queerness, diffability and animality is overwritten by the texts of the majoritarian order, of which they are now part. They are detached from the texts they once produced and are now incorporated into the majoritarian order of signification. The former individual is now nothing more than the product of the (hu)man. They are trapped on a hyperreal plane that is void of any archival records testifying to their individuality. They now live only as a copy without an original or as ‘the absent referent [who] is both there and not there. It is there through inference, but its meaningfulness reflects only upon what it refers to because the originating, literal, experience that contributes the
meaning is not here. We fail to accord this absent referent its own existence' (Adams 2010: 67). The non-phallogocentric body then does not exist (see Chapter Two). It is exterminated by the enunciative function of the patriarchal economy in which all Others are forced to constantly aspire towards majoritarianism but will never achieve transcendence as phallogocentrism can only exist through the Other's continuous objectification and juxtaposition to the (hu)man. To put it in Irigaray's words:

'Woman could be man's equal. In this case she would enjoy [...] the same economic, social, political rights as men. She would be a potential man. But on the exchange market -especially, or exemplarily, the market of sexual exchange - woman would also have to preserve and maintain what is called femininity [...]. In this masquerade of femininity, the woman loses herself, and loses herself by playing on her femininity' (Irigaray 1985b: 84; see Irigaray 1985a: 165; 1993: 20; 1993: 71).

Whether as woman or any other non-conforming body, Irigaray shows that existence is only possible in relation and subordination to the phallic. Only as a desirable object created by the (hu)man can they exist, not as themselves but as his phantasmatic creation. After being objectified and made imperceptible, they will be exterminated. They are dead as they cannot at the same time be themselves and exist in his discourse. As there is nothing outside of his discourse however, they cannot exist at all. Their subjectivity is exterminated, as one cannot consume the object without the death of its individuality (Irigaray 1985a; 1985b; Adams 2004: 66). In a conversation with her student, Irigaray explains this phenomenon as follows: When the student utters their concern 'I don't understand what “masculine” discourse means', Irigaray responds: 'Of course not, since there is no other. The problem is that of a possible alterity in masculine discourse - or in relation to masculine discourse' (Irigaray 1985b: 140). The hegemonic enunciative function ensures a standardised formula of signification, which entails hierarchical dichotomies, as mentioned above. Hierarchy in turn, to follow Irigaray's teaching, 'presupposes sameness: difference must be masked by the same and suppressed by the same. Hierarchy presupposes identity' (1985b: 141). Only through the discursive process of identifying, naming, describing and relativising do the phallogocentric functions of objectification and making imperceptible work. This is also the process by which it is possible for the non-phallic to be killed, symbolically and materially.
The phallogocentric enunciative function that protects the hegemonic discourse and the hierarchical structures within it, makes it permissible to exterminate all that cannot make use of this enunciative function. By killing the Other, phallogocentrism thus commits what would be deemed in this discourse as an uncivilised, barbaric and animalistic act. Adams describes how the killing of the animal Other is removed by a very specific discursive construction, that ‘removes the agency of humans’ in the process of killing animals (1994: 102): “Someone kills animals so that I can eat their corpses as meat” becomes “Animals are killed to be eaten as meat”, then “meat animals” thus “meat”. Something people do to animals has become instead something that is a part of animals’ nature’ (ibid.). Through linguistically making the referent absent we do not interact with the animal when eating their body, as we make the animal imperceptible. The conditions of objectification and imperceptibility, or absence of the referent however, ensure that the act of violating another’s body to the point of brutal extinction is not only permissible but even encouraged. It is this process that makes rape, murder and cannibalism\(^2\) acceptable.

Before moving on to a discussion of methodologies contributing to the undoing of phallogical communication processes, which I make use of in my work, I shall draw attention to Irigaray’s work on specularisation. I recognise specularisation as the working method of the phallogocentric enunciative function. I argue, that it is through specularisation that objectification, making imperceptible and exterminating the Other are applied. Irigaray states: ‘Participation in society requires that the body submit itself to a specularization, a speculation, that transforms it into a value-bearing object, a standardized sign, an exchangeable signifier, a “likeness” with reference to an authoritative model’ (1985b: 180). Thus, it is the method of specularisation which is used to create the objectified, absent and dead referent whilst at the same time using the method of specularisation to undo phallogocentric texts. Rosi Braidotti refers to Irigaray’s method as ‘a game of specular/speculative reflection of the inner logic of phallogocentric discourse. This game of strategic repetition of throwing back to the text what the text does to the “feminine” becomes a highly subversive practice of the critique of discourse’ (1994: 131). Before exploring speculative methods as a way to dismantle kyriarchy however, I shall

---

\(^2\) From an anti-speciesist perspective it is accurate to refer to the consumption of anybody’s flesh - human or animal - as cannibalism. As described above, the term ‘meat’ is a social construct to allow the ingestion of animal flesh.
focus on specularization as the method of finding the proper enunciative function that leads the subject to knowledge and truth.

In Irigaray’s *Speculum Of The Other Woman* (1985a) we learn that phallogocentric culture is based on the ideas of penetration of the object by the scientific subject, which can only ever make assumptions of its other through conjecture - based on mere speculation. Nevertheless, as suggested above, kyriarchal structures create the divine figure of the knower, who can never actually know the other but who can only ever reflect his own experience upon them. Thus specularisation works through penetrating and opening up an Other so as to draw conclusions about that which is made perceptible. Following Irigaray, these conclusions are found in the reflections of the mirror. They can only ever occur in the right light but can never disclose an identical, unaltered duplicate of the original.

I shall now explicate on specularisation as a method of *penetration, conjecture* and *reflection*, all three of which establish the subject as sovereign and the Other as oppressed by him. The subject can only come into existence through transcendence. This entails detachment and complete rejection of the own genesis. Through his narcissism the (hu)man neglects and fails to remember his origin, which, in fact, is always in the birth from an other. His aim is to realise himself through his singularity, fixedness, verticality and always in opposition to all else. Multiple, fluid and horizontal Others who would realise themselves through their difference and interconnectedness, thus, have no space from which to emanate, into which to drip, drizzle and leak, where to swell and contract again, where to creep in, climb onto and drop off again. Thus, as Irigaray writes, through specularization, the Other’s fluid, flexible and changing morphological traits are suppressed and she ‘remains in unrealized potentiality - unrealized at least, for/ by herself’ (1985a: 165). Consequently Irigaray asks:

‘Is she, by nature, a being that exists for/ by another? […] This question can never be decided since woman is never resolved by/in being, but remains the simultaneous co-existence of opposites. She is both one and the other. […] She is equally neither one nor the other. Or is she rather between the one and the other - that elusive gap between two discrete bodies? between two realizations of one body? […] Is she the indispensable condition whereby the living entity retains and maintains and prefects himself in his self-likeness?’ (ibid).

Irigaray recognises here that the subject only exists through his mirror-image that is based on perfect symmetry and representation of semblance and identity. All
that is constructed by him then is formed within the ‘non-place of the mirror’ (1985a: 206). All that is non-phallogical is disposed of within this space and recycled by the phallocratic enunciative function of kyriarchy. When the light hits the space of the mirror it creates a reflection of something that does not exist, an object that has no prior materiality. Thus the mirror creates an illusion of an embodied object. To produce such a reflection, the phallocratic order must thus construct the ideal circumstances to allow the eye of the knower to perceive the photons of light that will make it possible to detect the image within the mirror. Irigaray describes the precision of this ‘natural light’ (1985a: 148), which in discourse translates into reason and ‘ensure[s] a steady illumination, admittedly, but one without heat or brilliance’ (ibid.). The subject thus becomes the principal force that keeps his cosmos ongoing and prevents its discontinuation. He even prevents the earth from orbiting and brings it to complete stasis, or as Irigaray puts it, he banishes ‘not only the darkness of night but also the fires of noon’ (ibid.) so as to allow ‘the everlasting correctness of things seen clearly, perceived rightly’ (ibid.). That is, the subject’s actions are grounded within the will to sustain the world, which he believes can only be achieved through the knowledge that stems from recognising the truth and acknowledging, or validating, the perceived.

The apparatus that uncovers this objective truth about the self and the other, consists of all possible visualisation technologies, ‘relays of mirrors - as well as filters, lenses, paraphrags, camerae obscurae, projection and reproduction screens - which divide up “Being” as a whole into fragments suitable to each “being”: mirror of the Good, origin of all specula(ría)tions’ (1985a: 149). Thus the feminine, or any other non-masculine and non-phallogocentric identity-dimension is always identified only ‘by and for the masculine’ (Irigaray 1985b: 85; see Irigaray 1985a: 165; 1993: 20; 1993: 71). Only through his vision can she, they, and xe (and all Others) be represented and thus come into existence. Only when he acknowledges their reflection in his mirror, he can legitimise and validate their existence. This however, leads to them remaining a mere illusion, a phantasmatic product of his imagination, that is informed by his scientific gaze. Braidotti refers to this as ‘the triumph of the image, the represented object, of the visible in so far as it

---

3 Although Irigaray defends sexual difference over gender theory, and thus only refers to the woman as being situated within the non-place of the mirror, I include all who do not/cannot comply to the phallogocentric formula, as being discarded into this space through the kyriarchal order.

4 For a detailed analysis of the connection between masculinism and its phallogical discourse based in reason see Genevieve Lloyd’s The Man of Reason: “Male” and “Female” in Western Philosophy (1984).

5 Both ‘they’ and ‘xe’ are used as gender neutral pronouns.
becomes visual - that is, an object of scopic consumption. Hyper-realistically over-represented, this object remains profoundly absent’ (Braidotti 1994: 49 f.), she writes, echoing Adams’ discussion about the absent referent.

Applying Irigaray’s concept of the mirror to phallogocentric materiality, Braidotti draws our attention to the practice of medical examination and research. It is the ‘biomedical gaze’ that opens up the body of the Other (Braidotti 1994: 63). It enters the body, unfolds it and pulls it apart. Braidotti states of the function of the biomedical, phallogical gaze:

‘Offering everything for display or show, representing the unrepresentable, (like the origins of life), means producing images that displace the boundaries of space (inside/outside the mother’s\textsuperscript{6} body) and of time (before/after birth). It amounts to suspending time in the illusion of total vision, of the absolute transparency of living matter. Furthermore, these visualization techniques give a great autonomy or independence to the object they represent. The image acquires a life of its own, distinct from anything else. It is quite clear that echograms of the fetus confer upon it an identity, a visual shape, a visible and intelligible existence that the fetus would not usually have’ (Braidotti 1994: 68).

This existence and ability to produce affects that Braidotti ascribes the fetus here, or rather the image of the fetus, is nothing more than an identity that is imposed upon it. This fetus, that can only be visualised through the penetration of the body of the Other and ‘the practice that consists in opening something up so as to see how it functions; the impulse to go and see, to “look in”’ (1994: 67), in fact does not bring the fetus to life, but rather induces its death before it is born. The life that the fetus acquires is already inanimate, as the fetus does not exist in and by itself but through the (hu)man. It is the (hu)man, who inflicts a position within the system of signification upon the fetus, and so forces it to be an image and a reflection of the phallogocentric imagination. Braidotti continues: ‘The whole body becomes a visual surface of changeable parts, offered as exchange objects’ (ibid.), where the body and its parts are always relative to other bodies and their parts. The body is thus not only subject to penetration and reflection within specularisation but also of conjecture. By that I mean that the body can always only be defined based on assumptions derived from the process of opening up, dismembering, dissecting and comparing it.

\textsuperscript{6}To avoid biologically determinist assumptions about the birthing process this must read ‘the parent’s body’ instead of ‘the mother’s body’.
The assumptions drawn from this procedure are then specified as truth, absolute, factual and undeniable. It is this process that leads to the oppression of the Other and the absolute sovereignty of the (hu)man subject. As I have shown in this section, kyriarchy continuously maintains an enunciative function that allows for communication to be based on a strict set of signifiers that must be reproduced in order for the subject to be perceivable. This discourse is intrinsically phallogocentric. This entails that only phallogical subjects can ever learn the proper terms of signification, which leads to Others not being able to enunciate and thus not being able to participate in the formation of discourses. This is, as I have shown due to the process of specularisation, which generates the death of the referent, but still necessitates the preservation of the image of this referent. This is achieved through the cycle of objectification and elimination of the Other as the referent. Within this cycle the Other is commodified, made imperceptible and thus transformed symbolically into the absent referent and then also materially obliterated through the exchange, penetration and ingestion of the Other’s body. Thus, specularisation is a process of regurgitation. The object is consumed, digested and brought up again in a different shape and consistency. They are at once deprived of themselves, their own affectivities and desires, and derive their identity instead entirely from the gastrointestinal workings of the (hu)man. The object is hence, not only symbolically inexistent, remaining only as a hyperreal image of the projection emitted from the subject, but also legitimately killed and consumed. The objective of specularisation is to guarantee the authenticity and authority of the (hu)man.

**Placing my Work and Methods in Context**

In this section, I shall describe the methodology applied in my work and illustrate my contribution to knowledge. This work is an attempt at examining kyriarchy, the way kyriarchy examines the Other. Thus, I will use speculative methods to look inside and make assumptions about the kyriarchal (hu)man, so as to dismantle the subject and rupture the phallogocentric enunciative function. In essence, I will combine two social science methods, namely so-called ‘engaged theory’ and what John Law and John Urry (2004) call creating ‘a system of interference’. The latter allows us to make ‘particular forms of the social real while eroding others’ (2004: 6). Law and Urry acknowledge that research methods are ‘performative’ (2004: 3), implying that ‘they have effects; they make differences;
they enact realities; and they can help to bring into being what they also discover’ (ibid.). This way the theory explored and proposed in this thesis can be used to inform activism. Complementing this is the method of engaged theory, which allows me to derive theory from my activist background.

Adams describes an engaged approach as one arising ‘from anger at what is’ whilst envisioning ‘what is possible’ (2010: 2). I understand my role as an ‘engager’ (ibid.), whose position within a specific ecology is deeply interrelated to everyone and everything else with which my affective trajectorics intersect. Adams writes: ‘Engaged theory exposes problems, but also offers solutions. Engaged theory makes resistance empowering. We are creating a new culture - a culture not of top down thought or top down actions. We don’t need “deciders” who abdicate principles; we need “engagers” who understand that everything is connected’ (Adams 2010: 2). Framing my work within engaged theory instead of, for instance, the more conventional grounded theory approach, allows me to recognise my involvement within social justice activism and my position in the various social geographies that are described in this work. Thus, I reject the idea of objectivity and scientficity and concur with Anna Pinchuk who writes: ‘Current discursive formations discourage personal engagements and demand writers and scholars to be “objective”, “reasonable,” and “fair,” which recreates the static concepts of perfection, idealism and rationality. Such writings reinforce English-centric system of power and undermine all counter-hegemonic movements’ (Pinchuk 2014: 39). Through understanding my methodology in this way, I shall add to contemporary feminist discussions on inclusivity and intersectionality within the academic and activist social justice movement. In this respect, my contribution to knowledge is twofold:

My work shall, firstly, contribute to identifying a significant flaw found in both academic and activist feminist theory and practice: That is, the neglect of species belonging as a valid identity dimension. The main aim of this work is to provide tools for speciesism to be recognised as a valid oppression in both academic and activist feminist circles. In other words, I argue for the recognition of speciesism as a concern of social justice activists and theorists. This contribution is made in order to progress within the social justice movement by empowering the resistance. Patrice Jones writes that ‘feminist activists tend to ignore scholarly work demonstrating historic and ongoing linkage between speciesism and sexism’ (Jones 2010: 189). This is why my work draws heavily on a small minority of feminist scholars, who
understand speciesism as a form of oppression, such as Jones, Carol J. Adams, Lisa Kemmerer, Breeze Harper and Melanie Joy (see Chapter Three). Further, my work contributes to the emerging shift away from the humanist strand of critical animal studies, concerned with human-animal relations and animal rights. Therefore I explore Patricia MacCormack’s suggestion of the *ahuman* (MacCormack 2014) (see Chapter Four).

Through this I, secondly, attempt to connect social justice theory with social justice practice. The topology of both is mapped out in separate areas, which makes the reality of their social geographies almost oppositionally different. Access to the academy, in particular the increasingly neoliberalised academy, is not only determined by a required economic status and class belonging but also by a rigidly specified understanding of intellect and ability that needs to be quantifiable. In other words, one’s ability and/or willingness to understand and obey the hegemonic set of rules determines whether or not one will be recognised as an actor, an expert, a teacher, a doctor or professor, and whether or not one’s existence will be legitimised. The articulation practices needed for such a position are often far removed from the communication practice used in activist spaces. Although in these spaces often similar identity dimensions determine the validity of a speaker, an organiser, a leader, the rules of communication are often less rigid and more open to persons with minoritarian identity dimensions, who perhaps have not had the opportunity to join the sphere of theorists. Although both spheres are often part of the same system of communication, less obedience to enunciative rules is expected of activism, which in essence thrives off civil disobedience and resistance. This automatically invalidates activist discourse and positions it within a less legitimate framework. Thus my contribution to knowledge attempts to create a dialogue that will allow for more overlap between both social geographies and at the same time for a more horizontal space in which the academic can become an actor within the every-day practice of social justice, but also in which theory (not necessarily emerging from a university space) receives a more prominent place in activism. I hope to do this by divorcing public sphere discourse from political action, as I understand public sphere theory as perpetuating hegemony through specularisation, instead of fostering resistance (see Chapter One). Within this work I want to facilitate a radically different space in which to create social justice through activism.
As Law and Urry observe, theory and practice are not easily separated, and as writers and/or actors we navigate through the fields of both thought and action, affect and materiality at the same time:

‘If methods and practices are performative then worlds become multiple – though not necessarily entirely disconnected. This is because the extent to which they and the various methods which helped to produce them differ from one another is an empirical matter. In practice, no doubt methods and the practices in which they are carried overlap. This means that the realities that they produce also overlap and interact with one another. All of which has analytical and political implications’ (Law and Urry 2004: 6).

In my work I appropriate this idea that thought is political and that both political analysis and reality are in constant symbiosis with each other. However, Law and Urry’s work is placed in the context of expressive practices in a representational and relational communication economy, which they acknowledge as problematic due to the incommensurability of various symbols (Kuhn 1970; Lyotard 1988). Nevertheless, they do not encourage to rethink these relational communication principles nor do they work towards a radically different way of imagining expression and articulation (Law and Urry 2004: 13). As my thesis will show, it is this relativism rooted in a binary, oppositional and dialectic system of thought and practice that prohibits resistance to majoritarianism and hegemony. Thus, whilst acknowledging that methods are enacting the real, as they are performative, I also turn to a more fluid, less rigid, non-representational and always moving and changing way of thought and practice. However, before illustrating these methods, I first have to map out my own position within the social geography of the theory and practice that I am examining in this work. This is, because I acknowledge that the performativity of my research has an impact upon the theory and practice that emerges in the moment that my writing is perceived.

Understanding my research in this way as well as primarily using it as an exercise in dismantling my own (hu)man privilege, it is thus necessary to illustrate my position within the wider ecology of all affects. Lisa Kemmerer, drawing a picture of her own place in the world, positioned as a white, middle-class woman (Kemmerer 2011: 3), writes: ‘My whiteness - my blindness’ and ignorance - limits

7 ‘Blindness’ is here used as a metaphor and thus appropriates the experience of blind persons who are disabled in a society constructed for the seeing. To avoid the ableism inherent in this choice of words, the line could read ‘my inability (or unwillingness) to acknowledge my white privilege’.
my effectiveness as an activist’ (ibid.). Here, Kemmerer is describing her position in
the network of communication and power relations that kyriarchy entails. Each
instance of interaction we find ourselves in, offers a different constellation of power
relations that determines our capacity to communicate and to be perceived. The
work that I want to communicate in this piece is most dominantly informed by my
ability to access the academy and my place within various activist communities, at
times in an organising role. My position in these in turn is informed by my belonging
to a young (obviously human), white, European, English-speaking and literate,
cisgender, female identity group in which I can currently more often than not,
comply with norms of physical ability and economic status. These majoritarian
positions that I am located in, are reflective of my unearned benefit in kyriarchy
which corrupts my perception of social justice, as it allows me to neglect the
oppressions suffered by those who do not occupy my privilege milieu. At the same
time I am learning about social justice from this position, as I discover how to undo
roles of domination and supremacy, beginning with my own (hu)man traits.

I do so by constantly moving through existing kyriarchal systems that create
an economy of symbols so as to analyse and reject them. As Rebecca Coleman
and Jessica Ringrose state: ‘social scientists are themselves entangled within the
assemblages they seek to study’ (2013: 6). Thus my method of writing is
performative and always guided by my own experience of undoing various forms of
supremacy, so as to empower myself and especially minimise my destructive
effects upon those I, myself hold power over. I do so by using/creating an
object-oriented ontology (OOO), which assumes the intrinsic and unindividuated
value of what we call the object, by exploring the question that OOO philosophers
pose, and Levi Bryant specifically formulates as follows:

‘Do we, the question runs, touch the object in its reality in our
representations, or, rather, do our representations always “distort”
the object such that there is no warrant in the claim that our
representations actually represent a reality that is out there. It
would thus seem that the moment we pose the question of objects
we are no longer occupied with the question of objects, but rather
with the question of the relationship between the subject and the
object’ (Bryant 2011: 14).

This question lies at the foundation of my thesis as I explore possibilities of
resistance and emancipation for objects (informed by my ideas about the
conceptual object, objectification and de-humanising). OOO understands objects as
bodies that are continuously self-othering and withdrawing (Harman 2005: 56f.). That is, objects ‘perpetually withdraw from their qualities such that they never directly manifest themselves in the world’ (Bryant 2011: 85), as such a manifestation is only possible through being consumed by the subject. As Timothy Morton writes: ‘Objects withdraw such that other objects never adequately capture but only (inadequately) “translate” them’ (2011: 166).

Thus objects exist through self-othering, which preserves the object’s integrity and agency to self-define. This removes categorisation through authoritative power and creates horizontal spaces as opposed to vertically stratified, top-down ways of relating to each other. Bryant uses Karen Barad’s concept of diffraction and entanglements to depict this process: ‘Where a hegemonic ontology treats one agency as making all the difference, an ontology premised on entanglements is attentive to how a variety of different objects or agencies interact in the production of phenomena’ (Bryant 2011: 133). Through this interaction objects - and specifically relevant to my thesis, the objectified - create entities, homes communities, ecosystems, as they encounter one another in difference without presumptions. Bryant continues about the process of diffraction: ‘Just as new patterns emerge when waves intersect one another or encounter an obstacle with no one agency entirely responsible for the pattern, networks of objects interacting with one another produce unique patterns that cannot be reduced to any one of the agencies involved’ (ibid.). Allowing for these patterns, or as Barad calls them ‘entanglements’ (2007: 74) to unfold, is crucial to my project but to truly allow for objects to diffract, in terms of my thesis that is in the form of making possible self-identification and making lived experiences the only valid form of knowledge, we must first endeavour to expose the hegemonic ontology, that is phallogocentrism and it’s (hu)man subject. I do so by taking ‘account of the fact that [I am] too part of this world’s differential becoming’ (Barad 2007: 91) and by not only recognising that ‘knowledge practices have material consequences but [also] that practices of knowing are specific material engagements that participate in (re)configuring the world’ (ibid.).

Putting this feminist method of diffraction into practice then leads to an abolition of the dualistic subject/object definition through that which Iris van der Tuin notices as a manifestation of the ‘desire to think without presupposing dualist structures such as subject and object’ (van der Tuin in Iliadis 2014). This is not to say that my object-oriented ontology ignores current formations of representational
relations, but rather that I dismantle these through identifying their oppressive power structures and the lived experiences they evoke. Only that makes it possible to recognise the intrinsic value of the object. I aim to create a new political landscape. That is a landscape based on an ahuman geography with a rhizomatic infrastructure that encourages only nomadic movement and thus a fluid, situational and participatory social economy, where contractual relations are abandoned to be replaced with situationist consensual encounters. An ahuman geography not only rejects the (hu)man, it also rejects space as such and can be seen as aspatial. This is so, as to dismantle taxonomy (the human categorisation of everything) we also must practice the undoing of space. Deconstructing topology then is part of an ahuman practice. This entails that even geographic relations involving (hu)man interference will be discontinued and exchanges will be omitted, in instances when communication cannot possibly take place and thus no consent for a contractual exchange of affects, including responsibilities and expectations can be granted, such as between the (hu)man and the animal.

Although my work advocates the undoing of all forms of supremacy and domination, at this point, guided by my identity dimensions outlined above, it shall focus on the feminist anti-speciesist undoing of what I call the (hu)man, who can only exist in kyriarchy and is always located above. For that purpose my thought is informed by object-oriented ontology, through which I not only reject the dominance of the human over the all else but also insist that only ahuman thought and practice will evoke social justice. The ahuman implies an undoing of the (hu)man in analysis and the human in action, which takes non-representation to its most radical manifestation: The ahuman recognises the distortion of the object by the subject and liberates the minoritarian object without enforcing majoritarianism upon them. An undoing of the (hu)man leads to a respect for intrinsic value, that is not value as worth ascribed to, but a self-determined value, in and of itself, as an essential and inherent state. This is achieved by a practice of leaving alone (MacCormack 2012: 68) (see Chapter Three and Chapter Four).

Theorising and thus creating (and vice versa) an ahuman social milieu, as MacCormack and her contributors do in her 2014 work on The Animal Catalyst, exceeds the discussions currently held surrounding ‘more-than-human’ (Whatmore 2006; Lorimer 2013; Stengers 2012), transhuman (Haraway 1991; Parikka 2010) and posthuman (MacCormack 2012; Braidotti 2013) materialisations of the social. As I will show in my work, all of these schools of thought are flawed at their
inception: A ‘more-than-human’ conception of social geography reminds us that all
matter (humans, animals, plants, all organisms, landscapes, inanimate objects and
machines) creates reality, whilst at the same time promising to hold accountable
humans to the damage we inflict, by reminding us that we are not the sole occupier
of the world we inhabit nor the creator (this promise only becomes obvious if we
dare to reject to uphold the myth of scientific objectivity and acknowledge that all
thought and action is political). However, more-than-human geographies are always
already compromised, as they can only ever acknowledge the non-human Others
from the perspective of the human and thus the (animal) Other only exists in relation
to the human. Similarly, posthuman theory fails to acknowledge that when we
merge organic matter with technology or formerly non-commensurable other organic
matter, we do not evolve past the human, nor do we become posthuman. Instead,
we intensify our position as (hu)mans, by merely appropriating our
more-than-human world. Transhumanism epitomises this phenomenon, as within
this theory it becomes obvious that more-than-human components and individuals
are only valued, and even priced, in relation to their desirability for the (hu)man.
They are fetishised. They are reduced to providers of human pleasure, health,
youth, invincibility and mastery over all else. Further, when acknowledging
other-than-human species without objectifying them, the space of activism, that is
counter-hegemonic can no longer be theorised as the public sphere. The public
sphere is based within principles of the Enlightenment and relies thus on (hu)man
rationality and debate, which makes it an insufficient space for all-encompassing
social justice (see Chapter One).

My work is thus placed in a continuum of thought about the political that
emerged with the rejection of the animal and ends today with the fetishisation of
them. First, we understood politics as defined by the political man who comes into
being with the rejection of the animalistic that is the rejection of body and desire.
Today we fetishise the animal as an emancipatory tool, we try to re-appropriate
what we perceive as a savage state, which we understand as a freeing state due to
the perceived absence of capital, language and rationality and the presence of
emotions such as pleasure and pain, within the uncivilised, animalistic world.
Isabelle Stengers goes as far as to bluntly ‘reclaim animism’ (2006) for herself, in
the hope that it will free her from the shackles of rationality, scientificity and
objectivity. Modernity’s humanism can be said to have fortified (hu)man dominance,
and it is postmodern as well as posthuman thinkers who criticise this all
encompassing supremacy and the dualistic world it is placed in. It is the dualism of phallogocentrism that allows for the oppositional separation of humans and animals. Yet, whilst claiming to dismantle dichotomies and fighting the phallogical order, current discussions merely perpetuate these by reclaiming and so, re-appropriating, the minoritarian opposite (such as the animal). A rejection of oppressive dualisms can thus not take place by choosing to stand with the oppressed side, but rather by the *undoing* of the dominant one.

Although ‘posthuman theory is focused on the deconstruction but not replacement of the subject, precisely the human subject’ (MacCormack 2012: 65), it fails to so. The human position is always the subject position, to undo this position posthuman thinkers assume an object position through what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari have conceptualised as ‘becoming-animal’ and appropriating what is perceived to be animalistic (Deleuze and Guattari 2011). Following this train of thought, we fail to acknowledge that from a human perspective the animal can only ever be objectified. To liberate or empower the object thus does not mean to bestow more power upon them, as that merely leads to placing the object into the subject position and thus expanding the milieu of the dominant. Rather, an object-oriented ontology must lead to an ahuman milieu, in which we undo the (hu)man not by attempting to absolutely join the object’s position inside the phallogical order (as this is unattainable), but by exiting the system and positioning ourselves radically outside, whilst rejecting any responsibility towards the (hu)man, to the point where we cannot be held accountable for leaving. The ahuman world outside is guided by principles of nomadism, implying continuous movement, flexibility and impermanence.

In that respect, the deep ecology movement bears a significant influence upon my work, stemming from the postmodern conceptualisation of destratification, implying a horizontal instead of vertical social milieu, so as to dismantle the human position at the top of the hierarchy and make social spaces more accessible. Deep ecology imagines individualism in the form of self-determination and a decentralising of power (Pepper 1993: 155). Interconnectedness and plurality are fostered instead of isolated individualistic singularity, so as to move away from the One and the *I*, towards a holistic understanding of identity and society and all affect and matter that constitute them. Thus my conception of nomadic ahuman existence borrows from deep ecology the abandonment of human and inter-species hierarchies (Devall and Sessions 1985; Bookchin 1987; Hallam and Pepper 1990;
Pepper 1990: 156). Further my thesis is informed by some underlying principles prominent thinkers of the movement, such as Steve Bishop and Arne Naess propose, which are the recognition of the intrinsic value of every life form independent of their usefulness to humans (Naess 2008: 111), the abolition of an economy based on growth and abundance and with it the idea of reducing consumption and maximising recycling (Bishop 1991), which in turn calls for the abolition of neoliberal (hu)man interference and continuous expansion into the living spaces of non-human species (Naess 2008: 111 f.). With the rejection of representation and relativism, rationality and objectivity also become meaningless. However, the theistic, spiritual and specifically New Age elements (Pepper 1993: 26; Peet 1991: 41) of deep ecology that conceptualise social spaces exclusively as the result of the workings of the mind (Lacey 1986: 97), are rejected in my conceptualisation of the ahuman nomad, as such an understanding of the world does neither allow for the full recognition of (hu)man impacts nor for the validation of the lived experiences of those oppressed by these impacts. As Pepper states, New Ageism in deep ecology only serves to reaffirm the modern visions of the bourgeois elite (1993: 26) and is thus counter-productive to the ahuman project.

To resist masculinist rationalism and what in phallogocentrism is understood as ‘objectivity’ then, I follow the ecofeminist tradition with specific emphasis on anti-speciesist feminism. Ecofeminists recognise that the plight of nature, the climate and non-humans is entangled in kyriarchy. Species and ecological injustice and the global environmental imbalance is a direct result of (hu)man power, colonialism, capitalism and masculinism, which allows for the exploitation of the Other (Gaard and Gruen 2003: 279; see also Warren and Cheney 2003: 299; Corbett 2006: 47). As Julia B. Corbett notes it is ‘the logic of domination’, that is phallogocentrism, which makes possible and justifies the oppression of everyone who is not (hu)man-enough (2006: 47). My thesis departs from that very assumption and contributes to the ecofeminist project by including the knowledge produced in my own activist community and in those I stand in solidarity with. As Greta Gaard and Lori Gruen point out, this practice is resistance and revolution:

‘Indeed, ecofeminist theory is theory built on community-based knowing and valuing, and the strength of this knowledge is dependent on the inclusivity, flexibility, and reflexivity of the community in which it is generated. Ecofeminist theory grows out of dialogue and focuses on reaching consensus. One method for accomplishing this is to focus on commonality while at the same
time respecting difference, building coalitions with any number of individuals or groups struggling against oppression - such as deep ecologists, social ecologists, bioregionalists, Native American traditionalists, anti-imperialists, ecosocialists, greens and others' (Gaard and Gruen 2003: 292).

Such an understanding supplies nomadic thought and practice with an infrastructure, whilst Braidotti’s idea of nomadism at the same time also provides the conditions for this infrastructure to arise. My work serves as a building block of this infrastructure by developing Braidotti’s appropriation of Deleuzian nomadism. She states:

The ‘nomadic subject signifies the potential becoming, the opening out - the transformative power of all the exploited, marginalized, oppressed minorities. Just being a minority, however, is not enough: it is only the starting-point. What is crucial to becoming-Nomad is undoing the oppositional dualism of majority/minority and arousing an affirmative passion for and desire for the transformative flows that destabilize all identities [...] Becoming nomadic means that one learns to re-invent oneself and one desires the self as a process of transformation. It is about the desire for change, for flows and shifts of multiple desires' (Braidotti 2011: 84).

As stated before, I do not understand posthumanism as a movement that could possibly undo and dismantle the (hu)man, as it attempts to do so by assuming the minoritarian object position so as to deconstruct oppressive dichotomies from there. I reject the idea put forward by Braidotti, that nomads move through a minoritarian landscape, as it is always only minoritarian in relation to the majoritarian subject. Instead I propose that the nomad moves through space unrelated to and not represented by the majoritarian logos. The nomad is positioned by Braidotti in opposition to the migrant and the exiled. Nomadism, as Braidotti writes, does not imply ‘homelessness, or compulsive displacement’ (Braidotti 1994: 22). Instead the nomad is ‘rather a figuration for the kind of subject who has relinquished all idea, desire, or nostalgia for fixity. This figuration expresses the desire for an identity made of transitions, successive shifts, and coordinated changes, without and against an essential unity’ (ibid.). If constantly moving, the landscape in which the nomad roams needs to be accessible and explorble, not so as to allow for exploitation and colonisation but rather to foster only ‘transitory attachment and cyclical frequentation’ (Braidotti 1994: 25).

Here Braidotti positions the nomad in antithesis to the farmer (ibid.): ‘The nomad gathers, reaps, and exchanges but does not exploit' (ibid.), which for me,
poses another problem with the posthuman understanding of nomadism. To what extent is it possible to gather, reap and exchange without exploiting as a member of the human species? I argue, that it is in fact impossible. In the moment we enter the symbolic order, by merely being born, not of our own accord, we exploit. In a posthuman configuration, nomadism is bound to symbols and technologies. In an ahuman configuration, the nomad then does not gather, reap nor exchange. The ahuman nomad does not consume anything, except for oxygen. This is only so as to return carbon dioxide, which allows the nomad to give and thus be positioned in a symbiosis. They do not leave prints in the ground and instead float through space, not touching anything, as touch pollutes. They still make connections. As Braidotti writes: ‘A “nomadic” connection is not a dualistic or oppositional way of thinking but rather one that views discourse as a positive, multilayered network of power relations’ (1994: 77). The posthuman nomad however, can only ever attempt to undermine his own colonial power, whilst always continuing and enjoying his parasitic existence. This is because posthumanism (as part of humanism) fails to connect thought with praxis. It does not dare to live a nomadic, non-parasitic, non-imperialist life, it can only ever imagine it. The ahuman nomad however, is always part of a symbiosis in an unstratified network of power relations, that is a symbiosis in which they give more than they receive and in which their survival is not necessary for them nor the network they inhabit.

Thus my work is departing from posthumanism and exploring a practice to evoke ahuman realities. As Coleman and Ringrose write, following Deleuze and Parnet (2002): ‘concepts are inventive’ (Coleman and Ringrose 2013: 9). They state that ‘Concepts do things. Understanding concepts as doing is, fundamentally, an understanding of concepts as becoming’ (ibid.). The aim of my work is then to enact realities (Ringrose & Coleman, 2013: 6), by divorcing the idea of activism from a focus on liberating the oppressed and rather connecting it with an undoing of the self. Thus a more-than-human activist space, such as described by Hayden Lorimer, uses methodologies that firstly ‘challenge the ontologies of humanism to draw attention to the diverse objects, organisms, forces and materialities that populate the world and cross between porous bodies’ (2013: 62; see also: Hinchliffe 2007). Secondly, such a methodology evokes a ‘rethinking [of] what forms of intelligence, truth and expertise count. Attention has turned from cognition and representation to issues of embodiment, performance, skill and affect’ (2013: 62; see also: Thrift 2007; Haraway 2008; Braidotti 2013: 55-104). Thirdly, ‘appreciating
nonhuman agencies and diverse intelligences foregrounds both our material connections to the earth and the varying ways these can be made to matter' (Lorimer 2013: 62). Putting this epistemological shift into practice then, not only encourages thinking creative difference instead of dialectics, but also when extended to ahuman thought, it fosters the total passivity of the human as the next and final step towards social justice. The shift away from a dialectical socio-political economy towards one of difference and multiplicity inevitably entails the rejection of the public sphere as the moment of political action and hence evokes a new understanding of the realm of appearance and activism.

Chapter Summaries

Before exploring new conceptualisations of activism, I show in Chapter One in which ways the concept of the public sphere is insufficient in thinking about counter-hegemonic political action. I begin by examining current perceptions of democracy and publicness as the ideal of a democratic society, that is, a self-governed and equal society. For this purpose I explore perceptions of the dichotomy between public and private, which influence much of public sphere theory. Specifically, I apply a feminist critique of the canonical understanding of this dichotomy and, by doing so, point out the gendered oppression that takes place within a public sphere. Habermas (2011) theorises the public sphere as a place of activism and a hub of counter-culture, based on reasonable debate. The public sphere is following the model of the Ancient Greek polis. Thus I, secondly, explore the social geography of the Ancient Greek polis that is often regarded as the origin of modern democracy and individual autonomous decision-making. I critique the celebration of this ancient model of politics, as I point out that this conceptualisation contributes to the stratification of society. I end this chapter by exploring modern Eurocentric manifestations of the public sphere, illustrating that, both in theory and practice, the public sphere and public space can only ever contribute to the Other being appropriated by the (hu)man, as they are forced into either becoming majoritarian, and thus being granted the subject position, or existing as an object of exchange, but never in and of themselves.

In the second chapter I specifically make the case against the public sphere based on its inherent anthropocentrism and masculinism. I explore postmodern re-inventions of the Habermasian model, that contribute to a shift from dialectical
debate-based political progress between two opposites, to an acknowledgement of
difference and thus, I advocate for a multiplicity of various public spheres. The first
section of this chapter focuses on the illustration of the phallogocentric enunciative
function. I make clear that the enunciative function of the postmodern context
remains an inherently (hu)man one and thus is still based on masculinist and
anthropocentric ideals. In the second section, I explore postmodern and posthuman
attempts to remedy this problem. I conclude that although approaches suggesting a
multiplicity of public spheres offer a preliminary first step towards an all
encompassing social justice, the interactions remain (hu)man, as political
communication can only ever take place between humans. Thus, only a removal of
the human can contribute to social justice that is not advocating the improvement of
the subject’s position but that of the Other. For this purpose I suggest the
application of what MacCormack (2014) terms the ahuman to an understanding of
social justice activism. Before I can explore this concept in details however, I point
out why, as social justice advocates, it is of utmost urgency to be concerned about
the impact we have upon the nonhuman world.

Thus, Chapter Three combines my previous analysis of the enunciative
function within a phallogocentric public sphere and my understanding of
specularisation (as a form of creating the Other). I apply this specifically to the
animal Other and, in doing so, make obvious the extent to which the animal can
only ever exist as a construct of the human imagination, whilst their essence is
removed from human interactions with what humans call ‘the animal’. In the first
section of this chapter, I position the animal as an object of kyriarchy, showing the
similarities between the systems facilitating the oppression of all Others. At the
same time, I also examine the animal-rights based approach to liberating the animal
from their object position. I argue, however, that this approach is flawed and
insufficient as it only contributes to the animal becoming more-(hu)man, rather than
existing in their own right. The second section of this chapter discusses
interconnections between different systems of oppression and contributes
specifically to a body of work that deals with identity and privilege (McIntosh 1989;
Crenshaw 1989; Adams 2010). I acknowledge species as being a neglected albeit
valid identity dimension that impacts our lives. Hence, this chapter as a whole offers
a critique of critical animal studies and the field of animal behaviour, as I argue that
any discussion of the animal is always already oppressive as it is based on human
communication. Extending this argument I then continue in the last chapter to develop an ahuman conception of activism.

In Chapter Four, I imagine an activism that is based on the ahuman, which is the rejection of the human, instead of a modern or postmodern conception of what humanness and humanity imply, in relation to activism. To do so, I firstly outline that the imperceptibility of the Other is a consequence of the imperceptibility of the subject. The subject, by holding the normative position and articulating through and producing the dominant discourse remains, I contend, unnamed, unopened and thus unquestioned whilst the object is under constant scrutiny through specularisation. I exemplify the imperceptibility of the subject by exposing one specific system of oppression, which is speciesism. This is so as to contribute to an anti-speciesist understanding of social justice. In the second section of this chapter, I explore the contemporary understanding of non-speciesist encounters through the ahuman, recently theorised by MacCormack (2014). In doing so I apply specularisation against the (hu)man, and so advocate a making perceptible of the human, followed by the annihilation of all that the human represents.
Chapter One: A Genealogy Of the Public Sphere

This chapter shall address the development of the public sphere as a concept and its manifestation in public space as well as the discourse that is inherent to both of them. It shall show that current public sphere theory is rooted within phallogocentrism and thus perpetuates a (hu)man understanding of the idea of political action. Thus, this chapter conclusively introduces the idea that we, as critical thinkers, must no longer theorise the public sphere as the realm of activism and radical politics but rather conceptualise a plane outside of this hegemonic discourse, so as to rupture kyriarchal patterns of oppression. This reframing of activism will take place through and within the ahuman, which is addressed throughout the thesis and discussed in detail in Chapter Four.

The conception of phallogocentrism used in this work can be very briefly interpreted as twofold in its essence. Firstly and more obviously, phallogocentrism implies a doctrine based on a masculinist worldview, that a singular, logical, rational, and systematic one. Secondly, intrinsic to the concept is the systematic binary categorisation and with it the hierarchical stratification of all actors into those who are able and potent and those who are not. Together, both of these connotations create a lived experience that is defined by privileging of that which communicates phallogocentrally and the oppression of that which does not or cannot participate in phallogocentric discourse. That is, those who comply with the systematic categorisation and that which resists this type of organisation. Thus, to be perceived as an acting subject within kyriarchy, one must obey the rules of enunciation of its text. A deeper understanding of the complex workings of phallogocentrism is given in the introduction to this work and will be elaborated on throughout the thesis as a whole.

As this chapter shall show, the contemporary hegemonic academic and cultural understanding of publicness, that is public space and political action within that space, is based on a phallogical understanding of what it means to act politically for social justice and against the hegemonic order. I argue that public sphere theory and practice is put in place through the hegemonic order, whilst it simultaneously reproduces it. Thus I argue, activist discourse based on public sphere theory can never result in resistance or social justice and inclusiveness of difference. This chapter demonstrates the failure of public sphere discourse to effectively offer a theoretical foundation for activism by critically exploring the
division between public and private and thus exposing the publicness created by phallogocentrism as a vortex that devours all instigations of resistance and difference, only expectorating what has been digested thoroughly so that it finally can be in accord with the phallic order.

I explore this idea by genealogically tracing contemporary conceptions of public and private. Historical accuracy for this purpose is only secondary in my research, while what is accepted as canon will be given priority in this chapter. This is so as to dismantle the discursively constructed truth and expose its capacity to oppress through speculatively creating objects whose memories as well as lived experiences are rewritten to fit into phallogocentrism. By this I mean to suggest, that the texts which influence contemporary research into political action, democracy and social justice, reflect the majoritarian perception of the history they describe, and are, as all texts, products of their own contexts. These contexts are more often than not guided by a hegemonic belief system, where the subject is privileged. The subject, as mentioned before, can only ever perceive of the Other as object and can thus only ever create texts that incorporate divinduated Others. As many of the texts I chose to interrogate create today's unquestioned realities with respect to public sphere theory, I view them, as explained in the introduction as a form of specularisation (Irigaray 1974; Braidotti 1994: 131). I expose these accepted, not necessarily always factual, truths as parts of previous social geographies whose branches are intertwined with today's realities. Specific attention will thus be granted to the Ancient Greek polis and the modern right to the city, while other popular reference points to democratic values amongst critical thinkers lie within perceptions of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution as well as the process of Industrialisation, which are also incorporated in my work. These sequential points in history, which inform our contemporary understanding of democracy, are absolutely euro-, andro- and anthropocentric. This already indicates the degree to which public sphere theory is corrupted by the scholars and activists which it emerges from.

My analysis shall begin by tracing perceptions of the Athenian democratic division between public and private. I focus on the privileging of the public over the private and will thus interrogate ideas of domesticity, civilisation, and barbarism. To do so I shall review literature that draws on infrastructural and geographical accounts of the polis as well as structural, underlying perceptions scholars have of life in the polis. Athenian democracy is generally valued greatly, as the idea of participatory democracy is perceived to have been applied within it. The geographic
proximity of citizens within the *polis* and the clear class divide between citizens and non-citizens allowed for a participatory democracy to be carried out on a larger scale than today’s representative system could permit. My analysis shall stress that the geography of the *polis* was affected by its inherent ideological basis and vice versa. In other words, the material infrastructure of the *polis* was contingent on the social economy of its dwellers in the same way the social geography, that is the specific stratification of the population impacted the urban landscape (Markell 2001; Dillon 2002; Ferguson 2005). It is further significant, that many of the highlighted structural influences within the *polis* are still impacting contemporary society, even though the built environment of the city-state is non-existent today.

This focus shall make up the second part of this chapter: An understanding of what is today thought of as democracy in Classical Athens will be presented so as to question the social mapping of the *polis*, which still today is celebrated within academic and popular circles as the starting point of contemporary democracy. The significance of this section lies in indicating the oppressive structures inherent to the concept of democracy and what implications this has upon our understanding of equality, agency and social justice. The specific focus in both of these sections thus is found within the identification of the subject or agent and will lead to the exposure of (hu)man dominance as the legitimate citizen or person (Chapter Three draws specific attention to the interconnection between masculinity and humanness, both inherent traits of the subject). The clear distinction between public and private reflects my understanding of phallogocentrism and tracing the genealogy further into modernity, shows in the last part of this chapter, that the system of signification necessary to communicate publicness is always already entangled in that very binary logic and will thus always depend on its counterparts - privacy and domesticity.

Tracing the development of a new city and media landscape unfolding within modernity, I shall demonstrate the failure of public sphere discourse in creating a democratic power of resistance. I shall culminate in depicting the dangers of neoliberalism, pointing out its undermining of the right to the city, following contemporary scholars discussing public sphere theory and activism. This chapter shall thus depict the fallacy of public sphere discourse and introduce the following chapters, which explore new ways in which to discuss political action without being perceptible, as a means not to achieve privilege but simply to deconstruct it.
1.1. Gendered Division of Labour

In this section I shall outline the impact that social constellations have on political action. I shall describe the modern understanding of past social codes, to understand the implications for contemporary discourses about socio-political power relations. By specifically referring to concrete examples of a gendered division of labour, I shall show the significance these have for political life in the public sphere. I shall do so by pointing out that social identities and political action are always inextricably linked.

The system of power distribution based on a specific, gendered division of labour is of indeterminable origin, however two dominant theories are accepted in anthropological and sociological studies of this divide. Firstly, based on a biodeterminist view, it is often assumed that a natural division of social positioning occurs, based on natural differences between species, sexes and races. Although this is the perhaps more obvious claim, it is also a naive and simplistic one. As Lila Leibowitz, speaking about early hominids, points out: despite anatomical dissimilarities ‘both sexes [...] engaged in the same kinds of productive activities’ (1986: 43). Secondly, scholars following the Mother Right thesis (Bachofen 1861; see also Morgan 1877; Engels 2004) locate the gendered division of labour and with it a first distinction between public and private, at the same point in time that private property, the state and class society emerged, in order to form a patriarchal system. The Mother Right then holds that before these developments, matriarchal law determined socialisation and inheritance. Following feminist critiques of this Marxist understanding (see Leibowitz 1986; Coontz and Henderson 1986; Pateman 1999), it becomes clear that theories based on the Mother Right thesis (Bachofen 1861) not only confuse historical matrilineality with matriarchy (Saliou 1986: 170) but by doing so also portray patriarchal dominance as a relatively new occurrence (Saliou 1986: 193, 205). Further, as Gayle Rubin, in her famous essay Traffic in Women: Notes on the Political Economy of Sex points out, even in matrilineal societies ‘women do not have significant social authority’ (1975: 169). Thus, before analysing the contemporary divide between public and private, it is important to investigate the perceived historical context of this system of supremacy so as to understand the implications of its machine for contemporary structures of oppression.

Working with the notion of the phallogocentric production of meaning allows for critical engagement with the Marxist interpretation of the historical oppression of
those who are not ‘public’. Thus I turn to the Mother Right thesis, which still today influences critical thinkers of the Marxist tradition in their analysis of a gendered division of labour. Particular focus is granted to Engels’ conclusions drawn from the Mother Right thesis, in which he demonstrates the development of patriarchal supremacy by drawing upon different forms of social organisation, specifically upon the emergence of the family, private property and the institutional state. The significance of Morgan’s and Engels’ work lies in the fact that their explanation, firstly emerges from their contemporary and very subjective viewpoints, which only masquerade as objective, and secondly, that it shapes still today, the viewpoints of their readers and the canonical popular and academic discourse on the public sphere. Hence, their findings have an immediate impact on today’s realities as well as on the form contemporary oppressions take. The point of this section then, is to briefly clarify how in the democracy that we call Ancient Athens, large-scale and systematic stratification was possible. Following Engels’s analysis of family structures before Ancient Greece, I will point to the intrinsic injustice in Athenian democracy.

It is believed that before the institutional family, promiscuity was accepted as natural and common among the human species. It was only custom that eradicated natural promiscuity and limited sexual interconnectedness between our ancestors. This promiscuity was one that did not discriminate between blood relatives and acquaintances, and thus the social code - or rather the absence of a formal social code - allowed for intercourse between children and parents, brothers and sisters as well as strangers (Engels 2004: 50 f.) without the binding of a formal contract. Out of this primal stage emerged the ‘consanguine family’ (Engels 2004: 51) which Engels describes as follows:

‘Here the marriage groups are ranged according to generations: all the grandfathers and grandmothers within the limits of the family are all mutual husbands and wives, the same being the case with their children, the fathers and mothers, whose children will again form a third circle of common mates, their children — the great-grandchildren of the first — in turn, forming a fourth circle. Thus, in this form of the family, only ancestors and descendants, parents and children, are excluded from the rights and obligations (as we would say) of marriage with one another’ (ibid.).

It is within this stage, we can discern an early form of institutionalisation of the family. Within the stage of the ‘punaluan family’ (Engels 2004: 52) intercourse
between parents and children as well as natural brothers and sisters was eradicated. It is believed that soon a social code was put into place to enforce this family structure, as ‘tribes among whom inbreeding was restricted by this advance were bound to develop more rapidly and fully than those among whom intermarriage between brothers and sisters remained both rule and duty’ (2004: 53). Although Engels does not elaborate on the reasons behind this ‘advance’ - the term can be understood as surviving by increasingly easier means - the implications can be interpreted as twofold: The advance, I argue, could have sprung out of an expanding economy that exceeded one tribe and interconnected two or more. Thus new technologies could be introduced to one tribe by the other and formerly separate communities could collaborate in creating and producing tools and artefacts. This new product economy then also implies the exchange of affects across formerly isolated communities.

Perhaps it is at this point that we can discern a first strong prevalence of phallogocentrism, as these tribes learned how to become perceptible by communicating with others and how to become potent through commodity production and the use of technologies whilst establishing these technologies as private property and thus using them as signifiers of power. In this imagination of the past, I discern a definition of firstly, the body and mind which is able, versus that which is not. Secondly, I note the emergence of a binary between a person that is property-owning and one that is not. This entails the second implication of the shift from ‘consanguine’ to ‘punaluan’ family structures, which I read as a problematisation of the less able body as well as the poor person. This conception of our history as humans can be understood to have brought into existence a logos of social stratification still considered valid today.

As Lila Leibowitz points out, the gendered division of labour actually preceded these systems of oppression and arose as ‘a social construct […] out of the new techniques of production which created the conditions for a change in the relations of production’ (1986: 44). The phallogical body had become the ultimate technology and the highest class could from now on oppress the physically weaker and, materially speaking, less able ones by mere force. This very basic form of ableism can be understood as a gateway to the more complex construction of disability. Ability does not only imply physical or mental capability but also the ability to access and manipulate social codes. Thus ableism, as part of kyriarchy, translates into the discrimination of disabled and dìffabled bodies who do not abide
by the rules of the phallogocentric enunciative function, that is, they do not participate in communication practices using phallogocentric signifiers. Thus, the dffabled and disabled only become a currency exchanged within the social economy. The human-animal relationship illustrates this complexity within ableism, as many animals are in fact physically more able than humans, yet we control and dominate animals.

During the period of punaluan family arrangements, a social code was established that implemented ‘laws’ which normalised men’s dominion over women. In this concept of group marriage, the abduction and rape of women are thought to have been constructed as the ‘lawful’ customs that determined the woman’s intercourse circle, which she was not permitted to leave. Here specularisation, rather literally, transformed women into objects of exchange. Men, by the power of force and coercion on the other hand, were free to choose partners and victims from the ‘outside’. To elaborate, justifying this through biodeterminism, again, would be superficial. This reality was, just as similar scenarios are still today, socially constructed, as Leibowitz notes: ‘Many of the foragers were young and physically undifferentiated’ (1986: 45), due to low life expectancies. Further, many aspects of sexual difference were reduced ‘when fire and projectile hunting techniques became widespread’ (ibid.), as nothing indicates that these were initially exclusively used by males. Engels believes that this process however, instead of allowing for a choice in the division of labour amongst families, rather turned women into property so that their agency was diminished:

‘After the young man has abducted, or eloped with, the girl with the assistance of his friends, all of them have sexual intercourse with her one after the other, whereupon, however, she is regarded the wife of the young man who initiated the abduction. And, conversely, should the abducted woman run away from the man and be captured by another, she becomes the latter’s wife, and the first man loses his privilege. Thus, exclusive relations, pairing for longer or shorter periods, and also polygamy, establish themselves alongside of and within the system of group marriage, which, in general, continues to exist; so that here also group marriage is gradually dying out’ (2004: 58).

This portrays the objectification of the female body. Its reduction to a mere product of exchange (Saliou 1986: 177) and the deprivation of their agency caused women to become lower-class beings, economically and socially speaking. It is worth noting here again, that regardless of whether these accounts of our ancestors are
reflecting a historic lived experience, the significance lies in their authority in
influencing our perception of history.

Contrary to Engels, Leibowitz describes the commodification of the female
body in a more nuanced way. The process started with ‘production, that is,
individuals both male and female, pursuing similar or identical subsistence activities,
began distributing to those around them what they did not themselves consume,
and began consuming what others produced’ (1986: 48; see also Saliou 1986: 205).
The social code that eventually dislocated the woman’s position from producer to
product, is the institutionalisation of incest laws and marriage rules (Leibowitz ibid.;
Saliou 1986: 170), that were an immediate result of the gendered division of labour
intended to make intergroup exchange more efficient. Naturally, these laws could
only identify assigned mothers and not fathers, which gave way to drastic rules for a
division of labour, as Engels notes:

‘In all forms of the group family it is uncertain who the father of a child
is, but it is certain who the mother is […] It is thus clear that, wherever
group marriage exists, descent is traceable only on the maternal side,
and thus the female line alone is recognised […]. [The] exclusive
recognition of lineage through the mother, and the inheritance
relations that arose out of it in the course of time [are termed] mother
right’ (Engels 2004: 55).

This means that domestic possessions were women’s responsibility and the
‘home’ became the woman’s domain. This domain is believed to have included
tasks such as ‘processing skins and hides, converting them into clothing and
carrying devices, and making hunting equipment’ (Leibowitz 1986: 65). As Rubin
notes, this process, of transforming ‘elements of the natural world’ into ‘objects of
human consumption’ is generally referred to as creating an “economy” (1975: 165),
and as I show below bears similarity in structure to the oikos in Classical Greece. In
fact, Rubin notes, that it is through such an understanding of economic relations that
women, specifically wives (similarly to animals from an anti-speciesist feminist point
of view) are ‘among the necessities of a worker’ (1975: 164), which includes the fact
‘that women rather than men do housework, and that capitalism is heir to a long
tradition in which women do not inherit, in which women do not lead, and in which
women do not talk to god’ (ibid.).
Further, it is worth to note that the emergence of projectile hunting tools excluded children and all those unable to participate in the production and application of these weapons due to their abilities and disabilities. ‘Silence’, ‘stealth’, ‘self-control’, ‘patience’ and ‘experience’ (Leibowitz 1986: 64) were the conditions of the able-bodied, of those who could undertake the activities that underpinned the existence of the family. This application of new technologies hence entailed another split between the phallogocentric person and the impotent, disabled and irrational one. Further, with efficient hunting methods another responsibility emerged, namely that of processing game into food and clothing and tools (ibid.; Coontz and Henderson 1986: 111). This development additionally increased the necessity for an initial divide of public and private and thus labelled the disabled and diffabled members of a community as private persons. Although feminist anthropologists have traced this gendered division of labour amongst our hunter and gatherer ancestors in great detail (Saliou 1986: 174), a radically anti-speciesist engagement with this history, and specifically with its impact upon today’s society, is still to be found. It is of utmost urgency to acknowledge the origins of today’s interlocked oppressions of all not-sufficiently-(hu)man Others (women, persons of colour, diffabled and disabled people, gender and sexually non-conforming persons and animals). Thus it is worth noting at this stage, with regards to the hunting habits of our predecessors, that whilst increasingly strict social codes erased one form of cannibalism, using the flesh and skins of non-humans has not only become a prevalent part of anthropocentric cultures but also fortified the oppression of minoritarian groups throughout these societies.

Before elaborating on this in greater detail in the following chapters, I shall first return to discussing the development of a gendered division of labour. The exclusion of fatherly responsibilities from the social code can be interpreted as the reason for the emergence of the ‘pairing family’ (Engels 2004: 58). Engels infers that ‘occasional infidelity’ (2004: 59) was still found among men, as was polygamy although ‘seldom practised for economic reasons’ (ibid.). During this stage, women were to stay faithful to only their husband or otherwise be ‘cruelly punished’ (ibid.). Engels, insisting on the notion that women and especially mothers were valued members of these families, contradicts himself throughout his work. Although acknowledging it, he dismisses the fact that these marriages were often arranged by parents and grandparents, in which the groom’s parents paid for, or simply stole the bride (2004: 59 f.). He states: ‘The marriage tie can, however, be easily dissolved by
either side, and the children belong solely to the mother, as previously’ (Engels 2004: 59). The woman’s status after a divorce is however not being interrogated, and thus it stays unclear as to why Engels concludes that women’s oppression is ‘one of the most absurd notions’ (2004: 60), a belief system spread during Enlightenment. This is not only a reflection of his discourse on women and the public sphere but has also effects on today’s perception of the gendered division of labour.

To reiterate, Engels contradicts himself, describing the practice of men abducting, disciplining and raping women, while on the other hand insisting that at the same time women were respected and dominant over men, as it was women who ran the household and cared for the children. Whether Engels is correct in assuming that the woman was a respected member of the family during the stage of the pairing family, is questionable due to uncertainty concerning the degree of agency taken by the woman. Rather, it seems that Engels from his contemporary viewpoint is unable to rid himself of his own phallogocentric veil (Saliou 1986: 170), perpetuating an image of his object, the woman, that is built upon that of a victim. It seems that he naturally assumes that women’s bodies need constant protection and that their agency lies in demanding that protection which secures their capabilities to give birth and to nurture men’s offspring. Thus, it is necessary to recognise, as I have done, that the oppression of women and their bodies goes much further back than Engels is able to acknowledge. Engels points out that with the growth of populations, extensive cattle breeding\(^8\), metal and weaving works a division of labour had to be established (2004: 64). The rise of slavery as well as serfdom were entailed in this process.

When a new social code is believed to have emerged, Engels writes, that eventually mutually monogamous relationships were introduced: ‘Just as he domesticates the earth through labour, man domesticates woman through marriage’ (2004: 64). Engels, unnecessarily ascribes this shift from group marriages to monogamy as demanded and put into place by women, stating that ‘this advance could not have originated from the men, if only for the reason that they have never — not even to the present day — dreamed of renouncing the pleasures of actual group marriage’ (2004: 63 f.). Again, Engels, not being able to question his own phallogocentric chauvinism, completely dismisses the point he himself makes, with

\(^8\) I do not want to leave the speciesism of cattle-breeding unmentioned, as it correlates to many themes of this chapter, but I won’t engage with this form of domination in depth until Chapter Three, in order to now focus on the gendered division of labour which shall serve as a point of departure for a later discussion of speciesism.
regards to the mother right. With the growing wealth of households, the mother right had to be abandoned in order to secure the husband’s wealth in case of divorce or the wife’s death. As Engels himself puts it:

‘According to the division of labour then prevailing in the family, the procuring of food and the implements necessary thereto, and therefore, also, the ownership of the latter, fell to the man; he took them with him in case of separation, just as the woman retained the household goods. Thus, according to the custom of society at that time, the man was also the owner of the new sources of foodstuffs — the cattle — and later, of the new instrument of labour — the slaves. According to the custom of the same society, however, his children could not inherit from him, for the position in this respect was as follows’ (2004: 65).

This is to say, that after the father’s death, his children were disinherited, as his livestock and property was attributed to his brothers and sisters or aunts. To change these rules then in favour of the father’s children meant also to change them to the disadvantage of their mother, as the father now became more significant than the mother in economically sustaining the children in the long-term. The process by which this was instigated is described as follows by Engels:

‘The simple decision sufficed that in future the descendants of the male members should remain in the gens, but that those of the females were to be excluded from the gens and transferred to that of their father. The reckoning of descent through the female line and the right of inheritance through the mother were hereby overthrown and male lineage and right of inheritance from the father instituted’ (2004: 66).

Through this social code, the Ancient Greeks are perceived to have adopted the model of the patriarchal family, the division of public and private and the stratification of society through a division of labour. The contractually monogamous family, hence, is based on ‘the supremacy of the man; its express aim is the begetting of children of undisputed paternity’ (Engels 2004: 70). Monogamy is thus exposed as a construct that implies fidelity between two partners but in practice concerns itself only with the singularity of the masculine representative, who regulates the movement and interaction of the feminine one. To show the impact that this long-lasting phallogocentrism and the gendered division of labour has had on our understanding of the public sphere, I shall now trace the structural manifestation of the private/public binary etymologically, thus turning to Ancient
Greece and its city state administration. I shall, more precisely, address the Classical Period and thus Athenian democracy. These, as I will show later, are the remnants of the past which have been re-appropriated to suit contemporary mechanisms of power distribution.

As the discursive meaning attributed to the signifier ‘public’ is derived from the Ancient Greek distinction between public and private persons, it is necessary to examine first the significance of idiótēs, the private, non-political person, as well as the oikos, the private, family household. Only then is it possible to comprehend the significance of the ‘public’. This shall primarily illuminate the functioning of the cultural life within the polis and the political decisions made within the city state, as these were dependent upon the well-functioning of individual households and all their members, private and public persons.

‘The democrats of Athens […] distinguished between a public and a private sphere. The public sphere was the polis sphere, and it was first and foremost citizens in all activities of life: upbringing, agriculture, craft, trade, and many other economic and social activities were only minimally regulated by law and only rarely debated in the Assembly. As long as an Athenian kept the laws (and there were far fewer of them than in the modern state) he could do what he liked. He also had freedom of expression, both private, to say and do what he chose, and also public, i.e. have his say in the political assemblies’ (Hansen 2006: 123).

Schüssler Fiorenza recognises that the political assembly for full citizens, the so called ekklesia, which operated under ‘the radical democratic belief that all are created equal […], [stood] in conflictive tension with the reality of classical and modern kyriarchy’ (Schüssler Fiorenza 1998: 112). Schüssler Fiorenza here recognises that democracy in Ancient Greece carries rather kyriarchal attributes, as I also make clear in this chapter. However, it is worth noting that the concept of equality (which is also the basis of the public sphere as I discuss later) does belong to a kyriarchal understanding of the world. When abolishing kyriarchy it is rather helpful to speak of difference, as equality implies the making majoritarian of those who are minoritarian and in doing so, eliminates their individuality.

Returning to a discussion of the public/private divide in Ancient Greece, it is important to note that the privilege of publicness was also reflected within the home, the oikos. In Ancient Greece an oikos came into existence through the marriage between a man and a woman, while usually the male partner was ten to twenty
years older than the female one who could be as young as fifteen years of age and a complete stranger to the husband (Dillon 2002: 53). This was a first indication of the power relations within the household. Their living space was divided so that the women’s quarters, *gynaecae*, were separated from the men’s. Usually the women’s rooms could be found ‘in the most secluded part of the house, such as at the back, or in the case of two-storey houses, at the top’ (Dillon 2002: 54). If the husband had citizen status, that is the status of a public person, he was allowed to participate in political decision-making. He passed the citizen status on to his wife, who passed it on to the children. The democratic voting and deliberation privileges that came with this status for the man however, did not get passed on to his wife, thus one distinguishes amongst citizens between *astai*, citizens lacking formal citizenship and *politai*, citizens bearing all privileges and responsibilities of formal citizenship (Hansen 2006: 119). Additionally the population of the *polis* was made up by free non-citizens (2006: 35).

The upbringing of the children in Ancient Greece was exclusively the responsibility of the woman, who in the education of the children followed a strict social code that prescribed the adherence to very specific gender roles. In Athens, girls are believed to have lead a very protected and sheltered childhood while in Sparta girls were ‘encouraged to race and throw javelins and generally to be out of doors to keep them fit and healthy for child rearing’ (Dillon 2002: 62). For the Ancient Greek woman, becoming a mother was the ‘object of her life’ (Licht 1994: 18). A mother’s work in raising a girl was considered accomplished when the daughter was given away for marriage, while when raising a boy, his adulthood is thought to have been achieved through ‘awakening of the spiritual individuality of the soul’ (ibid.). In addition to the upbringing of the children, the ‘management of domestic affairs’ was ‘considered the highest imaginable’ responsibility for the Ancient Greek woman (ibid.). As Matthew Dillon describes, managing the *oikos* here meant, the manufacture of clothes and storage of the belongings as well as the care of slaves (2002: 53):

‘Among the slaves are prostitutes, and after the domestic slaves they form the second biggest category of women slaves. They can also be free, if they are skilled enough to earn their freedom. In addition to the ordinary prostitute, there is also the category of the *hetaira* [...]'. They are usually free (or freed) women with social skills or better at their occupation than the average call-girl ( *porne*)’ (2002: 126).
Evidently, the hierarchical stratification not only divided the *polis* and the *oikos* but also evoked a very strict topology within these spheres. Due to the strict separation of public (male/masculine) and private (female/feminine) responsibilities and spaces, it can be argued that slaves and citizen women were hierarchically closer to each other than citizen men and women: ‘Slaves and free women shared tasks. But this sharing benefitted only the free men of the household’ (Chevillard and Leconte 1986: 164). The number of female slaves was far higher than that of males, while the ruling classes of Athenian society thrived off of slave labour, which meant that it was an intrinsic value of the *polis* to ‘put women to work, [who] were inevitably entrusted with the most tiresome and above all the most disvalued tasks’ (Saliou 1986: 179). Men on the other hand, even those who did not necessarily belong to the higher class, ‘carried out less thankless tasks, and above all appeared to enjoy a greater freedom of movement. In the countryside, they were horse breeders and herdsmen; and in a society where breeding for war or for wool played a decisive role they enjoyed a valued status’ (Saliou 1986: 177). It becomes obvious that the social construct of a gendered division of labour, described earlier, is intrinsically linked to materialities such as human and nonhuman bodies and their allocated spaces. This includes a detailed mapping of not only women amongst men but also women amongst themselves as well as children and animals within the *polis*. Further an immediate relation between the status of an individual and the amount of his subordinates within the oikos becomes clear. Teaching others or mastering, domesticating and taming them - be it foreigners, children, women, servants or animal slaves - accredited the individuals of the *polis* with respect, status and power.

It is important to stress that in Classical Athens the gender dichotomy manifested itself in the disparity of rights granted to men and women and thus in the differing social mobility of dissimilar bodies. Athens introduced an ‘exclusively patrilineal kinship system, compulsory exogamy and the rupture between the woman and her family expressed by the dowry’ (Saliou 1986: 192), so as to keep family possessions within the circle of blood relatives (Dillon 2002: 53). Further, women’s access to money was limited, as purchases were made by men (ibid.). These laws and social guidelines indicate a power relationship that strips even citizen women of agency and positions them at the command of men. As Saliou notes, Athens deprived women of any civic identity through language itself. There is
no feminine Greek word for Athenian; there are only women of Athens or wives of Athenians’ (Saliou 1986: 193).

Women’s bodies were policed much more heavily than those of citizen men. As Dillon writes, ‘a man who accused his wife of adultery had, without exception, to divorce her’ (2002: 53). Such an instance would have wide reaching consequences for the wife, as ‘few men would want to marry a divorced woman who had been accused of adultery, and guilty wives might not even be accepted back into their father’s family because of the dishonour involved’ (ibid.). Further, women accused of adultery were also prohibited from public events such as city festivals, as their bodies were considered ‘to be polluting’ (Dillon 2002: 54). The motive behind this technique of oppression of women was simple: ‘Adultery was feared because it could introduce illegitimate children into the oikos, with a stranger’s child inheriting the family property’ (ibid.). On the other hand, Athenian social code encouraged male married citizens to make use of the widely available prostitution, without it being considered adulterous (Dillon 2002: 126). However, when acting as a male prostitute, adult citizens were punished by losing their citizen privileges, such as speaking in the assembly, holding political office, being a herald, ambassador or priest (Dillon 2002: 146). As Dillon further elaborates:

‘The disgrace of anal intercourse for a citizen related to the submission of oneself to another man’s sexual power, and the adoption of a submissive passive sexual position in a society in which male sexual power was meant to be domination. The male prostitute added to this disgrace by accepting money for his services’ (Dillon 2002: 147).

This is a significant indication of the symbolism of intercourse in the polis: Like other private areas of life, sexual relations were determined by (and at the same time determined) political and power relations. This part of the chapter has given us an insight into different socially constructed moralities applicable to different bodies participating in them. As I have shown, these relations create a socially constructed power structure within a society and thus are reflected within the socio-political economy of any given community. The sexual division of labour observed in Classical Athens thus had a significant influence on Athenian political life and on the idea of democracy. ‘Private’ power relations did not only shape language and discourse but also shaped the materialities of the polis. They were, and remain inextricably linked to the manifestations of democracy and social justice. Within
Athenian society, this stratification was not only accepted but more so demanded by thinkers, writers and politicians. Further, the rules of stratification remain prevalent today as a component in shaping our practice of democracy and social politics in general. I shall demonstrate this in the next section, before moving to a review of the literature concerning the modern conception of the public sphere.

1.2. Democratic Freedom in Classical Athens

The section above described the systematic institutionalisation of the gendered division of labour through the imposition of monogamy upon women and a social contract binding a father to the children of his wife. This, in Ancient Greece, was the basis for the distinction between private and public persons based on the nature of one’s labour and one’s assigned sex. This segmentation of Athenian society inevitably entailed a hierarchical stratification that ascribed not only different responsibilities but also different privileges to public persons and private ones, as discussed above. Full personhood was given to those who actively participated in political decision making within the polis. The fewer possibilities one had to partake, based on the arbitrariness of one’s birth, the further one’s status as a person or citizen was reduced. As mentioned above, the lowest class of humans in Classical Athens was made up of slaves, who had no formal rights except for purchasing their freedom at the mercy of their owners. Those slaves who were freed or managed to escape, formed the class above slaves and were no longer owned. The middle class then, was formed of non-citizens who came to Athens as contractors, artists and merchants so as to profit from the sales of wool and grain for example (Saliou 1986: 177; Dillon 2002: 99). The upper class, exclusively containing citizens and their wives, was the politically powerful part of society in Ancient Athens. Especially during the Classical period and the onset of democracy the upper class was largely removed from material obligations so as to focus entirely on administering the city-state. Of course, as described in the section above, the social contract of the time bestowed more freedoms on male citizens than their wives. While the first section of this chapter discussed the reasons for this divide, this section shall discuss the discourse and the materialities that emerged from it.

With the emergence of the polis "the household (oikos) supplanted the clan (genos) "as the integral, organic unity of the polis. To the polis instead of the genos the family oikos began to look for protection”" (Lacey 1968: 73 in Coontz and
Henderson 1986: 151). This meant that it was in the citizens’ interest to administer the *polis* on their own accord, so as to most beneficially serve the needs of their own *oikos*. Thus the democratic thought was born in Athens. It was at once rooted deeply within an anthropocentric phallogocentric worldview of personhood and freedom: The idea to be ruled democratically ‘by the people’ was already restricted by the concept of complete personhood through citizenship. This section shall illuminate how the Athenian city-state operated democratically, along with which responsibilities were expected of public persons and which ones of private persons, as well as why the conditions for political participation were so restricted within the democracy, whilst yet celebrated as a victory for justice in comparison to tyrannies. As briefly mentioned in the section above, the responsibilities within Athenian society were divided into the institutions of the *polis* and that of the *oikos*, whilst each of these in turn was dependent on the work of both public and private persons.

While my analysis so far has described the power relations within the private sphere, I shall now examine the extent to which these power relations and their subsequent classification of different bodies were reinforced publicly in the *polis*. Rather than functioning as a representative democracy, the *polis* was based on an ‘idea of the active participatory citizen’ (Marinetto 2003: 104). It was a ‘system of self-government’ that ensured that ‘those [...] assigned to be governors [were] at the same time governed’ (ibid.). Debate and policy making in this system relied on the interaction between equals (Marinetto 2003: 105) which was ensured through ‘ideals of visibility and transparency’ (Benhabib 2003: 20). Of course, these rules intended to foster public accountability, in accordance with the Habermasian version of the public sphere that is based on the example of the *polis*. The stratification of Athenian society corresponded with the grade of freedom and agency attributed to individuals: The more hierarchically inferior one’s status was evaluated as, the more they were exposed to coercion and violence, while superior persons would use persuasion and debate as a means to an end (Arendt 1958: 26). As Hannah Arendt writes in her work on The Human Condition (1958), the condition of freedom is to live ’in full independence of the necessities of life and the relationships they originated’ (1958: 12). The distinction between public and private, and thus between the classes, genders and species belonging to each sphere, represents for Arendt the division between those who are free and those who are suppressed. The Athenian private person was ’coerced by the necessity to stay alive’ (ibid.), and in case of a slaved person, also ’by the rule of his master’ (ibid.). Inevitably this
condition also applied to craftsmen and merchants (ibid.) as well as women, children, disabled persons and animals.

Due to the private realm being ruled by animalistic and primitive principles of the social economy (Markell 2001: 21; Arendt 1958: 12 f.) 'the private person or idiot [was regarded as] a being of lower purpose, goodness, rationality and worth' (Elshtain 1993: 22). When reading Plato's account of the responsibilities, duties and privileges of a citizen and his moral stance towards himself and others, it becomes clear that the disregard of non-citizens arose from the condemnation of corporeal and libidinal desires. In the Republic Plato (1993) reveals the supposed perils of human desires that would put the order of public life at risk. Plato describes the lack of self-discipline and the inability to morally evaluate circumstances, as a danger to public affairs. Consequently, the lack of access to education within lower classes, their dependence on material labour and supposed insistence on bodily pleasures prohibits them from entering public debates. Jean Bethke Elshtain elaborates on Plato's view, suggesting that those who were 'at the whim of passions had not learned, through discipline and education, to master' and thus they 'would forsake civic responsibility at the surge of a hormone and corrupt the polity in selfish pursuits' (1993: 25). It becomes clear that Plato's understanding of a public sphere does not correlate with that of Habermas, in as far as Plato presumes that those who are able to 'master' also possess a utilitarian understanding of the needs of the city-state as a whole. Hence, to establish and maintain a polis that would work towards the good of its citizens, all aberrant bodies had to be eliminated.

Plato's work on the republic, is regarded by himself and scholars following his tradition, as a treatise on the just society, as Elshtain observes: Knowledge entails a right to govern and to subordinate those without knowledge, this elite knew 'all that [had to] be known: they alone posses[ed] the political knowledge required to create and sustain the just city' (1993: 30; see Plato 1993: 485d9-e5).

Understanding knowledge as the key to publicness and the establishment of justice then, it emerges as a logical consequence to advocate the annihilation of all that is non-public. As Elshtain elaborates: 'socially and conceptually distinguishable public and private [had to] disappear for the distinctions exert[ed] a disunifying effect upon the social whole' (ibid.). The aim being, 'that all social and political conflict disappears, discord melts away, the state comes to resemble a single person, a fused organic entity' (ibid.). This understanding of political action as unifying equality
between all based on singularity is closer to the understanding of modern Public Sphere theorists in the Habermasian tradition.

From a poststructuralist perspective this solution could also be interpreted as an appeal to abolish the private/public dichotomy and to embrace difference in order to obtain justice and freedom. However, as Elshtain writes, Plato's solution is an unsophisticated one: 'Away then with private marriage, family life, and child-rearing' (ibid.). Plato's suggestion is based on his concept of the ideal life, *bios theoretikos*, the philosophical and only truly free and sovereign way of life. The only worthy existence is that of the 'Philosopher King' (Plato 1993: 193 f.), who is characterised by Karl Popper mainly through his 'omniscience and omnipotence' (1973: 132). This ultimate form of free existence was 'available only to a few good men who alone [could] come to see in order to found a city within themselves on the basis of what they have seen' (Elshtain 1993: 26). In other words, philosopher kings were assumed to occupy an elevated status simply on the grounds of possessing and or creating knowledge as revelation. Thus, I conclude in agreement with Popper, who writes that 'Plato's political programme, far from being morally superior to totalitarianism, is fundamentally identical with it' (1973: 87), in that it aims to reinforce a patriarchal system.

However, it is worth noting, that there are different readings of the *Republic*, for example feminist ones. Natalie Harris Bluestone, who reads the *Republic* from a feminist angle, states:

>'In Plato’s *Republic*, […] Socrates proposed an ideal society in which superior men and women would rule together equally […]. Believing that some women possessed the necessary capacity for reason and philosophy, he introduced the then startling proposal that identical leadership roles required identical education for the most capable members of both sexes […]. Plato’s passage on sexual equality has suffered a singular fate; it has been largely dismissed, deplored, or ignored.' (Harris Bluestone 1987: 3).

Harris Bluestone, criticises Popper for completely neglecting Plato’s feminism, she states that it 'has no role whatsoever to play in Popper’s analysis. Even if there is justice in his denunciation of the aristocratic, anti-individualist bent of Plato, it is clearly not correct to accuse the philosopher of advocating a patriarchy’ (1987: 25). Writing in 1987, Harris Bluestone expresses perplexity concerning the possible implications of this neglect and ignorance from scholars like Popper: 'It is far harder to understand how this current guide for students appearing in a world where a
strong women’s movement exists in many countries, and where serious readers will undoubtedly include women, can ignore the issue entirely’ (Harris Bluestone 1987: 26). This example is demonstrative of the wide impact, which the lack of acknowledgement and acceptance of the female and the feminine throughout history can have until today. Until the 19th century the Republic has either been consciously omitted by translators of Plato’s work or it has been purposely mistranslated in fear of spreading Plato’s radical feminist ideas (see Harris Bluestone 1987: 4). However, as Harris Bluestone notes, the 19th century scholarly ‘objectivity faltered and scholars dealt with Plato’s radical proposal for equality with a bias they themselves did not recognise’ (ibid.).

Harris Bluestone presents the following two ways of diminishing the impact of Plato’s words in modern society that, for me, exemplify the workings of the phallogocentric method of specularisation: She firstly identifies a ‘bias in language’ and the ‘hidden assumptions’ made when translating Plato’s work (1987: 54 ff.). This is inextricably linked to a conscious mistranslation of his work, so as to ‘make his views comfortably acceptable to [a] Victorian audience’ (1987: 55). Furthermore the bias in one’s choice of vocabulary distances the translations from the original text and is often derogatory towards women. This can be best exemplified by German translations which instead of the word ‘Frau’ (woman) use the term ‘Weib’, which in contemporary German carries a derogatory connotation. Secondly, I find what Harris Bluestone terms ‘equality as a non-issue’ (1987: 23), to be the consequence of the above mentioned factors that have lead to a misconception of Plato’s feminism - and most crucially, also to some extent the feminism - or lack of - in present day society9. Gender equality for most authors writing during early modernity was simply not a subject. What Harris Bluestone observes is thus part of the process of phallogocentric specularisation, which sets as a prerogative the fetishisation of the non-(hu)man as an object to be discovered, known, manipulated and formed in any way appropriate to the phallocratic order. These claims about the authors of modernity working with Plato’s ideas are of significance, not only because they portray the kyriarchy’s urgency to maintain the order, but also as these misinterpretations have influenced the contemporary understanding of past and present democracies, publics and the gendered division of labour. The social geography of Ancient Greece, specifically that of the, until today, highly celebrated

---

Athenian democracy, has had a major impact on how later societies would perceive and create their realities. Saliou writes that

'democracy [in the polis] could not accept the status of women who had a right to speak up because it would have had to extend it to all citizens' wives. It is significant that women's status in Sparta during the classical period was far higher than in Athens: Sparta had kept and aristocratic government. Similarly, the French Revolution of 1789 deprived all women of political rights, whereas the old regime accepted women holding fiefs and the right that derived from it' (Saliou 1986: 192).

Before however, discussing the discourse around publicness and the dichotomy of private and public during modernity in more depth (see section 1.3), I shall first return to the polis and examine the possibilities it offered for democracy, a public sphere and resistance to emerge. By examining the concept of philosopher kings, it becomes clear that the ideal political actor in the polis was he who, through his knowledge, could transcend 'animalistic' desires and in doing so focus on philosophising and kyriarchically governing. This implied a rejection of the corporeal and thus, set rigorous limitations on the majority of the Athenian population. The body and its expressions were heavily scrutinised, and although the corporeal economy, and specifically sexualisation, took different forms in Ancient Greece than they take today in a Eurocentric context, the parallels in sexualising Other’s bodies remain. The process of objectification often entails the sexualisation of the object and thus removes them from their own sexuality and imposes rigid rules upon their bodies (Adams 2010). Sexuality then is not necessarily concerned with sex per se, but more so with the utilisation of bodies by a kyriarchal authority.

The kyriarch is constructed as inherently phallogical and anthropocentric, as this concept granted a priori privileges to those who were able to participate quite literally in the masculine production of meaning and could resist ‘animalistic desires’ of necessity and pleasure as explained above. Although Plato’s philosopher kings had never been formally appointed to hold office in the polis, his concept nevertheless was an influential one within the Athenian city state and the history to come. The patriarchal and phallocratic lineage of the Eupatridae (translating into the ‘offspring of noble fathers’) is one such example of the extensive phallogocentric tradition, which continued long into the Athenian polis and can be clearly discerned in Plato’s concept of philosopher kings: ‘For the Greeks, these men [Eupatridae] weren’t just the rich, they also claimed to be the best in moral and intellectual terms,
and provided the leadership for the state’ (Ferguson 2005: 6). The division of labour, as shown in the first section, was essentially based on ideas of such inborn capabilities of citizens. The following section shall examine the structural conditions the people of Athens were born into and in how far they could develop their capabilities to act politically and create a public sphere.

As mentioned before, the democratic polis of Classical Athens was ruled by a participatory government. To facilitate unmediated communication between citizens then, the physical space of the agora was built: ‘Usually the polis [had] one shared area for political assemblies, and all citizens [were] expected to travel to this centre to vote or participate in public debate. As such, this means that the polis [could] not effectively be an extended territorial nation, since a journey of more than a few days would break down this form of civic participation’ (Ferguson 2005: 3). Thus mobility and accessibility were an essential condition for participation. The agora was also a social space, in which large parts of the inhabitants’ spiritual and commercial lives took place. It was also the focal point for athletic events as well as artistic gatherings. The agora was thus used in various ways that would hypothetically allow for multiple different public spheres to arise. Examples of activities discussed and participated in within the central space of public socialisation include ‘defending the state, [...] rotational office holding, sitting in the assembly, jury-service, through to attending the theatre (a mass activity) or providing public liturgies to fund such activities’ (Ferguson 2005: 8; see also Ober 1991). The polis with its agora was constructed so as to facilitate the most possibilities for citizens to engage in shaping the city-state and its local and intra-state politics. To not be a participating member of the public entailed the disdain of the public, as R. James Ferguson writes:

‘The Athenian polis specifically [...], aimed at wide participation of the citizen body in all forms of government, including the use of direct voting on laws, the use of sortition (election by lot), and representation on juries without any separation of the judiciary, the legislature and the executive (see Andrewes 1971: 184). Government, in effect, was run by amateurs [...], a position which the Athenians regarded as the greatest sign of their freedom, equality and ability (see Kitto 1957: 161). To be unconcerned with political life and to be uninvolved with the city was marginally possible, but viewed as at best suspicious or even strangely individual’ (Ferguson 2005: 9).
Although the *polis* with its open agora can be understood as a form of public sphere, I argue against that assumption, as a public sphere is formed as a counter-movement to the main government and its function is the control of that government by the means of different media. Although within the public channels of the *polis* the participants were equals and enjoyed the same privileges and duties as their peers (a vital condition of the public sphere), it is obvious that this form of government was non-democratic at its core. By excluding all non-citizens from the decision-making process the *polis* could never truly be democratic from a contemporary point of view. Citizenship was only granted to a few, which meant that the majority of the other inhabitants’ interests could not be represented in elections and votes. The role of a public sphere however, is to offer a space for those who are underrepresented and who want to ensure the government’s political correctness and legitimacy.

In conclusion, it becomes obvious that it is within the communities of female citizens and those of non-citizens and slaves, that a public sphere opposing or controlling the political action of the *polis* could possibly emerge. The tasks fulfilled by women and slaves were essential for the survival of the *oikos* and thus the *polis* as a whole. The care for the necessities of life was solely the responsibility of the classes beneath male citizens. The collection of water for example, was a female responsibility that could, like child care, be fulfilled by the slaves of the *oikos.* However, as Dillon points out, ‘collecting water was also a social event, a chance for women to meet each other and to chat’ (Dillon 2002: 53). Circumstances like these could have potentially allowed for a public sphere to emerge, for women and slaves to organise and question or even undermine the citizens’ authority. However, the women chosen to marry a citizen as well as the slaves purchased to maintain the *oikos* would often come from culturally different families and ‘had to learn the language and conform to the culture of their husbands and owners’ (Hansen 2006: 35):

‘Slaves were a heterogeneous group; many came from the barbarian lands around Greece, but the enslavement of fellow Greeks in warfare also meant that there were many Greek slaves. The lack of slave revolts in ancient Greece is due to the characteristics and nature of the Greek slave system. Slaves did not simply come from one place; they spoke many different languages and in being brought to Greece individual slaves were uprooted from home, family, kin. Many households owned only one or a few slaves, so there were few large groups of slaves who could meet […]’. Rather than revolt, the
major problem faced by slave-owners was run-away slaves’ (Dillon 2002: 125).

Hans Licht, does not recognise this or any other cause of the oppressive mechanisms of slaves and women and, similar to Engels above, ridicules the assumption that Ancient Greek women were oppressed: ‘It is hardly necessary nowadays to emphasise the fact that the assertion, one often heard, that the position of the Greek married woman was an unworthy one, is fundamentally wrong’ (1994: 18). He continues to state: ‘what one does not know cannot be missed […]’. Greek women took the strictly limited (but […] not less noble) tasks which resulted from their household duties so seriously, that they had no time for detailed or painful thoughts about their existence’ (1994: 19). His assumption implies agency on behalf of the women, that is the agency to ‘take’ one’s tasks, to make a choice and pick freely which direction one’s life should take. As I have shown in this chapter so far, this agency was more often than not undermined by the social geography of the polis. Ancient Greek women faced many restrictions within the polis and humiliation when attending events in the agora under specific circumstances, such as suspected adultery. We learn from Euripides’s Medea (2006) that women suffered from the lack of agency and authority, very well knowing that their citizen husbands did not face the same difficulties in mastering their lives:

‘Of all creatures that have life and reason
we women are the sorriest lot:
first we must at a great expenditure of money
buy a husband and even take on a master
over our body: this evil is more galling than the first.
Here is the most challenging contest, whether we will get a bad man
or a good one. Besides, divorce is unsavory
for a woman and it is not possible to say no to one’s husband.
And when she comes into new customs and rules
a woman must be a prophet of what she could never learn at home:
how best to deal with her marriage partner;
and if we get it worked out well and a husband shares
our life with us, and he bears the yoke without violence,
life is to be envied. Otherwise we are better off dead.
But the man, when he is bored with things at home
he can go out to ease the weariness of his heart.
But we have just one person to look to.
They say that we live a life free of danger
at home while they face battle with the spear.
How wrong they are. I would rather stand three times
in the line of battle than once bear a child’ (2006: 230-251).
Indeed there were only very few possibilities for non-male citizen inhabitants to create a public sphere. The violence that ruled within the oikos, described at the beginning of this section, and the abuse described in the lines of Medea can be considered to have asserted the authority of male citizens tremendously, however the great value ascribed to art and leisure activities within the agora allowed some heterogeneity in the representation of different bodies of the city-state and the popularity of the agora allowed for its materiality to become the surface of artistic and political expression through different forms of city space occupation. One such example is a recorded instance of graffiti culture, in particular expressing opposition to hetero-normativity (Dillon 2002: 95). It is the materiality of the city and the blurring of lines between public and private property, the ceasing of space and the affectivities these actions create that shall be discussed in the next section whilst chronologically moving forward with this genealogy of the public sphere.

1.3. Public Space and The Modern Right to the City

Moving chronologically to the modern city, whose Eurocentric government and infrastructure are often constructed to mirror that of the polis (Sennett 2002; Mitchell 2003; Habermas 2011) I will now discuss the above mentioned paradigms of publicness in a modern context. Proximity, distance and centrality which were decisive factors for in the establishment of the agora and in securing maximum citizen participation in the polis indicate that the concept of space is inextricably linked to that of the public sphere. Previously, I discussed the spaces moved through by different bodies, be it the home space which was the realm of citizens' wives, their children and the household slaves, or the municipal offices of the city-state, occupied by citizens. The agora, its different festivals, shops, theatres and leisure centres were also subject to the rules of mobility proper to each body, differentiated by class, gender and race. As these rules were constantly bent, blurred and rewritten, through large scale events such as war or micro-political occurrences such as a woman occupying a space she had been banned from, the understanding of space as a medium evolved. The most relevant conception of space to theorising the public sphere, is offered by Henri Lefebvre in his work on The Production of Space in which he writes about space as a social tool for the expression of power (1991). This section shall focus on an analysis of city spaces
defining space in conformity with the Lefebvrian tradition. However before examining social space I shall contextualise the private and public spheres of the city in post-polis circumstances. For this purpose I shall first investigate the assumptions made about the modern divide between public and private by Arendt (1958) and Habermas, as through their analyses of publicness they reveal the significance of the polis for modern cities.

When examining Arendt's account of the polis, it becomes obvious that the ancient division of labour into gendered tasks and subsequently into private and public obligations and privileges, has had a long-term effect upon social relations in emerging societies. She is specifically interested in the divide between action and contemplation, that the concept of bios theoreitkos (translated into Latin and used by Arendt as vita contemplativa) reinforced. The classification of contemplation, philosophising and mental labour hierarchically above physical deed and bodily activity, is scrutinised by Arendt. She ascribes the elevation of the bios theoreitkos to Aristotle who, she states, believed that 'the primacy of contemplation over activity rests on the conviction that no work of human hands can equal in beauty and truth the physical kosmos which swings in itself in changeless eternity' (Arendt 1958: 15). Arendt juxtaposes the concept of vita activa to vita contemplativa, stating that 'vita activa, comprehending all human activities and defined from the viewpoint of the absolute quiet contemplation, therefore corresponds more closely to the Greek askholia (unquiet), with which Aristotle designated all activity' (ibid.). Arendt's concept of the vita activa is crucial in understanding the post-polis evolution of the public/private divide and thus the public sphere and political action in and of itself. Vita activa for Arendt is threefold and encompasses the 'three fundamental human activities: labour, work, and action' (1958: 7). She understands labour as corresponding 'to the biological process of the human body' and 'bound to the vital necessities produced and fed into the life process by labour' (ibid.). Thus, the condition of labour is life itself (ibid.). Work, on the other hand corresponds to all that is artificial about human existence and thus outlasts life. Work comes into existence due to the condition of worldliness (ibid.). Lastly, action is possible due to the condition of plurality, as bodies can only exist under circumstances of socialisation (ibid.). Arendt, writing from a modern perspective, understands action not as separate from politics, as did Plato and Aristotle, but rather as a part of political life (1958: 8).

10 Indeed, for Aristotle a full human being is by definition a political animal, a person exploring their full range of potentials within the frame-work of polis life (see Kitto 1957: 78) (Ferguson 2005: 9). It is
Arendt’s theory implies a blurring of the private and public dichotomy in modern times, as she describes both realms combined within a new sphere, that of the social (1958: 28). Arendt justifies this claim as follows:

‘We see the body of peoples and political communities in the image of a family whose everyday affairs have to be taken care of by a gigantic, nation-wide administration of housekeeping [...] The collective of families economically organised into the facsimile of one super-human family is what we call “society” and its political form of organisation is called “nation”’ (1958: 28 f.).

Habermas views the shift, from formerly two separate public and private spheres to a single social one, as the structural transformation of the public sphere (2011). The functions of the public sphere in modernity were no longer based on ‘properly political tasks of a citizenry acting in common (i.e., administration of law as regards internal affairs and military survival as regards external affairs)’ (Habermas 2011: 52). The rise of the social public was then based on ‘properly civic tasks of society engaged in critical public debate (i.e., the protection of a commercial economy)’ (ibid.). The new post-polis public sphere has become one that combined intimacy (formerly attributed to the private sphere) as well as the challenging of monarchical or more generally authoritarian power and was thus ‘private and polemical at once’ (ibid.). Elshtain notes the purpose of a social sphere as follows: ‘That socially and conceptually distinguishable public and private must disappear for these distinctions exert a disunifying effect upon the social whole. That all social and political conflict disappears, discord melts away, [so that] the state comes to resemble a single person, a fused organic entity’ (Elshtain 1993: 30).

The new public sphere consisted of the literate and educated bourgeoisie, who had become fascinated with reading moral weeklies, domestic dramas, psychological novels (2011: 43) and letters penned by strangers (2011: 49). This development, as Habermas observes, was indicative of the blurring between private and public, as formerly private, subjective, irrational and intimate matters were from now of interest to those outside the authors private social circles. He writes that ‘the relations between author, work, and public changed. They became intimate mutual relationships between privatised individuals who were psychologically interested in what was “human”, in self-knowledge, and in empathy’ (Habermas 2011: 50).

---

important here to note that Aristotle understood politics, similar to Plato, as separate from the materialities and necessities of life. The condition to be an active member of the polis for them was knowledge and wisdom as discussed in section 1.2.
Situations that offered possibilities for such relationships to emerge were not only offered by the printing press but soon also within physical spaces, similar to the gathering loci of the *polis*.

Coffee houses, salons, inns and pubs, theatres, museums and concert halls often served as meeting places to discuss socio-political matters (Sennett 2012a: 79f.; Habermas 2011: 49f.). Similarly to Habermas, Richard Sennett also states that within these public spaces ‘distinctions of rank were temporarily suspended; anyone sitting in the coffeehouse had a right to talk to anyone else, to enter any conversation, whether he knew the other people or not, whether he was bidden to speak or not. It was bad form even to touch on the social origins of other persons when talking to them in the coffeehouse, because the free flow of talk might then be impeded’ (Sennett 2002: 81; see also Sennett 2012a: 80). This implies a temporary dismissal of social status (as mentioned in the introduction), which would, as I shall later point out, be impossible. The bracketing of social status would mean a temporary unlearning of any acquired literacy of social codes and symbols, including signifiers such as fashion, personal hygiene and language. Nevertheless both Sennett and Habermas argue that this practice was widely spread across modern Europe.

In the *polis* similar social spaces existed but were more rigid, in that they only allowed certain bodies to move through them. Don Mitchell argues that modern day ‘public spaces of spectacle, theater, and consumption’ (2003: 141) are similar in their function. Identical to public spaces in the *polis*, modern public spaces create images that define the public, and these images - backed by law - exclude as “undesirable” the homeless and the political activist’ (ibid.). Habermas (2011) and Sennett (2002) both argue that during modernity, these public spaces were intentionally used as grounds for ‘a public passionately concerned with itself [to seek] agreement and enlightenment through the rational-critical public debate of private persons with one another’ (Habermas 2011: 43). Seyla Benhabib describes these instances as moments of autonomy and collaboration, where tradition is ruptured and a new consensus is reached by the decision making process between reasonable individuals (1992: 85). In fact, rationality and critical objectivity were the axioms of the Habermasian public sphere. Having arisen during the onset of modernity, Habermas’s principles of impartiality and equality, which are said to be achieved through rational scientific discourse as the basis for a well-informed and balanced democratic discussion, could never be realised. These principles were
based on the growing orthodoxy of Industrialisation and Democratisation, the two dicta of modernity, which amount to the idea that ‘free and equal opportunities constitute the model of modern social arrangement’ (Heller 2003: 3).

Both Industrialisation and Democratisation entailed and encouraged each other. Both of them were the result of the advancement of three significant socio-economic structural changes within modernity: Firstly, the incline of capitalism, secondly, swift technological progress, and thirdly, the rise of the intellectual Enlightenment. These three developments had a crucial impact upon modernity, as they constantly affected the social and political infrastructures of modern cities. Through travel, science and education traditional values were rapidly dismantled and new understandings of the world were discussed, accepted and constantly renewed. The new knowledge could be increasingly accessed, reproduced and passed on by a growing audience. Knowledge of truth then became the key to freedom from ‘self-incurred tutelage’ (Kant 1997: 83) and thus to autonomy and power over one’s will and body.

To abide by the principles of modernity then, meant to use objective reason and rational thought without resorting to subjective emotions and affects. The (Hu)man was now on the path of transcending nature, of mastering all that is animalistic and primitive. In essence the Enlightenment then only perpetuated the social constructs already available. The divide between those potent in making political decisions and those impotent to act or even to comprehend the rationale of the figurative pastors and patriarchs, grew increasingly larger. The Enlightenment’s colonisation of all media could never allow for democratisation and autonomy, as its main principle was objective, rational truth. In other words, the Enlightenment propagated an absolutist meta-narrative. To create a public sphere based on this principle, would however be a paradox, as a truly pluralistic public, which could disregard social markers entirely, would not be able to sustain one truth, a single accepted discourse, and its sole purpose would indeed be to hold those who create that discourse to account as well as always to critically engage with these power holders. The assumption that the modern public sphere was democratic conceptually and practically is inherently anthropocentric and can only be upheld by a phallogical discourse that undermines the deviants. In fact the modern public sphere is perpetuating class systems, social stratification and systems of oppression in similar ways to those of the polis. I shall provide a more indepth analysis of the fallacies of a modern (and postmodern) conception of the public in
Chapter Two, firstly however I shall conclude this chapter by exploring the modern city.

Although the new prevalence of media outlets and social spaces in modern times initially led to a democratisation of social relations and politics, scientific advances and new technologies also increased economic concerns. In an increasingly urban environment, new relationships were created between employers and employees as well as amongst co-workers. These relationships had to be negotiated constantly to undermine unjust hierarchies, exploitation and oppression. However, complete destratification of these relationships was of course impossible and thus, similar to the *polis*, the division of labour within the modern city impacted social and private life. As Sennett writes about the enlightened urban dweller: ‘While man *made* himself in public, he *realized* his nature in the private realm, above all in his experience within the family’ (2002: 18 f.). Considering however, that I established earlier that the private and public realms have never been easily separable nor entirely based on different principles, Sennett’s testimony to the modern man, even if unintended, highlights my thesis about the kyriarchal discourse of the public sphere: The phallogocentrism of the Enlightenment, that is the prioritising of truth and complete autonomy, could not exclusively be applied to the public realm of politics, as Plato and Aristotle had imagined within the *polis*. The social contract of modernity allowed the phallogical patterns to be implemented in all social relations. In other words, in comparison to the *polis* conceptually only the referent has changed, but the underlying socio-economic system remained the same up until, and during, modernity. In the *polis* the educated male citizen bore the most privileges, while during modernity privilege was more nuanced, yet based on the idea of tutelage and authority. Whether we examine religious relations, feudal ties, capitalist associations or family bonds, we notice that just as in the *polis*, modernity only offered inherently patriarchal relationships based on phallogocentrism.

With a higher spending power amongst the growing urban population, the proliferation of media and technologies and increasing literacy rates, public spaces such as the coffee house were on the decline by the 18th century. New forms of public space emerged, whose sole purpose was consumption. Purchasing capital that distinguishes one (hu)man from the other swiftly became the priority of the urban dweller and thus the club and the promenade had become the new public spaces (Sennett 2002: 82 f.). Sennett states that ‘the first thing you wanted to know
[at the club] was not what was said, but who was speaking’ (2002: 84), which fostered a sense of exclusivity by allocating authority to only certain individuals. The club then functioned as a medium for the truthful identity expression to be recognised. This then inevitably increased the fragmentation of knowledge. The promenade, on the other hand, worked by attracting the gaze. The flaneur indulged in the Other’s gaze, gaining authority by asserting one’s legitimacy through appearance. This sense of pure representation, of course, promptly lead to imitation and artifice becoming the values of the new public, while the flaneurs’ dramatic act and the spectators’ gaze became the expression of these values. Thus the society of the spectacle, as famously coined by Guy Debord (2010) was born. The public person of the early 19th century then became a passive, malleable and submissive character. The flaneur ‘is to be watched, not spoken to. To understand him, you must learn the art of seeing’ (Sennett 2002: 213). This development entailed a dramatic shift that not only lead to the inaction of individuals in public but more so to a dismantling of the social sphere:

‘In the nineteenth century, public life shifted from verbal to visual encounter. By 1848, it was taken for granted in Paris that strangers would not speak to one another freely in the street or the cafe, unless expressively invited to do so. Leaving others alone and being left alone forged a new kind of and strangers who remained silent in each other’s presence formed a kind of compact not to violate the other’s privacy. The eye took the place of the voice; the flaneur in the city looked around him (flaneurs were mostly men), was stimulated by what he saw, and took these impressions, as it were, home with him’ (Sennett 2012a: 80).

The flaneur’s and the spectator’s roles were not separate, they were rather interchangeable and one always occupied both roles simultaneously. Both positions consisted of highly mediated acting, isolation and passivity which prohibited political action in the sense of Arendt’s vita activa. As Sennett writes: ‘The impulses governing the public were those of will and artifice; the impulses governing the private were those of restraint and the effacement of artifice. The public was a human creation; the private was the human condition’ (2002: 98), which underlines my suggestion that the system has inherently stayed the same, only the referents have changed. Whilst the polis took the citizen’s authority for granted, the modern city looked to other figures of authority. The class system had become more complicated and lines between different strata of society often blurred.
Thus, it is important to point out the infrastructural conditions that lead to modern society. In order to understand the significance of the shift from the *polis* to the *city*, I shall now examine Lefebvre’s concept of social space and how it can complement a theory of the public sphere. When Lefebvre writes about social space he understands the concept of space as threefold: He states: ‘The fields we are concerned with are, first, the *physical* - nature, the Cosmos; secondly, the *mental*, including logical and formal abstractions, and thirdly, the *social*’ (1991: 11). These three elements constitute what Lefebvre calls: ‘logico-epistemological space’ (ibid. f.), which is the location of the production of meaning. In kyriarchy, the logico-epistemological space is thus the location in which phallocentrism is produced. It is in fact, Lefebvre writes, ‘the space of social practice, the space occupied by sensory phenomena, including products of the imagination such as projects and projections, symbols and utopias’ (1991: 12). These ‘relations between the conceived-perceived-lived’, as Andy Merrifield terms Lefebvre’s threefold space, ‘aren’t ever stable and exhibit historically defined attributes and content’ (Merrifield 2000: 175). Thus, Merrifield continues, ‘Lefebvre’s theory needs to be *embodied* with actual flesh and blood and culture, with real life relationships and events’ (ibid.).

Before modern capitalism could reach its current peak with neoliberalism, the social production of oppressive space continued in the post-*polis* world. Depending on the economic welfare of states and cities, spaces of public spheres emerged and disappeared as described earlier with regards to the coffee house. The process of the production of space is always dependent on the economic system it is part of, thus the *embodiment* of Lefebvre’s theory can be found in the evolution of capitalism, which is a ‘cultural system rooted in economic practices that rotate around the imperative of private investors to turn a profit’ (Appleby 2011: 25).

To understand how the public sphere evolved from valuing the political and philosophical life (during the *polis*) to appreciating the artifice of commodity fetishism as personified by the *flaneur*, I shall look at the changing factors of the social and political economy until modernity. Similar to the power holders of the *polis*, Joyce Appleby writes, European ‘aristocrats not only looked down on those in commerce but encouraged qualities absolutely opposed to traits supportive of economic development’ (Appleby 2011: 32). The division of labour still dictated social class at the onset of capitalism, and again similar to the Athenian model, slavery swiftly became, or rather still proved the most profitable source of labour. Colonisation however reinforced and amplified another social stratum than class, namely that of
race. Capitalism introduced a ‘sustained and systematic brutality in the making of goods on a scale never seen before’ (Appleby 2011: 124): Genocides and ecocides perpetrated by European investors have gone hand in hand with the structural oppression of people of colour. The production of space in capitalism has thus not only created a culture of commodification and spectatorship but more so, one of structural oppression by allowing the phallogocentric production of meaning and space. The Enlightenment, not only as an intellectual movement but also in its materialities of numerous inventions and commodities, reinforced the phallogocentric world order. The democratisation of knowledge and purchasing power lead to the emotional and practical autonomy of the lower class. As Appleby writes, ‘individuals using their own resources made the decisions about how to use those resources without much interference from public authority’ (2011: 160). The Industrial Revolution then finally created a new type of public sphere, a new medium that would serve as the locus of political decision-making: the market. ‘Information coursing through an informal communications network in the form of prices or rates of interest or rents then influenced other participants’ choices. Employers rather than craft customs organised the work to be done. Personal power accrued to those who made money through the impersonal workings of the market’ (ibid.). Although the industrial revolution and the expansion of markets can be understood as widening accessibility to (cultural) capital, the destruction that allowed for market expansions in the form of colonisation capital, the destruction that allowed for market expansions in the form of colonisation has, of course, had long-term consequences on the history of the world. The Enlightenment as an intellectual movement and the process of industrialisation as its manifestation - both entangled into a capitalist economy - had a devastating effect upon political action. This is due to the fact that only those able to purchase and use new technologies would have the ability to influence the socio-economic structures of their communities. However, the increased drive for innovation that was nourished by the effort for profit, lead not only to colonisation but also to urbanisation. The revolutions of ‘1848 [were] preceded by a communications revolution: the railway and the steam boat formed part of an emerging transport and communications network clustered around the cities that became centres of social revolution’ (Mason 2012: 174). Technologies of mobility and communication became more accessible and were used in a variety of ways, which in turn created a variety of different functions of the emerging city landscapes. Thus Lefebvre’s notion of the city as an oeuvre (1996), a whole of many parts or ‘a work in which all citizens participate’ (Mitchell 2003: 17) implies
agency within the city not only delegated to its architects but also to the dwellers, its occupants, inhabitants and visitors. Their deliberate as well as inadvertent influence upon the city landscape, the utility of space and arrangement of (cultural) capital within it, is what Lefebvre calls the right to the city: “The right to the oeuvre, to participation and appropriation (clearly distinct from the right to property), [is] implied in the right to the city” (Lefebvre 1996: 174 in Mitchell 2003: 18).

The right to the city is directly linked with the right to a public sphere which emerges in public space. David Harvey, defines the right to the city as follows:

   It is ‘far more than a right of individual or group access to the resources that the city embodies: it is a right to change and reinvent the city more after our hearts’ desire. It is, moreover, a collective rather than an individual right, since reinventing the city inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power over the processes of urbanisation’ (2012: 4).

However, within the neoliberal social economy of space, be it a physical or virtual community landscape, the right to participate in the creative production of meaning and in shaping the social geography of one’s community is increasingly eradicated (Harvey 2012). In other words, the right to political agency is ultimately diminished due to the market’s seizure of the oeuvre. As Sharon Zukin observes: ‘Building a city depends on how people combine the traditional economic factors of land, labour, and capital. But it also depends on how they manipulate symbolic languages of exclusion and entitlement’ (Zukin 1995: 7). Within a neoliberal economy it then becomes obvious that the land, labour and capital of the contemporary geography of publicness only leaves minimal possibilities to manipulate the conditions of oppression and privilege. The neoliberal agenda established, not a breakdown of the public/private binary, but rather the old conditions that dictated publicness in the polis. Citizenship, publicness and with it political agency were only granted to property holding men. Similarly, within neoliberal capitalism ‘to be public means having access to private space to retreat to (so that publicness can remain voluntary)’ (Mitchell 2003: 132). Thus it becomes clear that, although the city has the potential to become an ever changing landscape that even functions as a ‘necessarily public’ - and hence a ‘necessarily different’ space compared to the idiocy of rural life (Mitchell 2003: 18) - it nevertheless has become a place of homogeneity and exclusivity. Further, within a society of mass consumption ‘the
production of space can be likened to the production of any other sort of merchandise, to any other sort of commodity’ (Merrifield 2000: 172).

Hence public space as the locus of any potential public sphere - which can, of course, also emerge within so called private or home spaces (hooks 1990) - is always already subject to the three phallogocentric functions: Objectification, invisibility, and extermination. As laid out in the introductory pages of this work, these three mechanisms ultimately eradicate all agency on behalf of the non-(hu)man or not-sufficiently-(hu)man individual through the process of specularisation. It is this very process that not only consumes the bodies of Others but also the spaces their bodies occupy. Public space, is thus devoured by the biopower of patriarchal discourse formation so as to prohibit the expression of affects that are non-conforming. Public space, which by definition must include all social space, i.e. the instance one is perceived by an other or the instance one perceives an other, be it an individual or an object, is always political. That is, interaction with anyone or anything always implies consequences. Under phalallocratic conditions, public space is thus colonised by specularisation, so as to prohibit disabled persons, homeless people, persons of colour, women, children and animals the production of meaning. A public sphere can thus not emerge within the given material conditions, as non-conforming groups cannot speak (Spivak 1986)11. In the instance they use the proper enunciative function they betray their Otherness and give in to the conditions of the phallogological order. To ensure the constant incorporation of Otherness into the system, kyriarchy thus applies objectification, the making invisible and the extermination of Otherness not only symbolically but materially, for example through capitalism.

Based on the absolute commodification under neoliberalism, the free market economy even turned contemporary public spaces into private and insular places based on property rights. Contemporary, so called public, spaces in the hands of (corporate) property holders are the manifestation of absolute privilege and ‘alienation backed up by violence’ (Mitchell 2003: 20). The constant perpetuation of violent oppression to protect property and to expel undesirable, incompatible and antagonistic individuals is intrinsically ingrained into the social economy of

11 In her work on postcolonial identity Spivak famously proclaims that the ‘subaltern cannot speak’ (1986). As colonised people have been historically prohibited from using and learning their own languages and have also been deprived of access to the same education as the colonisers, they have so been made unable to speak. Spivak however also adds a metaphorical connotation to the word ‘speak’ here, implying the failure of the dominant discourse to acknowledge any expressions of the subaltern Other.
contemporary publicness (see MacPherson 1978; Rose 1994; Blomley 1998). This public space as private property but not as home space merely symbolises what Jon Goss calls a ‘pseudo public’ (Goss 1993: 29). These are the spaces of today’s urban layout, planned in a way to restrict, control and survey public space as a locus for consumer interaction, serving the agenda of the free market (Mitchell 2003: 138), by evoking what Goss terms ‘agoraphilia’ (1993: 28). Mitchell points out that this agoraphilia, a ‘nostalgic desire for the market’ and a ‘yearning’ for closer proximity between the consumer and producer (2003: 138) creates a ‘highly constructed, corporatised image of a market quite unlike the idealisation of the agora as a place of commerce and politics’ (ibid.).

To maintain the profitability of pseudo public space, it has to be turned into what Sennett describes as ‘dead public space’ (2002: 12 ff.). Non-home spaces in a neoliberal setting are spaces that serve no other purpose than to be passed through by individuals who are constantly in motion. The infrastructure of dead public spaces is built with the intention of being ‘profoundly uncomfortable’ (e.g. concrete benches) (Sennett 2002: 13). This ensures, as Sennett states, that ‘the inhabitants or workers in an urban high-density structure are inhibited from feeling any relationship to the milieu in which that structure is set’ (2002: 14). This alienation of the individual from the immediate environment and the actors within it prohibits any form of political action as a sense of community and collectivity is prevented through the ‘isolation directly produced by one’s visibility to others’ (Sennett 2002: 15; see also Mitchell 2003: 138).

Lingering or interaction within (dead) public spaces is met with suspicion or even revulsion. The contemporary social contract only accepts lingering, dwelling and socialising within home spaces. So called public spaces are thus mere ‘representations of space’ (Lefebvre 1991: 39), implying a calculated infrastructure that is ‘planned, controlled [and] ordered’ (Mitchell 2003: 129), while home spaces can be understood as ‘representational space’ (Lefebvre 1991: 39), i.e. places that are in use, that are inhabited, occupied and lived in. They serve as places of social exchange and even political action. They do not necessarily arise in a traditional home setting, but their condition is that they are free from corporate or state violence - at least to the extent to which the community interacting within this space can resist that oppression. As Mitchell points out: ‘If public spaces arise out of a dialectic between representations of space and representational spaces, between the ordered and the appropriated, then they are also, and very importantly, spaces of representation. That is, public space is a place within which political movements
can stake out the territory that allows them to be seen (and heard)’ (Mitchell 2003: 129).

Thus I can conclude that the very idea of public space as a public sphere, one in which individuals can exercise their freedom to influence the socio-political arrangements of their community has not existed in the ideal form that Habermas imagines it in. This is due to the strict regulations to which I pointed throughout the genealogy, which prohibit certain bodies from being perceived and recognised. Within the *polis*, the will to freedom of female citizens, children, slaves, non-citizens and animals was made invisible. Further throughout history following the celebrated achievements of Athenian democracy, all bodies that did not follow the phallogocentric order of the production of meaning have always been oppressed by depriving them of the right to become public. These bodies include the non-able, non-cisgendered, non-heterosexual, non-white, non-male, and non-owning as well as the non-human. These bodies deviate from the standard public body in appearance and physical and mental capability, as well as in cultural capital. The surveyed literature then leads to the conclusion that the canonical discourse around public sphere theory is insufficient in realising the problem resolution it is set out to achieve, namely to create a participatory platform for democratic political agency, in the form of grassroots involvement that is as powerful as to control and influence the actions of power holders of a globalising community. Mitchell observes, the flaw within Habermasian public sphere theory is simple:

‘As numerous critics have pointed out, Habermas’s singular and normative theory of the universal public sphere is handicapped from the beginning because it attempts to universalise a model of discourse that developed in highly constrained, exclusive (male, bourgeois, white) spaces, such as the 18th-century coffee house. Nancy Fraser (1990) argues that the notion of the singular universal public sphere needs to be replaced with a theory of multiple, contending, often mutually exclusive public spheres. Just as important is the need to provide a more realistic geographical basis to the very notion of the “public sphere”’ (Mitchell 2003: 34).

Developing Fraser’s idea of a multiplicity of publics, this work shall examine how to create a conceptually similar but materially radically different notion to the public sphere, one that does not set out to create equality and homogeneity through bracketing of socio-economic differences between its actors. Rather, I shall inspect to what extent difference is a catalyst for non-normative bodies to claim political
agency. For this purpose the next chapter shall set out the theoretical underpinning for a new kind of political action discourse, by interrogating postmodern ideals of rupture, deterritorialisation and the Other.
Chapter Two: Postmodernism as a Passage to Social Justice

The public sphere as first theorised by Habermas has by now undergone multiple structural and material transformations. As I have shown before, the social geography of a community determines the possibilities of different bodies to express affects and create new forms of communication. While the first chapter examined what is widely regarded as the beginning of democracy and the heritage of today’s political system, this chapter shall look at the most recent structural transformation of the public sphere and with it of political action as well as the conditions that are postulated for participation within the public sphere. The major transformative moments are recognised as changing the workings of the public sphere and are manifested in the rise of the bourgeoisie and wider accessibility to economic wealth. Underlying this revolution was the refusal to obey authority and the growing possibility of retrieving knowledge and education. With the Enlightenment it was possible to leave one’s social stratum or at least modify it by fusing a hierarchically lower one with a higher stratum. New relationships formed and thus new concerns became political. With the emergence of postmodern material conditions, such as deindustrialisation, deregulation and laissez-faire, entrepreneurialism and financial power, as well as homelessness (Harvey 1992: 340 f.), peaking at the digitisation of the material world, once again, new interpersonal constellations appeared. Once more did issues and struggles become political that had never before been acknowledged as such.

This chapter shall scrutinise the moment in which established relations, accepted, customary norms and well-known discourses undergo radical change, with a specific focus on poststructural transformations of the political. Crucial to my argument is the idea that the political within public sphere theory is always already anthropopolitical. By this I mean that the order of signification within activist spaces that are defined through public sphere discourse, is always phallogically anthropocentric, that is humanist, imperialist and masculinist at the same time. This chapter lays the groundwork for exploring the possibilities to participate in an activism that dislocates itself from these principles. The first section of this chapter shall thus primarily interrogate the postmodern school of thought by comparing its possibilities for enunciation and articulation with those proposed by modern thinkers. ‘Mark Seem writes that once we loose ourselves from an ego, “where singularity and collectivity are no longer at odds with each other”, there is the
possibility to “de-normalize and de-individualize through a multiplicity of new, collective arrangements against power” (Seem 1983: xxi, cited in Mazzei 2013: 99). It is this de-normalisation of the (hu)man that I am exploring within this first section. I shall show to what extent a postmodern deconstruction of modern values is useful and whether or not postmodern thought can influence the materiality of political activism in as far as contributing to a unified concept of liberation based on difference.

As I showed in the introduction to this thesis, kyriarchy can only exist if it prevails as the sole system in place. Thus it does not acknowledge any bodies or affects that lie beyond it. Only through specularisation, making imperceptible and exterminating the Other, can the discourse create meaning, masquerading that act of creation as a reflection of the absolute truth. Public sphere theory explores possibilities to allow for activism that is not incorporated into the hegemonic order, that lies beyond it so as to criticise and control the mainstream political activity. I argue, however that locating activism within the public sphere always entails linking, albeit involuntarily, political action and kyriarchal discourse. Phallogocentrism, as Irigaray (1985a, 1985b) writes, places nothing outside itself and thus we can only create imaginaries from within, using the paradigms of kyriarchy. As we cannot escape being subjected to the biopower exerted by the system that only has a limited number of symbols to signify, it is impossible for us to exist outside of it. If a body does indeed exist outside the hegemonic order of signification it has no value, no meaning and no appearance. Thus it does not exist, at least in as far as it is not recognised by the phallic order, which is all encompassing. I argue that this is the case in all conceptions of the public sphere.

While this first section primarily focuses on the enunciative function and possibilities of rupturing kyriarchy, the next section shall outline the material implications of postmodern thought. I shall use conceptions of rhizomatic nomadism to explore to what extent it is possible to rupture the enunciative function, while still sustaining a form of the human being. This cannot be, as postmodern and posthuman thinkers argue, the (hu)man, the masculine subject who uses specularisation to categorise and determine the world around him, but a body that within and around themselves ‘synthesizes a multiplicity of elements without effacing their heterogeneity or hindering their potential for future rearranging (to the contrary)’ (Massumi 2011: xiii, in Deleuze and Guattari 2011). Thus I explore conceptions of the network, the simulacrum and the differend to identify their
common difficulty in establishing an expression of the Other. Underlying the idea of postmodernism is the rejection of the modern principle of a single unified subject. Thus I shall focus my analysis on the multiplicity, which does not have ‘subject nor object’ it is sustained only through ‘determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2011: 8 f.). Therefore, after illustrating an inclusive and democratic public sphere (that is not in opposition to the private anymore) conceptualised through postmodernism, I explore the materiality of the postmodern public sphere by drawing on the growing digitalisation and the expanding network of computer mediated communication. It will become obvious in this chapter, that the condition to politically act is to be human. The following chapters then will interrogate that humanness and humanism intrinsic to us, which I understand as expressions of the (hu)man.

2.1. A Postmodern Idea of Social Justice

In all cultural realms modernism, at its time, was thought of as radical, be it within art, philosophy, science and technology, or the economy. The movement was celebrated as a new era of emancipation, autonomy and self-sufficiency. Influenced by the modernist discourse, the material world was transformed accordingly so as to accommodate the newly liberated masses and their needs. Thus the modern city was born with its landscape of heterotopic locations through which the emancipated individual could stroll so as to be perceived. As I argued in the previous chapter, the phantasies that fed the utopic perceptions of modernity only created the illusion of enlightenment and self-government of the (hu)man (Adorno and Horkheimer 1997; Sennett 2002; Debord 2010). In this section I shall show that similarly, postmodernism has not allowed its generation to create an inclusive, democratic and participatory community either. Instead, I argue, analogous to its modern predecessor, postmodernity produced the illusion of power in the form of self-determination and individuality for an increasing number of humans. Through the postmodern project, even larger masses were lead to believe that they could create themselves.

---

12 I use this chronology empirically, as I understand modernity as postmodernity’s predecessor based on the material structures that are ascribed to each, e.g. industrialisation to modernity and digitisation to postmodernity. Whilst at the same time I will argue at a later stage that postmodernism and modernism are not always distinguishable and are often overlapping.
Postmodernism gave new hope after the time-space compression (Harvey 2001) of expanding globalisation revealed that neoliberal globalisation and corporatisation had turned the once celebrated and admired flaneur into a canvas for commercial advertising. New media, digital technologies and the increasingly more proximate and instant communication possibilities exposed the flaneur as a fraud, by simply uncovering and making visible a number of flaneurs, that is an abundance of identical city dwellers who all bought their individuality, leading them to consume the same products, using the same discourse and writing the same social texts. The homogeneity of modernity and the failure of the Enlightenment project was exposed, as the illusion of individuality could no longer be held up with the rapid momentum of the ever growing network of interconnections between citizens. Driven by the desire to revolt against this conspiracy, the disillusioned generation sought out a project that could let them come together in their idiosyncrasies and their Otherness and reject the modern ideals of specularisation, that is of opening up what is closed, finding what is hidden, naming, categorising, verifying, denouncing, legitimising, appropriating and homogenising everything.

However, I argue in this chapter that postmodernists have been deceived in the same manner as their predecessors. The postmodern citizen has been worked into the existent economy of signification, a preset text that is unalterable and inexhaustible, so that it can devour an ever growing number of Others and incorporate them into its discourse as (hu)man subjects. The postmodern revolutionaries fell victim to the very same modus operandi that had already oppressed their predecessors. Due to this mechanism, which is part of the threefold process of specularisation that I have identified in the introduction to this work, a postmodern public sphere, although canonically believed to be in existence, is unattainable in the same sense a modern one is not feasible. To illustrate my argument in this section, I shall firstly sketch an understanding of postmodernism and secondly envision the image of postmodern public spheres and the political action taking place within them.

The scholarly understanding of modernity is univocal in that it reflects ideas of the failure of what Kant pronounced the emancipation from one’s ‘self-incurred tutelage’ (1997). Writers descending from the Frankfurt School as well as the French post-structuralist and deconstructive movements have exposed the enlightenment project as the fraud that it was. Also disillusioned by the broken promises of modernity was the feminist movement, writing towards the end of the
20th century. Anna Yeatman, identifies the contradiction that revealed the fraudulency of modernity by pointing out the substitution of one phallogological divine figure for another, and thus maintaining the masses' tutelage or immaturity. She writes:

‘The modernist perspective contains a fundamental contradiction: the individualization of social life, which is developed by the culture of possessive individualism, dissolves and deconstructs the monological, monovocal structures of divine authority and that authority’s expression in kinship and kingship institutions. Instead of a divinely sanctioned, consensual moral order, there emerges the decentered world of plurality of individual agents responsible for their own destinies. At the same time that this order of individualized agency undermines all religious presuppositions and secularizes our reality, the primitive type of individuality involved necessitates that there be a single standard or norm of authority which subordinates the plurality of individualised agency, and renders it so many distinct versions of this sole authoritative voice’ (Yeatman 1990: 289).

To show that postmodernism emerged as a part of the same phallocratic order that created modernism, I shall investigate perceived differences between the two movements, so as to eventually illustrate that a public sphere in any form cannot exist as a space for the activism of the Other. Whilst modernism thrived off the identity of the One, the singular phallic subject, postmodernism set out to celebrate the multiple and androgenous. It is the dialectics of modernism that allowed for postmodern ideas to emerge. As Yeatman continues:

‘It is postmodernism which has exploded (imploded?) this contradiction of modernism by insisting the plurality is not containable or reducible in these ways, and by showing how the monovocal, monological of modern authority have authorized the totalising tendencies of oppositional forms of modernist discourse (scientific socialism, for example). The postmodern exploration of the pluralistic implications of a universal culture of individualized agency has been forced by the mid-space and late-space twentieth-century revolts against the monovocal structures of modern patriarchal possessive individualism: the postcolonial movements of self-determination’ (Yeatman 1990: 289).

This sentiment is echoed by Braidotti when she states that the conscious decision to reject modernity, ‘entails a move beyond the dualistic conceptual constraints and the perversely monological mental habits of phallocentrism’ (Braidotti 1994: 2). She understands the 'in-depth transformations of the system of
economic production’ as having an altering effect on ‘traditional social and symbolic structures’ (ibid.). The changes in the economic and cultural infrastructure of modern society allowed for the increasing homogeneity and standardisation of the fordist era to be disclosed.

The disappointment with the increasing homogeneity of modern times and the rejection of imperial values evoked a new movement that in turn re-built the materiality of the self and the Other as well as the spaces they occupied. In his work on the Condition of Postmodernity (1992), David Harvey uses Hassan’s ‘schematic differences between modernism and postmodernism’ (Hassan 1985: 123 f. cited in Harvey 1992: 43) to point out the transformations the city landscape has undergone in the process of a societal shift from modernity to postmodernity. Whilst the modern city was influenced by the principles of the Enlightenment and Industrialisation such as closed forms, purpose, design, finished work, presence, centring, a master code, the phallic and transcendental, the postmodern urban environment is now impacted by the open and disjunctive antiform, play, chance, anarchy, absence, dispersal, idiolects, the polymorphous and androgynous as well as the immanent (Harvey 1992: 43 ff.). Embracing these values of multiplicity, constant movement and uncertainty was of special significance to feminists, as it meant to diminish the kyriarchal values of modernism. Jane Flax posits, that ‘postmodern Philosophers seek to throw into radical doubt beliefs still prevalent in (especially American) culture but derived from the Enlightenment’ (Flax 1990: 41). Flax lists these principles of the Enlightenment, that still today influence discourse formation, which all are products of speculatisation, as described in the introduction to my thesis. The kyriarchal axioms that the Enlightenment reinforced, fortified a belief in the ‘existence of a stable, coherent self’ (ibid.).

This sense of singularity was a consequence of new found confidence in one’s own abilities, one’s reason and objectivity, which resulted in exposing that which is ‘true, […], real and unchanging’ (ibid). Further Flax notes the universality and transcendence of reason which, coupled with the autonomy of the self, is believed to achieve freedom (ibid.). Modernity’s trust in knowledge as neutral, science as the rational discourse of truth and language as transparent (1990: 42) is what feminist postmodern scholars identify as intrinsic to kyriarchal power structures. The opposition to modern dicta is thus welcomed by feminist scholars. However the alternatives that this opening up of possibilities to de- and reterritorialise the void that modernity left, are also insufficient for a politics of unity
in difference to emerge. As Christine di Stefano points out, the postmodern movement was swiftly appropriated by what I call the (hu)man subject. Although she does not take a feminist stand against all oppression by also advocating the undoing of anthropocentrism and the speciesism inherent in it, she explains how postmodernism has been seized by the phallocratic order:

‘First, postmodernism expresses the claims and needs of a constituency (white, privileged men of the industrialized West) that has already had an Enlightenment for itself and that is now ready and willing to subject that legacy to critical scrutiny. Secondly, [...] the objects of postmodernism’s various critical and deconstructive efforts have been the creations of a similarly specific and partial constituency (beginning with Plato). Third, [...] mainstream postmodernist theory (Derrida, Lyotard, Rorty, Foucault) has been remarkably blind and insensitive to questions of gender in its own purportedly politicized rereading of history, politics, and culture. And finally, [...] to the extent that feminist politics is bound up with a specific constituency or “subject”, namely, women13 the postmodernist prohibition against subject-centered inquiry and theory undermines the legitimacy of a broad-based organized movement dedicated to articulating and implementing the goals of such a constituency’ (Di Stefano 1987: 30-31 cited in Harding 1990: 86).

Whilst postmodernism cannot be defined canonically, the accepted understanding of the movement is that it implies a hostility towards modernist principles. Di Stefano however shows that the main postmodern thinkers, as subjects of modern dialectics, can only advocate transformations from within the established order. It is precisely this thought, that I shall illustrate in this chapter. To understand why postmodernism could not salvage the wrongdoings of modernism, that is the expansion and intensification of oppression, we have to first inspect the concept of postmodernism and secondly its impact upon the materiality of postmodernity and vice versa. The rendering of the ‘conventional into the arbitrary’ and the ‘disbelief toward the language of rights, rationality, interests, and autonomy’ (Di Stefano 1990: 64), bring about a new understanding of subjectivity, agency, power, knowledge and the political. That is a new conception for the fundamental products of the social economy of signification. Within the modern public sphere, signification functioned by guaranteeing obedience to accustomed forms of representation guided by metanarratives. A particular metanarrative would indicate the proper manner to enunciate, i.e. to represent. It is Jean-François Lyotard, who in

13 It is significant to add at this point that the subject of feminism is not only the woman, but more generally speaking anybody who does not comply with cis and hetero normative rules of enunciation.
his work on the *Postmodern Condition* famously defines the postmodern through an ‘incredulity toward metanarratives’ (1984: xxiv). He states that the postmodern ‘denies itself, the consensus of a taste which would make it possible to share collectively the nostalgia for the unattainable’ (1984: 81) and thus constantly produces new forms of representation so as to always express the unrepresentable (ibid.). Understanding the breakdown of metanarratives such as the dialectic, dichotomised system of representation, postmodernism then opens up a new and abundant realm of possibilities to produce the self. Whilst modernism was based on the production of the ‘principle of identity (if anything is A it is A), the principle of contradiction (nothing can be both A and not-A) and the principle of the excluded middle (anything and everything must be either A or not-A) (Hartsock 1990: 162; Jay 1981: 42, Adams 2004), postmodernism opens up the realm before, after, inside, outside, below and above A and not-A as well as between all of them, including the multiplicity of various not-As.

Reading Lyotard, Seyla Benhabib concludes that he ‘wants to convince that the destruction of the episteme of representation allows only one option, namely, a recognition of the irreconcilability and incommensurability of language games (Wittgenstein 1953) and the acceptance that only local and context-specific criteria of validity can be formulated’ (Benhabib 1990: 112). This idea of the incommensurability of language games, which in essence implies the inadequacy of signification and thus communication and social interaction, is at the core of my thesis. It is the phallogocentric enunciative function that I criticise in my introduction, when elucidating the process of Othering through the method of specularization, making visible and uncovering, so as to determine an infallible truth (Braidotti 1994: 67). It is the phallogocentric metanarrative that defines knowledge as an ‘adequate representation of things’ (Benhabib 1990: 110), thus I turn to postmodernism to refute and resist this absolutism. However, as I shall show later, postmodernism only offers a partial guide to resistance, rupture and revolution as it falls short in acknowledging its own belonging to the phallogocentric enunciative function. To identify to what extent postmodernism also failed the task of liberating the Other, I shall now investigate the postmodern understanding of language games and their incommensurability, before I show in the next section of this chapter why the postmodern vision of rupturing the set rules of enunciation could not be materialised.
Mostly, postmodernity is envisioned as a revolutionary time, during which the great epistemes of science and technology, which are the mouthpiece of specularisation, shall lose credibility and power. Terry Eagleton for example writes:

‘Post-modernism signals the death of such “meta-narratives” whose secretly terroristic function was to ground and legitimate the illusion of a “universal” human history. We are now in the process of wakening from the nightmare of modernity, with it’s manipulative reason and fetish of the totality, into the laid-back pluralism of the post-modern, that heterogeneous range of life-styles and language games which has renounced the nostalgic urge to totalize and legitimate itself...Science and philosophy must jettison their grandiose metaphysical claims and view themselves more modestly as just another set of narratives’ (Eagleton 1987, cited in Harvey 1992: 9).

To expose the sciences as producing metanarratives we have to first come to an understanding of the way the scientist produces a hegemonic discourse while at the same time being produced by that very discourse himself. Following Spinozist thought as well as the poststructuralist tradition, one assumes the ability to participate in discourse formation as the main condition for power. In this sense power is a productive force that can be used both to perpetuate and rupture a hegemony. The distinction between potestas (negative power) and potentia (positive power) is useful here in distinguishing between that which ‘prohibits and constraints’ and that which ‘empowers and enables’ (Braidotti 2002: 21). As Braidotti observes, ‘the constant negotiation between the two poles of power can also be formulated in political terms in the notion of subjectivity as power and desire. This view posits the subject as a term in a process, which is co-extensive with both power and the resistance to it’ (ibid.). This distinction between emancipatory and oppressive power is useful when distinguishing between discourse formation that either prohibits or enables political action as envisioned by public sphere theorists, that is the political as counter-hegemonic, subversive and opposed.

The enunciative function (in Foucauldian terms) of a society reflects the rules of a language game (in Lyotard’s terms). The question I ask is as follows: to what extent can an enunciative function based on (hu)man signifying systems be bent and broken so as to allow heterogeneity and resistance in a public sphere? By conceptualising the formation of an enunciative function through the idea of language games, Lyotard ascribes to it an inherently antagonistic nature. Players obey rules and make their ‘moves’ (Lyotard 1984: 10) so as to gain or lose power,
be it in form of potestas or potentia. Lyotard observes that the rules of a language game ‘are the object of a contract, explicit or not, between players (which is not to say that the players invent the rules)’ (ibid.). He further states that ‘if there are no rules, there is no game’ (ibid.), implying that each instance of interaction between individuals must be precluded by a set of discursive rules, that is an array of symbols to choose from and a preset range of structures or moulds to orderly place these symbols in. Only then can one participate in the process of signification. Similarly, if a “move” or utterance [...] does not satisfy the rules [it] does not belong to the game they define’ (ibid.), which implies that only those who have an understanding of the given rules and have the means to abide by them, are then able to perceive and be perceived within the dominant system of expression. Lyotard thus concludes that ‘to speak is to fight, in the sense of playing, and speech acts¹⁴ fall within the domain of a general agonistics’ (Lyotard 1984: 10).

Throughout his work Lyotard is referring to the speech act, as linguistic constructs of communication that are based on the proper linking of utterances. Although this is useful in exposing the underlying principles of phallocracy, the concept of language games and their incommensurability is also applicable to other forms of representation, that is communication as is expressed through other media than that of the scripted or uttered word. By this I mean to suggest that all matter and affectivity produces discourses, which Foucault also defines linguistically ‘as a group of statements that belong to a single system of formation’ (Foucault 1997: 107) and ‘it is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined’ (Foucault 1997: 117). However it is clear that bodies (e.g. their appearances, their smells, their sounds) and the intensities (e.g. emotions, intellect) they produce -or the lack thereof- as well as the technologies that enhance or prohibit these traits (e.g. clothing, medication, hearing aids) are also part of discursive systems and do act as signifiers in the economy of representation. Thus the speech act, discourse formation, language and communication in my work, is understood not only as linguistic symbolism but as any kind of mediation.

It is an arranged set of symbols, prepared for mediation and representation that is formed by a discourse but also at the same time produces that very discourse. The product of this discourse is what is referred to as knowledge: ‘Objects, enunciations, concepts, or theoretical choices [...] form the precondition of

¹⁴ Lyotard follows Searle’s (1969) work on speech acts here so as to define the speech act as fundamental component of linguistic interaction.
what is later revealed and which later functions as an item of knowledge or an illusion, an accepted truth or an exposed error, a definitive acquisition or an obstacle surmounted’ (1997: 181 f.). What Foucault refers to as discourse, is referred to by Lyotard as a language game. It is a group of statements that are produced by the same enunciative function. The enunciative function indicates the set of rules that are applicable in a certain heterotopic space. In the material world this would imply different rules of enunciation within different institutionalised social settings, such as the school, the prison, the family etc. (Foucault 1984; Foucault 1975; Lyotard 1984: 17). These heterotopias are singular units that shelter and feed the (hu)man. They can only ever exist through their reference point to another heterotopic space, just as the subject can only validate his existence through objectifying an Other. Foucault uses the concept of a mirror to explain the function of a heterotopia: The gaze into the mirror validates the actuality of the onlooker, and makes the space outside the glass ‘absolutely real, connected with all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal, since in order to be perceived it has to pass through this virtual point which is over there’ (Foucault 1984). By occupying this space the (hu)man is always at once alone in himself, and always already in relation to all Others. Foucault states that ‘the associated field’ in which the enunciative function operates (1997: 96) is based on an a priori set of statements ‘to which the statement refers (implicitly or not), either by repeating them, modifying them, or adapting them, or by opposing them, or by commenting on them; there can be no statement that in one way or another does not reactualize others’ (Foucault 1997: 98). Thus all statements, all symbols of signification represent a contextless unit and are only granted coherence and meaning through their position in relation to other statements inside and outside their field or heterotopia.

The individuality and distinctness of each heterotopia is what makes their enunciative functions, the rules of their specific language games incommensurable. Reading Lyotard, James Williams describes the incommensurability of language games as ‘the way rules from different spheres are inconsistent’ (1998: 5). He states that this antagonism ‘throws all action at the boundaries between spheres into a power struggle’ (ibid.). It is this power struggle that allows for a clear distinction between object and subject by clearly differentiating the position of the one who asks, the one who is asked and the one who is asked about. This is how a social bond comes into being (Lyotard 1984: 15). The ability to master the narratives native to a certain heterotopia bestows power upon the subject and thus a differing
degree of power is taken by each subject within one heterotopic locale. This process entails social stratification, as Lyotard explains: ‘Narratives allow the society in which they are told, on the one hand, to define its criteria of competence and, on the other, to evaluate according to those criteria what is performed or can be performed within it’ (Lyotard 1984: 21). As explicated in the introduction to this work, the possibility to take power lies only with those who are perceived as potent to apply the prearranged set of enunciative rules. To achieve the level of potency necessary to become a subject, Lyotard writes, one must display three competencies: “know-how,” “knowing how to speak,” and “knowing how to hear” [savoir-faire, savoir-dire, savoir-entendre] (Lyotard 1984: 21). It is this ability to decipher, comprehend and reconstruct ‘what one must say in order to be heard, what one must listen to in order to speak, and what role one must play [...] to be the object of a narrative’ (ibid.) that determines one’s position on the social stratum. Postmodernism made it its task to destratify the hierarchy of this social economy. However, I argue that due to its close relation to modernism the movement cannot free itself from the dialectics from which it arose.

To explore the possibility of political action arising as resistance, specifically in the form of a politics of the minoritarian Other and a politics of solidarity, I pose the following question: to what extent it is even useful to distinguish between modernism and postmodernism, when both descend from the same phallogocentric system of signification, although both departed from a point of resistance and revolution against the oppressiveness and violence of that very system? Due to the historic materiality of postmodernism, theorists can deconstruct the fallacies of modernism, which is based on that which can be represented. As shown above, the ability to enunciate always means to represent, whilst the representation always already replaces the sign and thus places itself in relation to it and all other signs and representations. That is how the heterotopia that Foucault’s metaphorical gaze into the mirror creates, is perceived to come into existence whilst never being present in actuality. Lyotard refers to this nihilism as ‘necessarily concomitant with the setting-up of a point of view on the Zero, on the empty centre, the place where everything is supposed to be visible and intelligible, the place of knowledge’ (Lyotard 2004: 11). The departure point for both modernism and postmodernism is that very Zero, the point at which only the indiscernible exists in a state of utter uncertainty and chaos. That Zero however, is also the very point which through specularisation, exposes that which cannot be perceived so as to transform it
instantaneously into representation. As modernity preceded postmodernity, the era of reason and the self colonised that Zero to such an extent that the postmodern generation can only ever attempt the rupture of the culture of the (hu)man but it can never succeed in this endeavour. The postmodern principles of multiplicities, the networked horizontal rhizome and nomadic fluid movement then can never occupy the Zero without the remnants of modern representations lingering within it.

2.2. Rupturing the (Hu)man Economy of Signification

The previous section laid out the enunciative function of kyriarchy, that is the system of signification based on inventing, excavating and revealing knowledge by means of specularisation. Throughout my work I refer to this particular system of assigning meaning to symbols and articulating that meaning in form of truth as phallogocentrism. Section 2.1. illustrated that both modernism and postmodernism are part of the same, that is a (hu)man economy of signs. Now I shall present in more detail to what extent postmodernism is hindered by the phallogological ideals of reason, truth and autonomy to create a radical opposition to these very same principles. I shall lay out why postmodern theory cannot free itself from the pitfalls of representation by discussing the simulacrum and then applying my theory to the materiality of postmodern public sphere theory. In the introduction to this work, I describe the method of specularisation, that is the searching for and opening up of the unknown, the definition, categorisation and denomination of what is found in the unknown, so as to make it an object of knowledge.

Through this process then, the knowing subject, the (hu)man, is able to establish his own position by perpetually objectifying the Other, then making them imperceptible by turning them into the absent referent, so as to lastly, be able to consume and annihilate the Other to the point that they can only exist within or as part of the subject. Chapter One describes this process while linking it to the materiality of the democratic movements within the polis and modernity. I indicated above, that the same process takes place within postmodern thought. I argue that postmodernism does not offer a solution to the problem of specularisation, as it fails to deconstruct the (hu)manness, the subjectivity of phallogocentric communication. Instead postmodernism is only an extension of modernism, which prevents the movement from creating a new materiality, instead only plunging it into a continuous circuit of repetition. This is, as Braidotti observes from a feminist perspective,
because ‘one cannot deconstruct a subjectivity one has never been fully granted control over; one cannot diffuse a sexuality [or any other form of identity] which has historically been defined as dark and mysterious’ (Braidotti 2002: 82).

Postmodernism cannot deconstruct or annihilate the (hu)man, as the enunciative function of kyriarchy does not allow for any Other to exist or to enunciate. As Braidotti continues: ‘In order to announce the death of the subject, one must first have gained the right to speak as one’ (ibid.; see also Braidotti 1994: 62).

Although postmodern theory is able to identify this conundrum, I shall now explain in more detail why it is impossible to escape this endless repetition of the phallogocentric order that does not permit anything but the (hu)man subject to enunciate. If one understands Lyotard’s conception of the Zero as a blank space that is instantaneously turned into the heterotopic mirror space that Foucault describes, it becomes obvious that by annexing postmodernity to modernity, we provoke the collapse of reality and instead exist only in a hyperreal state, as Jean Baudrillard describes in his 1981 work on Simulacra and Simulation (2007). He postulates that the postmodern condition leads to a loss of the authentic and instead only creates reality through producing ‘models of a real without origin or reality’ (2007: 1), that is, the ‘liquidation of all referentials’ (2007: 2). It is this space in the mirror that epitomises the phallogocentric function which oppresses all through the method of specularisation. In fact, Irigaray uses the concept of the mirror to elucidate how the phallogocentric system of signification devours all there is, so that no bodies, nor the affectivities they produce can exist outside its realm:

‘We have still to learn that the space-time of specularization is implicit in the intuition of space […]. Does the subject derive his power from the appropriation of this non-place of the mirror? And from speculation? And as speculation constitutes itself as such in this way, it cannot be analyzed, but falls into oblivion, re-emerging to play its part only when some new effect of symmetry is needed in the system. By some recourse to the imaginary, perhaps, that is both other and the same?’ (1985a: 205 f.).

As the original is nonexistent and we only enunciate copies of the non-existent, the non-present, we again communicate in representations. To put it in Lyotard’s words: a narrative ‘finds the raw material for its social bond not only in the meaning of the narratives it recounts, but also in the act of reciting them. The narratives’ reference may seem to belong to the past, but in reality it is always contemporaneous with the act of recitation’ (Lyotard 1984: 22). Thus we only exist
in what Baudrillard calls a ‘procession of simulacra’ (2007: 1) based on constant
‘rehallucinations’ (2007: 123). I identify these rehallucinations in Bernard Stiegler’s
understanding of transindividuation (2010). Working with Gilbert Simondon’s
concept of individuation, he perceives the emergence of a new economy through
the material progress in technology, which ‘constitutes a new commerce, that is, a
new regime of psychic and collective individuation, producing long circuits of
transindividuation – the contributors are those who contribute to this creation of long
circuits’ (2010: 50). This new economy of contribution (2010: 71) diminishes the
dichotomy between producer and consumer, and thus between the active and the
passive, the subject and the object and instead throws all individuals into a network
of continuous co-individuation. Stiegler understands transindividuation as an
emancipatory action, one that ‘breaks with the destruction of commerce by the
market’ (2010: 50) and bestows more power upon the actors. Assuming
postmodernity, as a (hu)man construct, is using specularisation however, it
becomes obvious that an economy of transindividuation is then only possible
through a recycling of previous interactions: We can only create an endless circuit of
simulacra and absent referents as the blurring of producer and consumer does not
result in bestowing productive powers upon the Other but only contributes further to
their imperceptibility. Instead this process allows specularisation to go further
unnoticed.

In this sense the postmodern deconstruction of modern binaries can be
regarded as existent, however the result is not emancipatory and liberational. This
form of transindividuation entails a communication process that causes nothing to be
identical to what has come before, as it merely reassembles the symbols that are
already given. The original is annihilated further and the new product, the new
interaction or enunciation, is only a repetition of what is perceived to have come
before. Postmodernism enforces specularisation and the creation of the objects as
consumable product of exchange. The real, Baudrillard states, is merely an ‘alibi’
(2007: 122), for the original referent, which is imploded by the enunciative function
of the economy of signification, or as Baudrillard calls it, the ‘universal market, not
only of merchandise, but of values, signs, models’ (2007: 123). As the only producer
of knowledge, the hyperreal (hu)man thus leaves ‘no room for the imaginary’ (ibid.),
that is the imagined. He erases all possibilities and alternatives, all difference and
any imagination along the lines of “what might be if…” which is the crucial question
of political action. Baudrillard’s notion of the simulacrum exposes that the
democratic and horizontal traits that Stiegler ascribes to transindividualization are simply a massification of subjectivity. It causes the eradication of the Other so as to allow the, now formerly, Other to participate in the process of enunciation, or transindividualization. It is what Irigaray calls the 'confusion between liberation as equal ownership of goods and liberation as access to a subjectivity of the same value' (1993: 71 f.), or what Gayatri Spivak addresses, when she declares that the subaltern cannot speak (1986).

Irigaray states ‘that any theory of the subject has always been appropriated by the “masculine”’ (Irigaray 1985a: 133), or what I define as the (hu)man. It is the one who enunciates, the one who practices transindividualization, and particularly the one who speaks, who hears, who is perceived and can perceive, that is the divine figure of the anthropos, the father, the lord and the god. Irigaray continues to explain that ‘when she [as the Other] submits to (such a) theory, woman fails to realize that she is renouncing the specificity of her own discourse - by being “female”.

Re-objectivizing her own self whenever she claims to identify herself “as” a masculine subject. A “subject” that would re-search itself as lost (maternal-feminine) “object’” (Irigaray 1985a: 133)? The phallogorical enunciative function only permits the (hu)man to speak and be heard. Within the simulacrum then, the process of transindividualization allows for, contrary to modernity, the (hu)man to become a more wide reaching category. Postmodernism simply allows one to break down the dichotomies that modernism perpetuated, not by eradicating them and replacing them with an original, but rather by reinscribing the Other ‘to a discourse that denies the specificity of her pleasure by inscribing it as the hollow, the intaglio, the negative, even as the censured other of its phallic assertions’ (Irigaray 1985a: 140 f.). Irigaray further implies that to speak as a subject, the Other is turned, on the one hand, into the object of desire for the (hu)man as well as, at the same time, being altered into the (hu)man herself. She is thus ‘hom(m)osexualise[d] […] by perversely travestying her for the pederastic, sodomizing satisfactions of the father/husband’ (Irigaray 1985a: 141). Thus it is obvious that, as Patricia MacCormack declares, ‘animals, like women [and other non-(hu)man identities], cannot become majoritarian’ (MacCormack 2012: 61). To become majoritarian means to deny one’s Otherness, thus if an Other speaks, they do so not in solidarity, but in betrayal. Thus they do not practice a radical politics but perpetrate the oppressive crimes they once fell victim to. The enunciative function can thus not allow revolutions of the Other, of the unnamed, anonymous, unutterable and indiscernible, as its place is within the
Zero that is now seized by phallogocentrism. That is because the undefined and uncertain cannot come into existence, as Irigaray explains:

‘The plant may indeed conform to her own purpose, but an other has to certify this. And that other must speak, and speak, and moreover, as a philosopher. She may be fully herself, but an other has to declare that this is the case. Thus, her development is subject (1985a: 162) to definitions from an other... And if, in the unforeseeable future, she happened to unleash some nameless potency, it would not be up to her to judge whether or not this unpredictable event had occurred [...] The substance of the plant, like that of any other (female) being, cannot move, or move beyond, the ontological status assigned to it. Once and for all. It is not capable of any less or any more’ (Irigaray 1985a: 163).

Thus, I understand phallocracy as absolutist and the simulacrum as a symptom of the process of specularisation.

However when reading Lyotard, one senses a solution that would interrupt the rigidity and authority of phallogocentric enunciation. He encourages the reader to find the space between the “I have heard” and the “you will hear” (Lyotard 1997: 22), or what Foucault simply refers to as the ‘not-said’ (1997: 25), that which ‘is a hollow that undermines from within all that is said’ (Foucault 1997: 25). It is placed at Lyotard’s point Zero and he refers to that which is in between enunciations and not articulated as the ‘differend’ (1988). Only if we bear witness to the differend will we not ‘neglect, forget or repress possibilities’ (1988: 136). The differend is an attempt to bring to life the Other, to let them be dignified as they are without bestowing them with kyriarchal recognition and credibility. Lyotard writes:

‘In the differend, something “asks” to be put into phrases, and suffers from the wrong of not being able to be put into phrases right away. This is when the human beings who thought they could use language as an instrument of communication learn through the feeling of pain which accompanies silence (and of pleasure which accompanies the invention of a new idiom), that they are summoned by language, not to augment to their profit the quantity of information communicable through existing idioms, but to recognize that what remains to be phrased exceeds what they can presently phrase, and that they must be allowed to institute idioms which do not yet exist [...] The differend is the unstable state and instant of language wherein something which must be able to be put into phrases cannot yet be. This state includes silence, which is a negative phrase, but it also calls upon phrases which are in principle possible. This state is signalled by what one ordinarily calls a feeling: "One cannot find the words," etc. A lot of searching must be done to find new rules for forming and linking
phrases that are able to express the differend disclosed by the feeling, unless one wants this differend to be smothered right away in a litigation and for the alarm sounded by the feeling to have been useless’ (Lyotard 1988: 13).

The differend is that which cannot be incorporated into the phallogocentric order because it lacks representative capacity. It is unrelatable and thus also imperceptible in discourse. This concept can be illustrated with the absent referent that is the animal.

MacCormack states that if we understand the assumption that nothing is outside the text as an account of our human experience, a posthuman (and ultimately ahuman) experience ‘attests to the world being everything’ (2012: 70). Thus, ‘nonhumans are both posthuman as extra-discursive, but they are also part of their own textual worlds to which we are irreducibly alienated’ (ibid.). However, posthuman realisations about the rigidity of enunciation and attempts to dismantle phallogocentrism through different becomings as envisioned by thinkers such as Haraway, Braidotti and Deleuze and Guattari, simply act as an extension of the (hu)man. That is to say, postmodern and specifically posthuman conceptualisations of the human condition only aid in improving our own subject position. Any human attempt to bear witness to the suffering of nonhumans will always perpetuate specularisation, as the nonhuman will be forced into the (hu)man order of signification. Thus MacCormack states: 'The animal as differend is also the dead victim in that the living animal is dead to the capacity to negotiate its existence using the appropriate kind of phrase, not to bear witness to its suffering but to bear witness to its ability to describe suffering within human paradigms' (2012: 68). Thus, bearing witness to the animal always already involves depriving the animal of their individuality, that is their intrinsic value not as relational currency for the human. Bearing witness to the animal, therefore, turns them into it by making it a signifier and thus bestowing meaning upon it.

This meaning, of course, is always (hu)man and it arises in the instance of perceiving the animal as animal, that is in relation to the human and always not human. As MacCormack puts it, the problem lies within human speech, which only allows us to speak for and about animals, as 'all speech is human and all phrases are between humans' (2012: 68). Humans must thus refrain from throwing the animal into specularisation by depriving them of their position within the differend by putting the animal into phrases, describing their condition and their realities, and by assuming their experiences, desires and abilities. The conclusion arising from this
understanding of the animal as being denied to exist as different is then one that negates the animal. ‘The animal does not exist as an animal or a life. While we are human there are no animals, only human ideas of animality’ (MacCormack 2012: 68) and to let the animal exist not as animal but as themselves we must divorce the relationality of nonhumans to us. In other words, to refrain from making a them into an it by negating the animal, we must negate the human, as MacCormack suggests: ‘In order to create an ethics of the inevitable shared living with nonhumans, only the human can and needs to be deconstructed and the human’s trajectories toward posthumanism have nothing to do with other life’ (2012: 58).

If we assume that interspecies encounters are inevitable, especially in light of the current animal and earth liberation movement reminding us that we have a responsibility towards nonhumans who are suffering as a consequence of our impact, we must attempt to recognise the differend. Only in doing so can we have responsible and ever fewer interactions with the nonhuman Other, be it the animal or the earth, until we undo ourselves and hence will not need a set of symbols designating that which is not human. When bearing witness to the differend, the task is to construct idioms so as not to fall victim to the oppression of phallogocentric speculation and its enunciative function. Giving testimony to the differend is thus an act of alliance and solidarity and not antagonistic game play, it is an act of harmony in difference and not equality. We must resist and renounce language games by, as Irigaray puts it, speaking ‘only in riddles, allusions, hints, [and] parables’ (1985a: 143). She encourages us to oppose the economy of representation by creating a new language ‘even if asked to clarify a few points. Even if people plead that they just don’t understand. After, all they never have understood. So why not double the misprision to the limits of the exasperation’ (ibid.).

To exasperate the (hu)man is precisely the goal of the differend, so as to reclaim the space of the Zero and to occupy this locus as a multiplicity of many in solidarity against the unified One. Infinite repetition of this exasperation, that is, using the enunciative function’s own method of creating an infinite circuit of articulations -or rather non-articulations-, will cause the multiplicity to grow and expand. It will not colonise. It will liberate. It will resist the simulacrum and force it to exert order only ‘on the real and the rational’ (Baudrillard 2007: 21). When the referential order can only reign over the referential, ‘power itself ends by being

---

15 It is from this crucial idea that MacCormack suggests the ahuman as the philosophy of undoing the human (see Chapter Four).
dismantled in this space and becoming a simulation of power (disconnected from its ends and its objectives, and dedicated to the effects of power and mass simulation)' (ibid.). The testimony to the differend needs to be continued and repeated until the movement of solidarity is large enough so that the Other’s ‘ear tunes into another music, the voice starts to sing again, the very gaze\[16\] stops squinting over the signs of auto-representation, and (re)production no longer inevitably amounts to the same and returns to the same forms, with minor variations’ (Irigaray 1985a: 143).

This section has so far provided two conclusions to the question as to what extent postmodernism can give rise to the Other: Firstly, I have shown the enunciative function to be all powerful and all consuming, with postmodernism only functioning as an appendix to modernism and thus being too restricted by the remnants of modernity to provide a haven for the Other to resist the (hu)man. Secondly, I have shown that the postmodern consciousness does make a solidarity movement of radical politics seem attainable, however it remains within the realm of the metaphysical, as the preceding principles of representation are still anchored deeply within the postmodern simulacrum. Further, it would be empirically necessary to dismantle the institutionalised heterotopic spaces. Before theorising a movement free from anthropopolitics, by which I mean the politics of the (hu)man displayed in the first two chapters, I shall now illustrate the material conditions of a postmodern public and investigate to what extent they are able to free the contemporary global network of cities from the (hu)man.

As the materiality of the late 20th century progressed, so did the vision of the early postmodern theorists, who imagined a world without singularity and within a ‘more multiple, lateral, and circular system of ramification, rather than a dichotomous one’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2011: 5). Nancy Fraser (1995) theorises a postmodern public sphere, whose geography is precisely one of such multiple interconnected realms that participate in constant transindivisuation. She mainly critiques the Habermasian notion of publicness for its lack of acknowledging plurality. Instead, she proposes to create ‘a postmodern multiplicity of mutually contestatory publics’ (1995: 295). Additionally ‘a postmodern conception of the public sphere must countenance not the exclusion, but the inclusion of interests and

\[16\] Foucault and Lyotard use terminology related to sight, hearing and the voice to describe phallocentric forms of expression, which allows for their texts to be taken literally. Here, on the other hand, Irigaray imagines a world outside phallocentrism by using the same terminology, however only to evoke figurative meaning. I argue that in an ahuman world, free from logic and singularity, expression does not center around sight, voice and hearing as that assumption is intrinsically ableist.
issues that bourgeois masculinist ideology labels "private" and treats as inadmissible' (ibid.; see also hooks 1990). Further, Fraser criticises Habermas for suggesting that social status can be temporarily abandoned, made unseen and imperceptible. She explicitly calls for the long lasting 'elimination [...] of systemic social inequalities' in order for 'participatory parity' (ibid.) to actually emerge.

Although Fraser writes of a postmodern state of political action, she still advocates ‘participatory parity’, that is equality and with it an erasure of difference. At the same time thinkers like Deleuze and Massumi are advocating difference and solidarity within this difference. They envision this difference to be released within rhizomatic structures of communication, which ‘are determined not by theoretical analyses implying universals but by pragmatics composing multiplicities or aggregates of intensities. A new rhizome may form in the heart of a tree, the hollow of a root, the crook of a branch’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2011: 16). The materiality of ordered ‘state space is “striated”, or gridded’ (Massumi 2011: xiii, in Deleuze and Guattari 2011). However, within the postmodern space all ‘paths between fixed and identifiable points’ are preset, so that ‘movement in it is confined’ (ibid.). Radically opposed to this, postmodern thinkers imagine nomadic space, which is ‘“smooth”, or open ended’ (Massumi 2011: xiii, in Deleuze and Guattari 2011). Within a postmodern public sphere, ‘one can rise up at any point and move to any other. Its mode of distribution is the nomos: arraying oneself in an open space (hold the street), as opposed to the logos of entrenching oneself in a closed space (hold the fort’ (Massumi 2011: xiii, in Deleuze and Guattari 2011). Freedom of movement, destratification and constant reterritorialisation also form the basis for the postmodern city. The aim is to transform former heterotopic spaces within the city into places of rational action and solidarity. As David Harvey writes: ‘The right to the city is far more than a right of individual or a group access to the resources that the city embodies: it is a right to change and reinvent the city more after our hearts’ desire’ (2012: 4). This includes an understanding of solidarity not in terms of equality, that is sameness, but justice, that is collectivity in difference. Thus, Harvey continues, the right to the city is ‘a collective rather than an individual right, since reinventing the city inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power over the process of urbanization’ (ibid.).

Postmodernity’s technological revolution is understood to have initiated the material conditions of nomadic solidarity. Digitisation allows for instant communication across the globe which is often used for the purpose of forming a
solidarity movement that is in fact grassroots, or rhizomatic. Paul Mason writes, 'social Media says to people who are alienated and disparate: you are like me; these things are everywhere' (2012: 56). New media are able to produce information that is only minimally mediated (Mason 2012: 34) and thus 'enables participants to judge what kind of history is being made in real time' (Mason 2012: 35). The digitisation of the enunciative function thus bestows agency upon the users and catapults them into a network of constant transindividuation, in the way Stiegler envisions. In contrast to Mason’s view however, it is worth noting that the use of digital communication is still not free of mediation. Most platforms are run commercially and thus can easily be (ab)used as tools of corporate control (Deleuze 1992). Access to these technologies is still a privilege and can be prohibited by many factors, such the lack of technical knowledge, restricted economic means, lack of time and very often, state or corporate censorship (Dahlberg 2001). Although I recognise the significance of digital transindividuation, I do not recognise it as a replacement of the physicality of radical politics (Mitchell 2003). Don Mitchell observes that ‘public democracy requires public visibility, and public visibility requires material public space (2003: 148). That is not to say that computer mediated communication [CMC] does not have material implications, in fact CMC ‘bring[s] this altered and networked consciousness into real life' (Mason 2012: 138).

It is this technology of postmodernity that allows us to theorise the posthuman condition, which indicates a step towards the radical movement needed to liberate the Other. As Braidotti states: ‘Technologies freeze time in a discontinuous set of variations determined by speed and simultaneity. They thus induce a dislocation of the subject, allowing not only for deferred or virtual social and personal relations, but also for a pervasive social imaginary of ubiquity and timelessness’ (Braidotti 2002: 18).

CMC can however only be understood as a tool for long lasting, superstructural change in favour of a radical politics of the Other, not as a replacement for the infrastructures in place. It is within this postmodern conception of the public sphere that we can locate the Other, the woman, the cyborg, the monster, the beast and the animal. Braidotti defines the monster as ‘the bodily incarnation of difference form the basic human norm; it is a deviant, an a-nomaly; it is abnormal' (Braidotti 1994: 78). Following Haraway’s posthumanism (1991) Braidotti envisions the cyborg as a hybrid between the organic and the technological: 'it is a figure of interrelationality, receptivity, and global
communication that deliberately blurs categorical distinctions (human/machine; nature/culture; male/female; oedipal/nonoedipal) (1994: 78). She further states that the cyborg ‘is not a unitary subject position. The cyborg is rather a multi-layered, complex and internally differentiated subject’ (Braidotti 2002: 17). In fact, Braidotti understands the cyborg as being ‘Haraway’s representation of a generic feminist humanity’ (Braidotti 1994: 105). I argue that using the postmodern materiality of networked societies to implement a politics of ‘feminist humanity’, is again only using postmodernism as an appendix to modernity’s conceptions of subjectivity. This is due to the movement’s blatant ignorance of its own anthropocentrism.

Similar to postmodernism’s efforts to cure the ills of modernism, the cyborg aims to liberate the Other, however it can only incorporate them within a structure of representation and specularity. The cyborg is only a means to improve the human and thus the (hu)man. Becoming cyborg, becoming abnormal, different and Other, is to be placed into the rhizome and be subject of and to continuous transindividuation. Occupying this space as an Other, would mean to reclaim Lyotard’s Zero and create a movement of solidarity. It would mean that endless difference is valued over singularity and unity, and it would create an unintelligible disorder of diversely coded bodies that would now all be intertwined in milieus of nomadic multiplicity. As Grosz states:

‘The body is [...] not an organic totality which is capable of the wholesale expression of subjectivity, a welling up of the subject’s emotions, attitudes, beliefs or experiences, but is itself an assemblage of organs, processes, pleasures, passions, activities, behaviors, linked by fine lines and unpredictable networks to other elements, segments and assemblages’ (Grosz 1994: 120).

However as I have argued in this section, the kyriarchal enunciative function of phallogocentrism that created both the modern and the postmodern movements, precludes the emergence of rhizomatic structures within the body and the places it occupies that would allow for such assemblages to emerge. Deleuze and Guattari state that: ‘to be rhizomorphous is to produce stems and filaments that seem to be roots, or better yet connect with them by penetrating the trunk, but put them to strange new uses’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2011: 18), which would in turn allow a public sphere of radical difference to emerge. Although Deleuze and Guattari do not distinguish between “rhizomatic” and “rhizomorphous”, I understand the postmodern project, as being only rhizomorphous, and not rhizomatic. Rhizomorphism I argue,
implies only a semblance to the rhizomatic, it is the phallogocentric in disguise, a
pretence of the rhizome that takes its shape and corporeality but is not able to give
birth to the lines of flight and the intensities and desires within them. This is due to
its ‘ostensibly nonhierarchical presentation or statement [which] in fact only admits
of a totally hierarchical solution’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2011: 18). In the next
chapter I shall argue in more detail, that the inherent anthropocentrism, the
obsession with the (hu)man is precisely the pitfall of not only the postmodern, but
also posthuman school of thought. Braidotti suggests a transition from this
phallocratic society of the anthropos to a zoe-centered culture (Braidotti 2011: 222),
one in which the earth is given agency over the (hu)man. As I will argue, this can be
achieved through a becoming-minoritarian’ and ‘becoming-imperceptible’ (Deleuze
and Guattari 2011: 320 f.). The next part of my work shall thus explore possibilities
for a radical politics of the Other to emerge, not within the public sphere nor in place
of it. Instead I envision space for collective solidarity that is built without utilising any
part of the kyriarchal enunciative function, a truly rhizomatic plane with constantly
changing variables, for ever increasing and decreasing speeds that cross and blur
all boundaries. To this purpose I shall now call into question the human being.
Chapter Three: Animal Others

As indicated in the first chapter the hierarchical categorisation of all organisms, is often based on the privileging of public minds over private bodies, properly masculine expressions over other gender performances and the civil and cultural over the natural and savage. As with all identification and classification, the categorisation based on species is also inherently speculative and destructive. Thus I propose in this chapter, that feminist scholarship and practice need to include not only strategising and organising against human oppressions but also against speciesism, which is ‘any form of discrimination based on species’ (Cavalieri 2001: 70). The first part of this chapter explores this form of discrimination, so as to illustrate its validity as an integral part of kyriarchal oppression.

Specifically, I draw from the field of critical animal studies and the so called ‘animal turn’ that it emerged from. Through addressing the contemporary shift towards ‘the animal’ and animal rights in the field of the humanities, which is rarely based in an anti-speciesist ethics, I hope to show the urgency of including this system of oppression into the discussion of kyriarchy, as I conclude that discussions about the animal can never be emancipatory for animal Others. Thus, this chapter shall specifically focus on exposing human privilege in contemporary human-animal relations. With the help of anti-speciesist feminists I map out the infrastructure within which speculative processes work to objectify the Other. In the second part of this chapter I present a conception of oppression that will stress the necessity to acknowledge the intrinsic interconnectedness of all kyriarchal systems if working towards social justice. To exemplify this idea, I specifically focus on the interdependence of speciesism and various forms of sexism and genderism, as well as racism, classism and ableism. Consequently, I thereby emphasise that speciesism must be understood as part of kyriarchal oppression and species must be acknowledged as an identity dimension that either creates privilege or marginalisation. I conclude the chapter by drawing attention to the importance of identifying the oppressors and subjecting them to specularisation, before doing so in the following fourth chapter.

Drawing on my analysis from previous chapters I now examine the construction of the Other with particular focus on the animal as the ultimate Other within a (hu)man-made world. This shall illustrate to what extent the public sphere as a concept of political action and counter cultural organising is insufficient. I make
clear why phallogocentric discourse formation practices inhibit our conceptualisation of liberation by suggesting an anti-speciesist approach to conceptualising liberation theory and practice. To stress the significance of ‘the animal’ within phallogocentrism, but also to highlight that anti-speciesist work must become an integral part of social justice and liberation theory/practice, I shall first briefly expand upon my conceptualisation of objectification, initially described in the introduction to this work. Drawing on Irigaray’s concept of the speculum, I expose three functions of specularisation – penetration, conjecture and reflection - which all aid objectification, rendering the Other a not-sufficiently-human it, an inanimate thing, without desires and without the possibility to self-identify (Nussbaum 1995; Adams 2010; Chen 2012).

As described in the introduction to this work, specularisation creates and maintains a (hu)man subject through the process of Othering. The Other is that which, as Haraway puts it, ‘both guarantees and refreshes the power of the knower, but any status as agent in the productions of knowledge must be denied the object’ (Haraway 1991: 197). This process, which more often than not ends in the literal dismemberment, killing, and consumption of the Other17, is grounded in the phalloglogical construction of language and the imaginary. Kyriarchic discourse creates ‘a chain of being extending from God, to “man”, and finally down to animals’ (Wolch, et al. 2000: 85). A particular position on this chain of being indicates what linguists refer to as a grade of ‘animacy’ (Chen 2012), which dictates our ability to participate within discourse formation, but also prescribes the positioning of ourselves within the imaginary and the material geography of actors: ‘An adult male who is “free” (as opposed to enslaved), able-bodied, and with intact linguistic capacities, one who is also familiar, individual, and positioned nearby, stands at the top of the hierarchy as the most “animate” or active agent within grammars of ordering’ (Chen 2012: 27). This privileged positioning of the adult able-bodied free man, as Mel Chen writes, is linguistically naturalised (if not even grammatically constructed and therefore a direct result of language): ‘The noun phrases at the top of the hierarchy manifest nominative-accusative case-marking, while those at the bottom manifest ergative-absolutive case marking. John Cherry examined grades of grammatical animacy within several language families including (but not limited to) English, Swahili, Algonquian, Polish, Navajo and Breton. Cherry’s findings reflect the social geography of today’s globalising world with its many systems of oppression:

17 From an anti-speciesist point of view, statistically speaking, the numbers of Others being murdered are higher than those of Others surviving.
‘Humans: adult > nonadult; male/MASC gender > female/FEM gender; free > enslaved; able-bodied > disabled; linguistically intact. prelinguistic / linguistically impaired; familiar (kin/named) > unfamiliar (nonkin/unnamed_); proximate (1p & 2p pronouns) > remote (3p pronouns).

Animals: higher/larger animals > lover/smaller animals > insects; whole animal > body part;

Inanimates: motile/active > nonmotile/nonactive; natural > manmade; count > mass;

Incorporeals: abstract conceptions, natural forces, states of affairs, states of being, emotions, qualities, activities, events, time periods, institutions, regions, diverse intellectual objects’ (Cherry 2002: 314, quoted in Chen 2012: 26 f.; also see Joly 1975: 273).

Being grounded in language, ‘these socially constructed categories [are] not rigidly defined or mutually exclusive, but rather dependent upon time, place and situation’ (Wolch et al. 2000: 93). We find very similarly arranged charted hierarchies of being by scholars who are not primarily interested in the linguistic basis of oppression but who draw our attention to the lived experience of those who are not (hu)man-enough (McIntosh 1989; Morgan 1996; Haraway 2008; Adams 2010).

Also mentioned in the introduction to this work, is the possibility of strategically using the methods of specularisation in order to expose kyriarchy itself. Although I understand my work as a whole as an exercise in throwing back kyriarchal methods of exposing, opening up, interrogating, defining and categorising different strands of kyriarchy back at themselves, this chapter (as well as the following one) explicitly does so by seeking out speciesist occurrences (and the cis/hetero sexist, ableist, racist, classist implications that come with it). Once hunted down, these will be named, condemned, denounced, made vulnerable, poisoned, trapped, displayed, eviscerated and exterminated; this is precisely and literally what kyriarchy does to the animal Other. The privilege enjoyed by humans can only be protected as long as it can stay unexposed, unmentioned and unnamed. Instances of supposedly ethical dominance, such as cohabiting with companion animals, or the implementation of conservation and breeding programmes as well as welfarist concerns for animals who are raised to be killed, are tools working to conceal this human privilege. These acts of dominance, disguised as altruism, implying
selflessness and the preservation of the Other over the self, further justify human privilege and with it the oppression of the animal. Directing discursive attention towards the Other’s assumed needs, the (hu)man can remain hidden. Thus it is our task as social justice advocates to seek out, bear witness to and pronounce not only the manifestations of oppression but also their perpetrators, who in the case of speciesism are always human.

3.1. The Animal as Kyriarchal Object

Within the humanities in the academy and various social justice projects in wider society, liberation work can be considered a humanitarian endeavour. Improving a marginalised person’s or group’s circumstances can be understood as a compassionate and humane act, be it through manual labour, policy-making, fundraising, technology development, or any other form of aid. Common conceptions of the terms ‘humanity’ and ‘humanness’ imply an intrinsic consideration for the other, if not even the sacrifice of the self. The growing gap between culture and nature, civilisation and barbarity described in the first chapter, fortifies the construct of humanity as reasonable, fair, caring and hospitable instead of violent, arbitrary and ruthless\(^\text{18}\). All of these human - and humane, i.e. benevolent - traits reflect the workings of the mind. They are conceptualised, imagined ideas based on affective responses to communication practices. Humane and (hu)man actions are the result of thought not of embodiment, making them implicitly phallogocentric although they seemingly insinuate emotion over logic. As shown previously, the mind, and with it thought and reason, belong to the public arena of white men, whilst persons lower down on the animacy hierarchy are defined through their corporeal expressions, or rather through the white man’s speculative interpretations of Others’ bodies.

The concept of humanity by extension then, implies that those possessing human traits - that is (hu)man traits, as the classification of the human species is intrinsically phallogical - are categorised as a single group. The justification that allows phallogocentrism to group humans together based on their perceived capability to empathise, as well as identify and resolve problems with their minds, is always presented as a scientific one, and is therefore rarely questioned. History has

\(^{18}\) For an analysis of the humanities and posthumanities, refer to Cary Wolfe (2009) who explores the human position from a position beyond these binaries and investigates to what extent the human place in the world has shifted along with increased technological advance.
experienced many such attempts to categorise individuals into humans, less-than-humans, and non-humans. Joan Dunayer illustrates the absurdity of speciesism by exposing the morally prioritised status of humans over non-humans, as the unscientific construction that it is. The opposition between humans and everyone else is just as valid, Dunayer writes, as ‘categoriz[ing] all animals as robins and nonrobins’ (2004: xi).

Social justice theory and practice focuses almost exclusively on achieving equality for members of our species, neglecting that the concept of equality is a product of (hu)man kyriarchy and can thus only strive to homogenise marginalised humans by bestowing the same rights that white rich cis men enjoy, upon them. Difference and individuality within the human group is then erased. The eurocentric humanitarian and humane project however, allows for all individuals belonging to the human species to be considered part of an ingroup, granting at least in theory, basic human rights. From an anti-speciesist point of view, this translates into (hu)man privilege and (hu)man supremacy, that is the domination of the white able cis man and includes the animals’ complete dependency upon humans.

The animal on the other hand, is constructed as an opposing pole to the (hu)man, however it can never be more than ‘a humanist abstraction’, ‘universal’ and ‘empty’ (Schneider 2005: 140). Chen argues that the animal only ‘survives in representation’ due to the concept’s ‘categorical contrast to “human”’ (2012: 100): ‘Animals serve as objects of almost fetishistic recuperation, recruited as signifiers of “nature”, or “the real”, and used to stand in for a sometimes conflicting array of other cultural meanings (including fear, discipline, sexuality, purity, wisdom, and so on)’ (ibid.). Similarly, Philo and Wilbert suggest that ‘if we concentrate solely on how animals are represented, the impression is that animals are merely passive surfaces on to which human groups inscribe imaginings and orderings of all kinds’ (2000: 5). Whilst they, similar to most geographers in the field, conceptualise animals as active agents of change and rupture of the human order in spatial movement, I argue that it is impossible for the animal to be an active agent, as the animal can never be anything other than an imaginary conception of the (hu)man. Whilst Philo and Wilbert pose the question of whether a “real” geography of animals [can] be developed, rather than an anthropocentric geography of humans in relation to animals’ (2000: 5), I argue that it cannot: Any conceptualisation and discussion of the animal is always already (hu)man and can thus never be of service to the animal.
To illustrate (hu)man privilege we need to examine the spaces inhabited by animals, who despite outnumbering us by far, must, I argue, still be considered minoritarian and oppressed. If we assume, as (hu)mans do, that no matter where we stand on the hierarchy of animacy, based on our race, class, gender, sexual orientation, ability and nationality we still are united through our evolutionary commonalities, we have to conclude that animals and plants are excluded from our group\textsuperscript{19}. Following my conception of phalloglogical specularisation, the animal can only exist as a part of (hu)man discourse formation within the imagination of the human. They are always already a product of the human speculative gaze. The animal, or animality, is as much a social construct as gender roles or nationalities. The bodies we describe as animals, however, perceive an utterly different reality to the one we create for them. Thus, the implications for the lived reality and embodied experience of those suffering from speciesism are just as material and authentic as the experiences of those who suffer from sexism and xenophobia, whilst the experiences in themselves are, of course, unique. Thus, when considering the ethical significance of nonhuman species we must acknowledge that ‘there are practical reasons for taking social construction into consideration in our moral reasoning’ as Daniel Elstein puts it: ‘Ideas can exist without referring to things that are real. Likewise, ideas can be morally relevant without their referents being morally relevant’ (Elstein 2003: 57). To illustrate the suffering that the concept of the animal as well as the social and material spaces given to animals cause, I examine four categories of animals. These categories have existed for centuries, but their predominance is a product of European neoliberal imperialism. They show that the animal, existing in any form, is always already a fetishised product of the human mind. It is widely acknowledged that it is humans who have the power to radically affect ‘the life conditions of all manner of animals’ (Philo and Wilbert 2000: 3; see also: Benton 1993: 68-69, Watts 2000) and by doing so enhance their own circumstances, deriving pleasure or profit.

The first category to be pointed out is that of pets: The (hu)man establishes a place for animals who are considered domesticated pets or, to be politically correct, companion animals\textsuperscript{20}. These are often part of a human family or are

\textsuperscript{19} A mapping out of a geography of plants would go beyond the scope of this work but must be considered equally valid to an analysis of animal spaces and even part of any anti-speciesist social geography. The later discussion of animals’ sentence and ability to consent to human interactions is to a large extent also applicable to a discussion of an ethical considerations of plant life.

\textsuperscript{20} Although the use of the term ‘companion animal’ is used by animal advocates, it is worth noting that this term still identifies the animal only in relation to the human, being the human’s companion.
otherwise placed in a friendly human-animal relationship. They are usually given a name and a home. They are to be coddled and are not contructed as edible or wearable. Similar to human-human relationships, these relationships might also be abusive and/or they can be broken up. Obviously, in circumstances like these, the animal will always make up the mistreated party, who will be abandoned, displaced and possibly killed without being able to give consent. Companion animals are bred and their sole value to humans lies within the pleasure their humans, often referred to as ‘owners’ can derive from them. Eurocentrally normative companion animals are, for example, cats and dogs or rabbits, whilst a goat or a pig could also be placed in such a relationship. This category is culturally dependent and not exclusive to only particular species, neither is it always applicable to a whole species. For example, instances of individual chimpanzees or individual dolphins, whose identities have been created by scientists, have left the humans studying them (within their own home space or the scientist's territory) under the impression of having built a consenting and mutual relationship with these animals.

Secondly, we create so called farm animals and spaces proper to them. Farm animals always undergo a strenuous if not violent breeding process. They might be named and also possibly homed in the private space of their human, or farmer. They might also be given a space that is separate from the farmer’s home and instead of naming them, he might just refer to them by numbers or simply apply mass terms that either describe the whole species, a particular breed or even just parts of their bodies. Even if a personal relationship is established between a human and a farm animal, the animal is to be exploited for the edible secretions (that is not poisonous and socially acceptable) of their body and more often than not, they are murdered, butchered and consumed by humans for clothing, decor or food for humans or their companion animals. This is the value humans ascribe to farm animals, which is solely measured by the profitability of their butchered body parts. Here the objectification process described earlier crosses the realm of the imaginary and the literally commodified animal becomes a currency to define the farmers worth and monetary profits. Various species are placed on farms, although every culture only exploits a number of animals for either their flesh or their skins and furs, this depends on factors such as which animals are indigenous to which region, which animals are given privileges by religious convictions, or simply which animals are in high demand on the global market.
Thirdly, we can distinguish otherwise imprisoned animals, who are not necessarily farmed, but more often than not forcibly bred. Again, these animals might be named or they might be referred to by numbers or in mass terms. They do not usually share a home with humans, however their cages and cells might be placed within the home environment of the human. The relationship the human has to imprisoned animals is purely voyeuristic. Imprisoned animals, just as companion and farm animals, depend on the human to be sustained and not abandoned, displaced, killed and butchered. However, their human owners might act upon any of these possibilities. The value to humans in imprisoning animals is that of a currency for power and status, reflected in the imprisonment and possibly training of ‘wild’ or ‘exotic’ animals, that is, those who are untamed or not indigenous. Both, public and private zoos and aquariums serve this purpose and the animals affected by this oppression are found within various species of reptiles, rodents, marine animals and birds. Further, imprisoned animals are also victims of vivisection.

Lastly, there exists a category for wild animals who are probably forced into actively engaged animal-human relationships far less than the animals in the three previous categories. They aren’t usually named, they aren’t coddled and are not placed within the immediate home of a human. Technically they aren’t dependent on a single human, however their homes often coincide with the environments of the human and might thus be considered a responsibility of a human community. The purpose this category fulfils is a combination of all of the above. Wild animals are used as attractions for spectators, they are used as test subjects for scientists, they are also hunted for their flesh, skins and bones, either to be consumed as food or to be displayed in private and public galleries. They might be bred or be subject to forms of population control, be it forced procreation or murder to reduce their impact upon the human community who is occupying their space. They might also be bred in a factory environment and then transported into the ‘wild’ so as to, for example, stock the countryside with so called ‘game’ to hunt.

An individual animal, or a whole species can also be made to occupy multiple categories at the same time or be moved between them. All four categories show that humans are in control of animals, including their dwellings, their food intake, bowel movements, sexual activity and their family/community structures. The animal is always only defined through the use value to humans. This does not necessarily only include positive, that is exploitable, value, but also a negative one, that is, for instance, disruptive or of harm to humans. We can now recognise that
the animal Other is not only always already existent in relation to the (hu)man but also that animals are made to be dependent on humans. This is due to human discourse controlling instances of animal life as well as creating and maintaining ecological territories to calculatively position animals. The well being and survival of all animals, including wild animals, is reliant on human actions. Not only do immediate one-to-one interactions put animals at the mercy of humans, but also the fact that humans have the power of entering and interfering with animals’ homes and lives at any given time. Humans do so, actively, by seeking out animals but also passively and possibly involuntarily. As humans we do not have a choice but to exist by negatively impacting our environment, by creating exploitative relationships with the soil we walk on, the animals whose homes we destroy to build our own, the plants we retrieve for nourishment and the water we steal to quench our thirst. The four categories described above illustrate the materiality of the speculative process of objectification and they expose the animal to be nothing more than a (hu)man construct of that very process. Animals can thus only ever exist in relation to humans and as part of the (hu)man. Hence, the animal can only be understood as a trope, one that the (hu)man’s existence depends upon.

Nevertheless, academic and activist social justice projects are increasingly concerned with returning to the natural world and granting space, in thought and action, to other species and the environment. The relations between humans and other species have always been scrutinised in philosophy, art and science. However the 20th century witnesses the emergence of the so called ‘animal turn’ including explorations of the ‘animal question’ and ‘animal perspective’ (Hartshorne 1939; Bennett 1960; Wolch and Emel 1995; 1998; Munich 1996, Wolch and Philo 1998; Whatmore 1999; Whatmore and Thorne 1998, Wolfe 2003). It is an interdisciplinary project merging the areas of philosophy, geography with animal behaviour and biology, set out to answer two questions: The first one being that of the animal’s effect upon humans, which often goes beyond the immediate intimate exchanges between humans and animals and exposes a ‘geography through which animals are able to have an effect on humans at-a-distance’ (Philo and Wilbert 2000: 2). This ‘external spatiality’ (ibid.) then entails questions for instance ‘about private property, the byproducts of economic activity, and the duty of the state to regulate agricultural activities in the interest of preventing pollution and preserving heathlands’ (ibid.). The absurdity of private property and its social construction is discussed in Chapter One where I demonstrate its phallogocentrism. The second question the animal turn
brings up, and the by far more subversive and radical one to ask, is that of how humans affect other species? And by extension, how much suffering is caused by humans? The latter is obviously the area I explore in my text. However, drawing upon perceptions of animals affecting and even disrupting human spaces is to be recognised as an intrinsic part of my work. Descriptions of the effect that animals have upon humans, when animals can only exist in one of the four categories illustrated above, are always anthropocentric and can only ever construct the animal as a fetish. Thus, making use of such descriptions (when stating for example, that pigs on a farm contaminate a 10 mile radius) (Philo and Wilbert 2000: 2), can only ever serve the human and reinforces the phallogocentric order.

The animal turn can be described as ‘a restorationist’s project of bringing animals back in’ (Brownlow 2000: 141), an assumption that ‘presupposes necessarily an appropriate ecological, social, political place for animals to be brought back into’ (ibid.). This place in academia as in activism is a (hu)man place, as thinking and acting occurs for or even on behalf of the animals. Creating a space within the humanities under the name of ‘critical animal studies’ is a rather inelegant solution to incorporate a compassionate and empathetic view about animals into the (hu)man world. We feel we need to ‘bring animals back’ because we occupy their territory, we have settled in their homes up to the point where we have completely eradicated or displaced them into one of the four categories mentioned above. All our attempts to return some space to the animal are fallible as long as we do not critically engage with our own dominance. We cannot let animals reclaim the parts of the world that were stolen from them by us whilst at the same time retaining our power and privilege.

The (hu)man differentiation between humans and nonhumans and the power that comes with this speciesist distinction, stems from the same historical context described in Chapter One, and it can by no means be considered a universal fact of life (Latour 1993: 120; Philo and Wilbert 2000). Philo and Wilbert appropriate Edward Said’s term ‘imaginative geography’ (Said 1978: 54 ff.) to visualise ways in which the (hu)man socially constructs the animal. On the one hand they observe discursive ways of ‘conceptual othering’, which ensures that ‘many human discourses contain within them a definite imaginative geography serving to position ‘them’ (animals) relative to ‘us’ (humans) (Philo and Wilbert 2000: 10). On the other hand, humans construct animals geographically ‘fixing them in worldly places and spaces different from those that we humans tend to occupy’ (2000: 11). I argue that
both the discursive and material objectification of Others are mutually reinforcing each other and are inextricably linked. This does not mean that they are fixed and unchangeable, in fact, as Alec Brownlow argues, ‘inclusions and exclusions are time- and space-dependent; what is ideologically “out of place” at one point in time and in a particular space may, for various cultural, political and social reasons, re-emerge as being suitable to that space at another time’ (2000: 155), which contributes to the concealment of the power structures responsible for the objectification of the Other. This becomes especially clear when noting that on a global scale various cultures construct animal identities differently (Joy 2010: 13). However, most human communities (those entangled in or removed from capitalism) are governed by (conscious or unconscious) human privilege, that is the preferential treatment of humans over all other species.

Human privilege allows for the care and protection of humans by humans and at the same time, allows for either neglect, abuse and/or murder of nonhumans. The justification of any form of oppressive system begins with precisely this othering of somebody based on difference. The othering then leads to exclusion from a community, which entails the loss of privileges: ‘The logic of exclusion works by starting with an assumption of difference, often an assumption of uniqueness, and then proceeds to question about the content or nature or worth of that difference’ (Dallery 1999: 253). As shown in the first chapter, the Enlightenment as an exercise in democracy and consensus reaching through reason and knowledge, seems to ‘undermine […] the theological anthropocentrism’ through the emergence of science and with it the widely acknowledged ‘classificatory differences between species […] [that] expanded the human universe’ (Franklin 1999: 12). The speculative exploration of inter-species differences lead to categorisation and objectification of nonhumans. As I have argued in previous chapters, despite the Enlightenment effort - or more precisely, due to the Enlightenment - kyriarchy, especially under neoliberal capitalism and globalisation, has grown stronger.

Obviously, the animal has always been defined in relation to humans, as this is the only condition the animal can exist in. Following Marx and Engels, we discover a possible origin of the dichotomy between human and animal which lies in the principle of production: Humans ‘begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence’ (Marx and Engels 1977: 42). If unable to produce, kyriarchy turns the subject into an object, that is, into a product instead of the producer. In other words, human incapability of
acknowledging the animal’s intrinsic value, transforms the animal into a fetishised commodity, figuratively in discursive practices as well as literally in the consumption of animal bodies. It is the inability to produce knowledge (in the eyes of the subject) that allows othering and objectification. As shown in Chapter One, the absence of phallogical capabilities, such as reasoning and proper enunciation and articulation, which are arbitrary and circumstantial, justifies the process of denying (complete) personhood which thereby fetishises the object as thing and commodity.

This problematic of the moral, and by extension political significance of the animal, also referred to as the animal question (Cavaliere 2001; Wolfe 2003), a speciesist and derogatory phrase that, although well-meaning, communicates self-serving anthropocentrism, calls for a simple solution originating from the humanities: Animal Rights. To prevent the oppression of animals by humans, humans must make animals representable within the public sphere so as to protect them before the law, as Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka lay out in their political theory of animal rights, Zoopolis (2011). They understand the rights-based approach as ‘a natural extension of the conception of moral equality underpinning the doctrine of human rights’ (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011: 4). Zoopolis advocates for the extension of inviolability onto non-humans and the authors make it explicitly clear that the goal must be abolition and liberation discourse and practice instead of ‘rights’ appropriation (2011: 49). As a stepping stone towards the end goal of making ‘animals independent of human society’ (2011: 7), and whilst still entangled in anthropocentrism, animals have to ‘be seen as possessing or approximating some aspect of this essence of humanity’ (2011: 33). Only so, can animals ‘achieve moral standing’ (ibid.).

However, the question arises of how to represent animals within the public sphere, considering that we only include the interests of those who can communicate their needs by means of the proper enunciative function, as discussed in Chapter Two. Donaldson and Kymlicka understand us, as humans, having a responsibility to ‘try to understand what animals are able to communicate to us about their needs and preferences, and to facilitate their realization of their own life projects’ (2011: 135). They are assuming that as humans we have the ability to try to understand animals so as to represent them. Further, they draw from this assumption, that we do indeed have the freedom to ‘use animals, or benefit from them […] under conditions that are consistent with their agency and their membership status’ (ibid.). Any such interaction, I argue however, would in fact be
violating the animal, as no human-animal-interaction can ever be consensual. To believe that we can understand animals (or in fact any Other) well enough to make political, life changing decisions on behalf of them, is a phallogical misconception arising from a speculative point of view of opening up, exposing, identifying and naming.

In a (hu)man-made world, animals will only ever exist within the four categories described above, which prohibits the animal from even expressing consent to human interactions in the first place. Although ‘animals are by nature barred from physical participation in the political process, their representations are frequently evoked in political discourse’, as Michael Woods (2000: 182) points out, who believes that ‘policy fields including agriculture, conservation and environmental health [are] where animals are intrinsically represented’ (Woods 2000: 182). It is indeed correct to assume that agricultural and environmental policy making has effects upon animals. However, the decision-making process within the public sphere that leads to these effects is always already deeply rooted in kyriarchy and can thus never be divorced from specularisation. Hence, it can never represent the interests of the animals as the animals only ever exist as a human fetish. Woods further notes that the occurrence of representation within the arena of the public sphere ‘is not just a re-presentation - the reproduction of an object in the same form in another arena but a translation, such that an object cannot be represented without taking on a new form’ (2000: 183). In this process the object to be presented for loses their identity and only exists as a hyperreal representation or a butchered replica, possibly not even resembling the now invisible original.

Whilst acknowledging the anthropocentrism of the public sphere, Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that to be represented within the political arena, it is not necessary to exercise political agency nor to be able to reason and deliberate (2011: 61). They make the case for a citizenship theory that ‘affirms values such as autonomy, agency, consent, trust, reciprocity, participation, authenticity, and self-determination and says that part of what it is to treat people as citizens is to treat them in ways that affirm and respect these values’ (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011: 58 f.). They envision a state incorporated personhood for animals that works within the categories that we impose for animals. They propose full citizenship for domestic animals (that is autonomy with the privileges and obligation of the justice system), sovereignty for wildlife (that is complete autonomy without the privileges
and obligations of the justice system) and denizenship for liminal animals (that is a ‘co-citizenship or external sovereignty’) (2011: 214).

Like Dunayer and many anti-speciesist feminists, I critique these approaches to animal rights that advocate personhood for animals, as they are speciesist in themselves. Dunayer understands the common arguments for expanding personhood, such as an animal’s autonomy (2004: 101), their genetic closeness to humans (2004: 103) and their similarity to human children (2004: 106), an argument that Donaldson and Kymlicka put forward as well (2011: 57), as perpetuating a hierarchy by relating different animals to humans. Arguing in such a way, as many amongst anti-speciesists celebrated animal rights proponents such as Peter Singer, Tom Reagan and Gary Francione do, is counterproductive and highly oppressive. Gary Francione for example, critiques the ecofeminist approach towards liberation, which Josephine Donovan and Carol J. Adams place within an ‘ethics of care’ (1996; see also Kheel 1996, Luke 1996) instead of ‘animal rights’. Francione argues that ‘animal rights theory is the only [emphasis by Francione] way to alter the status of animals as property, or “things”, and thereby eliminate the person/thing dualism that is the foundation of all institutionalized exploitation’ (2008: 187; see also Francione 1996). He fails to understand the complex interconnectedness of kyriarchal oppression and the mechanisms of specularisation. This leads to the homogenisation of the Other once the object is given elevated subject status, which is precisely the goal of ‘rights’. Rights discourse phallogically perpetuates the myth of an ideal subject against whom to measure everybody else. Animals who are counted as persons are only valued for their relation to the (hu)man. And although this entails the freedom from murder for some animals, bestowing personhood upon worthy animals is harming other animals who can never be similar enough to humans to evoke empathy. This rationale, of course, also further marginalises humans who do not possess the capabilities necessary to participate in the public sphere.

3.2. Interconnections Between Speciesism and Other Forms of Oppression

To further illustrate why animals should have our consideration as objects of oppression, I shall now focus on their entanglement in kyriarchic power structures. That is, power structures which work through the complex interdependence of mutually reaffirming socio-economic privileges and/or disadvantages. By examining
feminist conceptions of oppression, I show that speciesism must be considered as part of kyriarchy, which we as social justice scholars and activists, have taken upon ourselves to dismantle. For this purpose, I first present an analysis of oppression that shall serve as the infrastructure for the workings of specularisation, that is the organised space in which objectification takes place. Then, I will consider different forms of oppression, such as sexism or racism, and point out their connections to speciesism. This shall lead me to the conclusion that only by incorporating species into our framework of a politics of identity and social justice, can we truly dismantle all strands of kyriarchy.

As shown in the introduction to this work, kyriarchy can only exist through oppressive power relations between subject and object. In fact, the subject’s existence depends on the othering and the commodification and consumption of the object. Irigaray’s distinction between the A and the Not-A is used in many theories of the oppressed, where the A represents the dominant (Adams 2004: 39) or the majoritarian which makes Not-A the subordinate (Adams 2004: 39) or minoritarian. The opposition of humans and nonhumans exemplifies this arbitrary juxtapositioning of the authoritative with the subservient perfectly. In most feminist thinking however, species is not considered as a possible identity dimension. If included at all in distinctions between the privileged and the disadvantaged, species is usually grouped within ‘nature’ as the Not-A opposite to ‘culture’ (Haraway 1991, 2008; Braidotti 2013) or simply not referred to as an identity dimension at all. Cathryn Pauly Morgan illustrates this idea of the distinction between A and Not-A with a drawing of a wheel: All identity dimensions that allow individuals to participate in the dominant discourse formation are positioned within the top half of the circle, whilst those marginalised by the hegemonic forces make up the bottom half and find themselves in the resistance (Morgan 1996 appendix A). The identity dimensions Morgan incorporates into the taxonomy are continuously being adapted by different feminist scholars and activists.

I find such a demonstration and exposition of identity dimensions useful for two reasons: Firstly, it exposes, identifies and names the imperceptible\(^{21}\) dominant identities that own and reproduce the (cultural and social) capital which allows them to be in a privileged position. The ownership of this capital is always unearned and privileged positions in society are simply granted to individuals who represent the majoritarian hegemony. Being able to identify these power holders is crucial for

\(^{21}\) I shall present and in-depth analysis of the imperceptibility of dominant identities in Chapter Four.
social justice advocates to allow for the confrontation and challenging of privilege, which ultimately will lead to its complete deconstruction. Secondly, a taxonomy of this sort allows for those participating in the resistance (either by dismantling their own privilege or by being on the margins themselves) to identify their allies. This can be used as a strategic gesture in which greater numbers might allow for stronger organising of the resistance, but it also functions as a sign against kyriarchy by proving that those objectified by it cannot be isolated, fragmented and even butchered so as to be consumed.

To stress the importance of considering species as an identity dimension I contribute to the many lists of oppressive dichotomies that numerous feminist scholars and activists generate (Chen 2012: 3; Braidotti 2013; Haraway 1991; Morgan 1996). Although these lists often do recognise the animal’s position as one of the lowest on the hierarchy, not many of them engage with this fact from an anti-speciesist point of view. An exception can be found in Adams’ work (2010) as well as in Christine Garcia’s illustration of human entitlement (2011). I present here an alphabetised list of the kyriarchal dimensions of oppression and the subject (A) and objects (Not-A) it produces. This is by no means an exhaustive list and many of the kyriarchal dimensions also have subcategories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kyriarchal Dimension</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>Not-A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ableism</td>
<td>Non-disabled, enabled person</td>
<td>visibly and/or invisibly disabled person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ageism</td>
<td>adult</td>
<td>elderly person, child, infant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carnism</td>
<td>meat eater</td>
<td>vegetarian, and vegan person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cissexism</td>
<td>cisgender person</td>
<td>transgender, non-binary, agender, intersex and gender fluid person, gender non-conforming, gender-deviant and genderqueer person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept</td>
<td>Label 1</td>
<td>Label 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-semitism</td>
<td>Christians, Atheists</td>
<td>Jewish person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classism</td>
<td>person in upper-middle class</td>
<td>working class person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colourism</td>
<td>light or pale</td>
<td>dark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educationalism</td>
<td>qualified person</td>
<td>unqualified person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurocentrism</td>
<td>person of European descent (coloniser)</td>
<td>native or aboriginal person (colonised)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genderism</td>
<td>masculine male, and feminine female person</td>
<td>feminine male, masculine female, agender, non-binary, gender fluid, genderqueer, gender non-conforming, and gender-deviant person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterosexism</td>
<td>heterosexual person</td>
<td>lesbian, gay, bisexual, pansexual, asexual, queer person and person identifying with an otherwise marginalised orientation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamophobia</td>
<td>Christians, Atheists</td>
<td>Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monogamism</td>
<td>monogamous person</td>
<td>polyamorous person, relationship anarchist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natalism</td>
<td>fertile person, parent</td>
<td>infertile, childless and childfree person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>person within a state</td>
<td>person outside a state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racism and White Supremacy</td>
<td>white person</td>
<td>person of colour and person identifying with an ethnic minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexism</td>
<td>man</td>
<td>woman, intersex person, genderqueer, genderfluid, non-binary, agender, gender-deviant person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speciesism</td>
<td>human</td>
<td>animal, plant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As useful as such a depiction of different kyriarchal dimensions is, for the above named reasons, we must stress that they can never be treated in isolation as every individual occupies multiple spaces in this taxonomy simultaneously. This means that one can be A and not-A at the same time. That is, one can occupy a privileged ‘A’ space within the kyriarchal dimension of speciesism, but at the same time be oppressed within the dimension of classism. Further, one can also occupy the A and not-A simultaneously within a single one of the kyriarchal dimensions, such as heterosexism. If one is in fact pansexual but presents as - or rather is falsely perceived as - heterosexual (for example by displaying heterosexual affection), this position can grant privilege in certain circumstances. Marilyn Frye (1983) uses the analogy of an imprisoned bird to illustrate why it is significant to examine all kyriarchal dimensions in their interconnectedness. In her analogy the cage that keeps the bird imprisoned, that is, unfree to express themselves, symbolises kyriarchy, whilst the individual wires of the cage represent the individual kyriarchal dimensions. Although Frye uses the bird in a cage as a metaphor for freedom and resistance to oppression, from an anti-speciesist point of view it becomes obvious that the bird need not function as a mere substitute for the experience of oppression. In fact, using a bird in such a way perpetuates the fetishisation of non-human species. An imprisoned bird in themselves strives for liberty and can thus not only figuratively represent the oppressed but also literally, in and of themselves. She states:

‘If you look very closely at just one wire in the cage, you cannot see the other wires. If your conception of what is before you is determined by this myopic focus, you could look at that one wire, up and down the length of it, and be unable to see why a bird would not just fly around the wire any time it wanted to go somewhere. There is no physical property of any one wire, nothing that the closest scrutiny could discover, that could reveal how a bird could be inhibited or

22 ‘it’, whilst obviously referring to the bird here, is not an accurate description of a living individual.
harmed by it except in the most accidental way. It is only when you
step back, stop looking at the wires one by one, microscopically, and
take a macroscopic view of the whole cage, that you can see why the
bird does not go anywhere; and then you will see it in a moment’
(Frye 1983: 4).

Frye’s conception of oppression as a complex system of mutually reinforcing
components, emphasises that it is impossible to view each of the aforementioned
dimensions of subordination in isolation. Instead, to understand objectification and
marginalisation, we must identify each strand of kyriarchy and at the same time
explore the ways these strands work together to ensure the privileged position of
the subject. Patricia Hill Collins describes this complex interdependence of different
forms of oppression in terms of a ‘matrix of domination’ (2000: 227 f.). Hill Collins
chooses to use the concept of a matrix, as it ‘encapsulates the universality of
intersecting oppressions as organized through diverse local realities’ (2000: 228).
The idea of ‘intersecting oppressions’ is first introduced by Kimberle Crenshaw, who
conceptualises intersectionality, on the one hand to visualise this
interconnectedness between different strands of oppression, and on the other hand,
mainly to point out that within one kyriarchal dimension there are many differences
in experiencing oppression. Intersectionality is continuously re-theorised and
reappropriated as Evelien Geerts and Iris van der Tuin show, sketching out a
genealogy of the concept (2013: 172 ff.). Although both thinkers critique its
groundedness in representationalism which is a useful consideration for a
post-representational and thus post-phallicocratic world, I understand the term and its
belonging to representationalism as helpful in identifying current oppressive
structures. Intersectionality, in its original use as intended by Crenshaw, is
designated to describe the experience of working class women of colour, when
faced with institutional and physical violence (Crenshaw 1989, 1991). Consequently,
a white middle-class woman’s understanding of patriarchy and the whole of
kyriarchy, as well as her attempt to resist with feminist politics are of little or no help
to the emancipation of women who suffer from intersectionality, that is from multiple
kyriarchal dimensions intersecting at the same time. Not only is the isolation of
categories of oppression useless in this sense, it is also harmful to individuals
suffering from intersectionality. As Crenshaw writes:

‘Because ideological and descriptive definitions of patriarchy are
usually premised on white female experiences, feminists and others
informed by feminist literature may make the mistake of assuming
that since the role of the Black woman in the family and in other Black institutions does not always resemble familiar manifestations of patriarchy in the white community, Black women are somehow exempt from patriarchal norms’ (1989: 156).

Thus, by examining Crenshaw’s concept of intersectionality we realise that in viewing resistance struggles in isolation from one another, we also create hierarchies within them (Crenshaw 1989: 161 ff.). As a result, one struggle is given more significance over another and so harms an already marginalised group by preventing them from participation in a struggle they identify with, simply because they are additionally marginalised. Such is the case, for example, in women’s spaces where racial differences marginalise women of colour. Crenshaw also proposes a solution to remedy the overlap of kyriarchal values into spaces of resistance. A top-down distribution of power within social justice movements can be simply avoided by giving space to and ‘addressing the needs and problems of those who are most disadvantaged’ (1989: 167). Obviously, this necessitates a withdrawal of the privileged and dominant participators from leading positions within the resistance space and so entails a radical ‘restructuring and remaking the world where necessary’ (ibid). Such a restructuring can be conceptualised by what Deleuze and Guattari imagine as the rhizome, where certain points of intensification alter according to the malleability of the terrain, thus throwing our social geography into constant flux where everything and everyone can be connected to all else (Deleuze and Guattari 2011: 7 f.). Withdrawing one’s own privilege then entails giving up one’s self, that is one’s singularity, to a multiplicity, which, as Deleuze and Guattari write, ‘has neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions […]. There are no points or positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a structure, tree or root. There are only lines’ (2011: 8 f.).

Crenshaw’s insights into the workings of oppression are useful, so as to stress the urgency of viewing oppressive systems as having points of intersection. Further this implies the interconnectedness of different oppressions and so exposes hierarchies that work within them. To apply Crenshaw’s terminology of intersectionality to the anti-speciesist struggle (or any other social justice movement that is not working for the liberation of black women) however, would be appropriative. Now that the significance and urgency of intersectionality is clear, I continue to refer to the interconnectedness of kyriarchal dimensions of oppression and their complex inter-relationality. To encourage feminists and their allies to include species as an identity dimension intertwined in this complex structure of
privilege and oppression, and thus worth of moral consideration, I shall analyse the extent to which animals as a not-A species are entangled within these structures. The idea of incorporating anti-speciesist struggles into social justice scholarship and activism is often met with disdain (Jones 2010), as animals are still largely categorised hierarchically lower and the idea of treating animals in a dignified manner whilst many marginalised humans are treated inhumanely still carries connotations of disrespect and degradation. To degrade any other marginalised group is obviously not my intention here. It is also not my cause to state that animal suffering is more important than the suffering of human groups. Instead, I am showing the interconnectedness of similarly valid forms of resistance, whose advocates could stand in solidarity together, so as to become more unified in the face of kyriarchy.

To expose the infrastructure that allows for specularisation to objectify the Other, I now show in what ways kyriarchy materialises the concepts of the (hu)man and the animal and what effects the separation of subject from object within an imaginary geography has upon the real. Doing so will highlight the urgency of incorporating anti-speciesism into the feminist discourse. Hierarchies, such as the one described at the beginning of this chapter, ‘entail power-over, and the power of one individual over another inevitably support oppression’ (Kemmerer 2012: 5). Thus, as Lisa Kemmerer writes, ‘in seeking to stand above nonhuman females, women help to maintain a hierarchy through which they are held below men’ (ibid.). In fact, by striving to become majoritarian through the Othering of animals, women perpetuate kyriarchal specularisation (Kemmerer ibid.; Scholteijer 1995: 257; Adams 1993: 204). A very obvious, and by vegan feminists often applied argument for the solidarity between human women and animals, is the inherent misogyny of kyriarchy that is perpetrated by men against women but also by humans against animals. Animals who are assigned female at birth, suffer from enormous violations of their bodies simply because they were born with exploitable reproductive organs. Consequently animals who lack the ability to produce eggs, be impregnated or to lactate, be it due to the nature of their sex organs or due to their age or health conditions, are also discriminated against.

This makes animal exploitation a feminist issue. The struggle for consent and autonomy over one’s body is an inherently feminist issue, as the violation of bodies is inherently patriarchal. In the following paragraph I take the space to bear witness to the violence perpetrated in the name of masculinity and
heteronormativity. It is part of an anti-speciesist practice to give testimony of the cruelty that we, as humans, are guilty of. However, becoming anti-speciesist also entails dealing with the secondary trauma (van Dernoot Lipsky and Burk 2009) and the post-traumatic stress that arises from bearing witness (Jones 2007). Hence, the next paragraph, although underlining the material manifestations of the interconnections between misogyny and speciesism, is not essential to follow the argument I make in my work and can thus be omitted by the reader for reasons of self-care.

Many vegan feminists have compiled data that attests to the global physical violence perpetrated by humans, that is farmers, butchers, zoo keepers, scientists, hunters and fishers, animal trainers in circuses and aquariums, and those who buy their products from supermarkets, travel agents, pet stores and even many shelters (Spiegel 1988; Adams 2010: ch. 2, ch. 5; Joy 2011: ch. 3; Meadows 2010; Pachirat: 2011; Kemmerer 2011, 2012; Hamad, 2013; Socha 2013). The most addressed pattern of violence against animals is that perpetrated by farmers and butchers, however most animal industries are equally violent in their treatment of all non-human species. Imprisoned animals usually have to undergo debeaking, declawing or other procedures of mutilation (this also generally applies to organic and free-range farms). This is, so as to prevent them from killing themselves and each other with their beaks or claws as an expression of their fight or flight response to the danger they are subjected to. Because hens, sows and cows (to name only a few examples) are assigned female when born, a life-long cycle of forced impregnation, giving birth and, in the case of cows, lactating, awaits them. The industrial term for a forced impregnation device is called a ‘rape rack’, and it takes different forms depending on the species that is being violated (not only farm animals but companion animals are often forced onto a rape rack, too). Having given birth, sows are separated from their young through metal bars that act as a tight cage around the mother, making her unable to stand up so that she remains lying on her side for weeks at a time, so as for her children to gain access to her milk. Once old enough, these children are either forced into the same cycle or killed immediately to be processed into food. After giving birth, cows are usually immediately separated from their children. The male assigned offspring is imprisoned in a cell that has just enough room for them to stand up in, until they get transported to death factories. Female assigned cows, if not separated from their mothers, are forcefully prohibited from reaching their mothers breast by means of a
spiked nose ring. This way, every time the child approaches the mother, she will be in pain and will disallow her offspring to approach her. The mother’s milk is then stolen by humans in a highly harmful industrial milking process. Just as male assigned calves are not profitable, male assigned chicks are disposed of through various mass murder methods. Immediately after hatching, the ‘sexing’ process takes place, through which the male chickens are picked out in numbers of hundreds or thousands and are either shredded or ground up in an industrialised process where they are thrown onto a conveyor belt that transports them to their brutal deaths. Another option, often used by smaller farms is to either gas them, suffocate them by means of a deadly foam, or simply to throw them into rubbish containers.

The German government is aiming to implement a technology that allows for the sex-determination of an embryonic chicken. The, amongst the scientific and animal activist community, highly celebrated technology is aimed at reducing the numbers of killed male chickens, by terminating their development during their embryonic stage (Leipzig University 2015). The idea is being developed by Leipzig University veterinarian scientist Prof. Dr. Maria-Elisabeth Regina Krautwald-Junghanns. The betrayal of the female animal by Krautwald-Junghanns as a woman and a professional who is trained in medical care for birds is obscene. Her technology affirms human exploitation of hens simply for their reproductive organs.

Not only the meat, dairy and egg industries but any profitable institution that depends on animals will always rely on the exploitability of those assigned female, so as to be able to reproduce the suffering endlessly. The interconnectedness between human women’s oppression and that of animals also becomes clear through making perceptible the connection between masculinity (the material manifestation of phallogocentric discourse formation) and speciesist behaviour such as hunting and cannibalism (noticing that from an anti-speciesist perspective we strive to abolish the concept of species23, the eating of animal-flesh as well as their excretions can only be described as such). In their extensive study of carnivore men’s attitudes towards vegan men, entitled Vegan Sexuality: Challenging Heteronormative Masculinity through Meat-free Sex (2010) Annie Potts and Jovian Parry describe the ways in which vegan men are dismissed, ridiculed and objectified

23 ‘Abolishing the concept of species’ refers to the rejection of this particular social construct and its significance in an anthropocentric society. It does not imply homogenisation of the animal and the human. In fact, I maintain that it is a human responsibility to honour species difference so as to be able to bear witness to human supremacy and domination as well as the suffering inflicted upon animals.
by carnists who put vegans’ virility into question. The consumption of animal-flesh can then be taken as an indicator of one’s ability to properly use and apply the phallogocentric enunciative function discussed in Chapter Two. This is reflected by Adams when she refers to a survey of a 20th century working class community in London, stating that ‘where poverty forced a conscious distribution of meat, men received it. Many women emphasized that they had saved the meat for their husbands. They were articulating the prevailing connections between meat eating and the male role’ (Adams 2010: 51). She continues to state that in patriarchal circumstances ‘women are the food preparers’, thus they ‘accede to the dietary demands of their husbands, especially when it comes to meat’ (Adams 2010: 56).

Many feminists identify a sustenance hierarchy, with material and affective consequences. On the one hand this hierarchy also reinforces the linguistic animacies, described at the beginning of this chapter. On the other hand, such a hierarchy has practical manifestations, such as ensuring the patriarch’s nourishment through delivering him the most valuable foods, whilst those marginalised will be left with less desired foods (Douglas 1972; Adams 2010: 61; Franklin 1999: 153). Erika Cudworth for example observes that masculinity is associated with the consumption of so called ‘red meats’ (2010: 81) whilst femininity is (re)produced through the consumption of so called ‘white meats, fish and dairy products’ (ibid.). ‘White meat’ is associated with the flesh of smaller animals, such as birds, who can inflict very little damage upon their human killers when being resistant to slaughter. They are thus approached as more docile and easier to handle. A similar rationale explains why fish are feminised. Milk products do not connote gory labour (that is only in discourse, whilst in practice the dairy industry thrives off the murder of male assigned calves and the suffering of female assigned cows) which can be interpreted as a reason for their feminisation. Whereas ‘red meat’ is associated with bigger, even wild animals who must be cleverly tricked to be tamed, or skillfully murdered during a hunt. Skills such as ‘hunting, butchering, sacrificial preparation, herd protection and corralling’ are associated, with ‘key masculine rites of passage’ (Franklin 1999: 145), and the so called ‘carving’, that is the mutilation of a carcass, that usually takes place on larger pieces of meat, is usually the patriarch’s task (Franklin 1999: 153).

Indeed, in Eurocentric cultures, men tend to express more positive attitudes towards hunting, than women (Wilson and Peden 2015) and it is usually experienced as a masculine bonding activity that reinforces virility. Hunting, being a
predominantly male and exclusively masculine institution however, must have its members protect their heterosexual status. It does so through Othering Not-A’s. Thus in hunting and speciesism in general, the same rationale applies as within any patriarchal institution dominated by phallogocentrism, which has to use (cis and hetero) sexism to confirm the dominant position of cis hetero men who interact exclusively with cis hetero men. The institution of hunting underlines the connection between speciesism and sexism in particular, as many parallels between the hunt and heteronormative sexual intercourse can be drawn. A patriarchal understanding of intercourse presupposes the ‘pursuit of orgasm [otherwise] sex typically is thought to have no meaning or narrative structure; without the intent to kill, the hunt, we are told, has none as well’ (Kheel 1995: 91). Adams draws an even more graphic picture that points out this parallel with the following narrative that could read as she states, as pornography, a testimony of a sexual assault survivor, or even as a hunting story: ‘The sexual conquest of the object, identifying and stalking the prey, the thrill of capture, degrading, ejaculating in, or killing the victim, and the orgiastic triumph over a defeated victim’ (Adams 2004: 90). These discursive similarities between masculine dominance during heteronormative intercourse and during hunting, are, of course, materialised in the similar real life experiences of those involved in these acts. Further, as Alison Lance, an experienced hunt saboteur, notes, masculinity is also reinforced during a hunt through the use of blinds:

‘A blind is usually a wood shack designed to blend into the natural environment, where a fearless hunter/murderer sits with his penis in one hand and his trusty weapon in the other. As a thirsty individual arrives for a drink of water, the fearless hunter, hiding in his blind, just a few feet away, opens fire. Perverted hunters build these blinds next to watering holes to assure victims – a hunter in a blind can kill without even letting go of his penis’ (Lance 2011: 162).

These so called blinds allow for phallogocentrism, the language of kyriarchy, to materialise even before the act of killing, during the hunt. They are a space for men to indulge in their power. The kill then, as Marti Kheel notes above, serves as the final demonstration of sexual power. As Adams writes: ‘Male sexual power involves displaying power, including the power to degrade. By ritualizing the killing of Not-A’s, men reaffirm their status as A’s. Hunting […] provides the compensation
of dominance to those who themselves may be caught within the machinery of culture’ (Adams 2004: 95).

To return to a discussion of a hierarchical division in food consumption, we can assume that it is a result of what Adams terms the ‘sexual politics of meat’, through which the consumption of animal flesh becomes an expression of gender and gendered power relations. As Adams writes: ‘Species is gendered (animals are feminized) and [...] woman, who carries gender identification, is animalized. Men transcends species; woman bears it. So do the other animals’ (Adams 2004: 149). The misogyny that Potts’ and Parry’s study of carnist men’s attitudes towards vegans recognises, also becomes evident within our language and the food politics that inform the hierarchy of sustenance. Flesh is more desirable than plants, as the latter imply passivity, inactivity, monotony and dullness (Adams 2010: 60). These are, as the genealogy in the first chapter shows, historically feminised characteristics. This is in stark contrast to masculinised traits of actively partaking in various public pursuits, be it within politics, economics, or sports and entertainment.

To refuse the consumption of othered bodies is then to refuse to validate masculinity: ‘Men who choose not to eat meat repudiate one of their masculine privileges’ (2010: 63). Similarly, women who refuse to serve animal flesh and excretions at the same time refuse to nurture masculine privilege and patriarchal values. As Patrice Jones writes:

‘Women make most food purchases and preparation decisions. If women are going to both go vegan and withstand the demands of male family members for meat, women must be emboldened to resist their own subordination and at the same time reject the oppression of nonhuman individuals. In other words, animal advocates must balance the demand that women give up their power over nonhuman animals by encouraging them to seize their power among human animals’ (Jones 2011: 50 f.).

In fact, women’s delivery of animal-flesh can be understood as a way to exist and to become woman, in Irigaray’s sense. When considering specularisation, and the assumption made in the introduction to this work, that woman can only exist within man (just as animal can only exist within human), by refusing to participate in speciesism on men’s behalf women refuse to identify their existence in relation to patriarchy, that is in relation to their husbands, sons, uncles, grandfathers and brothers. By refusing to serve men carcasses, women thus allow themselves to exist independently in and of themselves. Further, this very liberation is
simultaneously also applied upon the animals they no longer use as a commodity to validate masculinity.

In addition to rejecting speciesism and masculinity at the same time, veganism is ‘a way of resisting heteronormativity, since meat-eating for men and, perhaps to a lesser degree women, is tied to the rhetorical as well as the actual reproduction of heterosexual norms and practices’ (Simonsen 2012: 55). This makes the anti-speciesist practice of veganism intrinsically queer, as Rasmus Rhabek Simonsen argues, whereas I would argue that veganism dismantles aspects of heteronormativity but does not imply queerness. Patrice Jones also identifies the connection between animal cruelty and hegemonic occurrences of cis- and heteronormative patriarchal practices of reproduction, when Jones states: ‘Most of the stereotypes by which we excuse the exploitation of animals began as justifications for animal husbandry, the success of which depends entirely on the ability to control reproduction. Homophobia serves the same essential function for patriarchy, policing gender roles so that it will be easier for men to exercise reproductive control over women’ (Jones 2010: 198). Queering food politics not only through discourse but also in its most practical manifestation, happens through vegansexuality. Potts’ and Parry’s study (2010) develops such an understanding of veganism as queer. Their study is inspired by the neologism ‘vegansexual’ as used in media, along with the discriminatory reactions to those who out themselves as vegansexuals, that is those who experience sexual attraction towards others who also reject animal exploitation whilst at the same time experiencing sexual aversion to carnists (Potts and Parry 2010). Veganism, and specifically vegansexuality must then be understood as the act of queering food politics as well as disrupting species hierarchy. As shown above and stated by Simonsen, the consumption of animal flesh is ‘tied to the discursive production of masculinity—and not simply in terms of aberration or one’s momentary preference for a certain food object’ (Simonsen 2012: 52). In the same way, the act of abstaining from the consumption of animals’ bodies and their secretions ‘comes to constitute a set of gendered acts that are linked to the whole of what signifies as male (and female), which certainly includes sexuality’ (ibid.).

Other scholars, such as Chen, construct a queer Animality, where the orthodox boundaries between human and animal geographies are disrupted. Without applying an anti-speciesist analysis of such an undertaking however, the queering of animality (or humanity for that matter, by making animality a part of the
(hu)man, as we often encounter in post- and especially transhuman discourse) 
(Haraway; 2008; Parikka 2010; Braidotti 2013) becomes corrupted by the (hu)man 
and turns into a mere intensification of already existent hegemonic ontologies. Chen 
describes the relationship between a chimpanzee and his ‘lifelong legal owner and 
human companion [who] shared wine with him in the evening, [who] gave him 
Xanax and other pharmaceuticals, and [who] shared his bed’ (2012: 123). Further, 
Chen describes comments condemning this relationship, as ‘indignant’ and 
‘reminiscent of the enforcement of homosexual sodomy laws in the United States’ 
(ibid.). Chen’s argument here approaches the absurd: The indignation caused by a 
human relationship with a non-consenting, drugged and otherwise abused member 
of a different species is more than justified, whilst the indignation towards 
consensual homosexual relationships must by all means be condemned. Chen 
imagines queerness where there is nothing other than perversely intensified 
(hu)manness, simply because the inherent speciesism of displacing animals into 
human environments and ‘owning’ them as property is rendered invisible through 
the objectification of the animal.

The most striking part of Chen’s narrative from an anti-speciesist 
perspective, is the fact that in the instant that the chimpanzee found the agency to 
resist oppression, humans ended his life: The chimpanzee one night, attacked his 
owner for which he was shot dead (ibid.). It is not within the forced relationship 
between an animal and a human (and every human-animal relationship will be 
forced, as the animal can only ever exist within the human’s world) where we find 
the queer. Rather, the queer lies within the denouncement of this very relationship. 
Queer animality, that is queerness expressed through an intensification of already 
perverse, but majoritarian and thus not perceived as such, human-animal 
relationships, only contributes to a fetishisation of the animal Other. At the same 
time the rejection and condemnation of human-animal relations, and with it of the 
human-inflicted animal suffering, might be seen to fetishise this very moment of 
death. In contrast to the fetishisation of the animal Other, the fetishisation of the 
animal’s death, that is the utilisation of the animal’s death for purposes of 
self-identification within the resistance movement and thus the minoritarian Not-A 
position, is a necessary and only temporary one, as Simonsen points out:

‘Perhaps it is even this “morbid” and “stubborn” preoccupation with 
the death of nonhuman others that renders veganism so markedly 
queer. The anxious disavowal of death itself by some vegans 
appears, to my mind, namely to prove this point. Do we, then,
fundamentally and continually run the risk of fetishizing the loss of the nonhuman? Veganism itself relies on the sacrifice of animals in order to sustain itself as an identity-defining project, since the goal of veganism - dismantling the animal agriculture industry - would make veganism redundant as a consequence’ (Simonsen 2012: 71).

Taking into consideration the gendered construction of the consumption or non-consumption of animal bodies and secretions, based on kyriarchal dichotomies of A and not-A, we must arrive at the conclusion that anti-speciesism is part of an anti-oppressive practice. Thus, ‘if one opposes speciesism, one must oppose other violently enacted binaries such as those that maintain systems of homophobia, heterosexism, Queer assimilation and transphobia’ (Loadenthal 2012: 97 f.) and vice versa.

Phallogocentrism is also expressed through imperialist structures, where dominance is not only enacted through cis hetero masculinity, but even more so through whiteness. White supremacy and its inherent oppression of people of colour, just as male dominance, is also inextricably linked to speciesism. Before going into more detail on the connections between speciesism and racism, it is worth noting that firstly, writing (and reading) about racism whilst being part of the oppressive group (just as writing as a human about the animal struggle), must always be interlinked with understanding one’s own privilege and undoing it by removing oneself. Secondly, it is worth reiterating that, just as pointing out the connections between gender oppression and speciesism does not imply the equalisation of suffering or the utilisation of one struggle to point out the other, neither does illustrating the connection between racism and speciesism imply the equalisation of the cruelty endured by people of colour and that endured by animals. Rather, as Breeze Harper puts it, various othered groups have in common that ‘they share the same basic relationship - that between oppressor and oppressed’ (Harper 2010a: xiv; see also Spiegel 1988: 25). Colonisation and enslavement are justified by imposing similar belief systems to the ones operating in other forms of oppression: They work through objectification. The A subject position is taken by the white human, who objectifies people of colour. This process works in a similar way to the animalisation of femininity described by Adams: The subject objectifies the Other by constructing them as not-(hu)man-enough.

Harper for example, points out the ‘connections among racism, racialization, and whiteness on the one hand, and people’s treatment and attitudes toward nonhuman animals [...] on the other’ (Harper 2011: 76), by recalling the trauma
 Europeans inflicted upon Africans, which is still deeply manifested in today’s African American experience of white supremacy: ‘Pro-slavery whites deeply believed that Africans could not feel pain; that we were believed to be “just like animals” who had no feelings, spirits, souls; we were just machines available to serve the purposes of white America’ (Harper 2011: 76). Racism operates similarly to speciesism which objectifies Not-A species and patriarchy which objectifies Not-A genders. Racism objectifies, and thus depersonifies people of colour who are not granted A rights in form of citizenship. Instead, in its most obvious form expressed through slavery, racism in fact thingyfied people of colour to the extent that they were merely given property status, so as to be owned and consumed. As Michelle R. Loyd-Paige observes:

‘In order to justify the brutality of slavery, the oppressors deemed Africans as less-than-human and undeserving of decent housing, education, food, health care, justice, or respect. African women who were enslaved were often used as breeders for a new crop of slaves. It was not uncommon for Africans who were too sick, too old, or too rebellious to be killed if it was thought cheaper to replace them than to keep them’ (Loyd-Paige 2010: 5; see also Spiegel 1988: 24).

Such an understanding of slavery makes visible the most obvious interconnection between different forms of oppression. The enslavement of another is possible when Othering takes place, which is the reason for there being ‘little or no difference between the uses of domestic animals and slaves’ (Aristotle 1883: xii) as Aristotle already remarks. Slavery in all its forms presumes a process of ‘domestication’ (Howell 2000: 51), which reduces the human ‘to the status of pets’ (ibid.; see also Munich 1996). Any form of slavery is thus rooted in, as Harper writes, ‘our relationships with, and constructions of, “the place of the animal”’ (Harper 2011: 76).

Discursive constructs such as that of ‘ownership’ and ‘domestication’, of course have real-life consequences for human conditions of oppression, and specifically for the conditions of people of colour. Whereas these conditions and circumstances vary depending on the strand of kyriarchy at hand, they are all results of phallogocentric specularisation and so manifest themselves through objectification and dehumanisation/animalisation.
To gain a more sophisticated understanding of the reasons why anti-racist and anti-imperialist practice go hand in hand with an anti-speciesist one, we must return to an analysis of food politics. This is not so as to utilise an anti-racist practice to advance the anti-speciesist cause, but rather, so as to show that an ethical vegan practice must include the undoing of white supremacy. As I have shown before, food politics entail a hierarchical categorisation of food supplies and their distribution in accordance to a hierarchy of animacy. This hierarchy does not only include a gendered power distribution but also a racialised one, which becomes obvious when examining imperialist food politics. A possible starting point for imperialist food politics can be identified with the introduction of the term ‘cannibalism’, which during colonialism comes to describe the ‘ultimate savage act’ (Adams 2010: 55), that justifies the ‘defeat and enslavement [of the colonised] at the hands of civilized, Christian whites’ (ibid.). Not only does such an understanding of cannibalism catapult food consumption into a racialised hierarchy but also does it carry speciesist connotations that further contribute to the Othering of animals as an outgroup to humans. Further, this development distinguishes animal husbandry, as we know it in neoliberal times of globalisation, as a European invention.

In fact, Africa, Asia and South America until colonised, as Adrian Franklin writes, sustained themselves on pulses and pulse-grain, ‘the most ubiquitous global forms of high quality protein’ (1999: 132). It is the colonial settlers who imposed mass animal exploitation upon other continents Franklin informs us:

‘The Spanish conquistadors in Mexico were followed by colonist pastoralists who quickly took over agricultural land such as the famously fertile area of irrigated intensive agriculture in the Valle de Mezquital in highland central Mexico. Spanish livestock began grazing this valley in the 1520s, shepherded by African slaves. By 1565 there were 2 million sheep in the valley and between 1576 and 1581 the local Indians were decimated by an epidemic brought by the colonists’ (Franklin 1999: 129).

This of course leads to the degradation of the native flora and fauna (ibid.). Increasingly more land has to be taken over and ever more people have to be enslaved to work on plantations and ranches to sustain the ever growing numbers of animals to be fed, kept and killed for the indulgence of white imperialists everywhere in the world. Before today’s animal industry could gain its ubiquitous status, the supply in animal carcasses was limited. As a result, animal flesh has been constructed as the food consumed by the dominant group. Beliefs such as ‘if
meat supply is limited, white people should get it’ (Adams 2010: 53) rely on the previously discussed myths that consuming animals bestows virility upon men and re-affirms their masculinity and the power that comes with it, making them more (hu)man, that is it confirming not only their masculinity but also their ability and whiteness. Further, the triple exploitation, that of the animals, the land they use and the slaves that keep the land and animals, allowed for a diet heavy in animal flesh, to be associated with Western preeminence (Adams 2010: 54), and thus once again comes to represent success, power and dominance.

The conflation of an animal-based diet, masculinity and whiteness through the subjugation of animals and people of colour then also translates into a hierarchy of sustenance, similar to the one addressed earlier with regards to masculinity and food distribution. Not only then do we hierarchically distinguish different animals that are turned into food and allocated to humans based on gender as shown above, but also based on race. Whilst destroying native and traditional food supplies by ‘farming’ animals in their occupied territories, white people, at the same time, make valuable animal flesh inaccessible to the people of colour they displace and enslave. As a result, black communities have to survive on so called ‘trash animals’ (although this term is used by predominantly black poor communities, the insulting speciesism inherent to the phrase must be regarded as a product of white supremacy). Trash animals are those that are classified by the dominant white Eurocentric (hu)man culture ‘as roadkill rather than as something prepared for dinner’ (Wolch et al. 2000:79; Marks 1991). That category also encompasses the interior organs of animals, that cannot be spun into an appetising and profitable commodity, as they are often considered ‘trash, vulgar and disgusting’ (ibid.) by the dominant culture. It is these so called trash animals that ‘have long been a default form of protein for many local African-Americans due to the sequestration of ‘legitimate’ game animals (for example, deer, partridge, or quail)’ (ibid.). The inherent speciesism in the categorisation of what is regarded as a valid form of nutrition, can thus only ever be understood as a product of racism. As Adams puts it:

‘Racism is perpetuated each time meat is thought to be the best protein source. The emphasis on the nutritional strengths of animal protein distorts the dietary history of most cultures in which complete protein dishes were made of vegetables and grains. Information about these dishes is overwhelmed by an ongoing cultural and political commitment to meat eating’ (Adams 2010: 55).
Similarly, Melissa Danielle suggests that ‘traditional West African diets are plant-based, and that most of what Black Americans understand to be traditional is a blend of European and African food traditions’ (Danielle 2010: 47). This hybridity of food culture is manifested in the Soul Food diet (Harper 2010b: 21; Drew 2010: 63) which is often seen as a way of ‘paying homage to [one’s] ancestors who had no choice but to consume the entrails and scraps of their masters - slave food that sustained a people through generations of hardship and unspeakable cruelty’ (Danielle 2010: 51). Black vegan feminists such as Danielle and Harper however, point out that Soul Food today functions as a myth that merely perpetuates colonialist racism. As Danielle writes: ‘Four hundred plus years ago, our ancestors sowed southern soil with their blood, sweat, and tears to produce commodities from which they reaped no return, and today we continue to be a slave to systems that do not reinvest in our communities and our health’ (2010: 51). By buying what the dominant, white market supplies (stolen goods from exploited land, and native human and animal communities), consumers everywhere participate in the continuation of imperialism.

In addition to the structural injustices that are perpetrated through dominant food politics, Harper also identifies addiction to substances such as sugar as a form of continuous enslavement. She writes that ‘the British who sipped their sugary teas considered themselves civilized, despite the torture and slavery it took to get that white sugar into their tea cups, along with the cotton and tobacco they used’ (2010b: 28). She makes the link to present day capitalism by stating that ‘those who were originally enslaved to harvest sugar cane (Africans and indigenous Americans) are now enslaved in multiple ways: as consumers of sucrose, hormone-injected processed meat and dairy products, and junk food’ (ibid.). However, to disrupt white supremacy in food politics proves difficult, as a compassionate diet is still largely inaccessible to low-income communities (Drew 2010: 63; see also Yaa 2010: 95), and thus contributes to the destruction of a people (ibid.), or as Harper phrases it, the continued genocide (Harper 2010b: 21 f.). This is why many vegans of colour also include health reasons in their conscious anti-imperialist choice to refrain from consuming animals (Lloyd-Paige 2010: 6; Danielle 2010: 47, Probus 2010: 57). This is an argument that is either not considered by white middle-class vegans or it is wrongly condemned for detracting from the urgent message of animal liberation. White anti-speciesist social justice advocates have a duty to be aware of the racist
implications our scholarship and activism has when we dismiss and even silence the compelling messages vegans of colour and of working-class background are bringing forward.

The class implications of historical and contemporary colonial practices must also be taken into consideration when including anti-speciesism in social justice work. Layli Phillips writes of veganism as resistance towards ‘gross disparities in access to food and food distribution around the world, exploitation of people living on subsistence incomes, risks in the medical-care industry’ (Phillips 2010: 18), and Harper understands a compassionate diet as a form of resistance against ‘substances such as refined sugar, processed flesh foods, chocolate, and coffee [that] take away and often pollute land that could be used to grow whole foods that can feed the malnourished and starving human beings of this planet’ (Harper 2010b: 24). Nevertheless they also acknowledge the limitations that inhibit this form of resistance. The hyper-urbanised living environments of today’s neoliberal states, are governed by gentrification, expensive supermarket chains and even more expensive health food stores. At the same time ‘there is a disproportionate number of fast-food chains and liquor stores in neighbourhoods where low- to middle-income families reside’ (Drew 2010: 63). Paired with inadequate health care and lack of insurance (ibid.) this structural racism can indeed be understood as perpetuating white supremacy through speciesist food politics.

A manifestation of speciesism upholding racism and white supremacy can also be located within the animal industry. As many scholar activists point out, a majority of job positions that involve the handling animals first-hand, such as slaughter and meat-packing factory work, are given to immigrants and people from deprived economic backgrounds, amongst whom there is a considerable population of people of colour (Adams 2004: 50; Joy 2011: 79 ff.; Pachirat 2011). They are given the work with the highest risk to their own lives, where handling knocking guns, head splitters and jaw bone pullers, just to name a few of the weapons that kill and dismember the animals, often leads to injuries to the workers’ bodies such as severe shock, cuts, fractures and amputations (Joy 2011: 81; see also Pachirat 2011: 9). The race and class divide is thus also made obvious within animal factories, where ‘the few whites on the payroll tend to be mechanics or supervisors’ (LeDuff 2004: 184). At the world’s largest pig corpse producer Smithfield Packing Co. for instance ‘a handful [of Native Americans] are supervisors, others tend to get clean menial jobs like warehouse work’ whilst Black and Mexican workers are given
the killing and butchering tasks (ibid). The employee turn-over is so high due to the abhorrent conditions that the company’s ‘recruiters comb the streets of New York’s immigrant communities [...] and word of mouth has reached Mexico and beyond. The company even procures criminals’ (LeDuff 2004: 185).

Thus classism, just as the misogyny and the racism analysed before, also manifests itself within food politics. It is produced through the exploitation of the working-class for the upper-middle-classes. As Adams points out, the same patterns are recreated continuously: ‘People in power have always eaten meat. The aristocracy of Europe consumed large courses filled with every kind of meat while the laborer consumed the complex carbohydrates’ (Adams 2010: 48). Similarly, in nineteenth century Europe ‘the regular consumption of meat was a mark of wealth and rank’ (Franklin 1999: 4). By recreating historical patterns, in an industrialised context, speciesism with all its interconnections to other forms of oppression, re-affirms and upholds kyriarchy. Thus practicing anti-speciesism through veganism must include a consideration of gender, race and class politics, as Adams sums up: ‘Dietary habits proclaim class distinctions, but they proclaim patriarchal distinctions as well. Women, second-class citizens, are more likely to eat what are considered to be second-class foods in a patriarchal culture: vegetables, fruits, and grains rather than meat’ (Adams 2010: 48). Thus it is important to note that class distinctions are reinforced by other systems of oppression such as racism, misogyny and discrimination of people in the Marginalised Orientations, Gender Alignments and Intersex (MOGAI) community, as well as any other given strand of kyriarchy, such as speciesism.

As shown above, speciesism itself also reinforces the other forms of oppression, which makes it thus impossible to destratify kyriarchy by only considering one oppressive system at a time. All of the individual strands are interconnected with each other through their common use of phallogocentrism as a form of expression and specularisation as their method of othering. Thus they recreate relationships of A to Not-A, where the mere differences are the subjects and the objects. Specularisation thrives off a phallogocentric understanding of knowledge acquisition and articulations, which are based in rationality. Specularisation, through opening up, exploring, comparing, occupying, identifying and categorising builds a repertoire of knowledge that serves to establish dominance, supremacy and normality whilst at the same time marginalising the deviant who is unable or unwilling to use this given set of knowledge (see Chapter
Two). As shown in the genealogy of the public sphere (Chapter One), one’s value to society in Eurocentric cultures has always been determined through one’s ability to apply this knowledge through reason and debate. Colonial history shows that ‘the [presupposed] lack of ability to reason by slaves, indigenous peoples, or nonhuman animals was often taken as a precursor to justifying their enslavement and slaughter’ (Socha et. al. 2014: 3). It is precisely this myth that makes speciesism not only a racist, classist and sexist issue, but also an ableist one. As Kim Socha et al. state: ‘whether one can walk, see, or hear serves as a precursor to justifying their exclusion from certain environments and social locations. In all cases, the privilege of being able-bodied is taken as a given, while those who are labeled as dis-abled are subordinated’ (ibid.). The able-bodied human then always occupies a subject position of the oppressor within an ableist system and is thus bestowed with ability privilege, which is based on the reality that one has certain advantages if exhibiting certain abilities’ (Wolbring 2014: 119). Ability privilege like any other form of A-privilege is materialised structurally and governmentally as well as interpersonally (ibid.).

Otherness implies being incomplete, flawed, incompetent and thus disabled. This is due to the construct of ability (and by extension disability) ‘falsely present[ing] the norm as both natural and desirable’ (ibid.). Disability can then be defined as ‘a cultural interpretation of human variation born out of invalid assumptions about what is normal’ (Sinclair 2014: 162). Assuming that the able-bodied (hu)man represents the normative subject, the animal then, always already occupies the disabled object position. As Socha puts it: ‘Other-than-human animal species have traditionally been viewed as “flawed” by nature of their not being born human. As such, they are always already excluded from conventional conceptions of who gets counted in the moral community’ (Socha et al. 2014: 2), due to an ableist system ‘of discrimination and marginalization of certain bodies that are understood as different, incapable and vulnerable, and the simultaneous privileging of bodies labeled able-bodied’ (Taylor 2014a: 15). Within ableist structures we can perhaps best identify speculative methods of phallogocentrism, even more so than within the previously discussed systems of oppression. Whereas various forms of sexism and racism are remnants of Eurocentric scientific practices, such as eugenics, psychiatry and gynecology, ableism is still very much rooted in medicine, which, as described in the introduction to this work, operates as the manifestation of specularisation. Although the scientific postulations justifying racist
and sexist ideologies are by now exposed as propaganda, their remains are so deeply ingrained into hegemonic culture that they still have an impact upon structural inequalities. Ableism and speciesism however, are still often justified through scientific rationalism. As Zach Richter observes, ‘Taxonomies in Medicine and Biology proliferate misunderstandings of disabled and nonhuman agency, most significantly in situations when symptoms, capacities, habits, and ranges of actions are falsely projected by positivist based knowledge production’ (Richter 2014: 87 f.).

‘Survival of the fittest’ discourse, deriving from evolutionary biology, is still so prominent that the existence of the current neoliberal market economy is justified by it (Appleby 2011). Similarly our perceptions of animals (including humans as a part of a biological animal taxonomy) are informed by the ideas deriving from it. Thus, we are guided by the misconception, as Sunaura Taylor puts it, ‘that only “the fittest” animals survive, which negates the value, and in many ways even the naturalness of such things as vulnerability, weakness, and interdependence’ (2014b: 100). It is worth noting here, that vulnerability weakness and interdependence are feminised traits as shown throughout this chapter and Chapter One. Through scientific discourse which is grounded in the assumption that "nature will run her course" (ibid.), specularisation materialises through literally killing the disabled Other. By justifying socio-economic occurrences of inequality through nature, the subject is ‘in effect saying that the natural process for a disabled animal is to die, rendering living disabled animals not only aberrational, but unnatural’ (ibid). Specularisation achieves the destruction of the Other through assimilating the object to the subject and thus creating homogenous singularity. This process is also, of course, based in scientific thinking: ‘Mastery over animals and sickness count as founding achievements for the industrial and scientific forces of capital accumulation. The materialist, positivist epistemology is maintained precisely because of its power of explanation, a power that assimilates any abnormality and operationalizes all forms of life outside of easy understanding’ (Richter 2014: 87).

Specularisation creates a proper way of enunciation through appropriate participation in kyriarchal discourse formation practices. This is required to be positioned as a subject, that is to be existent at all. By disabling individuals based on their perceived mental or physical incapabilities due to the nature of phallogorical discourse, being as rigid as it is, specularisation erases their existence figuratively and literally. Leaving little or no room for emancipation, kyriarchy instead catapults
them into an existence relative to the able-bodied, as Richter’s analysis for the intersection between ableism and speciesism shows:

‘Thus, the techno-capitalist institution, for both the disabled and nonhuman, is a locale designed to keep such identities from achieving an empowered existence so that the machinations of profit can play across their bodies. The categories blur when one recognizes that accessibility is cultivated only for certain types of embodiments, and the bodies that do not fit the paradigm for “normalcy” will not thrive without mandatory assimilation. Like their parallel epistemic cells in which flesh is reduced to study material, nonhuman and disabled bodies must also live in parallel levels of inarticulability and dependency’ (Richter 2014: 90).

This imposed dependency and inability to enunciate using the proper rules has material consequences for bodies who are disabled. Describing, the ‘vegetative state of a (former) human being [...] as not a human life at all’ (2006: 181) is informed by nothing else than a speciesist assumption of who counts as human or human-enough to be regarded as subject. The vegetable metaphor is once again used (we have seen above how it is made part of a sexist discourse) to indicate passivity, inability and weakness. To become a vegetable, enough of a human’s capabilities need to be cut off, as Nussbaum writes, ‘to constitute the death of anything like a characteristic human form of life’ (ibid.).

Animal bodies in particular are affected by ableism. Animals who are experiencing violence through food, clothing, entertainment and pet industries ‘are quite literally manufactured to be disabled’ (Taylor 2014b: 96). Hundreds of years of breeding have caused specific animals to be prone to specific disabilities but more so do the conditions animals are kept in lead to mental illness in laboratories, zoos, aquariums, factories and even human homes. The animals imprisoned for food for example regularly ‘have too much muscle for their bodies to hold, cows and chickens develop broken bones and osteoporosis from the overproduction of milk and eggs’ (Taylor 2014a: 14). Disability is often a consequence of humans placing animals in toxic environments as well as human utilisation of the animal which includes practices of mutilation and abuse (ibid.)24. Thus, materially and

---

24 ‘Industrialized farm animals live in such cramped, filthy, and unnatural conditions that disabilities become common, if not inevitable. They are often kept in virtually endless darkness, are cramped into cages with cement, wire, or metal grated floors, and live in their own feces. But the disabilities that arise from these toxic environments are often secondary to the ones they are already made to have. Farmed animals are bred to physical extremes, where udders produce too much milk for a cow’s body to hold, where turkeys and chickens cannot bear the weight of their own giant breasts, and where pigs are left with legs that cannot hold their own weight. Chickens, turkeys, and ducks are
conceptually we cannot envision a “healthy” or even “normal” animal (Taylor 2014b: 109). The reason for this is twofold: Firstly animals are all bred with the purpose of being disabled (ibid.); secondly, in a (hu)man world the animal can only ever exist as disabled because they are always already precluded from participation in hegemonic discourse formation.

In addition, conceptions of human disability are translated and imposed upon different animal communities. As Taylor notes, we have no way of knowing ‘how other animals comprehend physical or cognitive difference within their species’ (2014b: 97), or across species. Imposing our affective communication practices upon animals, based on an understanding of the animals as merely in relation to the (hu)man (able-bodiedness is implied in this concept), we terminate ‘opportunities for disabled or nonhuman bodies to develop their own affective agency’ (Richter 2014: 88). By imposing (hu)man systems of signification upon the Other we render meaningless the affective economy that is already existent within animal communities, or for that matter any Not-A-communities. Within a Eurocentric neoliberal setting then, disabled animals are perceived as worthless, not only to humans who cannot utilise these animals for profit, service or pleasure, but also to their peers within their own communities. As Taylor observes, this conceptualisation of disability and affectivity, is distorted: ‘Disabled animals are repeatedly presented as offering nothing back to their communities. But perhaps we need to broaden our understanding of contribution. Disabled animals raise important questions about adaptation, creativity and self-reflection that could expand our understandings of animal consciousness’ (Taylor 2014b: 103).

It is however, I argue, questionable to what extent it is necessary to explore animal consciousness as humans. When replacing an animal rights approach with one of liberation and freedom then an exploration of animal affect becomes irrelevant, as any definition of the animal and their desires always amounts to an intervention. Instead, to deconstruct ableism, or any other strand of kyriarchy, we need to deconstruct normativity and dominance, which is always (hu)man in form. In fact, Taylor offers a possibility for doing exactly that through acknowledging the interconnectedness between speciesism and ableism. In Animal Crips Taylor writes about the power of liberation contained in the term ‘animal crip’: ‘The word “crip” (of

also physically harmed with processes such as debeaking, which is done without anesthetic and which can leave them prone to serious infection, and make it very difficult for the birds to eat or preen themselves. All of this says nothing of the bruises, abscesses, sores, broken bones, vaginal and reproductive disorders, chronic illness, and psychological issues that farmed animals are commonly reported to endure’ (Taylor 2014: 104).
course from cripple) has been adopted by disability scholars and activists in a way similar to how LGBT scholars and activists have reclaimed the word “queer.” Many disabled people identify as “crips” (2014b: 113). Taylor is, of course, aware that to call an animal a crip is a projection of the human signifying economy (ibid.), however, it can be a powerful tool to rupture the hegemonic (hu)man ways of articulating: ‘To crip something does not mean to break it, but instead to radically and creatively invest it with disability history, politics and pride, while simultaneously questioning paradigms of normalcy and medicalization’ (ibid.).

By opposing the normalised set of language rules when conceptualising new subjectivities we resist objectification and at the same time assimilation to already existent normative subjects. We practice this resistance by inventing new languages, new ways of connecting signifiers and new modes of expressing identity. As shown in this chapter, it proves problematic to create new forms of articulation only through identifying the Other, their struggle and their way of resisting the hegemony. Applying this to the animal as Other, identifying their struggle and opening ways for them to resist the (hu)man can only ever be based on speculation and will thus never leave the realm of specularisation. This is why a ‘critical animal studies’ will always be anthropocentric and why conceptualising the animal in (hu)man terms through a sexist, racist, classist or ableist lens is also only self-serving. An analysis, like the one presented in this chapter however, is useful for purposes of strategising and organising as thinkers and actors of the resistance. It is foremost an act of bearing witness to the Other and acknowledging their existence. Thus, understanding the connections between different forms of kyriarchal oppression helps us to identify our allies and it helps us to identify ourselves so as to resist being subsumed by the (hu)man.

Exposing kyriarchy then allows for the deconstruction of one’s own position as oppressor whilst at the same time, beginning the occupation of increasingly more space as Other. To achieve a dismantling of speciesism we not only need to understand its interconnectedness with other systems of oppression, but we also need to expose the hidden, buried, unnamed, unidentified and uncategorised perpetrators of this violence. For this purpose the following chapter shall first investigate the imperceptibility of kyriarchy, with specific focus on speciesism and secondly, so as to avoid a discussion of the animal within an anthropocentric discourse, contribute to the field of ahuman theory. To advocate animal liberation, I
shall remove the focus from the animal Other to the human subject, the sole perpetrator of speciesism.
Chapter Four: Uncovering Speciesism and the (Hu)man

The previous chapters show how theorising activism, that is resistance to the hegemony, within a public sphere, is fallible. Creating a public sphere, whether in Habermasian terms or through a postmodern understanding, can only ever support phallogocentrism instead of rupturing the kyriarchal order because public sphere theory is based on the assumption of equality. Creating even temporary equality within any social economy, however, is impossible as all individuals learn to acquire and express knowledge differently. Whilst maintaining one specific enunciative function as the dominant one (e.g. phallogocentrism), all who do not comply with its proper rules of enunciation will be othered and thus objectified through the process of specularisation. As discussed before, any oppressive system, including the democratic project of the public sphere and equality within it, functions under specularisation.

Reiterating the previously analysed purpose of specularisation, I argue that the subject uses specularisation as a method not only to create an object but, also, to establish the self. The object is merely a phantasmatic pseudo-reflection of the subject, who can only exist through naming and defining what he is not. The whole of this thesis works as an exercise in using methods of specularisation to expose the subject as inherently oppressive, which is tactically employed in order to invert what the subject does to the Other (specularising the speculariser by opening up, defining, naming and consuming him). More precisely, when striving for the ahuman, the first step is necessarily a recognition of the human. As I argue in this chapter, it is indeed the human subject who stays imperceptible and hidden within a system of objectification, thus it is a priority to first expose the human, as specularisation does, so as to later undo the human. It is in this chapter specifically, that I illuminate the human (that is any and all humans) as an inherently oppressive actor. Through extensively constructed (hu)man privilege, which as humans some of us are given more than others, I argue that we, as humans, learn anthropocentrism, as we are born into it as a preceding structure. This consequently entails our supremacist positioning as humans and a continuous perpetuation of speciesism. Both, the gravity as well as exact expression of speciesism is, of course, culturally dependent. However, it is undeniable that even the least oppressive member of our species will practice human superiority, simply by physically existing in this world. Just by being human we continuously displace and
kill others. Seeing that we are intrinsically speciesist, we cannot speak of non-speciesism, but only of anti-speciesism, that is the practice of dismantling the speciesist system of oppression.

With all our actions as humans, be it through movement or consumption and production, we continuously have an impact upon other species. More often than not, this impact is a negative and even lethal one. Nevertheless our impact often goes unacknowledged by ourselves, which entails that we do not carry responsibility for the consequences of our actions. This is, I argue, due to the unrecognisability of speciesism which enacted through the invisibility of the (hu)man and human supremacy. The same speculative methods are applied in speciesism and the predominance of the human as in any other kyriarchal system of oppression. Phallogocentrism creates many Others, who are categorised hierarchically, based on their deviancy from the (hu)man. Racism, classism, ableism, as well as different forms of sexism are manifestations of the speculative method of objectification. Further, speciesism is part of all of these and in addition has a tremendous effect upon animal Others. Although manifestations of speciesism kill more animals a day than there are humans on the planet, this particular form of oppression is often indiscernible, and even amongst social justice advocates, often unrecognised (Jones 2010: 189). This chapter shall first, address speciesism’s imperceptibility. The second part of this chapter shall explore ways of making speciesism, and other forms of oppression, perceptible through pointing out, identifying, investigating and interrogating the perpetrator, that is the (hu)man who must be deconstructed, disassembled and discarded. Overall this chapter offers a new way of acting politically as a social justice advocate, through conceptualising what Patricia MacCormack terms the ahuman (2014) as a space of liberation activism.

4.1. Imperceptible Object / Imperceptible Subject

Although many authors conflate the concepts of invisibility and imperceptibility (Adams 2010; Joy 2011; Pachirat 2011), I distinguish between the two. Invisibility, as a concept connoting imperceptibility, carries ableist implications: Invisibility assumes the ability to perceive through seeing as a precondition. It is kyriarchy that presumes sight as the normative sense and thus positions it as A (instead of not-A). This is reflected in material manifestations in which the normative seeing subject influences, for example, urban planning, the development of
technology and communication. This places the visually impaired, partially sighted and blind at a, not only discursive, but more so a lived disadvantage and at the same time grants privilege to the seeing. Thus this section separates the concepts of imperceptibility and invisibility. When discussing structural forces such as political belief systems and the oppression and privilege they produce, I shall refer to concepts of ‘perceptibility’, whilst I shall reserve the term ‘invisibility’ for the material conditions that arise from these structural forces.

As discussed in the introduction to this work, the process of specularisation fulfills three functions, which are penetration, conjecture and reflection. They are an integral part of the phallocratic enunciative function whose purpose it is to objectify the Other, make them imperceptible and finally exterminate them through consumption (see introduction). Adams describes as invisible this ‘process of viewing another as consumable - as something’ (2004: 14). That is, the mechanisms that create the absent referent are both materially invisible and conceptually imperceptible\textsuperscript{25}. Structurally, the (hu)man and his actions as subject are undetectable as his existence and expression is continuously reproduced to the point where it is normalised. The (hu)man stance then becomes the dominant one. It is worth noting again, that the dominant socio-political economy translates into a qualitatively majoritarian one, whilst those excluded from it, form their own communication economies are regarded as minoritarian. The minoritarian Not-A position is not necessarily held by those who are fewer, relative to the A-group. Speciesism, like no other system of oppression, shows that the majoritarian subject position can be held by a small amount of individuals.

It is important to note that any social norms in place are not descriptive, reflecting the preferred patterns of enunciation of a quantitative majority, instead, as Joy states, ‘they are also prescriptive, dictating how we ought to behave’ (Joy 2011: 105). The (hu)man enunciative function enforces a way of administering individual and collective bodies, guiding and prescribing their actions in the present, their prospects and their memories of the past. In Foucauldian terms we can observe majoritarian normativity exerting biopower, which is force over bodies in the form of potestas. Following Foucault, Braidotti sees biopower as a means to discipline the body so as to make it ‘docile, productive, and reproductive’ (Braidotti 1994: 44), so as to gain profit from the ‘body as a supplier of forces, energies, whose materiality

\textsuperscript{25} On sight, that is perception as a subjective tool of kyriarchy that creates reality refer to Donna Haraway (1988).
lends them to being used, manipulated, and socially constructed’ (ibid.). In other words, the affects produced by the bodies of Others are only used as a currency by the (hu)man. As a consequence of a distribution of biopower in such a manner, the relationship between the subject as the producer-consumer and the object as the commodity to be traded is established and normalised. Rupturing the continuous cycle of specularisation through political action or applying any conception of the public sphere is thus impossible, as pointed out in the previous chapters. It is the process of normalisation which prevents political action for social justice as it allows not only for the object, and thus their suffering, to be indiscernible but, more, so for the subject and their privilege and power to be rendered imperceptible. Thus, the subject cannot be held accountable, so as to deprive him of his biopower.

To illustrate to what extent it is impossible to hold oppressors accountable and advocate for social justice for the oppressed, I once more make use of the example of speciesism and one of its intrinsic components in particular, which Joy terms carnism (2011), the ideology of eating animal flesh. Joy assumes that carnism - as well as speciesism in general, or even any other kyriarchal system of oppression - is imperceptible because it ‘actively works to keep itself hidden’ (Joy 2011: 33). Under specularisation, it is the (hu)man subject who decides what will be exposed, examined, identified and named. A symptom of kyriarchal oppression is thus, as Spiegel notes, the purposeful decrease in visibility of social justice problems in society (1996: 77 f.). Thus, invisibility does indeed connote a lack in making something available to be seen, especially in an urbanising environment, as shown in Chapter One.

Cities all over the world implement technologies to make social injustice disappear. Architectural pieces of urban engineering such as spikes and other forms of deterrents in front of private property, on sidewalks, under bridges, on roofs, benches and rails prevent the misappropriation of these objects by the Other, be it homeless or disabled humans, skaters, parkourists, graffiti artists or even protestors, as well as animals such as pigeons, dogs and cats. In other words, all those who are not able, or willing, to utilise the available environment for its intended, profit-bearing, purpose are actively prevented from reinterpreting and using it following their own preferences. Such a rejection of the intended enunciative function could indeed lead to rupture of what is understood as the private and public dichotomy, as well as the A and not-A dichotomy as a whole. However, kyriarchy not only prevents the Other from participating in discourse formation and thus the
engineering of their environments, but also facilitates their existence within institutions, which serve to contain and once again prohibit them from interacting with the hegemonic structures in place. This becomes particularly clear when examining Joy’s concept of carnism and specifically its material representations in the form of killing factories and the production of edible flesh/secretion products.

The killing factory that is the slaughterhouse, is a manifestation of Foucauldian institutions of biopower, similar to the family home, the school, the hospital or the prison. Zygmunt Bauman describes the slaughterhouse as a ‘zone of confinement’ and a ‘segregated and isolated territory’ that is ‘invisible’ and ‘on the whole inaccessible to ordinary members of society’ (Bauman 1989: 97, cited in Pachirat 2011: 4). Jean O’Malley Halley also notes that these zones of confinement, due to their singularity and detachment from all else, allow for the violence that occurs in them to be undetected. The home, for example, as a ‘common and hidden’ (O’Malley Halley 2012: 123) (that is normalised and imperceptible) zone of confinement, is created by instances of domestic violence, an act that produces and reproduces gender (ibid.) and gender injustices that are carried beyond the bounds of the home, whilst simultaneously keeping acts of violence hidden. The same systemic principles of biopower apply to the violent practice of animal slaughter.

Joy writes that the ideology of carnism is ‘a violent ideology, because it is literally organized around physical violence’ (2011: 33), and similarly, it also operates within a zone of confinement and is removed from public sensory perception. If any oppressive system were to be stopped, it is the cycle of violence within it that would have to be ruptured. This is obviously to be done by removing the violence, which in turn can only be achieved by removing the oppressor, that is the (hu)man (I shall return to an in depth analysis of undoing and removing the (hu)man in the next section). Joy writes: ‘If we were to remove the violence from the system - to stop killing animals - the system would cease to exist. Meat cannot be procured without slaughter’ (ibid.). Before this revolutionary moment can be established however, the question of where to find the oppressor, the perpetrator, arises. He can be located by bearing witness to an injustice, by being open to communicate with the oppressed and acknowledging them, that is by accepting as significant what the (hu)man portrays as unimportant, misleading and wrong. This very practice of bearing witness is what makes the absent referent present and what allows the object to become someone instead of something, without becoming the subject. It celebrates difference and freedom and deplores equality and democracy.
Thus, bearing witness does not rely on the logos of truth and is divorced from validation by the subject. Instead it acknowledges lived experience. As Derrida writes: "\textit{I bear witness}”—that means: "I affirm (rightly or wrongly, but in all good faith, sincerely)" (2000: 189). Bearing witness to a lived experience can only be achieved by the one who is living the particular experience. This entails a conundrum due to the incommensurability of communicative practices between the witness and the witness of the witness, that is the object bearing witness to their own experience and the subject seeking to validate the account. The instance of the subject perceiving the witness account turns it into a testimony to be evaluated and judged. To preserve the bearing witness as an act of emancipation, the witness of the witness must remain absent. An anti-speciesist understanding of bearing witness epitomises what Derrida calls the ‘immediate non-access of the addressee [the human] to the object of the witnessing [human-inflicted suffering of the animals and earth]’ (ibid.). It is inconceivable for the human to translate and interpret animal suffering without corrupting it. When animals, through their cries and screams, kicks and punches, as well as tears and scars bear witness to human crimes, we must refrain from attempting to comprehend their stories. Instead we must, as human activists, turn away from these witnesses and towards the perpetrators. Our victims do not need our pity, compassion or any other form of human validation. Animal liberation is nothing other than the refrain from catapulting the animal into the (hu)man system of signification. Only through unconditionally holding ourselves accountable without interpreting animal stories can we prevent further crimes. A human interpretation of animal stories can only ever make the animal perceptible to the human and hence will always conceal the human (as perpetrator) to the human.

To allow accountability we must understand kyriarchy and the purpose of making injustice imperceptible. Taking carnism as an example, we must understand \textit{what} is made imperceptible (animals as individuals) and \textit{why} it is made imperceptible (to create a profitable industry) before we can deconstruct the oppressor. Joy asks: ‘Though we may eat meat on a daily basis, most of us don’t stop to consider how peculiar it is that we can go through our entire lives without ever encountering the animals that become our food. Where are they?’ (Joy 2011: 39). The answer to this question encapsulates the conceptual idea of the objectified animal as absent referent but also offers a very pragmatic and material explanation, as Joy writes:
'We don’t see them because they are located in remote areas where most of us don’t venture. We don’t see them because we’re not allowed access even if we do try to get in. We don’t see them because their trucks are often sealed and unmarked [...]. We don’t see them because we’re not supposed to’ (Joy 2011: 40).

Here, Joy describes the modus operandi of carnism that so heavily relies on concealing the violence on which it is based.

This is also reflected in the transformation of traditional butcher shops. They are described by Franklin as a place where customers once used to want ‘to see the meat taken from the dressed carcass’ (Franklin 1999: 148). We now observe increasingly more shops butchering -in the truest sense of the word - animal bodies to such an extent that the individual the body belongs to, is made utterly unrecognisable. This is how the absent referent is materially created. The prevalence and massification of animal flesh as food, also contributes to the process of normalising the association of animals with food. We contribute to this normalisation by making butchered animal bodies ubiquitous, not only in the previously described linguistic terms, but also materially in shops (so called ‘meat’), on pavements and roads (so called ‘road kill’), and represented in advertising imagery. It is the ‘superabundance’ of consumable animal flesh ‘combined with a repugnance for killing’ (Franklin 1999: 42) that allows the (hu)man to remove the referent when consuming someone’s carcass.

Hegemonic normativity is achieved through rewarding obedience to the proper enunciative function and punishing deviance. The reward (that is becoming subject) and punishment (that is becoming object) are induced through biopower exerted within institutions. Obedience to the enunciative function is learned throughout life whilst being subjected to normalised heterotopic spaces such as the family, the school, the state, the market etc. In speciesism, specifically its expression in carnism, this is reflected in socially accepted forms of food consumption. As described in the previous chapter, the consumption of animal bodies represents masculinity and so upholds the proper use of the enunciative function expressed through phallogenocentrism. Kyriarchy expresses carnism, and the phallogenocentric, masculinist way of enunciating, through making animal dead bodies abundant. As Joy writes: ‘Practically and socially, it is vastly easier to eat meat than not. Meat is readily available, while nonmeat alternatives must be actively sought out and may be hard to come by’ (2011: 106).
This encouragement to consume dead animal bodies whilst simultaneously condemning the ingestion of dead humans, enforces the position of the (hu)man, the white masculinist subject. To justify this inconsistency in his presumably logical reasoning, the subject argues that eating animals is ‘what we have always done’ and ‘we like the way they taste’ (Joy 2011: 29). This fragile, and yet omnipresent premise allows for non-conformist food consumers, such as vegans or fruitarians to be (accurately) portrayed as ideological and (inaccurately) as hostile and aggressive, due to us undermining, rupturing and re-establishing the enunciative functions surrounding food consumption. Veganism and fruitarianism does imply an ideological stance that is deviant from the normative one. This makes vegans political, be they concerned with animals, the planet or their own health. As described in Chapter Three personal health is often mentioned as a reason for veganism as a form of anti-colonialist resistance, which makes it political. However I do not understand as political an all-plant diet based on narcissistic self-preservation rooted in the Eurocentric and capitalist ideology that conflates the concepts of youth, health and beauty and so makes a plant-based diet phallogocentric, by removing it from a concern for the Other. Those eating animals in a phallogocentric (hu)man society however, by obeying the normative enunciative function, seem apolitical and neutral. Hence, they become imperceptible through the workings of specularisation, which makes only the deviant visible, dissects and defines them as different and Other. The suffix ‘-ism’ in ‘veganism’ and ‘fruitarianism’ denotes a political stance, whilst, as Joy writes, ‘the term “meat eater” [or omnivore] isolates the practice of consuming meat, as though it were divorced from a person’s beliefs and values. It implies that the person who eats meat is acting outside of a belief system’ (Joy 2011: 29).

Speciesism, by applying specularisation and focussing all attention on creating and disciplining the Other, thus renders the carnist subject imperceptible. It does so by allowing carnism to not be perceived in geographical nor in political terms. That is, carnism is not occupying any space within our social interactions (geography) and is thus removed from the idea of the strategic organisation of affectivities (politics) that would arise from these interactions. In her analysis of carnism, Joy argues that carnism is based on the assumption that speciesism, and the carnist practice of eating certain species, is founded on three justifications: That flesh-eating is natural, necessary and normal (2011). She points out however that
we do not eat animals because we have to, but rather because we choose to (2011: 29). She states:

‘We don’t see meat eating [...] as a choice, based on a set of assumptions about animals, our world, and ourselves. Rather, we see it as a given, the “natural” thing to do, the way things have always been and the way things will always be. We eat animals without thinking about what we are doing and why because the belief system that underlies this behavior is invisible [that is imperceptible]’ (Joy 2011: ibid).

To understand why speciesism and specifically carnism is imperceptible (not least due to being unnamed until Joy coined the term), it is useful to demonstrate how the process of specularisation works to establish a species hierarchy and the human supremacist position. Specularisation makes speciesism’s subject, that is the human, imperceptible so as to prohibit responsibility, accountability and guilt. Specularisation also makes speciesism’s referents, that is non-human species (and by extension the anti-speciesist) imperceptible, using the same three functions as in the process of objectifying any human Others (see introduction): Firstly, the individual is penetrated, more often than not literally. Their body is violated, dissected and even vivisected so as to be examined. This, secondly, opens the body for conjecture, where speculations and assumptions are made about the scientific nature of the individual, their chemical composition is defined as are their physical and affective abilities. This in turn then, removes the original referent, the personality of the individual, and with it their intrinsic right to be as they are. The third speculative function that I define in the introduction as reflection then only allows the object to be a hyperreal, distorted image projected into mirror by the subject. Without its own original referent, the object now only exists as defined by the subject. At the same time the reflection inside the mirror uses the subject as its referent and so validates and gives a purpose to the (hu)man’s existence.

To return to an analysis of the circumstances that allow this process of specularisation to be applied within the lived experience of those exchanging affectivities in a speciesist world, it is useful to consider the covert ethnographic study of a slaughterhouse conducted by political scientist Timothy Pachirat (2011). Pachirat describes working in the slaughterhouse of an US-American meat company, being employed once as a cooler hanging up cows’ livers, at another time as a so called ‘cattle driver’ in the chutes as well as on the so called ‘killing floor’ as
a surveyor for food safety and quality control, all within a period of five months. Pachirat discovers a similar interconnectedness between structural and physical politics of concealment within the confines of the slaughterhouse, as I describe above more generally with regards to speciesism as a whole. Thus, the study offers a good illustration of my analysis. Pachirat writes of the slaughterhouse: ‘Its internal divisions create physical, linguistic, and phenomenological walls that often feel every bit as rigid as those marking off the exterior of the slaughterhouse from the outside world’ (Pachirat 2011: 236). The slaughterhouse exists as an institution with its own set of enunciative rules. Upon entering a killing factory, as a worker or a visitor, it is impossible not to be subjected to the violence inside.

Pachirat, however, does identify the imperceptibility of the terror inside the factory - or at least a denial thereof. This is based on ‘a complexity that highlights unexpected sympathy between concealment and surveillance in the social strategies that distance dirty, dangerous and demeaning work such as this [on the killing floor] from those it benefits directly [those who derive a profit]’ (2011: 235 f.). Relying on workers who will execute the murders and consumers who will buy the carcasses, the industry has to subject both the employees and spectators to strategically applied biopower that will allow them to partake in such atrocities. Pachirat concludes that their willingness to participate lies in a mechanism of power that ‘works by removing barriers to sight, by eradicating obstacles that create possibilities for darkness and concealment, and by installing instead what the social theorist Michel Foucault identifie[s] as “continuous and permanent systems of surveillance”’, that discipline the worker (Foucault 1975: 105 cited in Pachirat 2011: 11).

To illustrate this concept, Foucault appropriates Jeremy Bentham’s panoptic prison model, that places the guard inside a tower, which is centered within a circular arrangement of prison cells, so as to be able to oversee, from within, any cell at any given moment in time. Foucault identifies the purpose of complete visibility in terms of disciplinary biopower: Not only is the subject positioned as omniscient but the object is disciplined at all times, simply by being aware of the possibility of being visible (Foucault 1975). The panopticon is thus an expression of phallogocentric specularisation, as it is based on ‘a logic of power directly linked to an expansion of sight, a leveling of obstacles to visibility and transparency’ (Pachirat 2011: 13), for the purpose of penetration, conjecture and reflection. The hyperreal image of the slaughterhouse that is created by this process of specularisation works
to remove the victim and present a (hu)man truth to the spectators. Through specularisation the slaughterhouse (or any other setting of an animal killing) is not perceived as the killing factory it is, where an inconceivable amount of bodies are murdered, cut open, hung, and butchered, where workers are exposed to dangerous weapons that injure them on a regular basis. Rather it is turned into an essential institution that supplies humans with occupations and food, and thus provides the two most essential elements that guarantee our sustenance: Money and nutrients. Thus, it is an inherently phallogocentric institution supporting the transcendence of the human.

The truth often presented to those working on the killing floor is one that surrounds their own circumstances: As mentioned in the previous chapter, slaughterhouse workers, just as meat packers and coolers, are often, in all industrialised states, struggling with class issues, language barriers, racism and are very often subject to xenophobic laws. The (hu)man subject as all-knowing, presents working in this occupation as their only hope for an improvement in their quality of life. At the same time the slaughterhouse managers represent the embodied all-seeing disciplining power, that could also impose unwanted consequences upon the workers. The consumers and spectators of speciesism, on the other hand, are subjected to a different kind of biopower: Marketing allows for animal carcasses to be turned into entertainment, where it is presented as desirable to experiment with different ways of preparing someone’s dead (and often also alive), body or parts of it, to be consumed. Countless products such as frying pans, turkey hooks, grills, fondue sets, etc. are marketed to us continuously, along with the butchered bodies we are told to prepare inside them. These are nothing more than tools of phallogocentrism, that is, they are displayed in support of total transparency, so as to allow for an informed consumer choice, but actually present a distorted truth that is created through the three steps of specularisation.

A Danish pig slaughterhouse serves as an example of this false glorification of total transparency. The (to-date) active killing factory opened its doors to visitors in 2005, giving tours, running exhibitions and conferences inside their venue. In doing so, it collapses the enunciative functions of different institutions into one. By creating an entertainment facility out of the killing halls and, thus, making it a desirable leisure activity to explore and gain knowledge about the goings on behind the walls of a mostly concealed industry, this slaughterhouse exploits the society of
the spectacle and contributes to the normalisation of murder and cannibalism. Their website also invites us to digitally explore their killing factory by stating: ‘Come on an exciting [my emphasis] tour of the world’s most modern pig slaughterhouse in words, pictures, audio and video from the Danish Crown facility in Horsens’ (Danish Crown 2014). Upon entering the Danish Crown website one is greeted by an image of a smiling white masculine human, dressed in clean white overalls and a hair net standing next to numerous hung animal carcasses. When the page is reloaded a similar image of workers posing is shown. One such image even shows a group of four, hugging each other and smiling happily in the spotlight, whilst the dead pigs are shown hanging by their legs in ambient lighting behind them. This is accompanied by a 3-second sound clip, which brings to mind a sharp knife and dripping blood. ‘Each day, the meat from 70,000 pigs is dispatched from Danish Crown’s slaughterhouses. This equals approx. 4,900 tonnes or 222 lorry loads – every day’ (Danish Crown 2014).

Carnist practices that include physical violence on such a large scale, would not be permissible in any other oppressive strand of kyriarchy but speciesism, and yet they go unchallenged, unnoticed and even celebrated. There are, of course, some stimuli that remind us of our proximity to and involvement in murder, such as the sounds of cows in distress being beaten on a local farm, lorries transporting pigs to their deaths passing us by on the motorway, or a drought that comes about from the sheer amount of animals we murder daily. Pachirat, for example, describes the stimulus of smell. It is in fact, an ‘unruliness of smell’ (2011: 3) as it cannot be contained within the confines of the killing factory, and is thus disturbing to the citizens surrounding it, reminding them of their complicity in the killing. Speciesism cannot create a completely separate geography to ours, so it must rely on ideals of total transparency. Yet, carnism and speciesism as a whole are potent enough to allow for the violence to be imperceptible and thus unacknowledged. In fact, the structural and physical separation of the slaughterhouse and everything that occurs within it, allows not only for it to be ‘ overtly segregated from society’ (Pachirat 2011:8) but also for ‘the work of killing [to be] hidden even from those who participate directly in it’ (2011: 9). Thus, it becomes clear that making injustice imperceptible on a macro political level, is also applied to the individual affective politics of each and every one of us. Biopower is often exerted to such an extent,

---

26 Once more, it is important to note that in deploying an anti-speciesist vocabulary, we use cannibalism in order to abolish species hierarchies.
that our individual psychology does not allow for us to participate in bearing witness to the oppressed, much less to name the oppressor and hold him accountable, as I will now elaborate.

Carnism specifically, relies on those who are otherwise conscious of social injustices to contradict their awareness with respect to animals (Joy 2011). The idea that consuming the flesh of another is necessary for our survival ‘is a common psychological mechanism for enabling humans to harm animals while still seeing themselves as compassionate’ (Wolch et al. 2000: 78; see also Plous 1993; Joy 2011). Further, as Joy writes, carnism relies on the active refusal to bear witness:

‘The primary defense of the system is invisibility; invisibility reflects the defenses avoidance and denial and is the foundation on which all other mechanisms stand. Invisibility enables us, for example, to consume beef without envisioning the animal we’re eating; it cloaks our thoughts from ourselves. Invisibility also keeps us safely insulated from the unpleasant process of raising and killing animals for our food’ (Joy 2011: 21).

Avoidance and denial allow for the imperceptibility of institutionalised oppression by creating a hyperreal experience that relies on the absent referent. Specularisation, thus, leads to what Bahna-James calls a ‘willingness to be kept in a state of denial about details’ (2010: 161), which implies an active inclination towards perceiving a hyperreal vision of the world. Psychologically speaking, this choice is a mechanism of self-care and preservation. Structural violence, even if not experienced by ourselves, can lead to traumatic stress. Being aware of oppression causes secondary trauma (Van Dernoot Lipsky and Burk 2009). Thus, it is safer to be part of the phallogocentric enunciative function and believe the constructs of specularisation. This presumably self-preserving mechanism of choosing to believe one thing over another is not only applied by the consumers of animal flesh but also by the workers who are directly involved in the killing process.

It is also striking that those employed to murder, are often able to create the absent referent although perceiving the embodiment and expression of the individual to be killed. Joy writes of ‘desensitisation’ (2011: 82) to the suffering, which is what makes the killing possible. It is the result of long-term exposure to violence (ibid.) and, again, works to normalise the process. In an interview with US-American slaughterhouse workers, Gail Eisnitz (1997) reveals this very moment,
of simultaneously perceiving and denying the identity of an individual, when killing them:

'If you work in that stick pit for any period of time, you develop an attitude that lets you kill things but doesn’t let you care. You may look a hog in the eye that’s walking around down in the blood pit with you and think, “God, that really isn’t a bad-looking animal.” You may want to pet it. Pigs down on the kill floor have come up and nuzzled me like a puppy. Two minutes later, I had to kill them - beat them to death with a pipe. I can’t care’ (Eisnitz 1997: 87, cited in Joy 2011: 82).

They speak of killing ‘things’ using the pronoun ‘it’, both instances of dehumanising (making them less subject more object) an individual who, as the worker describes, communicates with them. More interestingly, when inferring that they had no other choice but to kill the pig (I had to), the worker seems trapped in their own object-position. They defer the responsibility for the life taken and any accountability to someone within a subject-position. Kyriarchy ensures to always have in place an entity that is more-subject, more-A than oneself. In this case we could speculate whether the worker feels forced to kill by a supervisor, by the CEO of the company or for example by a state actor, who perhaps threatens with consequences if they fail to kill, or even by some internalised capitalist false consciousness, such as the necessity to provide. Pachirat recalls conversations with coworkers who also use the strict division of labour as a mechanism to refrain from taking responsibility and acknowledging one’s own blame in the killing. A quality-control worker (whose job position does not involve manually murdering the animals) is quoted as saying: ‘I already feel guilty enough as it is [...] especially when I go out there and see their cute little faces’ (Pachirat 2011: 151), whilst a worker from the cooler is quoted as saying: ‘Knockers have to see a psychologist or a psychiatrist or whatever they’re called every three months’ (2011: 153), to which Pachirat asks ‘why?’ ‘Because, man, that’s killing [...] that shit will fuck you up’ (ibid.). It is obvious that the contemplation and intensity of both statements indicate that each person removes themselves from being part of the killing process.

This phenomenon is termed by Arendt as ‘the banality of evil’ (1963), which indeed, allows for cruel acts of violence to seem apolitical, neutral and circumstantial. The worker might otherwise be a peace-loving, caring and
gentle person who now suffers from cognitive dissonance for being forced to commit murders. However, the principle of banality of evil, that is being primarily guided not by ideological but rather circumstantial convictions, proves problematic. It is a kyriarchal product, in that it establishes and maintains a hierarchy (as described in the previous chapter). Thus it will always allow for responsibility to be deferred to higher instances, who are not necessarily human, and can thus not be held responsible for their actions. Responsibility is often deferred to institutions such as science, a company, a state, a religious collective or even a god. As social justice advocates we must refrain from participating in this kyriarchal practice of deferral. Rather, we must admit to our crimes and experience the consequences. That is the basis of liberation: By acknowledging our own privilege that allows us to harm another, we begin to dismantle power as potestas, a harmful force, and to practice power as potentia, an emancipating force.

4.2. Deconstructing the (Hu)man

To create relationships between all bodies that are based on an exchange of liberating affectivities, we must disrupt the phallogocentric enunciative function, so as to rupture kyriarchal hierarchies without the prospect of equality but rather with that of difference. As indicated throughout this thesis, a way to do so is to understand specularisation and to utilise its mechanisms against the system it supports. In other words, the kyriarchal subject must be penetrated and opened up, disected and investigated, so as to expose every manipulated representation as the hyperreal lie it is, and to define and name the one who carefully constructs the history, present and future of these representations - be they conceptualisations of inferior gender, racial or species representations, or be they the lived realities of bodies other than that of the A-subject. In this section I interpret MacCormack’s concept of the ahuman, as a space and a practice of doing precisely this. Specifically, this section first introduces the recent conceptualisation of the ahuman and second, situates it in the context of my work by critically examining the efforts of the animal rights movement and social justice action in general.

27 In the case of the slaughterhouse worker who is arguably oppressed in many, if not most, aspects of their life, they are still privileged in as far as they are human, which allows them commit a crime against an animal, simply because they are different.
For anti-speciesist politics the ahuman, as MacCormack writes, entails nothing more than an undoing of the human:

‘Only the human can and needs to be deconstructed and the human’s trajectories towards ahumanism have nothing to do with other life. If this were the technique of ahumanism, it would simply constitute a reverse of dragging nonhumans up to human level to be viable and resemble the revolting fetishization of animals in human becomings through continued use, conceptually and actually’ (MacCormack 2014a: 5).

Once the subject is revealed, all Others, in solidarity, will indict him and hold him accountable for the crimes committed. The accountability lies within the (hu)man subject’s own recognition of the injustices perpetuated. That is, it lies within his acknowledgement and consequent declination of his privilege. Only through a rejection of privilege, that is the refusal to make use of the unearned benefits given within one’s socio-economic circumstances, can the subject be dismantled so as for the Other to live in and of themselves, outside a system of representation and speculative reflection. To practice liberation politics we, thus, need to apply a speculative gaze towards kyriarchy. If we assume that phallogocentrism is kyriarchy’s language used by the (hu)man as its subject, the kyrios, we then come to the conclusion that to liberate we must deconstruct the (hu)man in theory, whilst minimising human impacts in practice. The undoing of the kyriarchal subject, is found in what MacCormack terms the ahuman (2014). This section explicitly proposes an ahuman practice, as an anti-speciesist and otherwise liberationist path to exchanging affects that are based on empowering potentia and thus actively undo singular subjects and their relations to objects informed by coercive potestas.

To conceptualise how an ahuman practice could manifest itself, we must once more return to a discussion of perceptibility, specifically to one of the perceptibility of the subject. Using speculative methods against kyriarchy itself is what Pachirat conceptualises as a ‘politics of sight’ (2011), ‘defined as organized, concerted attempts to make visible what is hidden and to breach, literally or figuratively, zones of confinement in order to bring about social and political transformation’ (Pachirat 2011: 15). A politics of sight is then a metaphor28 for the

---

28 It is Evelyn Fox-Keller and Christine R. Grontkowski who encourage us to ‘cease to accept the visual metaphor as necessarily natural or intrinsic to the meaning of knowledge’ and ‘to inquire into the ways in which our reliance on it has formed and shaped this meaning’ (1983: 208).
active effort of making perceptible what is hidden within the hyperreal world of speculative representations. Pachirat imagines a reversal of panoptic relations to illustrate the method of using specularisation against itself:

‘A politics of sight that seeks to subvert physical, social, linguistic, and methodological distance in order to produce social and political change might be understood as a generalized Panopticon in which the prisoners have replaced the guards in the central tower that enables them to see without limits’ (Pachirat 2011: 242).

It is through this reversal of power relations, that any strand of kyriarchy can be not only interrupted but dismantled, by shifting the purpose of interrogation from defining the Other to defining the self. It is important to note that, of course, a definition of the Other is still useful for purposes of creating communities and developing a sense of belonging. However, this definition of characteristics and features cannot be imposed by an outside force, as that would constitute the moment of fetishising another and thus turning them into the object. Thus self-definition in a politics of sight - or rather a politics of perception - must be prioritised. Once a platform for self-definition is established, the ‘power of sight’ (Pachirat 2011: 243), that is the power of perception, can be used as a counterforce (ibid.). As Pachirat writes: ‘This is the strategy characterizing diverse movements across the political spectrum, that seek to make visible [that is perceptible] what is hidden in zones of confinement as a catalyst for political and social transformation’ (ibid.).

The success in human liberation movements lies precisely in the strategic organisation described by Pachirat. It is through pointing out the subject’s privilege instead of focussing on the object’s suffering, that we are creating long-term social change. The moment of revolution in the fight against speciesism then lies exactly in the act of ‘deconstructing the invisibility of the system, exposing the principles and practices of a system that has since its inception been in hiding’ (Joy 2011: 21). The invisibility of speciesism, and with it carnism, lies not only in the physical separation of the industry from its consumers (Franklin 1999: 42) but also in the imperceptibility of structural nuances that are based in our fundamentally anthropocentric understanding of ethics, which allows ‘humans to manipulate, exploit, displace, consume, waste and torture non-human individuals with impunity’ (Jones 2000: 279). Raising awareness of the system that enables humans to make use of their
privilege is part of, as Loadentahl states, ‘a holistic, anti-authoritarian framework’ (2012: 100).

To create such a framework by making use of a politics of sight - or rather a politics of perception - we thus, must not only point out human suffering but also human privilege, the latter being in a symbiotic relationship with animal exploitation. Thus, by undoing human privilege, that is by rejecting the intrinsic benefit given to us by the nature of our species, we bring an end to the suffering we cause. Pachirat and countless other activists, make use of this strategy when delivering a sober analysis of the slaughterhouse, or the atrocities hidden behind the walls of leather and fur factories or within the hunting and pet industries. Joy, by adding carnism to the nomenclature of ideological systems, turns phallogocentric specularisation against itself through naming what is hidden (thus perceived as neutral and harmless). Similarly, MacCormack (2014) uses the term ahuman to, firstly, present in the open, and to secondly, deconstruct and unmake that which in a phallogocentric system of signification is hidden, imperceptible and unquestioned: the (hu)man.

Before exploring the ahuman as a concept and the opportunities it offers for grassroots organisers who reject the public sphere as the arena for radical change, it is worth remembering that the human body and the (hu)man meanings it produces are not exclusively harmful to non-human species. They cause suffering through varied degrees of objectification of any Other who is not-(hu)man-enough. Adams writes that ‘violence against people and that against animals is interdependent’ (2014: 15) and we must not forget when exposing the (hu)man that we are not only turning the speculative gaze of humanness but also that of white able masculinity against themselves, as they are ‘locked together’ (Adams 2004: 164). The ahuman, as a space of active undoing, a space of activism, rejects the speculative methods of the public sphere. It transfers power from potestas to potentia (MacCormack 2014a: 2 f.). As MacCormack puts it: ‘Defining, signifying, classifying and placing into a hierarchy certain kinds of life is an act which is based not on the quality of essence of an entity but on the powers which constitute the capacity to define’ (ibid.). Specularisation is thus an expression of power, and as shown in Chapter One, it governs all encounters, including the counter-hegemonic spaces of the public sphere. To allow for ethical encounters by dismantling processes of knowing and signifying, we must envision an activism that takes place within the ahuman. The ahuman turns the oppressive power that is potestas into potentia, ‘a
deterritorializing force [...] not oppositional or conflicting but the communion of
difference itself and the self which expresses as a coalescence of the forces which
in turn have produced it’ (MacCormack 2014a: 3).

The ahuman offers a place of radical change by proposing ‘an absolute
abolitionist refusal of the human’ (MacCormack 2014a: 2), which entails forms of
enunciation that reject human phallogocentrism and instead envisions ‘encountering
the outside of human’ (MacCormack 2014a: 1). As the previous chapters show, the
human creates a world based on representations, that is, a hyperreal cosmos based
on nothing but absent referents. The absent referents come into being through
speculative objectification of the not-human-enough Other, who is separated from
their original expression, so as to embody a ‘free floating image’ (Adams 2010: 13)
constructed after the liking, that is as a reflection, as well as a desired object of the
(hu)man subject. In other words, the A creates Not-A, so as to define himself in his
singularity. For instance the human creates the animal to delineate ‘humanness’.
That makes the human a parasitic creature, who can only exist through the
penetration, consumption and extermination of the Other without offering symbiotic
reciprocity. In fact, as MacCormack writes, ‘for the human all non-parasitic
nonhuman connections are unnatural’ (MacCormack 2014: 1), that is, the human
cannot relate to the animal without perpetuating speciesist violence. Further,
MacCormack writes, ‘an encounter with the preconceived is no encounter, but a
reification of self through confirmation of opposition or commonality based on
structures that by their very definition cannot locate two entities without one
subsuming the other through exertions of the power to define’ (MacCormack 2014a:
3). It is always the human who, through being born into a position of privilege,
subsumes all else through methodical specularisation and who through knowing is
always already preconceiving.

The privilege utilised by the (hu)man is a product of this knowledge.
Knowledge about his objects, and thus himself, gained through a speculative gaze
is what creates his position as majoritarian. Jason Wallin, conceptualises the
becoming ahuman through the undoing of ‘the representational presumption that the
world reflects our knowledge of it, or rather, that the world conforms to an
anthropocentric image in which life itself is continually captured as an object of
meaning established in advance of its difference’ (2014: 147). Undoing
anthropocentric epistemes of knowledge is then giving priority to nonhuman
versions of reality. This can only be achieved if we refrain from catapulting every
Other into a (hu)man system of enunciation, that is, if we refrain from defining, categorising and thus hierarchically ordering. The ahuman implies our rejection of understanding, knowing and foremost relating.

The ahuman, with its rejection of humanist values and its plea to not only overthrow but diminish the human, poses a difficult task for social justice advocates: It is a project that demands an unlearning of relations. Instead, it asks us to learn to encounter. Whereas relations are constructed based on the exertion of potestas, a form of power that works through pointing out, defining and constructing the Other, encounters are simply situationist moments of affect exchange where perceiving another only becomes possible through not knowing them. Rejecting relation is rejecting signification. Instead of applying knowledge to moments of perception, so as to categorically decipher and understand them, the ahuman asks us to desire and evoke disorder and chaos and embrace these as affirmative. Instead of conceiving of new, improved systems of signification, which is precisely the exercise undertaken by postmodernists as well as posthumanists, the ahuman attempts to abort any encoding or re-coding of meanings by humans. Instead, the ahuman deprives the human of his megalomania and reclaims the space taken up by him, so as to turn him into an insignificant and minute nonentity. As MacCormack puts it:

‘Ahuman theory consistently seeks the silencing of what is understood as human speech emergent through logic, power and signification. Human speech makes the world according to the human, tells the world what it is and speaks for the world, that is, to other humans and to the gods of human speech - religion, science, capital, the family (of man). Silencing human speech opens a harmonious cacophony of polyvocalities imperceptible to human understanding, just as human speech has the detrimental effect of silencing unheard, unthought expression’ (MacCormack 2014b: 182).

For an anti-speciesist framework this includes the discontinuation of human-animal relations, as these can only ever be based on (hu)man systems of signification. It is crucial, that within an ahuman practice, anti-speciesism does not only question the nonhuman anymore but only the human. As MacCormack writes: ‘Thinking the nonhuman ethically should, indeed can, only concern itself with the human and its decentred and delimited futures, in order to create hope in reference to inevitable, perhaps unfortunate (not for humans, often for nonhumans) encounters with nonhumans’ (2014a: 5). With respect to the animal, the ahuman, in practice, thus implies human disinterest in critical animal studies, animal behaviour,
animal psychology and all zoological and biological sciences. It also implies the end of breeding programmes as well as those dedicated to the exploration of nonhuman homes, in the earth, the sky and the water. By realising that the animal can only ever exist conceptually as absent referent, and thus practically only ever stand in relation to the human and vice versa, the ahuman rejects the animal by rejecting the human. ‘Ahuman philosophy begins towards the nonhuman with the I will not which creates the I am not all thus I am not, so the other may be’ (MacCormack 2014a: 4). In this way the ahuman challenges us not to make use of our human privilege that allows us to be all by indulging in what MacCormack calls ‘anthropocentric autoglorification’ (MacCormack 2013, cited in Wallin 2014: 160).

Rejecting human privilege thus means to become nothing, instead of continuously striving to become everything, that is to become (hu)man. MacCormack’s understanding of what Michel Serres conceptualises as ‘grace’, is useful in envisioning a practice of refusing human privilege, and with it, space and a platform for (hu)man enunciation. Serres writes that ‘grace is nothing, it is nothing but stepping aside’ (Serres 1995: 47). Grace comes from removing oneself, including one’s knowledge and one’s body and one’s expectations towards another. Only through grace can we, as humans, put an end to the continuous destruction of all else: ‘Non-parasitic recognition is the turning away with grace, making no demands of the addressee’s face; exchange comes from disanchoring the parasitic human and reciprocity is human absence’ (MacCormack 2014a: 6). MacCormack continues to explain nothingness by stating that it ‘is antithetical to nihilistic nothingness, rather a means by which we can become capable of anything, and that very capacity results in the freedom of real responsibility, far from the freedom to do what we can as dominant humans, to allow the nonhuman to be’ (MacCormack 2014a: 6).

To reiterate, all human-animal relations must be abandoned, by removing the human. It is important to note however, that as humans we do carry a responsibility for those of another species who we displace and kill. A turning away with grace and an annihilation of relations does not negate perceiving the animal and their suffering. The consequences of our crimes, which will be felt by the traumatised, injured, orphaned and displaced animals for years to come, must not be ignored. The ahuman does what humanism (including its strands of post- and transhumanism) cannot do: It bears witness to the harms of specularisation and is accountable to those humanism hurts. Thus, a graceful encounter includes an
ahuman awareness of human guilt and a responsibility towards those suffering from the human. Ahuman activism begins with the acknowledgment of human crimes and a recognition of guilt. Instead of the human practice of wallowing in guilt however, which is always connected to feelings of pity and especially self-pity, the ahuman activist refrains from projecting their own emotional response upon their victim. So the ahuman makes the human unavailable to the animal, both emotionally and physically, and so does no longer stand in relation to the animal but rather in solidarity as a fellow Other.

MacCormack writes: ‘Gracious ahuman-nonhuman/animal contracts attempt to make the bond its most flexible, seeking a catalyst with which the interaction is made that comes from no human source, unheard of matter in a singular emergence and connecting in ways for which human vocabulary has no verbs or nouns’ (MacCormack 2014a: 6). The ahuman then exists not through a hermeneutic exchange based on a symbolic order of affects but through one where all must remain possible whilst at the same time being uncertain, multiple and constantly in motion. If, as Wallin writes, ‘the human is marked by its deterritorialization from the mutability of the earth’ (2014: 145), the ahuman on the other hand, is marked only by the changes to the social economy of their environment. Further, whilst the human can be said to affect his environment, always parasitically, the ahuman - and possibly ahumans - embody nomadism in that their circumstances determine their being. As MacCormack writes, the ahuman exists in a ‘condition of immanence where the human is no longer projected into a position of assumed superiority over the world, but implicated with the material ecologies of this planet (MacCormack 2013, cited in Wallin 2014: 160).

Within animal rights, as a movement, the canonical understanding considering the movement’s aims and strategies is that the idea of animals as property must be abolished. That is, an elevated status must be bestowed upon them, to ‘remove a legal status that inevitably promotes suffering’ (Sunstein 2004: 11). The consideration given to animals in this predominantly utilitarian and rationalist movement is one that still assumes human superiority without dismantling nor otherwise challenging it. Thus an animal rights approach maintains a speciesist hierarchy. Brigid Brophy, who offers an almost anti-speciesist critique of human-nonhuman relations in ‘The Rights of Animals’ provides us with one such example of rationalist anthropocentrism and autoglorification:
‘I don’t hold animals superior or even equal to humans. The whole case for behaving decently to animals rests on the fact that we are the superior species. We are the species uniquely capable of imagination, rationality and moral choice - and that is precisely why we are under the obligation to recognize and respect the rights of animals’ (Brophy 2004: 161 f.).

Brophy’s essay, first published in 1965, can be regarded as radical within the 20th century context of the social justice movement. Whilst the Fordist era was coming to an end, the market for animal flesh was continuously expanding due to new advertising technologies and the ever growing ‘factory farming’ industry. Owing to Brophy’s unapologetic essay, in which she even bears witness to fish, whose personhood is often overlooked until today, a new generation of social justice advocates can develop a more critical understanding of the human position, one that does not epitomise the (hu)man any longer, and so rejects the white able masculinist conceptualisation of human identity, which is still part of Brophy’s understanding.

It is worth noting however that in academia, as in activism, it is precisely the animal rights advocates who enunciate phallogocentrically, that are predominantly referred to as sources of justification for this belief system. Under manhood as the working definition of “human”, as Adams (n.d.) puts it, we claim Peter Singer (1995; 2004a; 2004b) and Tom Regan (2004) as the fathers of the animal movement, although they only began gaining prominence towards the end of the 20th century. We do not, however, acknowledge authors such as Brophy or Nussbaum and Adams herself for their pioneering work. Despite women enunciating similar ideas, we fail to acknowledge their contributions and simply make them imperceptible. As Adams writes:

‘Women represent what is not valued—femaleness, and [...] femaleness is associated with: the body, emotions, and animals. What if part of the resistance to recognizing human exceptionalism (the idea that humans are different from and better than other animals) is the close association between our definitions of humanness and manhood? Historical memory is fraught and unstable, influenced by stereotypes, including a rigid yet untrue gender binary that privileges men and their words and protects “manhood.” And so, we claim “fathers” but not mothers. The animal activism origin story most frequently told is that Peter Singer is the father of the contemporary movement because of his 1976 book, Animal Liberation. This claim ignores the significant amount of
grassroots and analytic work that preceded the appearance of Singer’s book’ (Adams, n.d.).

Adams here illustrates specularisation by pointing to the denial of coming from an Other, of having a genesis that is other than oneself. This is precisely how the animal movement has positioned Singer, Regan as well as other prominent masculinist animal advocates, simply by denying the successes achieved by the women who came before them, for example within the British Anti-Vivisection Movement.

Reading woman authors of the social justice movement however does not necessarily entail the deconstruction of the (hu)man. It is not until the generation of authors such as Adams, Dunayer or Davis, that the contemporary animal justice movement is presented with an all-encompassing analysis of kyriarchy. Within the utilitarian tradition in animal rights, we are especially confronted with phallogocentric forms of enunciation originating in women’s writing. Nussbaum offers one such example, when she critiques the often applied comparison between animals and human children or disabled humans. Obviously, from an ahuman perspective, such comparisons are invalid and even harmful because the ageism and ableism inherent in them force different individuals into relations, and in doing so presume identities. From a utilitarian perspective, however, they are also inappropriate as Nussbaum shows. She points out that any comparison between species based on cognitive abilities or desires is futile as humans can only ever ‘flourish as a human being’ (2004: 310), and thus have no option ‘of flourishing as a happy chimpanzee’ for example (ibid.). Thus humans must be given ‘the fullest benefits of citizenship’ by means of ‘health benefits, education, and reeducation of the public culture’ (ibid.), whereas applying similar rights to a chimpanzee would be absurd. She continues: ‘A chimpanzee flourishes in [their] own way, communicating with [their] own community in a perfectly adequate manner’ (ibid.). Following the argument presented in this thesis, this assumption should lead to the conclusion that only an ahuman conception of the world can lead to both, humans and animals flourishing in their given societies. The ahuman, just as the approach to human-nonhuman relations that Nussbaum follows, both acknowledge difference (in species membership), however only the ahuman offers a perspective for truly anti-oppressive and emancipatory action, by rejecting categorisation.

Nussbaum advocates for a capabilities approach, which presumes a fulfillment of basic capabilities, that is desires and values, as a right. Nussbaum
maps out these capabilities as guidelines for public policy and includes categories such as ‘bodily health’, ‘bodily integrity’, ‘emotions’ and ‘practical reason’ (2004: 315). In each category she includes a brief description of what rights to live out each capability would entail. Both her understanding of human and animal capabilities are highly generalised and so become patronising and thus objectifying. Nussbaum advocates to ‘adopt a type of paternalism [emphasis mine] that is highly sensitive to the different forms of flourishing’ (2004: 313). As an animal rights advocate however, she is not urging for anti-speciesist policy implementation and, in fact, even supports speciesist practices that are of benefit to human capabilities. This rationale even allows Nussbaum to defend cruel practices such as vivisection:

‘I do not favor stopping all such research [on animals]. What I do favor is (a) asking whether the research is really necessary for a major human capability; (b) focusing on the use of less-complex sentient animals where possible, on the grounds that they suffer fewer and lesser harms from such research; (c) improving the conditions of research animals; (d) removing the psychological brutality that is inherent in so much treatment of animals for research; (e) choosing topics cautiously and seriously, so that no animal is harmed for a frivolous reason; and (f) a constant effort to develop experimental methods (for example, computer simulations) that do not have these bad consequences’ (Nussbaum 2004: 317).

Brophy disagrees by stating that vivisection ‘is never justified’ (Brophy 2004: 160). The only rationale behind vivisection is ‘our being able to get away with it’ (ibid.), which essentially would make vivisection a hate-crime, based on the fact that it is perpetrated for the sole reason of identity-difference. Further, Nussbaum’s argument, which does not leave room for an ahuman conception of a law for animals, is counterintuitive, especially from a utilitarian and scientific perspective: Research on, as Nussbaum states, ‘less-complex sentient animals’, is futile because the disparities in anatomy between species firstly do not allow for proper results that could be transferred onto the human model, whilst secondly this rationale would rather call for experimentation ‘on a few humans […] whom we might sacrifice for the good of the many’ (Brophy 2004: 160). Further, generalised medical trials also presume the biological sameness of humans and thus perpetuate ableist hierarchies by assuming all our medical needs to be identical.

A discussion of rights, be it in the form of the capabilities approach or otherwise (see previous discussion of different forms of nonhuman citizenship), presumes a subject. In a world that includes humans, that subject will always be
human and thus exerting biopower in the form of privilege. Assuming that animal rights, as Nussbaum writes, should be implemented in nations’ constitutions, is assuming ‘animals as subjects of political justice and a commitment that animals will be treated with dignity’ (Nussbaum 2004: 317). The fact that dignity is then always defined by the law giver, who always is human, remains unchallenged by Nussbaum and other rights proponents, who do not include an ahuman understanding of graceful turning away in their conceptions. The ahuman does not answer to a law giver, it does not answer to a government or a nation, it does not have constitutions nor does it have a language. It thus refutes the idea of rights in the moment it refutes the (hu)man kyriarch.

Contrary to that utilitarian tradition, we have those who envision activism in a ecofeminist and deep ecology tradition, led by the work of anti-speciesist feminists who dedicate their writing and their actions to the abolition of each and every individual case of oppression. They collectively work towards the ahuman by refraining from the utilitarian exercise of quantifying suffering and weighing one case of exploitation against another. Further, as MacCormack recognises, by creating animal rights, “humans indulge in the name of the rights of “them” and “us” based on qualities of each or critiquing the qualities ascribed to each, yet remaining within a realm that speaks of, thus speaks for, and ultimately speaks with human language’ (MacCormack 2014a: 5). The emancipatory project, anti-speciesist and otherwise anti-oppressive, must thus turn away from advocating rights, and promoting the object’s becoming-subject. Instead social justice must focus on an undoing of the subject.

Only the ahuman envisions an abolition of any kind of hierarchical understanding of the world and thus conceptualises an ahuman (that is not-human and anti-humanist) socio-political responsibility (including the actions, or non-actions that arise from that responsibility). Hierarchical conceptions include equality, which is informed by the presumption of traits that are more desirable than others, but also the assumption of the human as a superior species who, through elevated status, is able to perceive and redeem all ill in the world. Both are essentially humanist and anthropocentric, and thus harmful to nonhumans. Benevolent superiority, that is precisely the kyriarchal act of patronising, as well as benevolent equality, that is the act of attributing majoritarian rights to minoritarian bodies, are both presuming the identity of the Other and are thus immediately speculatively objectifying them. That is why, as MacCormack writes, ‘ahuman theory deals explicitly with the death of
identity, because the demand for identity, to be identified by the identity which one has been proscribed and which one must accept to register as an identity, is where lives emerge as cells of signifying systems’ (MacCormack 2014b: 180).

Thus, instead of thinking identity, and hence performing in accordance to it (Butler 2010), the ahuman can allow for a deconstruction of privilege, as discussed in the previous chapter. By gracefully turning away from the animal Other, the ahuman turns the speculative gaze inward at the (hu)man so as to deconstruct human privilege and prevent further harmful practices, such as carnism, deforestation, oil-spills, fracking, water depletion, air pollution, the pet trade and vivisection. Although the ahuman negates human supremacy with respect to relatively better or more complex moral or cognitive capabilities, it does not negate human supremacy in the sense of an advantageous positioning of the human compared to other species. The ahuman works to dismantle this privilege. In other words, the ahuman recognises the social infrastructure that allows the human to overpower all other species and it realises that the human, affectively as materially, takes up most of the space within this infrastructure. Thus, the ahuman works, not primarily on providing more space for the Other, which is a humanist endeavour, but rather on a decolonisation of the spaces occupied by humans, through removing ourselves. Only by undoing of the (hu)man can we dismantle human privilege.

Anthropocentrism utilises potestas in the form of biopower, which, as Braidotti states, ‘has more to do with the denial of death, than with the mastery of life’ (1994: 48). This applies on the one hand to the subject, as the (hu)man denies his own mortality by construing ways of existing ever longer, both in person, and in memory. On the other hand Braidotti’s assumption also reflects the subject’s denial of the object’s death. This is exemplified above, where I discuss the conceptual and physical imperceptibility of instances of mass murder that go unnoticed. Braidotti, following Foucault, writes of specularisation that to gain knowledge, to uncover the mysteries of life and so keep the subject alive, the phallogocentric gaze must dissect the dead bodies of its objects (1994: 62). In my work I suggest a project where specularisation is turned against itself and its subject, which eventually makes us arrive within an ahuman space. In that space, I argue, we do not desire transcendence and so, we reject kyriarchal ideals of redemption, divinity and eternity. The ahuman presents a practice of liberation through undoing the self, by becoming multiple and fluid. Being a rejection of the (hu)man, the ahuman can only be realised in (hu)man death. Just as speculative knowledge kills its object, the act
of undoing the (hu)man then must end his life. MacCormack writes that ‘human knowledge of life sacrifices that life, conceptually and actually’ (2014b: 182), thus the physical act of discontinuing human life is the ultimate act of using specularisation against itself. The embodied (hu)man can only ever become ahuman, for being ahuman is only achieved through ceasing to be human, that is ceasing to be. By becoming ahuman we become nomadic, fluid and ever moving without a form or direction. The ahuman is thus not guided by symbols nor are they leaving any signs of passing by. The ahuman turns specularisation against itself so that it is the embodied (hu)man, who becomes invisible and imperceptible.

The ahuman then, as a sphere of imagining and creating a world based on social justice, rather than equality, which belongs to public sphere activism, deconstructs the (hu)man as a representation of phallogocentric enunciation. A dismantling of the (hu)man is accompanied by an undoing of the human species and its individual bodies, as well as the history of corporeal violence we all are part of, in order to pair the ahuman as concept with manifestations of our lived experience. This way, the ahuman also re-imagines the practice of veganism. Whilst within public sphere activism, pursuing the rights of animals and practicing veganism represents a boycott (and through this inevitably upholds the dominant position of consuming animals), within ahuman activism the practice of not consuming others is implicit as ‘the object is gone [and] the subject derealized’ (MacCormack 2012: 74).

The ahuman activist removes the ‘social’ from their encounter with the animal, as it is the social which always already constructs the animal as purely oedipal and thus fetishises the animal as object. Instead, ahuman activism applies an ecosophical critique (Guattari 1996) of the human-animal relationship that forces all animals into a human geography of affects, where every animal fulfills a specific (hu)man function (as described in Chapter Three), some as companions, some as food for instance, but always removed from their individual desires which are replaced with (hu)man reflections. Ahuman activists tackle speciesism not through rescuing the animals and so positioning humans as their saviours, but as Others, unrelatable, unavailable and thus imperceptible to the animal. The ahuman thus rejects all institutions, that is all order and organisation(s) which in a human world often take the form of governments, policies, regulations and laws (Beaulieu 2011: 82). The ahuman recognises that control must not be exerted over the Other. All that needs to be regulated, or rather de-regulated is the human.
No humanist approach nor public-sphere-oriented activism, that is an activism informed by rationalist phallogocentric philosophy, can achieve anti-speciesism. The ahuman thus offers a completely new understanding of activism, social justice and with it, all who are affected by it. Through exploring and developing the ahuman we reach beyond a non-human-focussed understanding of our position in the world.
Conclusion

Advocating for an ahuman activism implies a practice of undoing the (hu)man, his texts and the privilege that emerges from these texts. It implies an abandonment of the self that is neither based on martyrdom, which always implies social recognition, nor one that relies on mercy towards an Other, which connotes compassion and attention to someone whom it is in one’s power to harm. Thus the ahuman renounces the human through nothing but world-weariness, where the world is always a human one. Such a rejection of humanness, humaneness and humanity takes place with the abandonment of singularity, absolutism and representation, all of which, however, are firmly intertwined in current formations of activism. Activism understood as occurring within a public sphere makes use of phallogocentric paradigms that are guided by principles of representation, social stratification and enunciation.

This is because the democratic model of the public sphere presents principles of equality, reason and debate as desirable, whereas I show in this thesis, that these are only speculative tools, forcing the minoritarian to be assimilated by the majoritarian subject. Thus, in response to my first research question ‘To what extent is the public sphere as a conceptualisation of political action and especially counter-hegemonic activism appropriate to a politics of emancipation?’ I conclude that public sphere theory and its manifestations in public space are indeed harmful to our understanding of liberation politics, as shown in chapters one and two. Whilst critiquing this canonical view of activism, I also explore alternatives in chapters three and four, that, in accordance with the second research question ‘What theoretical and practical alternatives are more suitable for an activism that concerns itself with all Others, including nonhuman species?’, propose speculative examinations and deconstructions of (hu)man texts and specifically of human privilege. In Chapter Three I thus show the impact humans have upon other species, and the urgency of including species membership in an understanding of identity. Only through this can we realise that it is the (hu)man who lies at the root of kyriarchal oppression and so eventually undo any understanding of identity that is based on representative and relational assumptions and identification.

I do so conceptually by turning the phallogocentric mode of specularisation against its own subject. In other words, I use methods similar to speculative penetration, conjecture and reflection, as outlined in the introduction. This is
achieved in my work through infiltrating and opening up kyriarchy, so as to make it perceptible. I then identify kyriarchal subjects and make assumptions so as to create knowledge about the (hu)man which allows for a vocabulary to arise that assists in organising and strategising within the resistance. To rupture, reclaim and permeate the territory from which the Other was displaced, I appropriate speculative reflection to create an understanding of the subject from the position of the Other. I do this throughout this work by pointing out to the way kyriarchy (re)produces its texts but also by exemplifying the consequences of these texts with the lived reality of the Other. Thus my contribution to knowledge becomes clear within the blurring of activism and theory as well as within the specific focus on a feminist anti-speciesist critique of kyriarchy. To conclude, I imagine an ahuman activism that, after MacCormack, is realised through the undoing of the human rather than the active engagement with the nonhuman.

Imaging an ahuman world then, as I do throughout my work, does not only include a reconfiguration of the human but a rejection and dismantling of all that is (hu)man. This includes masculinity, specifically white, cis, hetero, able, and capitalist representatives of masculinity. An undoing of identities that signify within these dimensions necessitates their discursive and physical removal from occupied spaces. Many feminist critics of the (masculinist) symbolic order have contributed to the minimisation of most subject positions, however anti-speciesist critiques specifically minimising ‘humaness’ are rarely found in academia as in activism. Thus, throughout my work I suggest how we, as humans, can begin to create an ahuman world, by shifting our focus from the nonhuman world upon ourselves, and so remove ourselves from the spaces we have too long occupied, destroyed and misappropriated.

An ahuman practice manifests itself in the rejection of human privilege. Privilege occurs through a beneficial positioning of the subject in society and (re)produces dominance over Others. A rejection of human privilege begins by denouncing the consumption of Others, who are objectified and exchanged as currency that buys our (hu)man subject position. This includes the discontinuation of digesting animal bodies and their secretions, as well as skins, feathers and of course, furs. A discontinuation of hunting for animals as food or ‘game’ is implicit, too, as is the rejection of controlling the animal for any entertainment purpose, such as in zoos (including aquariums and safari parks) and circuses for example. The support of an industry that tests products intended for consumption (cosmetics,
household products, pharmaceuticals, food etc.) on animals must also be rescinded. A rejection of animal testing, including dissection and vivisection, also extends towards the animal breeding industry, which will be made redundant through this rejection of human privilege. Similarly, animals such as ‘pets’, zoo animals and ‘livestock’ are created through anthropocentric breeding programmes. A discontinuation of ‘keeping’ animals (a human privilege) is also part of the ahuman.

This work focuses on the animal Other as the object of the human and the main point of interest of (hu)man texts. To expand upon the idea of dismantling human privilege, future research could examine how the (hu)man enunciates specifically in relation to the earth. Consideration could be given to how we define the human with regard to plants, and other organisms that are not anthropocentrically categorised as animal. Landscapes as a whole could also be regarded as objects that aid in the construction of human privilege. An ahuman practice then, of course, also includes the discontinuation of the depletion of this earth’s resources, which we claim complete possession of, but are not the sole consumer of. Aspiring towards the ahuman also incorporates our discontinuation of construction. This includes ceasing to build new infrastructures that accommodate human needs. To be clear, I am not advocating against the construction of urgently needed facilities to create dignified living conditions for those humans who live without access to their individual need fulfilment. Instead I am rather advocating for a redistribution and a making more accessible of the already available human constructions. A simple discontinuation of creating new housing facilities, or roads for example, would only lead to the further alienation and oppression of the already disadvantaged.

In the face of water shortages, famine and the global housing crisis, which affect not only the human species, despite being caused solely by humans, a further point of enquiry that would extend the research conducted herein could concern itself with long term practical solutions that would allow the earth to recover organically, without the interference of the human. One such direction could be a critique of natalism, that is, the Eurocentric and capitalist, thus also firmly phallocentric, belief in procreation specifically as a cis-hetero ideology of reproduction. Further research might examine a shift from the idea of living eternally, transcending one’s own body through passing on one’s legacy through offspring, coupled with a fear of death, to a conceptualisation of the ahuman, that is the non-existent human. This does not only include homo sapiens but also all that
includes a transhuman extension of the (hu)man, be it through technology, biology or discourse.

An ahuman critique could also be applied to an interdisciplinary approach that combats the devastating impact the (hu)man parasite has had upon earth. We are currently awaiting the formal recognition of the current time period theorised as the anthropocene (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000), a concept recognising the drastic geological shifts caused by human activity. The working group on the anthropocene of the Subcommission on Quaternary Stratigraphy (2015) describes the following changes in the geological composition of this earth:

‘Erosion and sediment transport associated with a variety of anthropogenic processes, including colonisation, agriculture, urbanisation and global warming. the chemical composition of the atmosphere, oceans and soils, with significant anthropogenic perturbations of the cycles of elements such as carbon, nitrogen, phosphorus and various metals. environmental conditions generated by these perturbations; these include global warming, ocean acidification and spreading oceanic ‘dead zones’. [sic] the biosphere both on land and in the sea, as a result of habitat loss, predation, species invasions and the physical and chemical changes noted above’ (2015).

Naming and defining this crucial geological era as a solely human one, as a result of (hu)man ideologies, whereas a critique of anthropocentrism is inherent in the illustration of the devastation caused by solely the human species, is part of using specularisation against itself. The acknowledgement of the anthropocene is a first step to allowing the ahuman to arise with respect to geological transformations. It offers an interesting source for further analysis of the ahuman and anti-speciesist thought in general.

The suggestion of the anthropocene, translates into a suggestion of a humanist and anthropocentric material world. Thus, in theory and practice, as I show in this work, it is only through refraining from occupying space as (hu)mans, that we can dismantle our privilege and so minimise our impact upon other species. An anti-speciesist and ultimately non-speciesist conceptualisation of the world removes the masculinist human subject and aspires to replace all interaction and representation with ahuman encounters. Many practical applications of the ahuman are dependent upon a person’s situated life conditions and their overall position within the social geography of this planet. Although it is self-evident that the ahuman first necessitates certain circumstances to arise before being able to practice the
ahuman, it is our responsibility to make an effort to dismantle human privilege to any extent possible.
Glossary

ahuman
This is a term coined by MacCormack, rejecting human signifying systems and envisioning non-speciesiesism as the complete dismantling of the human. Ahuman activism consists of a practice that minimises human impact upon others. Thus, to move from one end of the human-ahuman spectrum, it is not enough to practice animal and earth liberation through a shift from ecologically unethical to responsible and sustainable living. Rather the ahuman activist rejects an anthropocentric existence, that is an existence privileging the (hu)man and thus the human species, which in turn is the only way the human-enough can exist.

biopower
This is a term coined by Foucault and it is used in my work to describe the power exerted by one party affecting the body of another. This can relate to institutions and groups but also to individuals. Foucault specifically understands biopower as a means of controlling and administering populations by regulating their behaviours through law, science, and general socialisation. However, this concept can also be applied to any instance of majoritarian bodies exerting privilege and so contributing to the oppression of minoritarian ones.

carnism
Joy describes carnism as the ideology of eating flesh. This term is crucial as it reveals a normative practice that is perceived as natural and intrinsic to existence, to be socially constructed, and thus bearing political implications.

(hu)man
I introduce this term to draw attention to the inherent masculinism in human existence. I distinguish between the term human as indicative of species membership and the term (hu)man as indicative of white, able masculinist and human privilege. Consequently humans who are not male can also enact (hu)man privilege. In other words, if we aren’t ahuman we are de facto (hu)man, to different degrees.

hegemony
This concept implies dominance of one social group over another. It can take the form of military, economic, and/or socio-political control.

**enunciative function**
The enunciative function can be understood as a set of rules for proper communication. It is what upholds phallogocentrism through reproducing its guidelines for communication. The proper way of enunciating, that is communicating via language and all other signifiers that carry meaning (be it in the form of knowledge, physical appearances, actions or the lack of these). Under phallogocentrism the enunciative function is guided by rules about humanness and masculinity. Its purpose is to objectify, make imperceptible and exterminate the Other so as to reaffirm the (hu)man subject position (see specularisation).

**kyriarchy**
Schüssler Fiorenza suggests the term as an extension of the concept of patriarchy, as it encompasses not only gendered oppressive systems but all oppression that originates with a supremacist subject, or kyriarch (derived from the Ancient Greek word for master or lord, *kyrios*).

**lived experience**
This is a concept that delineates the first-hand description of given circumstances by those who are oppressed. Often the lived experience deviates from the perceived and presented majoritarian truth and is thus invalidated.

**object**
The object exists in kyriarchy as a phallogocentric construct. It is the (hu)man idea of a once autonomous individual who possessed intrinsic value, not comprehensible to the human. Removed from their individuality the object becomes a feminised and animalised currency of exchange that allows us to estimate the value of the subject who possesses it.

**phallogocentrism**
This concept combines masculinism, that is the masculine as dominant over all else, with the systematic and logical. It is the discursive system that produces the texts of kyriarchy. As an order of signification phallogocentrism relies on
representation which utilises dichotomies to create a meaning and so creates the absolute symbolic and material demarcation of the self from the other, the mind from the body. Further, it is the systematic binary categorisation and with it the hierarchical stratification of all actors into those who are able and potent and those who are not. This concept thus creates a materiality that is defined by privileging of that which communicates phallogocentrically and the oppression of that which does not or cannot participate in phallogocentric discourse. That is, that which complies to the systematic categorisation and that which resists this type of organisation.

privilege
The concept of privilege is explored in feminist theory and activism by, for example, McIntosh and Crenshaw. It refers to somebody’s beneficial positioning within any given social geography, which is not achieved but given, due to the nature of one’s being and that of the system one is placed in.

speciesism
The system of oppression that hierarchically categorises biological entities based on their species-specific characteristics. It is a (hu)man and thus anthropocentric and narcissistic system.

specularisation
This term is first introduced by Irigaray who conceptualises specularisation as the method for categorising all bodies and so making them useful for social interaction. I specifically argue, that specularisation is used in phallogocentrism to firstly, objectify, secondly, make imperceptible, and thirdly exterminate the Other.

subject
The subject exists in kyriarchy as a phallogocentric construct. He is always masculinist and human, i.e. (hu)man and is defined through his ability to use the proper method of expression (i.e. his mastery of the enunciative function) as well as his ability to exchange objects. The subject can only exist through the object. For instance, the (hu)man can only exist through using the animal, that is the objectified body of any not-human-enough individual, as a currency of exchange.
Bibliography


Sass A. Fras, 2015. Message From the Grassroots: #activistproblems. [online] Available at:


### Appendix A


![Image of privileged and oppressed identities]