ANGLIA RUSKIN UNIVERSITY

THE RHETORIC OF STASIS, GESTURE, AND DANCE
IN RENAISSANCE LITERATURE

MELISSA LYNNE HUDLER

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ANGLIA RUSKIN UNIVERSITY
ABSTRACT

FACULTY OF ARTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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MELISSA LYNNE HUDLER

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Focusing attention on a neglected aspect of Renaissance scholarship, this study
aims to illuminate the rhetorical role of the body in Renaissance literature by exploring
the rhetorical nature of three forms of corporeality: stasis, gesture, and dance.
Generally speaking, rhetoric of the body is not lacking in early modern scholarship.
However, consideration of the literary body as a rhetorical entity that not only
articulates but also creates meaning is indeed a neglected area. The body-as-text
paradigm that grounds performance studies provides for a unique and nuanced approach
to literary text analysis. The methodology employed in this thesis combines a historical
and text-based approach, with substantial attention given to classical rhetoric because of
its awareness of the rhetorical capacity of the body.

The rhetoric of stasis is explored in Sir John Davies’ poem Orchestra and in
three works by Shakespeare: The Winter’s Tale, The Rape of Lucrece, and Coriolanus.
In this chapter, trauma is presented as a framing mechanism for the characters’ static
presence. Gesture and its rhetorical quality are studied through distinctive analyses of
Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale, The Rape of Lucrece, and Titus Andronicus. An
analysis of Ben Jonson’s Epicoene provides a comic close to this study of gesture. This
chapter also has as its framework the concept of trauma, presenting it as either a cause
for or effect of gesture. Finally, the rhetoric of dance is examined in further analyses of
Orchestra and The Winter’s Tale and also in Ben Jonson’s Pleasure Reconciled to
Virtue.

The literary approach to the rhetorical study of stasis, gesture, and dance taken
in this study includes its dramaturgical and compositional functions, providing for a
new lens through which to view instances of corporeality in Renaissance literature. This
project attends to the early modern awareness and understanding of the rhetorical
capacity and force of the body, and does so in a way that allows the speaking body to be
examined within original contexts, thus bridging literary and performance analysis.

Key Words: Renaissance, early modern, rhetoric, stasis, gesture, dance
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Figure 1:  
from Bulwer’s *Chirologia* (1644), “A Corollary of the Speaking Motions”
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The Rhetoric of Stasis, Gesture, and Dance in Renaissance Literature

By Melissa Hudler, March 2014

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Chapter One
Introduction

“New histories of the body, historical phenomenology, and psychoanalytic readings of the body-as-text have flourished in the last two decades in early modern studies.”

The quotation that opens this chapter is from a call for papers for a special issue of *Early Modern Literary Studies* called *Embodying Shakespeare* (2009). Looking just at this issue, Special Issue 19, one recognizes that studies of the body provide for diverse approaches to Renaissance literary criticism, and those available and represented in *EMLS* 19—cultural, historical, domestic, and political—are indeed substantial in scope and possibility. However, among such critical concentration and breadth, it is surprising that the deployment of the literary body as a rhetorical medium is neglected by the contributors to *Embodying Shakespeare*, and, as I will go on to show, such neglect is widespread within contemporary Renaissance studies. With the exception of performance studies, Renaissance scholarship seems to favor the symbolic and representational rather than the functional notion of the body-as-text. In other words, the literary body is traditionally studied as a microcosm of a system or as an ideal rather than as a rhetorical medium. That is, the body is most often attended to as a truth, not the means of articulating a truth.

To be clear, rhetoric of the body is not lacking in early modern scholarship; as early moderns were intrigued by the “corporeal ‘topic,’” so are post-moderns, Hillman and Mazzio assert in the “Introduction” to *The Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern Europe*. Clarifying the interest in “corporeal topic,” Hillman and Mazzio observe that
“[b]ecause corporeal parts have individuated functions, locations, and differentiated relations to the body as a whole, they can become concentrated sites where meaning is invested and often apparently stabilized. But while the invocation of a specific body part may generate the illusion of a narrowed sphere of reference, it is in fact precisely this specificity that creates, in the corporeal fragment, a remarkable density of implication.”

Despite this recognition of the cognitive and rhetorical qualities of the body, consideration of the body in literature as a rhetorical entity that not only articulates meaning but also creates it lacks scholarly attention.

Supporting my argument for the body as a rhetorical force within Renaissance literature is the reciprocity between the rhetorical and the physical realms as evidenced in Renaissance-era rhetorical and dance treatises; such evidence is provided in Chapter Three (Gesture) and Chapter Four (Dance). An intriguing study of this shared ideology comes from Caroline Van Eck who examines the influence of classical rhetoric on Renaissance visual art and architecture. She offers this insight into the body-language bond: “Just as the expression of the eyes and gestures of the hands excite the emotions, the figures of style make speech more acceptable and moving. They animate speech, one could say, and make it human.” Van Eck fortifies her observation with classical insight:

Drawing on the fact that the Latin ‘figura’ can mean both the human form and metaphor or metonymy, [Quintilian] suggested that ultimately eloquence—in speech as in the arts—can only be understood in terms of human behavior, whether of the body or mind.
The body-language bond was understood, it would seem, as one of dependence, in which language relies directly and indirectly upon the body to realize its achievements. In this thesis, I argue that such an understanding is evident in the corporeal descriptions and actions presented in particular literary works of the Renaissance.

A review of David Bevington’s book *Action is Eloquence: Shakespeare’s Language of Gesture* (1984) explains that the attention paid to the text of the plays at the expense of the visual elements of their staging is a critical response to the “universally accepted [idea] that the Elizabethans were accustomed to listening to sermons, town-crying and other verbal announcements and were, therefore, more responsive to the spoken word than what was to be perceived by the eye. . . .”6 In response to the privileging of orality and aurality, Bevington’s book directs scholarly attention to the corporeal and physical elements of the plays (including costumes, props, space, and gestures). As the reviewer notes, for Bevington, the stage where the text comes to life can just as significantly exist in one’s “inner eye” (observed through one’s reading of a play) as in a theater (238).7 My work is located in the space between page and stage, as I seek to bridge text and performance by displaying via textual, rather than performance, analysis the rhetorical and dramaturgical capacities and functions of the body in particular works about which my analysis teases out aspects of corporeal performance. By focusing on matters of corporeality in the texts of several dramatic works and in two poems, I am able to show that the implications for corporeality can be perceived significantly through nuanced readings of texts produced in a body-centric culture, thus enhancing the discipline and practice of text interpretation and criticism in Renaissance studies.

In an effort to augment text interpretation and criticism, this thesis attends to
various forms of corporeal rhetoric, forms that reveal the rhetorical and performative functions of the static and moving body. Specifically, this study explores the rhetoric of stasis, gesture, and dance in dramatic and non-dramatic works. Existing scholarship on the Renaissance literary body explores primarily issues of gender, culture, and politics; as such, the body-as-rhetoric or the body-as-text serves chiefly to advance these ideological studies. In contrast, I take my cue from Renaissance rhetoricians and dancing masters who perceived and emphasized in their writings the connection between rhetoric and the body/movement to prove that the rhetorical body in Renaissance literature can be perceived not only as a reification of an ideological concept or cultural value but also as a rhetorical or dramatic force, thus possessing more than a symbolic function in the literature. Rather than arguing against such scholarship, indeed attempting to invalidate it, I seek to position my research within it, for the symbolic function of the rhetorical body is a valid and necessary critical perspective through which to emphasize the rhetorical function of the performing body in literature.

This function of the body has garnered some scholarly attention; however, my point of departure from such scholarship is located in the depth to which the rhetorical body, its functions and implications, is dissected in individual works and in the attention to corporeality in texts not commonly studied in this regard. My methodology combines a historical and text-based approach with a reliance on classical rhetoric. At this point, I should clarify my privileging of the term Renaissance over early modern. Although I recognize the academic motivation and relevance for the use of early modern, I find that it deemphasizes the nostalgic and aesthetic aspects of the period, both of which greatly inform my academic perspective, research, and, not least of all, my sensibilities as a student of the Renaissance. For as long as I have been old enough to appreciate art, my
eyes and mind have always been drawn to the art of the Renaissance because of the
powerful and majestic images of the body and the narrative quality of these images. The
artists’ rendering of hands have especially intrigued me, as their stilled motions
contribute much to the interest with which I aesthetically and academically approach the
art. With that said, it is my hope that my use of the term Renaissance is perceived, not
as an unaware expression, but rather as a deliberate semantic choice based on my
academic sensibilities and the subject of this thesis. In this thesis, corporeality is
explored and its rhetorical and dramaturgical relevance is realized in the following
texts: Orchestra, The Winter’s Tale, The Rape of Lucrece, Coriolanus, Titus
Andronicus, Epicoene, and Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue.

Body of Scholarship

I approach a review of current scholarship by considering first each form of
corporeal rhetoric, second, the relevant texts, and third, the manner in which each form
is or is not addressed for each text in current criticism.

Stasis

The thesis begins with a study of stasis in Orchestra, The Winter’s Tale, The Rape
of Lucrece, and Coriolanus. Whe stasis is examined in Renaissance literature, it is
typically done so in the context of female piety and Renaissance notions of the inherently
sinful female body. Such scholarship tends toward cultural/theological sources that
promote chastity and the ideal woman through stillness and silence. In “Female Piety in
the Reign of Queen Elizabeth I.” Paige Martin Reynolds studies female piety in relation
to female physicality, figuring the static body primarily through the hushed mouth. This
article is a useful source for gaining sixteenth- and seventeenth-century cultural and, to a
lesser degree, literary perspectives of female stillness, as it relies on Renaissance treatises and Protestant writings, sets the writings of Queen Elizabeth I against the Protestant ideal, and offers glances into eleven literary texts, including ten Shakespearean plays and Spenser’s *The Faerie Queen*. Reynolds’ brief analyses of the literary texts focus on the silence of their main female characters and function to complement her examination of the treatises and religious writings, rather than to advance the study of female stasis in Renaissance literature. Reynolds’ use of philosophical, theological, and literary texts serve to set the cultural stage for Queen Elizabeth’s persistent battle of “reconcil[ing] her reign with the protestant conflation of female domesticity (marriage and maternity) and female piety.”

Reynolds comes to the conclusion that “the female body and the immaterial soul are not incompatible after all—at least not when they belong to the queen.” I find, however, that the static female body resonates more fully in this period to communicate more than virtue, including and in addition to seeming licentiousness.

The first static character examined in this thesis is Penelope, reimagined in *Orchestra* by Sir John Davies as a literary representation of Queen Elizabeth. In a review of the scholarship of Davies’ poem, it is apparent that current perspective is lacking. The definitive study is by E. M. W. Tillyard who concentrates his analysis on the image of the Elizabethan World Picture and thus addresses notions of order and harmony through analysis of the dance metaphors Davies develops. As mentioned and argued against in the stasis chapter, Tillyard claims that a finished poem would have shown Penelope give in to Antinous’ seduction and dance with him. A study of Antinous’ seduction strategy is offered by John Huntington. In “Philosophical Seduction in Chapman, Davies, and Donne,” Huntington’s analysis of *Orchestra* centers on the dramatic situation: the seduction efforts of Antinous. Observing that Antinous sets forth a
“radical vision of harmony” that crosses the boundaries of reason and “ordinary moral rules,” Huntington grounds his analysis of the poem in a “moral tension” evident in Antinous’ overly desirous state.\textsuperscript{12} An antidote to this Platonic misbehavior is the character of Penelope, who Huntington claims, “keeps us aware of the possibilities of error and deception” in Antinous’ seduction.\textsuperscript{13} With this statement, Huntington acknowledges Penelope’s active role in the poem, yet, as a necessary limitation of his philosophical approach, the relevance of her corporeal presence goes unacknowledged. It is, however, Huntington’s claim about Penelope that opens the way for a corporeal study of her corrective presence in the poem.

An examination of Hermione’s statuesque presence in the closing scene of The Winter’s Tale continues my study of female stasis. The scholarship surrounding Hermione’s statuesque presence in the closing scene centers on its ambiguous and deceptive qualities: is she really a statue brought to life? Did she not really die? Concerning the scene’s uncertain and illusory nature, competing clues about Hermione’s condition are commonly cited. Martin Mueller, in “Hermione’s Wrinkles, or, Ovid Transformed: An Essay on The Winter’s Tale,” cites an angelic image of Hermione from act three, scene three and sets this image against Paulina’s “artificial rhetoric with which Paulina announced the death of Hermione” in the prior scene.\textsuperscript{14} Mueller furthers his ambiguous reading of the closing scene when he observes that act five “contains a number of increasingly overt signs pointing to the possibility that Hermione is still alive.”\textsuperscript{15} Lynn Enterline, who also offers an Ovidian reading (addressed in Chapter 2) sums up the ambiguity in “‘You Speak a Language that I Understand Not’: The Rhetoric of Animation in The Winter’s Tale.” She asserts, “The truth of Hermione’s body—its innocence and its death—is always held from view; all that remains is the evidence of
'word’ and ‘oath.'”16 Also looking to language to help illuminate the ambiguity of the scene is James Knapp who observes that “. . . the statue scene emphasizes the overcoming of both language and vision in favor of an ‘otherwise’—something beyond both the stasis of the visual image and the self-affirming word.”17 Caroline van Eek’s explanation of the Renaissance view of animate/inanimate ambiguity in classical Rome speaks directly to the statue scene in The Winter’s Tale and informs the cited scholarship. She observes that the existence of two populations in Rome, “one consisting of living people, the other of statues,” was a Renaissance perspective that suggested “the distinction between inanimate statues and living beings was not always crystal clear.”18 Scott Crider embraces the ambiguity of the closing scene in “Weeping in the Upper World: The Orphic Frame in 5.3 of The Winter’s Tale and the Archive of Poetry.” Mentioning Stephen Orgel’s introduction to the Oxford edition of the play (1996) and arguing against Jonathan Bate’s interpretation in Shakespeare and Ovid (1993), Crider concludes that a “critical commonplace” is to perform a theatrical reading of the scene and asserts that Orgel’s and Bate’s studies rely on assumption and therefore fail to indisputably support a strictly theatrical reading of the closing scene.19 Crider cites evidence in the play for both theatrical and magical readings and thus faults Orgel and Bate for “assum[ing] that, without a doubt, we may not say that a statue of Hermione becomes Hermione herself.”20 Crider sets out to answer this question: “Is the animation actual, or is it a representation of an animation?” He argues that the ambiguity demands a simultaneous experience of both, with both being evident via Shakespeare’s appropriation of the Orphic frame in Ovid’s tale.21 The Orphic frame includes Orpheus’ “doubt in the presence of the dead,” thus bringing to the statue scene, argues Crider, the possibility for both magic and performance.22
Rather than furthering these prevailing perspectives, I focus on the rhetorical function of Hermione’s stasis, a critical stance that precludes an answer to the reality of Hermione’s presence.

The study of stasis offered in this thesis not only advances a rhetorical reading of the static body but also includes the male body and the notion of ethical stasis manifested in corporeal stasis. Critical attention to Coriolanus, however, centers primarily on verbal rhetoric and its failings. Two contradictory views bookend this traditional scholarship: “The Failure of Words” by Carol M. Sicherman (1972) and “The Pathology of Rhetoric” by Yvonne Bruce (2000).

In “The Failure of Words,” Carol M. Sicherman analyzes Shakespeare’s development of “unwilling speech” and the meaninglessness of language, ultimately viewing the play as a “dissection of verbal inadequacy.” Sicherman details a comparison to Plutarch’s Coriolanus, a man of “‘eloquent tongue,’” to support her argument that, through an inability for civil speech, Shakespeare embeds in Coriolanus the mechanism of his own downfall. Citing utterances that evince disparate understandings of language, Sicherman concludes that the speech of Coriolanus “manifests the two extremes”: (1) there is no common understanding of words and their meanings, and (2) words are “rigidly bound to their meanings.” This lack of a cohesive perception of language figures itself in the play’s close, which gives us a world of disharmony and contradiction. While other critics, Sicherman notes, see a dramaturgical and creative flaw in the close of the play, Sicherman sees it, along with the rhetorical issues, as the closing of one chapter in Shakespeare’s career and the opening of another: the romances. With this play, Sicherman posits that Shakespeare “succeeded in purging himself with words, with the tough, deliberate, controlled penning of an uncontrolled
man’s speeches. A change was taking place within Shakespeare.”

Countering Sicherman’s reading, Yvonne Bruce, in “The Pathology of Rhetoric,” sees language as successful in Coriolanus. Bruce concludes that the uses of rhetoric, rather than the words themselves, fail. Words work, Bruce’s reading reveals, because they suggest the “reconciliation of voice and body, members to corporation, fragments to whole.” For instance, Bruce cites the opening scene in which words prevent violent action and act two, scene three in which Coriolanus wins the consulship with only a few words that fail to fully answer the demands to show his wounds and speak of his heroic actions. Thus, Bruce understands the failure in Coriolanus to be, not words, but rather the manipulative, rhetorical uses to which words are put. Her observation that all the characters in the play are either physically or politically starving provide the context for rhetorical manipulation and explain the ease in which the manipulation of characters through rhetoric is so easily accomplished.

An inordinate desire for individualism is a theme frequently attended to in criticism of the play, and it is this criticism that has proven most useful to my corporeal reading of Coriolanus, in that I attribute the character’s stasis to his “‘titanic individualism.’” Marcus Nordlund, in “Parental Love in Two Roman Tragedies,” draws from the works of Richard Ide (quoted above) and Thomas McFarland, who says that the play exhibits “‘Shakespeare’s wizard grasp of the depth of the eternal struggle between individual and society.’” For McFarland, the play is about this struggle and “nothing else.” Nordlund complicates McFarland’s proclamation by introducing the human need for community, which makes Coriolanus’ autonomous desire vulnerable to the society against which he fights. Rather than interpreting Coriolanus as an undeveloped character, Nordlund sees Coriolanus’ lack of growth as evidence that the
play is “about an unchanging man.” Nordlund’s attention to stasis and individualism is in service to his study of how parental love (biological and otherwise) bears its weight on Coriolanus throughout the play while he struggles to stand against social demands. My reading of *Coriolanus* furthers the work of Bruce and Nordlund by focusing on the rhetorical function of Coriolanus’ body. Like Bruce, I interpret a manipulative capacity in the way Coriolanus uses and refuses to use his body. In agreement with Nordlund, I advance the idea of “titanic individualism” to convey Coriolanus’ defensive use of and rhetoric in his static body. With regard to the traditional rhetorical studies of the play, I undertake some analysis of verbal rhetoric to help frame my argument for corporeal rhetoric.

**Gesture**

In *Institutio Oratoria*, Quintilian instructs orators on the importance of bodily movements to their art. Despite the benefit of diverse movements, Quintilian holds up movements of the hands as speech itself:

> For other portions of the body may help the speaker, whereas the hands may almost be said to speak. Do we not use them to demand, promise, summon, dismiss, threaten, supplicate, express aversion or fear, question or deny? Do we not employ them to indicate joy, sorrow, hesitation, confession, penitence, measure, quantity, number and time? Have they not power to excite and prohibit, to express approval, wonder or shame? Do they not take the place of adverbs and pronouns when we point at places and things? In fact, though the peoples and nations of the earth speak a multitude of tongues, they share in common the universal language of the hands.
I quote this in full to emphasize the communicative power of the hands that the ancients, and later the Renaissance, so fully recognized. Despite this recognition, which unquestionably informs the literature of the Renaissance era, there remain significant gaps in such gestural scholarship, with regard to depth, context (text versus performance), and recognition.

Providing a gestural landscape of Renaissance drama, Barbara Mowat in “The Beckoning Ghost: Stage Gesture in Shakespeare” surveys the use of gesture in various plays and categorizes the types of descriptive commentary in Shakespeare’s plays for the purpose of establishing the dramaturgical use of the gesture-language correlation, thus expanding the critical perspective of gesture from that of “stage business” to dramaturgy. In doing so, Mowat examines primarily the commentary on performed gestures rather than the gestures themselves. Mowat identifies three categories of gestural commentary—directive (character identifies the gesture), explanatory (character identifies and also explains/interprets the gesture), and interpretive (character inaccurately interprets the gesture)—and clarifies the reasons for the commentary: validates actors’ movements, directs audience’s attention to the appropriate place on the stage, and informs us of gestures that are difficult or impossible to see. The categories identified point toward the fact that gestures, whether voluntary or involuntary (blushing, trembling, fainting), can be ambiguous and untrustworthy. Mowat provides commentary on specific gestures in Hamlet, Othello, 3 Henry VI, Richard III, Hero and Leander, Comedy of Errors, Much Ado about Nothing, As You Like It, Macbeth, Coriolanus, King Lear, and The Winter’s Tale. In its scope, Mowat’s work lays the groundwork for more thorough exploration of gesture in individual plays, which I seek to accomplish in this thesis.
Taking a rhetorical approach to gesture, Harold Fisch, in “Shakespeare and the Language of Gesture,” attends to the use of gesture in seven of Shakespeare’s plays. Generally, he finds that “an awareness of body language” is “an integral feature” of Shakespeare’s plays, a feature that affords gesture the ability to define the central meaning of a play. Rhetorically, Fisch observes that gesture can be metonymic (Macbeth), in that it “points to a fundamental pattern in the play as a whole.” Gesture can also enforce an idea or meaning (King Lear) and, more broadly and dramaturgically relevant, figure a rhetorical code (The Merchant of Venice), in that culturally recognizable gestural language articulates a “formal structure” that “goes both the deployment of the plot and the patterning of the characters.” Gesture can also function as anti-language (Troilus and Cressida, and Timon of Athens), transcending or subverting spoken language. Fisch theorizes that the rhetorical study of gesture reveals an “overall gestic code” that may serve to link Shakespeare’s plays. Where Mowat’s study opens the way for more thorough examinations of gesture in individual plays, Fisch’s survey suggests a useful direction for such scholarship.

Because of the centrality of the hands in Titus Andronicus, the scholarship, unlike that of the other works discussed in the gesture chapter, frequently considers issues of corporeality. Despite this critical attention to the play’s corporeal elements, studies of Titus Andronicus neglect gestural significance and potential in favor of a metaphorical, rather than a communicative, approach to the play’s corporeal elements. The condition of physical fragmentation and its metaphorical capacity in Titus Andronicus stand on a critical foundation of Renaissance bodily fragmentation. For instance, Nancy J. Vickers discusses the dissected woman in Petrarch’s Rime Sparse, noting that, although it is impossible to describe without fragmenting the descriptive
subject, Petrarch “systematically avoids those structures that would mask fragmentation.” Jonathan Sawday offers a book-length examination of the dissected body in *The Body Emblazoned: Dissection and the Human Body*. Sawday grounds his study in the cultural truth that dissection was one of the organizational methods of human knowledge. David Hillman and Carla Mazzio offer an anatomically conceived study called *The Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern Europe*, in which each chapter addresses either a particular body part or condition. Focusing on hands, Katherine Rowe studies severed hands in art, literature, emblem books, and medical treatises to advance a perspective on hands as agents of actions that question bodily autonomy. Turning to *Titus Andronicus*, the body part under scrutiny is the severed hand, and, as mentioned above, the symbolic, rather than the communicative, quality of this part is central to studies of the play. Critics convey this corporeal symbolism through analysis of the play’s language. Gillian Murray Kendall argues that the metaphorical language of *Titus Andronicus* “influence[s], transform[s], and mutilate[s] the action of the play.” Albert H. Tricomi recognizes the ability for the play’s metaphorical language to function prophetically and thus to maintain the presence of absent visual spectacles. Together, Kendall and Tricomi have as the central focus of their studies the ability of language to sever the boundary between metaphor and reality in the play. Nicola Imbrascio views the hand as a dramatic symbol, with the “literalization of abstract metaphors and the materialization of cultural emblems” emphasizing the symbolic quality of the hand. Reading the play through the lens of disability theory, Imbrascio forges a most substantial link between language and corporeality in the play and argues that the “symbolic power” of the hand is strongest in its absence and insists upon a recognition of the “disabled body as active and
Rather than addressing the metaphorical and symbolic function of the severed hand, I approach a study of this mutilation with a more literal perspective. Looking primarily at the ways in which Lavinia mutely communicates without hands, how her corporeal language is interpreted by others, and the implications of this signification, I further the collective critical perspective by bringing to the forefront the potential for and depth and relevance of bodily communication.

Dance

A review of the scholarship on Renaissance dance reveals a focus on gender politics, self-fashioning, and performance. These issues are studied most commonly through courtly dancing. Jennifer Nevile’s edited collection Dance, Spectacle, and the Body Politick, 1250-1750 explores dance in the context of court and theater performance. Skiles Howard scrutinizes dance with a keen eye on two sites: court and drama. In The Politics of Courtly Dancing in Early Modern England, Howard attends to the performance of rank and gender, competing cultural and religious views of dance, gender politics, and self-fashioning. Barbara Ravelhofer offers a comprehensive look at dance performance in The Early Stuart Masque: Dance, Costume, and Music, in which she includes choreographic treatises and addresses such aspects as rehearsals, visual effects, and costume conventions, as well as provides performance case studies. While The Early Stuart Masque offers some attention to the rhetorical qualities of Renaissance dance, it is in her article “Memorable Movements: Rhetoric and Choreography in Early Modern Courtly Entertainment” that Ravelhofer most fully explores the direct connections between rhetorical practice and performance and dance rehearsal and performance. This article provides the sturdy foundation upon which my argument for the rhetorical capacity of dance in Renaissance literature is developed.
Studies of dance in literature outside of the masque yield little in the way of rhetorical function. In *Shakespeare and the Dance*, for instance, Alan Brissenden focuses on the symbolic implications of dance, specifically order, harmony, and conflict. His attention to a dance-dialogue relation focuses on the way in which dialogue reflects the dancing that is or might be occurring. With regard to the latter, his is a speculative discussion. Rhetorically speaking, Brissenden sees dance interestingly but narrowly as “useful for highlighting dramatic conversation.”^44^ Twenty-four years prior, Walter Sorrell wrote an article of the same title, in which he, like Brissenden, speculates on the types of dances Shakespeare’s characters perform and uses descriptions within the text of the plays to offer suggestions to the choreographers of modern stagings.\(^45^\) In *Power on Display: The Politics of Shakespeare’s Genres* (1986), Leonard Tennenhouse presents types of ceremonial dance as either a celebration or transgression of state power.\(^46^\)

Two of the three works that I analyze for rhetorically-functioning dance have garnered scholarship illuminating the presence of dance. *Orchestra*, which suffers somewhat from critical neglect, lends itself to discussion of dance in terms of cosmic harmony. Dance as a rhetorical medium, however, is lacking in this slight discourse. Sarah Thesiger attends to the problem of dancing in Davies’ poem through a discussion of the disparate symbolism of dance in literature: dance as a symbol of married and of unmarried love. Furthering the idea above and hinting at a rhetorical analysis of dance, Thesiger notes the ability of dance to externally express the internal mind.\(^47^\) In an article that addresses Davies’ use of *prolepsis*, emphasizes the base character of Antinous, and reveals the deceptive nature of Antinous’ eloquence, R. J. Manning more fully recognizes the rhetorical character of dance in the poem.\(^48^\) Thomas M. Greene and John C. Meagher reference *Orchestra* in their discussions of dance in Ben Jonson’s masque.
**Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue.** Both critics recognize Davies’ poem as a source for Jonson’s use of dance, particularly labyrinthine dance, which, as Greene observes, is “stated most explicitly” in *Pleasure* than in his other masques.\(^49\) Meagher’s article centers on Jonson’s interest in “discover[ing] and exploit[ing]” available knowledge to reveal an “intimate association” between dance and poetry.\(^50\) He explores the uses of dance in Jonson’s masques, citing dance as a metaphor for order and as a medium for morality. Accordingly, Meagher looks to the ancients and Sir Thomas Elyot to support his reading of *Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue.*

Dance in *The Winter’s Tale* proves a topic wanting in critical attention, as the play has compelled studies primarily of the jealousy and the statue scenes, 1.2 and 5.3, respectively. Concerning the former (the latter is discussed above in “Stasis”), a very brief but observant article by Roger J. Trienens outlines the debate surrounding the origin of Leontes’ suspicion and jealousy and offers evidence countering the consensus.\(^51\) In “The Inception of Leontes’ Jealousy in *The Winter’s Tale,*” Trienens concludes that two common views dominant the discourse: (1) the manifestation of an inherent weakness in Leontes’ nature or (2) a dramaturgical flaw stemming from the improbability of Leontes’ reaction. Trienens, however, cites the astonished reaction of the other characters, the amount of time that Leontes and Hermione have been married without any other such manifestation of jealousy, and the nine-month timeframe in which Leontes has been tolerating Polixenes’ visit as reasons to discount these views. Instead Trienens posits that Leontes must be understood to have entered the scene already suffering from jealousy. More recent views offered by Ros King and Norman Nathan recognize a provocation for the sudden onset of jealousy: the intimate banter between Hermione and Polixenes and their subsequent physical interaction.\(^52\) For both
critics, however, verbal rhetoric is the dominant focus, the dominant catalyst of
Leontes’ jealousy, to the extent that Nathan defines the hand play as one of a few
“trifling actions.”53 I seek to prove otherwise, as I provide evidence that gesture was
understood to have the potential for profound emotional transformation on the
observer(s) of bodily communication.

The hand play between Hermione and Polixenes is not the only noteworthy yet
neglected physical interaction in the play. The pastoral spectacle of Perdita’s dancing at
the sheep-shearing festival likewise displays the qualities of communicative interaction.
The rhetorical quality of dance was readily perceived during the Renaissance, and it is
through this cultural context that I perceive the necessity to attend to Shakespeare’s use
of dance in the play and to tease out the rhetorical quality of its performance.

Summary of Chapters

Chapter two, “The Rhetoric of Stasis,” is framed in trauma theory and advances
the idea of stasis as a form of mute rhetoric through the use of a range of sources, from
Sir Thomas Elyot’s conduct manual, The Book Named the Governor, to Sergei
Lobanov-Rostovsky’s study of the eye in The Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality
in Early Modern Europe. First considering trauma theory, Elissa Marder asserts that
“some of the most influential and far-reaching new insights about trauma” have
emerged from the field of literary theory (1). Another source relevant to my use of
trauma theory is Catherine Silverstone’s Shakespeare, Trauma, and Contemporary
Performance (Routledge, 2011). Silverstone explores the ways in which traumatic
events are interpreted for the stage in contemporary performances of Shakespearean
drama and the role that historical and current traumatic events inform these
interpretations. Because Silverstone concentrates her study on contemporary
performances of Shakespearean drama, my concern with the original contexts of trauma evident in the moral and physical stasis of particular literary characters in *Orchestra, The Rape of Lucrece*, and *Coriolanus* limits my ability to make significant use of Silverstone’s work. The chapter addresses physical and moral stasis, with moral stasis manifesting itself corporeally via a state of physical immobility. The chapter is organized according to two structural principles. The primary structure is based on the degree of trauma suffered, with the female characters examined first. Gender governs the secondary structure, as the study of Coriolanus is offered last and stands, with regard to the types of and catalyst for stasis, as a gendered counterpart to the study of Penelope. Overall, the static bodies prove rhetorical entities in their conveyance of virtue, victimization, and autonomy.

Penelope in Sir John Davies’ poem *Orchestra, or a Poem of Dancing* opens the chapter. An exemplar of virtue, Penelope is a figure of both moral and physical stasis, with moral stasis manifesting itself as physical stasis, in that the virtuous queen takes an immobile stance against Antinous, her unwanted suitor. This situation illustrates a minor instance of trauma, as Antinous attempts an assault against the virtue of Penelope. His lengthy seduction attempt can be described as a rhetorical battering ram. Disparate notions of civility ground this battle of wills, as Antinous subscribes to the humanist idea that civility is displayed through dancing, and Penelope understands dancing to be an uncivil activity. An exploration of the place of and beliefs about dance in the Renaissance provides a cultural context for Antinous’ Platonic position and Penelope’s Stoic stance. Penelope’s physical stasis functions as a corporeal rejection of Antinous’ seduction attempts. Based on the elements of history, mythology, cosmology, and eloquence, I present the suitor’s attempted seduction as a model of formal rhetoric. As
such, I analyze Penelope’s stillness as a corporeal rebuttal of a rhetorical argument. This persistent, mute rebuttal eventually forces Antinous to admit to rhetorical defeat and call on Love to take over the task. The glorious dancing spectacle reflected in Love’s mirror transforms Penelope’s stasis from one that figures condemnation to one that proclaims awe and rapture. Although her sense of virtue has been compromised, Penelope, to the end, remains a figure of chaste stillness.

Moving to a more serious illustration of trauma-induced stasis, the chapter next explores the stasis of Hermione in The Winter’s Tale. Taking an approach different from the common Ovidian one, I analyze the rhetorical nature of Hermione’s stasis in terms of a particular goal of rhetoric: movere. Because her statuesque presence moves Perdita to awe, brings Leontes to tears and compels him to repent, and encourages reconciliation among all, I argue that Hermione’s form is a model of corporeal eloquence and persuasion and thus achieves rhetorical movere, indeed stirs her observer’s emotions. I ground this argument in the classical understanding that image can be as or more rhetorically powerful than language and rely primarily on the work of Caroline Van Eck to present this understanding in an early modern context. Ultimately, a condition of stasis borne of trauma functions rhetorically to achieve domestic and political harmony.

Progressing to a more violent instance of trauma-induced stasis, the chapter moves to The Rape of Lucrece. My reading of Lucrece’s stasis attempts to complete the perspective offered by Joyce Green MacDonald who interprets Lucrece’s static body as the “customary language of static perfection.”54 Addressing MacDonald’s interpretation, I first examine the rhetoric of Lucrece’s sleeping form, the “static perfection”: what it speaks to and how it influences her attacker, Tarquin. To accomplish a complete
rhetorical study of Lucrece’s stasis, I investigate also the rhetorical nature of Lucrece’s static body post-rape and post-suicide. In sleep, the body of Lucrece compels Tarquin to commit rape, thus, I argue, her body performs rhetorically as a corporeal imperative. Extending this rhetorical function, I offer the theory that Lucrece’s beauty functions not only imperatively but also forensically, in that her body provides Tarquin with the details to form a defense of his crime. Following the rape, Lucrece suffers from a trauma-induced stasis that I, with the assistance of Shakespeare’s rhetoric of death, present as a state of living death—a state that functions rhetorically to foreshadow her suicide. Following her ultimate act of self-authorship, suicide, Lucrece becomes once again a male-authored text when her father and husband display/publish her tragic body in the streets. I assert the rhetorical nature of her corpse on the basis of its effect on the observers, for her corpse stirs the people’s emotions and moves the population to political revolution.

Coriolanus is the last character considered in this chapter. His situation bears some resemblance to Penelope’s in that an unwanted ideal threatens to destroy a personal sense of virtue. As in *Orchestra*, physical stasis is a manifestation of moral stasis. To be sure, personal autonomy is at risk from the force of an external value system, and the refusal of Coriolanus to engage in the activities of an undesirable ideal renders him the male counterpart to Penelope and makes an examination of his stasis an effective way to close the chapter.

Coriolanus has no interest in engaging in the ceremonial rituals required to gain the vote of the people, and it is this contradictory value that creates the moral stasis ultimately realized via physical stasis that voices his inordinate valuing of personal autonomy and individualism. I show his body to be a medium of rhetoric also through
his battle wounds, which his mother, the consuls, and the people desire him to put voice to by displaying them as proof of his worthiness. The idea of Renaissance self-fashioning is taken up in this section via the work of Stephen Greenblatt. Although Greenblatt does not cite Coriolanus, his observations prove relevant to the situation of Coriolanus, in that Greenblatt describes Renaissance self-fashioning as a limited ideal, restricted by the social and ideological mechanisms that limit personal choice. Indeed, Coriolanus realizes his push against ceremony and tradition is futile and so decides to comply, only to be perceived as a fraud. By withdrawing his static position, thus rescinding his value system, Coriolanus loses sense of himself, proving that, even in corporeal terms, a man devoid of character and value cannot be a persuasive rhetor.

What underlies each of these works is the presence of trauma, and this presence renders stasis, whether offensive or defensive, a mechanism of protection. The connections that emerge in this chapter couple Penelope and Coriolanus in terms of a protection of threatened virtue and ethos, respectively, and an ultimate violation of identity—certainly less so in Orchestra than in Coriolanus. Hermione and Lucrece adopt defensive static conditions in response to fully realized instances of trauma and ultimately effect significant change through their immobility.

Chapter three, “The Rhetoric of Gesture in The Winter’s Tale, The Rape of Lucrece, Titus Andronicus, and Epicoene,” revisits two works, The Winter’s Tale and The Rape of Lucrece, and introduces two others, Titus Andronicus and Epicoene. In this chapter, my aim is to reveal the rhetorical quality and power of gesture in the above plays and poem beyond performance studies. As such, I hope to achieve a textual study of gesture that casts a suggestive light on the authors’ awareness of the rhetorical power of gesture and thus of their intentions for gesture to yield provocative and
communicative effects.

My discussion of gesture in *The Winter’s Tale* centers on the hand play between Hermione and Polixenes in act one, scene two. As evidenced above in the gesture section of the literature review, this physical interaction and its apparent impact on Leontes’ emotional state is ripe for critical examination. I make the case for such through the use of classical and Renaissance rhetorical treatises, including John Bulwer’s seminal study of manual language, *Chirologia, the Natural Language of the Hand*. Ultimately, I argue that the gestural spectacle that Leontes can neither bear to watch nor force himself to turn away from is a viable, yet ignored, candidate for the sudden onset of Leontes’ jealousy. It is, thus, a literary contribution to the substantial body of work that promotes, indeed insists upon, the rhetorical force of gesture.

Attention to *The Rape of Lucrece* follows, not simply because it is another Shakespearean work, but because it signals a shift, with regard to the texts I study in this chapter, in the function of gesture from catalyst for trauma to response to it. To establish the gestural presence in the poem, I first call attention to the gestures Lucrece performs before the rape occurs. During this time with Tarquin, Lucrece first gestures to express joy and then to plead for mercy. These are the same gesture: raised hands. I then address Lucrece’s solitary performance of the traditional gestures of grief and mourning, which occur after she is raped. Tears then become viable orators, and to support my argument that Lucrece’s tears are part of her gestural reaction to trauma, I cite a portion of Bulwer’s chirology that, through a hand-wringing analogy, renders tears as a form of gesture. I end this section of the chapter with an examination of Lucrece’s final gestural response to trauma: her suicide. Studies of manual agency by Katherine Rowe and Michael Neill provide useful insight to this final gesture.
Continuing my study of gesture as a response to trauma is a play about which it may seem illogical to examine this topic: Titus Andronicus. Like The Rape of Lucrece, a desperate need for gesture emerges, yet unlike Lucrece, gesture is not so traditionally performed. In Titus Andronicus, the implications of manual and oral dismemberment would seem to impede any valuable attention to gesture. However, these obstacles provide the opportunity for unique consideration of gesture in the play, specifically with regard to notions of gesture and corporeal efficacy. As in The Rape of Lucrece, Titus Andronicus presents the gestural possibilities of tears, and in this discussion, I am able to expand upon the idea of “lachrymal discourse” presented by Eugene Giddens in his exploration of weeping and gender identity in the play (par. 6). What becomes clear through this dramatization of futile communication followed by prosthetically achieved and other non-traditional modes of communication, is the significance of gesture to human interaction. Tongueless, one can still communicate. Tongueless and handless, one is seemingly wholly silenced.

The completion of the above analyses brought two complications to my attention: (1) this chapter, in a thesis not intended to be a study solely in Shakespeare, is quite heavy with Shakespeare, and (2) this chapter is quite heavy with tragedy. To mitigate these complications, I end this chapter with an investigation of gesture in Epicoene. S. Clark Hulse provides a convenient but useful transition into this comic relief. He observes that laughter “has been an appropriate and necessary response to [Titus Andronicus] since 1600.” I provide a summary of his evidence in the relevant chapter—a summary that concludes with Hulse’s simultaneously insightful, in terms of the play under consideration, and pedestrian observation that sometimes laughter is the only coping mechanism for pain. I thus proceeded under the assumption that, at this
point, my reader would be quite ready for and possibly in need of a laugh.

Despite its humor, *Epicoene* maintains the concern with trauma upon which my investigations of gesture in Shakespeare’s works are based. Indeed, gesture serves to prevent the trauma Morose would suffer at the mouths of others. Much of this section relies upon the Plutarchian and Jonsonian distinctions between chatter/talking and eloquence/speaking, as rehearsed in Plutarch’s “*De garrulitate*” from *Moralia* and Jonson’s essay “Of Talking Overmuch.” Criticism by Huston Hallahan provides a modern critical perspective of silence and talk in the play. Where available scholarship on *Epicoene* is lacking, comparisons of gestural and rhetorical situations and conditions to Leontes and Titus assist in the development of my analysis.

Chapter four, “The Rhetoric of Dance in *Orchestra, Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue*, and *The Winter’s Tale,*” like chapter three, revisits two works, *Orchestra* and *The Winter’s Tale,* and introduces one other, *Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue.* With this chapter, corporeal rhetoric is examined in its most active and most rhetorically diverse state, as dance involves the movement of multiple body parts, includes gesture, and communicates various ideals. The work of Barbara Ravelhofer provides an essential perspective for this chapter, as her article “Memorable Movements: Rhetoric and Choreography in Early Modern Courtly Entertainment” unquestionably partners rhetoric and dance. Classical rhetoric and Renaissance dance treatises accompany each other in my investigation of the rhetorical nature of dance.

The chapter opens with a second look at *Orchestra* that focuses on Antinous’ rhetorical descriptions of dance, fleshed out through the use of works by Cicero, Thomas Wilson, and George Puttenham; and the rhetorical accomplishment of dance, rather than verbal rhetoric, at the close of the poem. In this poem, all is shown to dance, and dance
is presented as the great civilizer. It is this reasoning that Antinous relies on to achieve his seduction of Penelope. However, it proves fruitless, whereas the spectacle of dance that Love shows her proves the ultimate persuader, the victorious rhetor. While the form of corporeal rhetoric studied in this chapter and in chapter two (stasis) differ, the conclusion in each is the same—a repeated interpretation that underscores the strength of corporeal rhetoric over verbal rhetoric and calls into question E. M. W. Tillyard’s claim that Davies, had he completed the poem, would have shown Antinous successful in his attempted persuasion of Penelope. While I do not reject the possibility that Davies may have shown Penelope to dance, I argue that this moral pivot would have been an accomplishment of the visual/corporeal rhetoric, rather than of Antinous’ verbal rhetoric. I base this contention on two pieces of evidence: (1) Antinous’ admission of rhetorical failing and (2) the point in the poem at which Penelope becomes enamored with dance. This poem ends with a hint at a rivalry between rhetoric and spectacle—a rivalry that allows me to easily transition into an investigation of rhetorical dance in *Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue*.

In the analysis of Jonson’s masque, I focus on the character Daedalus, dancing master, and his songs, in which he narrates choreography and defines dance as a form of speech. Neo-platonic ideas about the communicative power of images and spectacle, as well as theories from Jonson’s treatise on writing, *Timber or Discoveries*, construct the foundation needed to support my argument for the rhetorical function of dance in the masque. The first song contains choreographic evidence of rhetorical *inventio* and *dispositio* and directly links the arts of rhetoric and dance through the articulation of the dancers’ goal: to move the spectators to admire their footed wisdom and to move the beholders to wisdom. This idea of rhetorical *movere* is extended in the trope of
transformation illustrated in Daedalus’ second song, broadening the focus to include not only the spectators but also the dancers themselves. In the second song, Daedalus instructs the dancers to transform their stillness into a second dance that will, in turn, transform personified praise into a state of near speechlessness. Jonson’s evaluation of his audience as possessing the ability to aesthetically and ethically benefit from his masques factors into this discussion, for Daedalus claims that his dancers should offer the spectators an aesthetic and ethical profit they can internalize and by which they can be transformed.

With this chapter, *The Winter’s Tale* makes its third appearance in the thesis. Concerning the rhetorical capacity of dance, this play differs from *Orchestra* and *Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue* in the way in which dance communicatively functions. In *The Winter’s Tale*, dance is an unintentional medium for rhetoric, in that its presence is intended to be ceremonial, rather than instructional as in *Orchestra* and *Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue*. The dancing under consideration is that of Perdita during the sheep-shearing festival and that of the Satyrs. Perdita’s dancing corporeally articulates the virtue and innate nobility of the princess-shepherdess, and its presence offers an eloquent contrast to the rustic setting in which it is performed. Dancing and rhetoric are linked throughout the analysis through attention to the epideictic rhetoric that Perdita’s dancing evokes, the reverent effect it has on the observers, and the natural ability her dancing exudes. Castiglione’s *The Book of the Courtier* provides a useful starting point by which to explore these characteristics, particularly Castiglione’s anatomization of the ideal noble figure. Cicero’s *De Oratore* and Elyot’s *The Book Named the Governor* assist in the exploration of Perdita’s revelatory dancing.

The second element of dance addressed in act four, scene four is the dance of the
Satyrs. Through this dancing, the link between rhetoric and dance takes on a reflective character, in that the dance of the Satyrs reflects the discord created by Polixenes’ rhetorical attempt to stop the wedding ceremony between Florizel and Perdita. Accordingly, this section of the chapter offers a close reading of the scene’s verbal rhetoric, which leads to discussion of cosmic and numerical constructs of harmony/unity, the latter revealing common principles between numerical constructs of harmony/unity and choreography. For this discussion, the works of S. K. Heninger, Jennifer Nevile, and Susan Foster prove useful.

What I seek to reveal in this introduction is that the available scholarship on the forms of corporeal rhetoric under consideration in this thesis justifies and conveys a need for the study of these forms as they manifest themselves in the actions of and interactions between literary characters. The nature of the available scholarship has required me to take a tapestry approach, in that I have had to, for the most part, weave together relevant threads of modern insight onto a backdrop of classical and Renaissance thinking in order to achieve a complete rhetorical narrative of the static, the gesturing, and the dancing body as each is written into being. The end result, I hope, is a study that gives the Renaissance literary body its due and lays the groundwork for alternative critical approaches.
Notes

1. Cfpp.english.upenn.edu/archive/Renaissance/0679.html

2. Hillman, David and Carla Mazzio eds. “Introduction.” The Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern Europe. New York: Routledge, 1997: xii-xxix. In the Introduction, the editors point out that before the word topical came to mean “of current interest, contemporary,” it meant “of or applied to an isolated part of the body.” The word was used in this sense in 1608, as recorded in the Oxford English Dictionary (xii-xiii).

3. Ibid, xii.


5. Ibid, 162.


7. Ibid.


10. Ibid, 115.


15. Ibid, 227. While Mueller makes this observation, he does not cite the “overt signs.” The following are gathered from my reading of act five: 5.1.29-30, 75-84; 5.2.112-15; 5.3.17-20, 27-29, 63-64, 66, 77-78.


26. Ibid, 95, 98.


28. Ibid, 80.


Chapter Two
The Rhetoric of Stasis in *Orchestra, The Winter’s Tale, The Rape of Lucrece, and Coriolanus*

The study of stasis requires attention to a relatively new area of literary criticism: trauma theory. As Elissa Marder observes, “some of the most influential and far-reaching new insights about trauma” have emerged from the field of literary theory (1). Despite the groundbreaking scholarship that literary theory has provided to the field of trauma theory, Marder admits that the link “might come as something of a surprise” and describes literature and literary theory as fields that “might appear to be far removed from [trauma studies]” but nonetheless have contributed “some of the most influential and far-reaching new insights” (1). Because literature is universally viewed as the study of human nature and as a means of understanding the human condition and because literary characters commonly suffer the psychoanalytic gaze of scholars, the use of trauma theory to further literary studies and literary theory appears to be a natural movement. The role of history, specifically violent history, in the production and study of literature fortifies the natural relationship between literature and trauma studies, and scholarship of early modern literature provides an especially fertile ground upon which to nurture this relationship. Catherine Silverstone has achieved such in her most recent book: *Shakespeare, Trauma, and Contemporary Performance* (Routledge, 2011). In its focus on contemporary performances of Shakespearean drama, this study is not wholly relevant to my study of stasis as a form of corporeal rhetoric in Renaissance texts. However, it assists me in constructing a framework of trauma theory by which to enclose my own study, as I seek to interrogate the role of varying degrees of trauma in the moral and physical stasis of particular literary characters.
In this chapter, I study physical and moral stasis as a consequence of various types and degrees of trauma in *Orchestra, The Winter’s Tale, The Rape of Lucrece*, and *Coriolanus*. The ambiguous truth of trauma, that it “defies simple definition and escapes the confines of known categories,” helps to justify the latitude with which I employ trauma as a cause for stasis (Marder 1). However, the dimension of trauma as “inherently political, historical, and ethical” (1) provides specific contexts through which trauma informs the static presence of the characters studied here: Penelope, Hermione, Lucrece, and Coriolanus. As revealed in the title and character listings, the organization of this chapter does not follow a structure determined by genre or chronology. Instead, it groups the female characters based on the degree of trauma suffered and then provides an example of masculine stasis, which proves unique from female stasis in its origin but akin to it in its protective/defensive function. For the characters under examination, the static body speaks as a form of corporeal rhetoric conveying virtue, victimization, and autonomy.

**Penelope in *Orchestra***

In *Orchestra* (1596), Sir John Davies reimagines Antinous’ attempted seduction of Penelope as an eloquent argument for dancing, in which the hopeful suitor espouses the virtues of “Love’s proper exercise” (18.7). Advancing into a rhetorical battle of wills, Antinous constructs a nimble defense of dancing that fails to sway Penelope’s static argument against, in her virtuous mind, such crude activity. The poem illustrates the tension between intellectual and moral virtue for which Penelope’s body is the center. Antinous looks to the history of the world and man to promote his argument that dance is the father of universal harmony and human civility, that dance is the essential
way to experience cosmic, earthly, and human harmony, beauty, virtue, and love.¹ In Antinous’ neo-Platonic perspective, Penelope should exercise her own beauty and virtue and engage in dancing. While Antinous employs historical knowledge and various rhetorical weapons to defend his desire and position on the virtues of dancing, Penelope wields a single yet weighty one to defend her moral stance. Penelope’s weapon is her untiring stillness, reinforced by an almost complete silence, which performs in the poem as mute rebuttal and silent rhetoric of virtue. In this way, Penelope seems to subscribe to the ideal promoted in Shakespeare’s Sonnet 94: “Who moving others, are themselves as stone, / Unmoved, cold, and to temptation slow, / They rightly do inherit heaven’s graces, / And husband nature’s riches from expense” (3-6). Penelope’s static response to Antinous’ argument mutely articulates the queen’s disdain for dancing, as well as her ability to uphold her virtuous character in the face of domestic trauma: the lengthy absence of her husband and the intrusion of an unwanted suitor.

Despite the civility and grace that Davies awards Homer’s crude and lustful Antinous, the poet does not give us a victorious suitor-rhetor in this battle between desire and virtue, between dance and stillness. At the heart of the battle is the notion of civility, the understanding of which originates for Antinous and Penelope from two acknowledged yet contradictory ideals. For Antinous, civility should be displayed by one’s engagement in dancing because dance creates and communicates one’s civility. Dancing as a means to and display of civility is a humanistic principle maintaining that “the body, as well as the mind and spirit, demanded the right set of training” and that dancing, as an exercise prescribed for the attainment and display of inner and outer
grace, was a part of such training (Major 27-28). On the other hand, Penelope sees
dancing as a crude activity having no kinship to civility or virtue. To be sure, Davies
provides Penelope, in his recasting of Homer’s abandoned queen, with a distinct
Renaissance awareness that Mark Franko describes in his study of the Renaissance
courtly body: “An illusion of surveillance is maintained at all levels of privacy and
sociability. Thus precepts are not merely suggestions; they are imperatives which
impose a discipline on each moment of one’s existence” (Franko 40). Penelope’s
existence is that of a long-abandoned queen who has been waiting chastely for the
return of her king. As such an auditor to an argument of seduction, Penelope is
compelled to uphold a noble and virtuous presence, a presence she believes would be
tarnished if she were to accept Antinous’ offer and dance with him. In order to maintain
her own sense of disciplined civility, which opposes such physical display, Penelope
verbally and physically rebuts Antinous’ argument for dancing by speaking quite
minimally against such movement and, more pervasively, sustaining a static presence in
the poem. In response to Penelope’s immediate verbal refusal, Antinous develops an
allegorical argument that presents dance as an act of universal (cosmic, elemental,
societal) harmony. His goal is to convince the queen that harmony and civility exist only
because all aspects of the universe dance; thus, it is only proper for her to exercise her
beauty and virtue by engaging in this harmonizing and civilizing activity. For Antinous,
Penelope’s rigidity articulates a neglect of beauty and virtue, and as such, it articulates
also a rejection of the means to a “well-ordered society” (Arbeau 12). It is indeed a
moral and physical stasis that Antinous rhetorically labors to sway. Davies’
contemporary audience would have recognized the tension dramatized here (and
exaggerated in Penelope’s stasis) between the highly moralistic dance ideology disseminated in Sir Thomas Elyot’s *The Book Named the Governor* (1531), in which Elyot connects female dance style to culturally desired female virtues of modesty and chastity, and Queen Elizabeth’s love and performance of vigorous dances. Revealing the position of dance in Queen Elizabeth’s court is the circumstance of Christopher Hatton, who was “acclaimed, admired, and loved” for his dancing (Arbeau 16) and was able to advance himself in the Elizabethan court by way of his superior dancing talent (Nicolas 4-5). The Queen herself was an accomplished dancer, having been instructed in and showing a taste for the art since her youth and was adept at the Italian style of dancing, which “proliferated in leaps of all sorts” (Ravelhofer 103, 107).

Female dancing became more vigorous in the Stuart Court, as Barbara Ravelhofer observes. She explains that female dancers “might be expected to ‘heave up’ their men” (116). In a letter to John Chamberlain, Dudley Carleton describes the vigorous dancing of female dancers in the Stuart Court:

... for galliards and corantoes [the women] went by discretion, and the young prince was tossed from hand to hand like a tennis ball. The Lady Bedford and Lady Susan took out the two ambassadors and they bestirred themselves very lively; especially the Spaniard, who in his Spanish galliard showed himself a lusty old reveler. (56)

Although both rulers possessed a taste for energetic dancing and both eras limited the kind of dances women could perform, with the Stuart Court excluding only the *capriole* (Ravelhofer 116), evidence of Stuart-era performances reveals that athletic female movement was more acceptable under King James, allowing female dancers to dance
toe-to-toe, so to speak, with their male counterparts. This suggests that female stasis would have been more of an ideological concern during Elizabeth’s reign. As a matter of fact, Davies uses gendered metaphors to illustrate two dances of distinct style: the measured pavane and robust galliard. Davies describes the pavane as the measured dance of the moon and the galliard as the dance of the sun that possesses “[a] spirit and a virtue Masculine” and is performed to “lusty tunes” (41.1, 68.2, 7). Recasting this era’s dance ideology in a classical context, Davies adds a cultural layer to the tension of the poem: the domestic code that governed the behavior of Greek women. In this way, Penelope’s stasis pits historical context against cultural ideology, with the final image of the unfinished poem (discussed later) revealing a harmonizing of the two.

Davies presents Antinous as a “fresh and jolly knight” with “[w]it to persuade, and beauty to delight” (5.2, 5), and his first attempt to woo Penelope to dance reveals his courtly grace:

Let me the mover be, to turn about
Those glorious ornaments that youth and love
Have fixed in you, every part throughout:
Which if you will in timely measure move,
Not all those precious gems in heaven above
Shall yield a sight more pleasing to behold,
With all their turns and tracings manifold. (13)

Despite Antinous’ eloquent request, a request that places the image of the would-be dancing of Penelope above the divine vision of the cosmic dance, Penelope politely refuses him:
Faire sir, you needs must fairly be denied,
Where your demand cannot be satisfied.
My feet, which only nature taught to go,

Did never yet the art of footing know. (14.4-7)

With her mention of nature, Penelope implies that artifice is contrary to feminine beauty and virtue, that constructed movement is unnatural and thus destructive to the natural state of female movement. The final two lines convey a mild tone of refusal, for Penelope says that she is unable to dance because of nature’s governance over her. However, Penelope’s tone becomes harsh as she continues her refutation. It is clear that Penelope has no interest in learning “the art of footing” from an inappropriate suitor. In the next stanza, Penelope questions the courtier’s motive. She asks, “But why persuade you me to this new rage?” and proceeds to cast dancing as a form of civil unrest:

For all disorder and misrule is new,
For such misgovernment in former age
Our old divine forefathers never knew;
Who if they lived, and did the follies view,
Which their fond nephews make their chief affairs,

Would hate themselves, that had begot such heirs. (15.1-6)

The terms through which Penelope defines dancing (“disorder,” “misrule,” “misgovernment”) makes clear her perspective that dancing has no place in a civil society and certainly should have no reign over a well-governed virtue. Taken together, the stance of each illustrates John Huntington’s observation of Platonic and Stoic virtues: “The Platonist’s intellectual virtue threatens the moral virtue which is the goal of Stoic philosophy, and therefore what to the Platonist looks like a path to the highest truth to the
Stoic may look like vile debauch” (41). Penelope’s Stoic response prompts Antinous to construct an argument based upon antiquity, the elemental workings of heaven and earth, the history of man, and the arts of speech and love to prove that dancing is the father of all civilizing and virtuous ideals. To be sure, this argument allows Antinous to display Platonic intellectual virtue. Antinous spins his argument for over six hundred lines, during which time Penelope interjects her contempt for dancing two times but otherwise remains a silent and static, indeed Stoic, opponent. While Penelope does verbally respond to Antinous, her rhetoric simply gives voice to the more powerful argument articulated through her body, which is noble and virtuous in its stillness. Penelope’s static response seems to function in the same way as verbalized refutations, for Antinous is compelled to continue building his case, as if he is responding to spoken rebuttals. A verbally non-responsive auditor, Penelope resoundingly and sturdily rejects Antinous’ argument with her unwavering motionlessness. Indeed, despite Antinous’ learned and eloquent labor, Penelope refuses to compromise her virtue.

Toward the end of *Orchestra*, Antinous admits to the failing of his rhetoric:

But if these eyes of yours (lodestars of love,

Showing the world’s great dance to your mind’s eye)

Cannot with all their demonstrations move

Kind apprehension in your fantasy

Of dancing’s virtue and nobility,

How can my barbarous tongue win you thereto

Which heav’n and earth’s fair speech could never do? (117)

Realizing that neither his “barbarous tongue” nor the natural eloquence of heaven and earth hold sway over the virtuous queen, Antinous calls upon Love to take up the
persuasive efforts. Referring to himself as Love’s “true liegeman” and to Love as the creator of dancing, the hopeful suitor succeeds in convincing Love to come to his aid and to “[e]nd that persuasion which [he] erst began” (118.4, 7, 5). Love complies and appears before Antinous and Penelope bearing a tool of visual rhetoric: a mirror reflecting stars dancing around the moon, which are later described as the queen herself surrounded by her interlinked and dancing “barons brave and ladies fair” (133.1). It is this reflected vision that leads Penelope to comprehend the virtue and nobility of dancing and thus causes this former adversary of dancing to be “rapt with sweet pleasure” at the sight of it. Still, Penelope is not shown to dance at the end of the poem but rather to maintain her silent and unmoving presence as a reaction to the beauty, harmony, and nobility of the spectacle. Yet this is a silence and stillness born of awe, not disdain. To be sure, Penelope’s mute and static condemnation of dancing is ultimately swayed not by Antinous’ rigorous argument, but rather by the mute argument that Love presents after Antinous admits the failing of his rhetoric and has nothing more of his own rhetorical invention to offer.

Davies’ poem contains two rhetors encouraged and emboldened by their strong sense of self-awareness, Antinous intellectually self-aware and Penelope morally so. Her body is at the center of the tension between their competing virtues, and this tension creates a corporeal irony. To be sure, Antinous uses Penelope’s body as a weapon against her morality by basing part of his argument on Penelope’s beauty and on the dance that takes place within her. Penelope’s stillness is her moral defense against this argument. The result of Penelope’s stasis is a discourse seemingly one-sided, since Penelope primarily communicates her moral stance corporeally, rather than verbally. Because Penelope expresses her disdain for dancing early in the poem,
it is clear that a debate will ensue. Despite Penelope’s lack of verbal reactions past stanza fifteen (in a poem of 136 stanzas), a debate does develop by way of the queen’s unrelenting corporeal refutation. The static presence of Penelope originates from her need to preserve her chastity and to conduct herself as her noble status requires. These qualities are transformed at the end of the poem to convey awe for what was originally detested. The message that Penelope’s mute and unmoving presence communicates transforms from an ideal of rigid virtue to an understanding of the intellectual virtue of beauty perceived when, confronted with the dancing spectacle, Penelope questions the value of her weaving, a creation and representation of moral virtue. Davies’ unfinished poem shows an unmoving queen, despite her obvious enthrallment with the dancing; thus, her mind is moved but not her body. In its incomplete form, Orchestra leaves the reader with a vision of Penelope not performing graceful footings upon a dancing round, but instead “rapt with sweet pleasure” in a state of sustained stillness (134.3). Here, Penelope is presented as a forerunner of the Jonsonian beholder, in that, through static observation, she is able to benefit from the corporeal wit and eloquence of the dancers without sacrificing her moral vantage. For the attainment of honor and nobility, Sir Thomas Elyot promotes such observance, if participation in the dancing is not possible:

Wherefore all they that haue their courage stered towarde very honour or perfecte nobilitie, let them approche to this passe tyme, and either them selfes prepare them to daunse, or els at the leste way beholde with watching eien other that can daunse truely, kepynge juste measure and tyme” (241)

As a proper Greek wife, Penelope refrains from dancing with Antinous (although a
logical conclusion is that she would have if Davies had completed the poem). As a literary representation of Queen Elizabeth, Penelope is characteristically enamored by the dance performance.

**Hermione in The Winter’s Tale**

In *The Winter’s Tale* (1610-11)⁹, female stasis is borne of tragedy and appears as a form of corporeal rhetoric in the closing scene of the play. In this scene, Paulina displays Hermione, imprisoned for treason and believed to be dead, as a statue. Whether or not Hermione is truly dead or is truly a statue, the issue at hand is the cause of her immobility: the tyrannical actions of her husband, Leontes. He believes Hermione’s baby to be the offspring of an adulterous affair with Polixenes, his boyhood friend and fellow king, and reacts by imprisoning Hermione for treason and ordering the abandonment of the infant. Rhetorically, the strength of her stillness lies in the highly emotional and repentant effect it has on Leontes. This scene dramatizes the communicative strength of the body, as the physical presence of Hermione figures the pinnacle of eloquence and persuasion in her stony silence and majestic stillness. After Paulina reveals Hermione “like a statue,” as the stage direction notes, she indicates the power of silence, an oral stasis, in unquestionable terms when she says to the observers, “I like your silence. It the more shows off / your wonder” (5.3.21-22). This observation can also be read in terms of Hermione in her sculpted, thus silent and wondrous, condition. Read in this way, Paulina’s observation recalls Quintilian’s recognition in *Institutio Oratoria* that “. . . pictures, which are silent and motionless penetrate into our innermost feelings with such power that at times they seem more eloquent than language itself” (281, 21.67). Michael O’Connell echoes this theory in his claim that Shakespeare’s use of sculpture affirms “the power of the visual
spectacle over ‘humanist claims for an exclusive or near exclusive, truth in language’” (qtd. in Knapp 276). Concerning the observed and the observer, the transcendent eloquence of Hermione’s silence and stillness compares to the effect that persuasive gifts and eloquence have on an orator and his auditor’s perception of him. Paulina’s comment also speaks to the sixteenth-century beholding of sculpture as animate stone. For instance, after the unearthing of Laocoön in 1506, various poems were written with Laocoön not as the subject but as the speaker, and others write life into the sculpture. Paramount to the passage at hand are the following lines from Evangelista Maddaleni de’ Capodiferro: “If the sculptors who were able to give death and fear and living grief to stone could also endow it with a voice and soul, they would have refused, because it is more wondrous to struggle, suffer, beg, lament, fear and die without voice, without soul” (qtd. in van Eck 159). The ability of Hermione’s presence to create a sense of wonder in her spectators (and to articulate her own wonder) and the emotional effects that her silence and stillness have on her spectators (Leontes is “transported” and “stirred” and Perdita could spend twenty years as a “looker on” [5.3.68, 73, 84]), provide her mute and static presence with the rhetorical quality afforded “wondrous” sculpture.10

Further concerning rhetorical theory, Hermione’s mute presence in such an emotionally-charged situation speaks to the rhetorical element kairos, in that the context of this scene begs for yet constrains Hermione’s speech. It is true that Paulina encourages Hermione’s silence, but she does so as an integral part of this context of guilt and repentance, which functions as the context for Hermione’s mute rhetoric. The queen’s silent presence overpowers Leontes and immediately compels him to speak words of shame and repentance, thus succeeding in the rhetorical duties of persuadare
and *move*re. In studying the repentance of Leontes, Paula S. Berggren posits that Leontes “finds correction not in action but in passivity . . .” (30). Hence, the king assumes a female role and allows Hermione to hold the rhetor’s power of moving him to penance. Although Paulina directs this scene, Leontes becomes repentant as a direct result of gazing upon Hermione, to which Paulina responds, “Indeed, my lord, If I had thought the sight of my poor image / would thus have wrought you (for the stone is mine), / I’d not have show’d it” (5.3.56-58). With this, Shakespeare constructs a counterpart to Hermione’s visual rhetoric in act one, scene two. This still and silent rhetoric that Leontes observes leads him now to humbly gaze upon his queen. Where the first instance (1.2) reveals the suspicious and destructive nature of rhetoric, equates movement to corruption, this scene illustrates its virtuous and generative power, revealing stillness as indicative of chastity. In his gazing, Leontes experiences visual rhetoric in the same way that the architect Giuliano de Sangallo and the artist Michelangelo experienced it upon first encountering the recovered Hellenistic sculpture, Laocoön. Caroline Van Eck quotes an eyewitness account of their response to the image: “‘as soon [as the statue] was visible everyone started to draw, all the while discoursing on ancient things . . .’” (158). To be sure, Leontes speaks of and longs for the past. Thus Hermione as statue is memory as echo, just as classical Roman *figura* evoked memories of the heroic and noble actions of the observers’ Roman ancestors and compelled “‘their spirit . . . to virtue’” (qtd. in van Eck 95).

In a request that illustrates the rhetorical power of sculpture as the classical and Renaissance eras understood it, as well as conflates purposeful speech and purposeful silence, Leontes pleads, “Chide me, dear stone, that I may say indeed / Thou art Hermione; or rather, thou art she / In thy not chiding; . . .” (24-26). The “majesty” (39)
of her form moves the king to further words of shame, guilt, and repentance—indeed moves him closer to virtue:

I am asham’d; does not the stone rebuke me
For being more stone than it? O royal piece,
There’s magic in thy majesty, which has
My evils conjured to remembrance, and
From thy admiring daughter took the spirits,
Standing like stone with thee. (37-42)

This daughter awed into stillness is likewise moved by Hermione’s static majesty, for Perdita kneels before Hermione to “implore her blessing” (44). Leontes weeps, and this reaction points to another poem about Laocoon and the rhetorical power and human quality of sculpture. As the speaker of Antonio Tebaldi’s poem, Laocoön says, “‘I am Laocoön, so expressive and alive / that, if you are not made of the material / out of which I am made and my sons, you will make of your eyes a sorrowful river’” (qtd. in van Eck 159). Here, Laocoön evokes tears of pity, while Hermione evokes tears of guilty sorrow. Concerning the human quality of sculpture, Paulina’s statement that “[her] lord’s almost so far transported that / He’ll think anon [the statue] lives” (68-69) reveals the extent to which sculpture performs as rhetoric and rhetor, not only to stir one’s emotions (movere) but also to manipulate one’s reason (persuadare).

Hermione as statue graces the closing scene of *The Winter’s Tale* with a corporeal rhetoric of no uncertain power, for the stony presence of Hermione’s form brings Leontes to tears, compels him to repent for his treatment of his queen, and encourages reconciliation of the court. In this way, Leontes is a Lacanian subject of the male gaze, in that Hermione, as the object of his gaze, holds a position of control over
Leontes. Lynn Enterline speaks to the rhetorical capacity of image when she concludes that the statue of Hermione “becomes a visual analogue for the play’s desire for a truly performative language” (40). Placing this scene within the context of the play as a whole, Hermione’s majestic stillness provides a sturdy contrast to the destructive role of rhetoric throughout. Hermione’s physical presence in this moment also functions as a reification of the play’s achievement of political and domestic harmony. Though borne of trauma, female stasis in this tragicomedy proves domestically and politically constructive—a function only partially realized in The Rape of Lucrece. In this narrative poem, stasis is not just a consequence of trauma but also the cause of it, for Lucrece’s sleeping form of unrivaled beauty and virtue, as Collatine reports his wife’s qualities, compels Tarquin to sexual violence. Stasis, corporeal rhetoric, and trauma appear with unquestionable force in that Lucrece’s body clamors with multiple voices resulting in a corporeal rhetoric that speaks of virtue, lust, domestic dishonor, and political justice.

**Lucrece in The Rape of Lucrece**

The stillness that haunts the The Rape of Lucrece (1594) is, as in Orchestra and The Winter’s Tale, a corporeal effect of rhetoric.¹¹ Joyce Green MacDonald observes Lucrece as a woman whose motionless body speaks the “customary language of static perfection” (79); however, this observation presents an incomplete perspective of Lucrece’s stillness. The multi-authored body of Lucrece is rendered a *sermo corporis* of antagonistic intentions, for the emblematic rhetoric of Collatine compels Tarquin to read Lucrece not as a paragon of virtue to be honored but as a fortress to be ravaged—a trope of stasis contrary to that of The Winter’s Tale. Furthermore, through lamentation and suicide, Lucrece publishes her own body as a text of dishonor, which Collatine, Lucretius, and Brutus recontextualize in order to
bring shame upon Tarquin and his family.

The poem opens with Collatine, the husband of Lucrece, boasting of his wife’s Petrarchan beauty and chastity. To the delight of Tarquin’s ears but to the detriment of Lucrece’s body and soul, Collatine “unwisely did not let / To praise the clear unmatched red and white” (lines 10-11). His inability to cease speaking about Lucrece’s charms compels Tarquin to possess this “rich jewel” (34). Although Collatine’s boasting seduces Tarquin’s spirit of conquest, the rhetoric ultimately to blame for the physical attack is the static vision of Lucrece’s published body. When Tarquin bears witness to the emblematic figure of Collatine’s rhetoric, the narrator proclaims:

Beauty itself doth of itself persuade
The eyes of men without an orator;
What needeth then apology be made
To set forth that which is so singular? (29-32)

With such forceful beauty, there is no need for one to set forth an argument in its defense; thus, Collatine’s rhetoric is rendered impotent. The narrator reveals such through Tarquin’s thoughts:

Now thinks he that her husband’s shallow tongue,
The niggard prodigal that prais’d her so,
In that high task hath done her beauty wrong,
Which far exceeds his barren skill to show. (78-81)

The use of the adjectives *niggard* and *barren* to describe Collatine and his insufficient tongue slurs his character and, in the context of the impending rape, demeans his masculinity.

Verbal rhetoric almost immediately (at line 29) loses power in the poem to the
force of corporeal rhetoric. While Lucrece is still the product of Petrarchan rhetoric, the narrator tells us, indeed warns us, that beauty is its own orator. In this regard, Lucrece’s static beauty performs as an imperative, as a command for Tarquin to conquer this figure of perfect chastity.\textsuperscript{12} To be sure, the motionless, therefore chaste, body of Lucrece commands its possession. Although Coppélia Kahn observes that the rape is, regarding Tarquin’s desire to attack Collatine’s honor, “an affair between men,” it is Lucrece’s body, as published by Collatine’s boasting and read by Tarquin, that commands it to occur (54). In sleep, Lucrece is in a state of “static perfection,” which prompts Tarquin to speak of her “in idealized, transcendent language more evocative of a tomb effigy than a living woman”—a macabre blason of sorts (MacDonald 79). Appearing as in death, Lucrece figures, through her perfect stillness, perfect virtue and thus heightens Tarquin’s desire to conquer her.\textsuperscript{12} As a married thus sexual woman haloed in rhetoric of purity, Lucrece is in a state of paradoxical stasis that articulates a virginal sexuality. Hence, the rhetorical function of beauty proves detrimental to Lucrece. While Tarquin’s digression will “live engraven in [his] face” (203), the blame for his vile deed asserts itself in Lucrece’s face, thus providing the source for Tarquin’s invented defense:

“She took me kindly by the hand
And gaz’d for tidings in my eager eyes,
Fearing some hard news from the warlike band,
Where her beloved Collatinus lies.
O, how her fear did make her colour rise!

First red as roses that on lawn we lay,
Then white as lawn, the roses took away.
“And how her hand, in my hand being lock’d,
Forc’d it to tremble with her loyal fear!
Which strook her sad, and then it faster rock’d,
Until her husband’s welfare she did hear;
Whereat she smiled with so sweet a cheer
That, had Narcissus seen her as she stood,
Self-love had never drown’d him in the flood. (253-66)

In response to Lucrece’s innocent corporeal rhetoric, Tarquin constructs a false forensic rhetoric that describes a struggle of red and white, symbolically of passion and virtue, arising in Lucrece’s face as she awaits news of her husband’s welfare. Tarquin intends to tarnish Lucrece’s virtue with evidence of this symbolic struggle, the red proving evidence of lust and thus justifying his sexual violence. Compounding the sensual tone of Tarquin’s defense is the added detail of their interlocked hands that tremble and rock from Lucrece’s fear—physical details suggestive of a sexual encounter. In these lines, Tarquin establishes the persuasive power of Lucrece’s beauty, a beauty that, as told above, could humble Narcissus and reinforces this power with the proclamation that “[his] heart shall never countermand [his] eye” (276).

The commanding rhetoric of Lucrece’s beauty becomes also a form of forensic rhetoric, for not only does beauty, in its imperative function, provoke Tarquin to rape, but it also provides his defense. In response to Lucrece’s questioning of Tarquin’s reason, he asserts that the color in her face “[s]hall plead for [him] and tell [his] loving tale” (480). Indeed, Lucrece’s beauty is at once offender against Tarquin’s character, thus indirectly against Lucrece, and defender of his “ill” (476). Sergei Lobanov-Rostovsky understands the psychosomatic effect of beauty as beginning with the eye
and ending with the soul (which has a direct bearing on character). It can be argued
then that Tarquin experiences Lucrece’s beauty as a “weapon that solicits [his] eye,
then strikes through it to pierce [his] soul,” transforming his character in the process
(202). Moreover, Tarquin’s threat not only to verbally but also physically publish
Lucrece, after killing her, as an adulteress if she refuses him reinforces the rhetorical
danger inherent in her body. The corporeal text Tarquin threatens to compose through
the defamatory positioning of her corpse with a slave’s will tarnish Lucrece’s honor as
well as that of Collatine, as Tarquin well knows:

“So thy surviving husband shall remain

The scornful mark of every open eye;

Thy kinsmen hang their heads at this disdain,

Thy issue blurr’d with nameless bastardy;” (519-22)

Like Paulina in The Winter’s Tale, Tarquin presents himself as a sculptor tasked with
creating a figure of corporeal deception; however, the deception that Tarquin imagines
sculpting is intended for destructive ends. While Paulina manipulates Hermione’s body
in order to produce guilt in Leontes and thus restore domestic harmony, Tarquin
threatens to sculpt Lucrece into an image of base adultery in order to bring about
domestic ruin. In this comparison, the stillness of Hermione represents virtue and unity,
while the threatened stillness of Lucrece would signify vice and dishonor. The potential
object of such corporeal manipulation and display, Lucrece’s body possesses the power
to destroy the honor of her family. This is a truth of which Lucrece is well aware, for
after the rape, she describes the place she will surely hold in future lore:

“The nurse, to still her child, will tell my story,

And fright her crying babe with Tarquin’s name;

53
The orator, to deck his oratory
Will couple my reproach to Tarquin’s shame;
Feast-finding minstrels, tuning my defame,
Will tie the hearers to attend each line,
How Tarquin wronged me, I Collatine (813-19).

Despite Lucrece’s silent surrender to Tarquin’s lust, thus sparing her the death and public display Tarquin threatens, Lucrece recognizes that Collatine and his family have still been victimized by “unseen shame” and now suffer “[c]rest-wounding, private scar” (827, 828). By submitting to Tarquin, Lucrece gains control of her inevitable suffering, as she will live to choose her own manner of death, thus providing for Lucrece temporary authorship over her male-authored body. The modifier crest-wounding suggests not only familial but also domestic damage, for not only has the family crest been damaged but Collatine may now be regarded as a cuckold (Bate and Rasmussen 2421 n). With regard to this demeaning status, Lucrece rhetoricizes Collatine when she proclaims that his face is “stamp’d” with reproach and is thus a text in which Tarquin “may read the mot afar,” an admission that speaks to the dishonor the rape has caused Collatine (829, 830).

The trauma that derives first from Collatine’s epideictic rhetoric and then from Lucrece’s corporeal rhetoric leads to the stillness with which, following the rape, Lucrece laments her chastity and marital honor. Regarding the Shakespearean canon, Lucrece’s static presence is predominant, for Shakespeare awards Lucrece more lines than any of his other female characters, and she delivers them in stony grief.13 A physical reflection of her emotional state, Lucrece’s stillness speaks not only of trauma but also of death. To be sure, she survives the rape only to experience a condition of
living death before taking her own life. This corpse-like condition is anticipated early in the poem when the narrator describes Lucrece asleep in her bed: “Between whose hills [pillow] her head entombed is; / Where like a virtuous monument she lies” (390-91). Not only does entombed suggest death, but the image of Lucrece as a supine “virtuous monument” speaks of the martyrdom to come. At the time of the rape, the word entombs signifies Lucrece’s silencing of her own cries. Poetically displayed as a lamb falling victim to a wolf, Lucrece clothed in her “own white fleece. . . / Entombs her outcry in her lips’ sweet fold” (678-79). A direct reference to death, the use of this word reifies death by emphasizing its corporeal quality: a corpse in a tomb. As a consequence of the rape, Lucrece’s bedchamber becomes a tomb of multiple deaths.

The association of death to Lucrece’s living, motionless body occurs prior to Tarquin’s attack when the narrator urges the reader to “[i]magine her as one in dead of night / From forth dull sleep from dreadful fancy waking, / That thinks she hath beheld some ghastly sprite” (449-51). Within a few lines, the references to death begin to address Lucrece directly. First, she is compared to a dead creature: “Wrapp’d and confounded in a thousand fears, / Like to a new-kill’d bird she trembling lies” (456-57). Here the reference lies outside of Lucrece, for the dead thing her quaking body resembles is a dying bird; however, the subsequent reference to death penetrates Lucrece’s body. With his hand upon her breast, Tarquin feels “her heart (poor citizen!) distress’d, / Wounding itself to death, rise up and fall” (465-66). With this metaphor, the narrator renders the body of Lucrece a ravaged city and her heart a citizen who rises up against the enemy and is killed. A battle to the death occurs within Lucrece’s breast—an image that anticipates her suicide. The atmosphere of death is furthered once Lucrece experiences the trauma of rape, for she becomes “thrall [slave] / To living death. . . ,” a
condition that reveals the death of her soul (725-26).

Existing now in a state of living death, Lucrece “stays, exclaiming on the direful night” (741). As silence and chaste stillness were requirements of Roman aristocratic women, Lucrece’s static presence speaks as much about feminine ideology as it does about her post-traumatic condition. Concerning traumatic stasis, Lucrece’s references to death reinforce the rhetoric of death that her traumatized body communicates. She laments the shame that will be “grave [engraven], like water that doth eat in steel, /Upon [her] cheeks. . .” (755-56). However, prior to this linguistic reference to death, we are given a direct statement of Lucrece’s wish to die: “She prays she never may behold the day” (746). Preceding her act of suicide, the only movement we see from Lucrece following the rape is her “beating on her breast” to rouse her heart “[a]nd [bid] it leap from thence . . .” (759-60). Here, Lucrece acts upon her body to encourage its demise. Following this self-inflicted violence, she returns to a state of traumatized stasis and shifts her attack to the guilty night. Lucrece’s apostrophe to Night thrusts us onto a “[b]lack stage for tragedies and murtheres fell” (766) and conveys her death wish for the coming day:

“O comfort-killing Night, Image of hell!

........................................

Grim cave of death, whisp’ring conspirator

With close-tongu’d treason and the ravisher! (764-70)

Although Lucrece reproaches Night, she looks to it for comfort by demanding it to “[m]ake war against proportion’d course of time” and if not victorious to “[k]nit poisonous clouds about [the sun’s] golden head” (774, 777). For if the sun cannot rise, then Lucrece’s body will neither reveal its “story of sweet chastity’s decay” nor allow
even the illiterate to “cote [her] loathsome trespass in [her] looks” (808, 812). But the sun does rise, and it provides the light by which Collatine reads his ravaged wife’s sorrow in her “bloodless hand” and pale visage (1597, 1600). This corporeal discourse of shame, sorrow, and trauma reveals Lucrece in a state that foreshadows her suicide, for she appears a lifeless house for her already-dead soul.

Immediately before Lucrece stabs herself, she diminishes further into living death by falling into a state of near speechlessness: “. . . He, he,’ she says, / But more than ‘he’ her poor tongue could not speak” (1717-18). For a time, Lucrece shares somewhat in her lament for Hecuba: “. . . so much grief, and not a tongue” (1463). It is only after “many accents and delays” that Lucrece is able to articulate herself and reveal, “‘He, he, fair lords, ‘tis he, / That guides this hand to give this wound to me’” (1719, 1721-22). This statement, at once epilogue to the tragedy Lucrece’s body narrates and prologue to her self-inflicted death reveals a detachment from the act of suicide. Indeed, it is “this hand” rather than “my hand” that inflicts the wound, a semantic detail that distances Lucrece from the offending body part, thus from the act itself. Such detachment reinforces the external authorship Lucrece’s body suffers from the beginning of the poem. Although she is emotionally and physically poised to take her own life, Lucrece announces her suicide with language that reveals an external force acting upon her, thus denying her corporeal authority. With her death, Lucrece is further rhetoricized at the hands of Collatine and her father, Lucretius. The two men, at the urging of Brutus, carry Lucrece’s bloody corpse through the streets of Rome “so to publish Tarquin’s foul offence” (1851-52). In death, the rhetorical function of Lucrece’s body lies not just in its capability to publicize a crime but also in its persuasive power to compel men to act. Upon seeing Lucrece’s corpse, “[t]he Romans plausibly did give
consent / To Tarquin’s everlasting banishment” (1854-55).

In *The Rape of Lucrece*, Shakespeare develops the trope of stillness into three
incarnations associated with death. First, Tarquin threatens Lucrece with a contrived and
publicized death if she refuses him, and it is Lucrece’s sleeping form that ignites this
lustful violence. Second, Lucrece experiences an ekphrastic death when she studies the
woven tragedy of the Trojan War and thus beholds static images of violence and death in
her mournful and fixed gaze. By studying this tapestry, Lucrece is also able “to mourn
some newer way”—a necessity, since she finds it “stale to sigh, to weep, and groan”
(1365, 1362). Working her way through the tapestry, Lucrece finds Hecuba, in whom
“all distress and dolour” dwell and in whom “the painter had anatomiz’d / Time’s ruin,
beauty’s wrack, and grim care’s reign (1446, 1450-51). Thus, Lucrece finds in the image
of Hecuba a condition analogous to her own, an ekphrastic experience that compels her
to “[shape] her sorrow to the beldame’s woes” (1458). Lucrece relates these
mythological deaths to the metaphorical deaths her family will suffer as a result of her
rape; indeed, the dishonor she is sure that her family will suffer will entomb them in her
tragedy. This truth leads Lucrece to defend her family’s honor through suicide, an act of
fatal penetration that brings the stasis in the poem to a point of tragic absoluteness. In
death, Lucrece becomes a politically destabilizing power when her father and husband
parade her through the streets, a publishing of the victim that leads to the fall of the
Tarquin dynasty.18 Thus, in death, Lucrece becomes an immobile yet forceful rhetoric
for political revolution to which the people justly respond by banishing the ruling
family. Viewing this event through the lens of trauma theory, we see a massive instance
of communal pain. For Elaine Scarry, pain is “unsharable” (“Introduction” 3), yet it is a
communal experience, in that “... the awareness explicit in the process of registering is
what makes any kind of response—from either victim or victimizer, whether sympathy, rage, or apathy. . .—possible” (Allard and Martin 73-74). In Shakespeare’s poem, the reaction is pity and anger, which, as John D. Staines concludes, “can be the radical spur to action” (Staines 76). In Aristotelian terms, the husband, father, and citizens are definitive of “good characters” since they respond to the injustice of Lucrece’s rape and suicide with “pity and indignation” (Staines 78).

Regarding motive, trauma, and rhetorical tropes, The Rape of Lucrece can be viewed as the exceedingly tragic sister of Orchestra and The Winter’s Tale. To begin the comparison, the rape that occurs in Shakespeare’s narrative poem is a violent version of the battle between Davies’ Antinous and Penelope, in that, like Antinous, Tarquin seeks to possess beauty and virtue through physical acts. Moreover, both men perceive the beauty of their desired subjects, thus the women themselves, to blame for their lustful desires. Indeed, if it weren’t for Penelope’s and Lucrece’s renowned beauty and virtue, there would be no offenses taken upon them. Antinous implies this blame by claiming that dance is the proper exercise for her beauty and virtue. Therefore, these qualities compel him to attack the virtue of Penelope by attempting to seduce her to dance. Tarquin, on the other hand, blames Lucrece’s beauty directly by asserting that “‘[t]he color in [her] face, / . . . / [s]hall plead for [him] and tell [his] loving tale”’ (477-480). In both cases, the men perceive themselves to be victims of the female ideal.

Concerning the connection to The Winter’s Tale, Lucrece’s stillness is the result of trauma, yet unlike Hermione, Lucrece’s motionless body does not plead for forgiveness and renewal. Instead, it begs for death and incites political revolution.

**Caius Martius/Coriolanus in Coriolanus**

With Coriolanus (1607-08)\(^9\), stasis as practiced by a male character is an
exercise in the preservation of personal autonomy. As a soldier, Coriolanus is accustomed to acting and reacting in order to preserve his life; indeed, his life is one of literal significance and his worldview one of literal understanding. In other words, Coriolanus' life is the warrior's physical, gritty response to the rough demands of real-life savagery, not the statesman's smooth assimilation of the inclusive, prescribed conventions of senatorial politics. Returning from the violent reality of the battlefield, Coriolanus has difficulty functioning in the emblematic and symbolic society for which he expects to serve as consul by design of his achievements rather than by concession to ceremonial demands. However, Coriolanus is expected to participate in a ceremonial approval process that he perceives as an assault against his ideology of self-governance, an ideology that James L. Calderwood observes as a preoccupation with his own sense of integrity and nobility (218). As Eve Rachele Sanders understands it, Coriolanus is expected to “add sound track and gesture; embellish the objective facts of his appearance with emotion and narrative; alter his voice, expression, stance, and dress; modulate his movements self-consciously; communicate his subjective experience to others; and, in short, take on the role of an actor” (387). Coriolanus acts with an awareness of the danger David Bevington articulates in Action is Eloquence: “. . . a character can lose identity, especially in the tragedies, and thereby lose all reason for existence” (136). In response to the potential assault against his autonomous ideology, Coriolanus rhetorically and corporeally digs his heels into the ground, so to speak, in a sustained attempt to avoid becoming the political and symbolic property of Rome, to avoid becoming a “site of subjugation” (Schoenfeldt 12). However, as Stephen Greenblatt discovered during his research for Renaissance Self-Fashioning, . . . the human subject itself began to seem remarkably unfree, the
ideological product of the relations of power in a particular society.

Whenever I focused sharply upon a moment of apparently autonomous self-fashioning, I found not an epiphany of identity freely chosen but a cultural artifact. If there remained traces of free choice, the choice was among possibilities whose range was strictly delineated by the social and ideological system in force. ("Epilogue" 256)

The stasis aimed at preserving autonomy is a corporeal rhetoric of self-fashioning. Yet its effort to construct an autonomous body/text that the public will accept fails.

Greenblatt explains why: "Self-fashioning is in effect the Renaissance version of these control mechanisms [‘plans, recipes, rules, instructions,. . .’], the cultural system of meanings that creates specific individuals by governing the passage from abstract potential to concrete historical embodiment" ("Introduction" 3-4).21 In the play, the control mechanism is ceremony, and, to revisit Greenblatt’s theory of the always publicly-determined being, Coriolanus’ assertion of autonomy is a reaction to the force of external powers.

Coriolanus asserts his autonomy against ceremony early on with speech sounding simply of modesty but tinged with excessive pride. The first instance of this occurs when Lartius attempts to praise the war hero. Coriolanus interrupts Lartius mid-sentence, not allowing the general to complete an illustration of him as a “steed” in the presence of “caparison” (1.9.13). This characterization recalls the Second Citizens’ anatomical metaphor, in which the leg is the steed; thus, Lartius deems Coriolanus the leg of the body politic, the part that allows it to stand erect and powerful (1.1.117). Coriolanus has returned from a triumphant battle against the Volscians and is uneasy with Lartius’ metaphorical praise. He responds with a literalness that speaks to duty:
. . . I have done
As you have done—that’s what I can; induc’d
As you have been—that’s for my country:
He that has but effected his good will
Hath overt’a’en mine act. (1.9.15-19)

Coriolanus will not allow Lartius to misrepresent him, for he is a soldier who carried out his duty, not a man who acted heroically. Even if it means portraying himself as inferior to one who safely carries out good will, Coriolanus must protect his identity against the, as the prideful warrior presents it, false representation voiced through epideictic rhetoric. He has such disdain for symbolic speech that even praise from his mother, “[w]ho has a charter to extol her blood,” causes him grief (14-15). This disdain arises from an inordinate sense of self-sufficiency, which makes the achievement of honor impossible because “the individual honor [Coriolanus] seeks is dependent on the perceptions of other people”—perceptions he rejects (Nordlund “Parental Love” 79).

When Cominius interjects, the assertion of autonomy becomes less a display of modesty and more a display of criminal disrespect for Rome and her people. Cominius scolds,

You shall not be
The grave of your deserving; Rome must know
The value of her own. ‘Twere a concealment
Worse than a theft, no less than a traducement,
To hide your doings, and to silence that
Which, to the spire and top of praisès vouch’d,
Would seem but modest; therefore I beseech you,

In sign of what you are, not to reward

What you have done, before our army hear me. (20-27)

By refusing to allow Lartius to praise him, Coriolanus maintains control of his person by seizing control of Lartius’ rhetoric. Cominius alludes to such theft when he transfers the act of disclosure from Lartius to Coriolanus with the accusation that, in not allowing Lartius to praise him, Coriolanus is hiding his own achievements. With this shift in rhetorical agency, the connection between praise and personal autonomy proves culturally understood and is thus no longer the ideology of just one autonomous man.

With this understanding, Coriolanus attempts to reclaim himself through specific corporeal reference. Referring to his battle wounds, Coriolanus matter-of-factly reveals, “I have some wounds upon me, and they smart / To hear themselves rememb’red (1.9.28-29). With this description, Coriolanus collapses himself into his wounds, a rhetorical maneuver meant to strengthen his fight for autonomy, in that Coriolanus makes clear the wounds are his, not Rome’s; therefore, he is not Rome’s. Furthermore, with this description, Coriolanus reveals that he makes no distinction between what he is and what he has done, essentially refuting Cominius’s claim that the praise will pay tribute to him and not his deeds. In response to the soldier’s epigrammatic and, in the eyes of the tribunes, ungracious declaration, Cominius attempts to claim Coriolanus for Rome when he warns, “Should they not, / Well might they fester ‘gainst ingratitude, / And tent themselves with death. . . .” (30-31). If we understand Coriolanus’ wounds as a synecdoche for the soldier, then it is clear that Cominius’ warning is a warning to Coriolanus: abandon your principles and embrace the ceremonial praise or fester in disapproval. Despite Cominius’ warning, Coriolanus continues to shun ceremony in an
effort to maintain sovereignty over himself. When Cominius awards Coriolanus with a privileged portion of the city’s horses and treasure, Coriolanus replies, “I thank you, general; / But cannot make my heart consent to take / A bribe to pay my sword. . .” (1.9.36-37). Referring to his heart, Coriolanus penetrates his body and now claims a deeper seat for his autonomy. It no longer sits only in his wounds but also in his heart. Through his use of the word *bribe*, rather than *reward or remuneration*, for example, Coriolanus interprets the offer as a challenge to his principles and thus refuses to act upon it. Indeed, accepting this reward would mean surrendering physically and morally to a symbolic system he disdains.

The shunning of praise points toward a more destructive symptom of Coriolanus’ assertion of personal autonomy: his rejection of ritual acts. Such rejection provides the play with a clearer sense of stasis, as it requires Coriolanus to reject the requests and demands of the tribunes, Volumnia, and the citizens to rhetorically and physically display himself. Although he seeks public office, Coriolanus has no desire to surrender his personal autonomy in order to attain voiced approval for the consulship. Instead, he expects to gain the consulship on the merits of his battlefield triumphs. To be sure, Coriolanus finds it offensive that he is expected to engage in a political ritual that, to him, amounts to begging beggars, a belief to which Coriolanus later directly refers when he tells the third citizen that he has no desire “to trouble the poor with begging” (2.3.70). With this insult, Coriolanus is apparently unaware of the nature and weight of the citizens’ role in this process, a role made clear via corporeal metaphor in act one. Menenius proclaims the Second Citizen as the “great toe of [the] assembly,” the part that, while base, “goest foremost” (1.1.155, 157-58). As Peter Stallybrass reasons, “Without the great toe, the body limps, the body politic totters” (317). This lack of
understanding causes Coriolanus to “love [the citizens] as they weigh” (2.2.73). Thus, he refuses to modify his principles to appease this, in his view, unworthy population. In refusing to offer the citizens rhetorical and corporeal evidence of his worthiness to be consul, Coriolanus refuses to misuse his tongue and trade the autonomy of his body for their voices:

I do beseech you,

Let me o’erleap that custom; for I cannot

Put on the gown, stand naked, and entreat them

For my wounds’ sake to give their suffrage. Please you

That I may pass this doing (2.2.136-39)

As in act one, scene nine, Coriolanus cites the well-being of his wounds as the reason for his fixed position against this, in his eyes, degrading custom. Interestingly, with the verbs o’erleap, put, stand, entreat, and pass, this passage that begs for permission not to act is rhetorically quite active.

Charging custom with heaping “mountainous error” so high that truth cannot “o’erpeer” it (2.3.120, 121), Coriolanus speaks against a process that is “invested with false content,” for there are no shared values between Coriolanus and the citizens; thus, he cannot truthfully stand as a “reference point” for a mutual value system (Calderwood 211). Coriolanus’ refusal prompts Sicinius to remind the uncooperative candidate of the necessity to follow custom. He reminds him that “the people / Must have their voices; neither will they bate / One jot of ceremony” (2.2.140-41). Menenius emphasizes the corporeal quality of the ritual when he implores Coriolanus to “[t]ake to you, as your predecessors have, / Your honour with your form” (143-44). As the editors note, form refers not to Coriolanus’ body but to the formality in which he, because of his
status, is required to perform (n. 1411). However, this is a formality that requires physical presentation and representation, thus allowing for a corporeal interpretation of form in this passage. The necessity to uphold ceremony is not enough to persuade Coriolanus stoop to such a submissive ideological and corporeal position:

To brag unto them, “Thus I did, and thus!”

Show them th’ unaching scars which I should hide,

As if I had receiv’d them for the hire

Of their breath only! (2.2.147-49)

In refusing to boast of his wartime achievements and display his wounds, Coriolanus refuses to untune his “throat of war” and consent to the commodification of his wounds and body in the marketplace (3.2.112). Such tolerance on Coriolanus’ part would give the citizens symbolic power over him.

In a scene that corporealizes language, indeed collapses words and wounds, scene three of act two exhibits the tension between personal autonomy and political ceremony.\(^{23}\) The citizens are willing to voice Coriolanus into the consulship only if he conforms to political ceremony by displaying his wounds and speaking of his deeds. That the physical and rhetorical actions may be one and the same is suggested when the third citizen contends that, once Coriolanus displays his wounds, they will have the power to “put [their] / tongues into those wounds and speak for them” (2.3.6-7). In these opening lines, wounds become mouths that Coriolanus fights to keep silent, yet the citizens’ “noble acceptance” of Coriolanus requires that he cooperate through corporeal and rhetorical display (9). David Bevington speaks to the necessity for ceremonial reciprocity:

Ceremonies of state in Shakespeare, including coronations, triumphal
entries, and the receiving of ambassadors, are perhaps to be viewed as the rites of passage of the body politic, for they celebrate moments of transition in social order. As such, they must celebrate a separation and a reincorporation as well, for the life of the nation is no less dependent than is the individual on ceremonious completion in which all participants fulfill their proper roles (my emphasis). (“The Language of Ceremony” 147)

However, such cooperation is counter to Coriolanus’ sense of personal autonomy. As a result, this act of noble reciprocity is halted, making a monster of Coriolanus, if the following ideology is applied to him in the same way it is to the citizens: “Ingratitude is monstrous, and for the multitude to be ingrateful, were to make a monster of the multitude; of the which we, being members, should bring ourselves to be monstrous members” (2.3.9-13). These are the words of the third citizen who speaks of obliging Coriolanus if he indeed obliges their request. It seems as if he might, when he stands before the citizens in the gown of humility; however, he neither speaks to them nor shows them his wounds. In language that connotes a degree of physical stasis and brings to mind Cordelia’s rhetorical stasis, Coriolanus confesses, “I cannot / Bring my tongue to such a pace” (50-51). Not only does he refuse to use his wounds as his mouthpiece by publicly displaying them—“I will not seal your knowledge with showing / them” Coriolanus avows—but he also refuses to speak of them (108-09). In light of the fact that wearing a particular garment threatens to destroy Coriolanus’ sense of self, as Coriolanus insists that removing it will allow him to know himself again, one can more readily grasp the degree to which rhetorical and physical self-publishing will act as an assault upon his personal autonomy (2.3.149).
Such tension between political ritual and personal autonomy is evident also in act three, scene two, in which Coriolanus appears as a rejected candidate. Now it is Volumnia, his mother, who begs Coriolanus to submit to ceremony, and thus misrepresent himself, in order to gain the consulship. At the opening of this scene, Coriolanus questions the validity of such submissive behavior: “Why did you wish me milder? Would you have me / False to my nature?” (3.2.14-15). In terms of Bevington’s theory of identity loss (cited earlier), it can be said that Coriolanus creates a death wish when he later concedes to the tribunes and plebians. For he acts against his vow to “play / The man I am,” indeed turns away from the literal and embraces the symbolic, thereby willing into being his symbolic and literal loss of existence (3.2.15-16). In response to his vow, Volumnia accuses her son of being “too absolute”—an accusation against his moral, thus rhetorical and physical, stasis—and attempts to persuade Coriolanus to speak before the citizens by claiming that the ceremonial words required are “but bastards, and syllables / Of no allowance, to [his] bosom’s truth” (56-57). Yet Coriolanus possesses such a fixed perception of himself that he is unable to divorce his tongue from his heart, is unwilling to speak against his ethics: “Must I / With my base tongue give to my noble heart / A lie that it must bear?” (100-01).25 Earlier, Coriolanus proclaimed the risk to his wounds if he and others boasted of his achievements; now he must protect his heart. It is clear that the war hero has left one battlefield only to enter another, and he defends himself with a static physical and rhetorical posture that reveals his inability to exploit the symbolic register through which this society politically functions.26

In this same scene, Coriolanus finally agrees to publish himself before the people, to concede to the “vigilant eye”27 of the body politic, and thus surrender his
autonomy to them--however not without first engaging in tragic speculation and warning of his possible failure:

Must I go show them my unbarb’d sconce?
Must I with my base tongue give to my noble heart
A lie that it must bear? Well, I will do’t;
Yet, were there but this single plot [body] to lose,
This mould of Martius, they to dust should grind it
And throw’t against the wind. To th’market-place!
You have put me now to such a part which never
I shall discharge to th’ life. (3.2.99-105)

The distaste Coriolanus possesses for ceremony is expressed here in words that render ceremony an enemy to his honor and physical being, in that ceremony will require him to lie and will allow for the disintegration of that which manifests and carries his warrior’s honor. Declaring the necessity to take on an actor’s role, Coriolanus closes his reluctant agreement with a warning to the tribunes and his mother that he will not be able to perform this role convincingly.

Determined to help Coriolanus succeed, Cominius assures the averse actor that they will prompt him in his public role. Volumnia follows Cominius with a motherly inveigling that Coriolanus has neither the strength nor the heart to refuse:

I prithee now, sweet son, as thou hast said
My praises made thee first a soldier, so,
To have my praise for this, perform a part
Thou hast not done before. (3.2.107-09)

“Well, I must do’t” (110), Coriolanus concedes but not without a proclamation of his
certain destruction:

Away, my disposition, and possess me
Some harlot’s spirit! My throat of war be turn’d,
Which quier’d with my drum, into a pipe
Small as an eunuch, or the virgin voice
That babies lull asleep! The smiles of knaves
Tent in my cheek, and schoolboys’ tears take up
The glasses of my sight! A beggar’s tongue
Make motion through my lips, and my arm’d knees,
Who bow’d but in my stirrup, bend like his
That hath received an alms! . . . (3.2.111-20)

No longer a static and autonomous Roman general, Coriolanus predicts his physical destruction: the grinding up of his body and his becoming feminine beings and beggar. In relinquishing his autonomy, Coriolanus relinquishes his masculinity—an issue of gender inherent in theories of the gaze. Indeed, by providing the citizens such public access to his body, Coriolanus essentially agrees to prostitute himself (“harlot’s spirit”), a conclusion for which the Latin etymology of the word allows: *pro* (“public”) and *statuere* (“to set or place”). In *The Wounded Storyteller*, sociologist Arthur Frank discusses the concept of narrative surrender, in which the ill give their stories over to medical professionals who linguistically confiscate their patients’ narratives by translating them into medical jargon and sharing them with colleagues (Frank 6). Coriolanus experiences a corporeal form of narrative surrender when the tribunes and his mother convince the wounded warrior to display his marks of battle and victory to the plebeians, thus effectively surrendering his battle narrative to a community that will
then have control over Coriolanus’ future.

Continuing the examination of consequences, Coriolanus concludes that, in order to follow tradition, he must “surcease to honor [his] own truth, / And “by [his] body’s action teach [his] mind / A most inherent baseness” (3.2.121-23).²⁹ Just as Coriolanus recognizes the marriage between his tongue and heart (100), he is also aware of the inseparable nature of his body and mind. He cannot simply play a part and emerge unharmed. Indeed, a life of battle has killed any possible capacity for representation, for symbolic surrender. Such incapacity guarantees his failure when he goes before the citizens to “mountebank their loves” (132), for Coriolanus’ known resistance to engage in ceremony and please the citizens makes him vulnerable to Sicinuius’ public accusations that he is a traitor. Brutus proclaims this vulnerability when he refers to Coriolanus’ ethical need to “speak / What’s in his heart” as his inherent flaw that will allow them “to break his neck” (3.3.28-29). It is this tragic flaw that prevents the possibility for Coriolanus’ narrative surrender to be perceived by the plebeians as sincere and prevents his being voiced into official power.

For Coriolanus, what is in his heart is all that should be heaved onto his tongue, and since what is in his heart is offensive to the citizens, Coriolanus is urged to betray himself in order to gain public approval. Consequently, the candidate for the consulship assumes silence when demanded to engage in ceremonial rhetoric. Also rejecting the required physical displays that counter his need for personal autonomy—indeed refusing, among other acts, to give his hat to the plebeians in place of his heart—Coriolanus accompanies his rhetorical stasis with corporeal stasis, thus becoming a man of disobedient tongue and body in a society that honors ritual observance. As such, he is
able to cultivate neither a trustworthy rhetoric nor political body when he finally
abandons his static stance and attempts to please the body politic—an act that leads to
traumatic and mortal consequences. This abrupt moral and physical pivot brings us back
to a focus on Renaissance self-fashioning, which suggests, among other characteristics,
“an adherence to mere outward ceremony” and “representation of one’s nature or
intention in speech or actions” (Greenblatt 3). Coriolanus negates both of these by
rejecting “mere outward ceremony” and by choosing silence and inaction in order to
impress his true self upon the people. For the doomed candidate, engaging in self-
fashioning means denying cultural norms and demands; it means insisting through stasis
that his internal nature, rather than social and cultural constructs, should govern the
fashioning of his identity. Loyal to his heart, Coriolanus possesses a pure identity, an
identity of fixed essence, which cannot be altered without fatal consequences. Thus,
when Coriolanus attempts to alter his identity and betray his autonomous ideal, he is
destroyed. Coriolanus’ “I” is the people’s Other, which they fail to fashion according to
their symbolic construct, leaving them no choice but to abolish his existence. 30

Conclusion

Whether an offensive or a defensive stance, stasis can be understood as a
protective mechanism. Penelope and Coriolanus adopt static positions to protect their
virtue and ethos, respectively, yet these attempts ultimately lead to the destruction, to
some degree, of what they seek to protect. Indeed, Penelope comes to admire dancing
and thus breaks from her rigidly virtuous identity, and Coriolanus attempts to abandon
his ethos in order to indulge the desires of the tribunes and citizens, yet fails and is thus
killed. In the attempt to preserve one’s identity through moral and corporeal stasis,
identity is violated to certain extents, thus creating varying degrees of trauma. This creation of trauma from a response to trauma is observed most tragically in Lucrece, who kills herself in order to restore her family’s honor and her identity as a chaste wife. For Lucrece, only the most absolute form of stasis can preserve her identity. Unlike Penelope and Coriolanus, Lucrece manages to retain her identity but must take fatal measures to do so. In the case of Hermione, the trauma that stasis begot occurs for Leontes. The king is certainly humbled and subsumed under the command of Hermione’s majestic stasis, and, although Leontes welcomes this repentant and powerless state, the king suffers trauma to his ruling positions as husband and king. In each of these situations, the stasis beget by trauma ultimately creates trauma, and this cycle substantiates the ethical power of the immobile body.
Notes


2. In “Concerning Liberal Studies” (a section of De Ingenius Moribus), Petrus Paulus Vergerius condemns dancing as an activity to avoid in order that one may uphold “a high standard of purity” and thus not be tempted to “lasciviousness and vain conceit.” This fourteenth-century treatise remained popular well into the sixteenth century. Woodward, W. H., ed. Vittorino da Feltre and other Humanist Educators. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1912. 93-118.

3. In Elizabethan Women and the Poetry of Courtship, Illona Bell refers to Spenser’s Penelope (The Amoretti) as one of two mythic “performance artists” (the other being Arachne). However, in Orchestra, Davies does not show Penelope “performing” at her loom. Instead, her performance of chastity is achieved through stasis and almost complete silence.

4. Arbeau says, “. . . for dancing is practised to reveal whether lovers are in good health and sound of limb, after which they are permitted to kiss their mistresses in order that they may touch and savour one another, thus to ascertain if they are shapely or emit an unpleasant odour as of bad meat. Therefore, from this standpoint, . . . it becomes an essential to a well-ordered society” (12).

5. This function of dance at court is mocked in Henry V when the First Ambassador relays a message to King Henry from Prince Louis that warns against the
relishing of his youth in terms of dancing: “... there’s naught in France / That can be
with a nimble galliard won. / You cannot revel into dukedoms there” (1.2.255-57).

6. About forty years later, John Donne takes up this conceit in his poem “The
Flea” (1633), in which it is apparent that the speaker reacts to an unspoken but obvious
(perhaps corporeal) rejection of his spontaneous but nonetheless logically presented
argument for engaging in intercourse.

7. The end of the poem shows Penelope enamored with the dancing of her ladies
and barons, an indication that Davies may have shown her to dance if he had completed
the poem. However, the poem is unfinished, and I am basing my statement of
Penelope’s sustained stillness on the details the poem provides in its published form.
(Discussion of the possibility of Penelope’s dancing occurs in the chapter that explores
dance as a form of rhetoric.)

8. “For dancing is an exercise / Not only shows the mover’s wit, / But maketh
the beholder wise, / As he hath power to rise to it” (“Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue”
215-18).

9. The dating of The Winter’s Tale has been determined by an entry made by
Dr. Simon Forman describing a performance of the play at the Globe on May 15,
1611. In addition, the Office of the Revels documented a performance of “Ye
Winters night Tayle” that took place in November, 1611. The editors of The
Riverside Shakespeare note that the composition date “is a matter of surmise” but
believe that the play was written after Cymbeline because The Winter’s Tale
includes source material at 4.4.783-91 that Shakespeare “had put aside as unsuitable
for Cymbeline” (1564). The play has an accepted date of 1610-1611. Smith, Hallett.
Introduction to The Winter’s Tale. The Riverside Shakespeare. 1564-68.
10. Rhetoric and sculpture are further linked by the classical and Renaissance notion that rhetoric and sculpture possess a magical quality, as conveyed in the Pygmalion myth and in the rhetorical writings of Gorgias and Ficino.

11. In *Orchestra*, Penelope responds to Antinous’ argument for dancing primarily by maintaining her chaste and static presence, for she speaks very few words. In *The Winter’s Tale*, Hermione returns to the play as a statue following her imprisonment and reported death, which are the consequences of Leontes’ faulty forensic rhetoric.

12. In “Silence and Gender,” Christina Luckyj notes that “[s]ilence leaves women, perhaps more than men, open to manipulation. In her sleeping state, Lucrece is doubly vulnerable, as she is silent and temptingly still and unaware. ‘A moving Rhetoricke’: *Gender and Silence in Early Modern England*. Manchester: Manchester UP, 2002. 42-77.

13. Paige Martin Reynolds explains in “Female Piety in the Reign of Elizabeth I” that “the status of women’s bodies indicated the status of their virtue” and observes the case of Katherine Stubbes whose husband boasted of her virtue: “‘whilst she lived’ she ‘was a myrrour of womanhood,’ but ‘now being dead, is a perfect patterne of true Christianitie’” (102, emphasis added). In death, the early modern woman achieved the purest form of virtue. “Female Piety in the Reign of Elizabeth I.” *Explorations in Renaissance Culture* 37.1 (2011): 101-17.

14. I thank Dr. Eugene Giddens for bringing this fact to my attention. In this condition, Lucrece anticipates the presence of Hermione as statue in *The Winter’s Tale*. Lucrece’s verbal “looseness” and simultaneous stillness work as rhetorical and
corporeal manifestations of her conflicting identities of chaste and unchaste, and because the loquaciousness and stasis occur simultaneously, they conflate her conflicting identities (see note 12). Joyce Green MacDonald explains that “copiousness appears as a distinctively female property of language, a linguistic property often at odds with social prescriptions of female silence, retirement, and obedience” [qtd. in Johnson 80 (cited below)]. I argue that the qualities of retirement and obedience imply stasis.

15. Heather G. S. Johnson explains Lucrece’s lack of being through her transformed identity that renders her at once chaste and unchaste: “There is no positive way of expressing her identity (in human terms), no word that adequately describes her strangely “in between” condition—she can be explained only by pointing out what she is not” (76). “Precious Stories: The Discursive Economy in Shakespeare’s Rape of Lucrece.” Through a Glass Darkly: Suffering, the Sacred, and the Sublime in Literature and Theory. Ed. Holly Faith Nelson and Jens Zimmermann. Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier UP, 2010.


17. The first section of The Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern Europe is titled “Subjecting the Part.” About this section, editors David Hillman and Carla Mazzio explain that the essays, one each on particular parts of the body (the hand excluded), “investigate the period’s emergent forms of subjectivity”
(xix). The editors point out that “the part, in the early modern period, becomes a subject” in two senses: isolation and disempowerment and intentionality and subjectivity” (xix). The latter sense helps to inform my interpretation of Lucrece’s reference to her hand.

18. In “Sins of the Tongue in Early Modern England,” Carla Mazzio quotes Gerhard Richter: “strategic declarations of independence by individual body parts presuppose the prior dismemberment of the self-identical, whole body” (99). The linguistic dismemberment of Lucrece’s hand speaks to the physical, emotional, and spiritual mutilation that Lucrece suffers as a result of the rape.

19. In his introduction to Coriolanus, Frank Kermode explains the uncertain dating of Coriolanus. First, he cites 1.1.173 (“coal of fire upon the ice”) as evidence for a date of 1608. In January 1608, the Thames froze to such an extent that fires had to be built upon the river. Kermode underscores the likelihood of this date by pointing out that “there had been no comparable frost since 1565.” Arguing for a certain post-1605 date, Kermode further notes that the play contains allusions to the Midland riots of 1607. Riverside Shakespeare (1974), 1392.

20. The effect that the display of Lucrece’s body has on the people in the streets, the influence this act has on their feelings about the Tarquins, is echoed in King Lear when Regan recognizes what “great ignorance” it was to gouge out Lear’s eyes and allow him to live because “where he arrives he moves / All hearts against us” (4.5.10-11). The parading of Lucrece’s corpse through the streets moves the people’s hearts against the Tarquin dynasty, thus compelling them to banish the ruling family.

21. While the assertion of personal autonomy prevents Coriolanus from becoming the property of Rome, this same act in the form of suicide performed by
Lucrece leads to her becoming Roman property used to effect a political upheaval. With regard to Schoenfeldt’s “site of subjugation,” the loss of identity is relevant to Coriolanus’ and Lucrece’s circumstances, and while Lucrece’s suicide is a tragic reaction to the loss of identity, it can be understood as a final grasp at personal autonomy. Both situations present death as the outcome of extreme measures toward this state.

22. Greenblatt quotes these control mechanisms from Clifford Geertz (The Interpretation of Cultures).

23. Calderwood illustrates the citizens as “[f]ickle, vacillating, mutable, constant only in capriciousness” (213). In this way, they provide a direct contrast to the static character of Coriolanus. Through an explication of improvisation as it relates to power, Greenblatt provides further clarification of Coriolanus’ inability, when he eventually tries, to connect with the people: “If improvisation is made possible by the subversive perception of another’s truth as an ideological construct, that construct must at the same time be grasped in terms that bear a certain structural resemblance to one’s own set of beliefs. An ideology that is perceived as entirely alien would permit no point of histrionic entry: it could be destroyed but not performed (my emphasis)” (228).


24. Volumnia’s response to Virgilia regarding the hypothetical loss of her son in battle underscores the rhetoric-body link when she says that “his good report would have been my son, / I therein would have found issue” (1.3.20-21). I credit the work of Marcus Nordlund for bringing this passage to my attention. “Parental Love in Two Roman Tragedies.” Shakespeare and the Nature of Love: Literature, Culture, Evolution.

25. In *King Lear*, Cordelia responds to her father’s request to match her sisters’ lavish expressions of love for him with “Unhappy that I am, I cannot heave / My heart into my mouth. I love your majesty / According to my bond; no more nor less” (1.1.83-85). Like Coriolanus, Cordelia rejects ceremony by refusing to speak what is not in her heart. She struggles rhetorically, in that she is unable to voice her heart. It is telling then that both names begin with the first three letters of *cordis* (“of the heart”) and ironic that Coriolanus is given this name by those for whom he has no heart.

26. This question echoes the sentiment of Bolingbroke in *Richard II*: “Ere my tongue / Shall wound my honour with such feeble wrong, or sound so base a parle,. . .” (1.1.191-92). Like Coriolanus, Bolingbroke establishes his defiant stance through a trope of silence.


28. During a discussion with Menenius in act one, scene one about the role of the fabled belly, the Second Citizen dissects the ruling body: “The kingly crownèd head, the vigilant eye / The counselor heart, the arm our soldier, / Our steed the leg, the tongue our trumpeter” (92-94).

29. David Hillman and Carla Mazzio mention the gendering power of the gaze in the introduction to *The Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern*
Europe. New York: Routledge, 1997. The editors refer to the chapter “Taming the Basilisk” in which Sergei Lobanov-Rostovsky “traces traditional conceptions of the eye as alternatively a penetrative (and hence implicitly masculine) agent or a passive (and implicitly feminine) receptor” (xxi). Lobanov-Rostovsky examines the anatomical gaze through Plato and Galen, among others. He first cites the Galenic theory of the eye: “the eye is both sovereign and implicitly male: it engenders the visible world by its projection of spiritual substance, the ‘pneuma’ that flows out through the hollow optic nerve, exciting the surrounding air and translating it into a receptive body made ‘sympathetic. . . with the change effected by the outflow of the pneuma into it.’” (198).

In Theaetetus, Plato describes the process of vision in terms of a birth, thus implying gendered functions of the gazer and the gazed upon (198). Regarding Coriolanus, the now (but temporarily) submissive general agrees to be feminized as the receiver of the citizens’ ocular penetration and to be “rebirthed” as a ceremonial object.

30. This is a reversal of what P. A. Skantze calls Aphra Behn’s “pedagogy of motion, a supposition that the body learns with the mind, and indeed that often behavior, that bodily thing, only changes when the senses too are educated” (4). “Introduction.”

Stillness in Motion in the Seventeenth-Century Theatre. Routledge: London, 2003. In An Anatomy of Melancholy, Burton describes the body/mind/soul connection in terms of disease: “For as the body works upon the mind by his bad humours, troubling the spirits, sending gross fumes into the brain, and so per consequens disturbing the soul, and all the faculties of it, with fear, sorrow, & c, which are ordinary symptoms of this disease [melancholy]” (247). As such, Coriolanus as a Roman in a Renaissance-era play desires to stave off melancholy. As a Stoic, he strives to remain “a wise man” who protects himself from “all manner of passions and perturbations whatsoever” (247).

31. For Robert Burton, Coriolanus is the origin of Rome’s shared melancholy:

Chapter Three
“For with our hands”: The Rhetoric of Gesture in The Winter’s Tale, The Rape of Lucrece, Titus Andronicus, and Epicoene

Classical and Renaissance rhetorical treatises provide guidance to orators regarding the rhetorical art of gesture. Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian agree that hands can be as eloquent as tongues, a theory also held up by the sixth-century A.D. senator Cassiodorus who observed the “speaking hands” of pantomime actors and dancers as having “fingers that are tongues” and performing “silent exposition” (qtd. in Jory 164). This notion of speaking hands is carried forth in the writings of various Renaissance rhetoricians. For instance, in Passions of the Minde in Generall (1604), Thomas Wright posits that action is an “externall image of an internall minde,” as well as a “certaine visible eloquence, or an eloquece [sic] of the bodei” (176). Wright then defines the action of gesture, calling it the “composition” of “embodied passion” and asserts that rhetoricians move because passion moves them, and because passion moves them, the corporeal expression of passion should thus move rhetoricians’ listeners (176). This reasoning allows for the conclusion that rhetoric and gesture function similarly: inciting passion to move minds.

The study of gesture as a form of communication also interested the physician John Bulwer, who gives the hand an oratorical character by defining it as one of two (the head being the other) amphitheatres possessed by the body (6). With its illustrations, descriptions, and historical context of hand gestures, Bulwer’s work Chirologia or the Naturall Language of the Hand (1644) articulates some familiar ideas and proves an illuminating source for understanding the natural communicative capacity of the gesturing hand. In his address to the reader, Bulwer explains:
For, the lineaments of the Body doe disclose the disposition and inclination of the minde in generall; but the motions doe not only so, but doe further disclose the present human and state of the minde and will; for as the Tongue speaketh to the Eare, so Gesture speaketh to the Eye... [original italics]

Bulwer further illustrates the speaking ability of the hand:

And this naturall expression seems to result from the sympathy between the will and the Hands for, the will affectionately inclined and moved to stretch forth her selfe, the Hand, that is moved by the same spirit, willing to goe out and set a glosse upon the inward motion, calls it selfe into a forme extending to a semblance of the inward appetite; neither is the Hand at any time found too short for such an expression if the will be disposed to cooperate with it. (110)

In short, the hand is the outward instrument of an internal process, being that it is “invaded” by the “habits of the mind,” and thus speaks the thoughts and desires of the mind (Bulwer 16). Earlier in Chirologia, Bulwer variously proclaims the rhetorical capacity of the hands, and the point made in each of the passages is that the hand is another tongue that is “most talkative” and contains a “fountaine of discourse” (1). Within these proclamations, Bulwer insists that the motions of the speaking hand are natural and that its language is “the onely speech that is natural to Man” and “may well be called the the Tongue and generall language of Humane Nature” (3). Bruce R. Smith understands Bulwer to argue that hand gestures are not simply “ornaments that occur after verbal signifiers” but rather “meaning-formationsthat occur before verbal
signifiers—and that often outpace them” (par. 20). Celebrating this rhetorical strength of the hand is the commendatory poem “To the Very Pure and Beloved Hand of John Bulwer” by Fra. Goldsmith. In the poem, Goldsmith proclaims, “What use to me are a hundred tongues and a hundred mouths / If thy hand alone will be the likeness of a thousand?” (8).

Joseph Roach explains the involuntary nature of the motions of the hand in his study of seventeenth-century passions and rhetoric when he concludes that classical and Renaissance rhetoricians perceived a “relationship between the nervous system and emotional responses,” thus grounding the theory that the physical expression of emotions is natural (57). According to Brownell Salomon, “Perceptive Renaissance audiences must have noted an agreement between linguistic and bodily means of communication, for so-called ‘Rhetorical daunsing’ or ‘Histrionicall Rhetorike’ was but an easy extension of classical rhetorical theory” (154). As such, gesture constituted a universal language that was captured in portraiture and performed on the stage. Additionally, the editor of the edition of Chirologia cited here observes that Bulwer, in his discussion of each gesture, provides examples from ancient, medieval, or contemporary historians and poets, which support the use and meaning that Bulwer imputes to the gesture (xv). This observation might help to validate critical assumptions made regarding the meaning and interpretation of gestural instances in literature.
The expression of trust, affection, love, and grief are discourses that possess distinct and culturally understood hand gestures. Such universality was possible because “[o]utward significations attain universality, Bulwer believed, because they flow naturally from the inner workings of the body—an undeniable part of the common experience of all humanity” (Roach 34). It is the work of this chapter to delineate the various reasons and ways that gesture is put into the service of dramatic works to communicate these passions. This chapter, like the previous one, develops its argument on the mantle of trauma through examinations of *The Winter’s Tale*, *The Rape of Lucrece*, *Titus Andronicus*, and *Epicoene* and attends to the various ways that gesture creates, communicates, and responds to trauma.
In *The Winter’s Tale*, gesture proves itself a destructive force, in that it communicates a false message of adultery to Leontes. As interloper to Hermione and Polixenes’ physical interaction, Leontes wrongly interprets this interaction as a result of the suspicion formed earlier in reaction to Hermione’s previous rhetoric, in which she is able to achieve what Leontes could not: convince Polixenes, Leontes’ fellow king and boyhood friend, to extend his visit. Quite boldly, Hermione blames the failure on her husband’s faulty rhetoric that “charge[d] [Polixenes] too coldly” (1.2.30). Although it is Leontes that Polixenes addresses when he says, “There is no tongue that moves, none, none i’ th’ world, / So soon as yours could win me” (1.2.20-21), the victorious tongue belongs to Hermione. Used to out-speak her husband, Hermione’s tongue is a sinful organ upon which Leontes mounts his accusation of adultery against Hermione. With her rhetorical success, the queen has not only brought suspicion upon herself, but she has also subverted gender boundaries and breached the bonds of male friendship. These offenses establish the destructive role of rhetoric in the play and prompt one to question the nature of Leontes’ epideictic response: “At my request he would not. / Hermione, my dearest, thou never spok’st / To better purpose” (1.2.87). By simply asking, “Never?” (88), Hermione prompts her husband to rethink this observation, and in doing so, Leontes recalls when Hermione had indeed spoken to an equally noble purpose: “Ere I could make thee open thy white hand / [And] clap thyself my love; then didst thou utter / ‘I am yours forever’” (1.2.103-04). Here, a physical gesture is given rhetorical significance, in that “clap thyself” refers to the handclasp one would offer to seal a bargain (1571 n.). As such, the references to hand clasping and to Hermione’s vow indicate deliberative rhetoric in corporeal form, and the simultaneous
occurrence of the two unquestionably establishes the rhetorical quality of the gesture.

The reading or misreading of such gestures comes to define the narrative of the play. Following her rhetorical success, Hermione boasts that her rhetorical ability has “for ever earn’d a royal husband” and “for some while a friend” (1.2.106, 07). Yet, she offers only Polixenes her hand (s.d., 1.2). Rhetorically speaking, the lack of a simultaneous offering to Leontes is justified because his and Hermione’s bargain-sealing gesture had already occurred, as Leontes recalls in line 133. Thus, Hermione is concerned only with sealing her bargain with Polixenes. This gesture progresses into dance-like interaction with erotic overtones, which dislodges Leontes’ sense of self as king, husband, and friend and quite quickly unhinges his reason. The traditional argument is that Leontes suffers from suspicion and jealousy from the beginning, for little else, critics claim, would explain his explosive response to Hermione and Polixenes’ hand play. Despite the uncertain nature of Hermione and Polixenes’ interaction (is she or is she not simply practicing courtesy?), the argument to be made here is that this physical display, whether accurately or erroneously perceived and interpreted by Leontes, speaks to and moves the observing king, indeed functions quite meaningfully and provocatively in the play, and thus acts as the catalyst for the ensuing tragedy. As Roach reminds us, “Ancient and Renaissance doctrine presumed the primacy of sight among the senses, particularly its efficacy in provoking intense emotional responses (46-47). As such, the manual interaction between Hermione and Polixenes deserves more critical attention than it has traditionally received. Accordingly, I argue that this physical interaction plays a more powerful role in the king’s emotional state than scholars have thus far recognized.

By offering her hand to Polixenes and then engaging in intimate hand play with
him, Hermione physically speaks for unity in a situation that leaves Polixenes disarmed and Leontes dethroned, so to speak, under her verbal rhetorical conquest and assertive corporeal rhetoric. Because displays of rhetoric were approved of only as a masculine practice, Hermione’s victory proves a bitter-tasting one. This belief that rhetorical practice belonged solely in the male sphere is addressed by Leonardo Bruni d’Arezzo who asserts, “To her neither the intricacies of debate nor the oratorical artifices of action and delivery are of the least practical use, if indeed they are not positively unbecoming. Rhetoric in all its forms—public discussion, forensic argument, logical fence, and the like—lies absolutely outside of the province of woman” (126). With the banter between Hermione and Polixenes, the court of Leontes is transformed into a rhetorical performance hall of the Roman tradition, in which “manhood is contested, defended, defined, and indeed produced” (Richlin 90). Because her victorious display subverts the authority of Leontes as husband and king, the queen’s manly rhetorical prowess creates a dilemma for Leontes, to which Adam McKeown speaks when he asserts that “Hermione compromises Leontes’ authority and threatens everything he understands about the relationship of oratory and world order”—an interpretation that reinforces this scene as a representation of the patriarchal "chain of being" at the heart of the Elizabethan world picture (117). The result of this disruption is that Hermione’s gesture of unity creates internal discord for Leontes:

Too hot, too hot!

To mingle friendship far is mingling bloods.

I have tremor cordis on me; my heart dances,

But not for joy; not joy. (1.2.108-11)

While the unifying outcome of Hermione’s verbal interaction with Polixenes
simultaneously moves Leontes to epideictic rhetoric and suspicion, the queen’s corporeal unifying interaction with Polixenes manifests a destructive emotional and physical reaction in the king; thus, Leontes suffers mental and physical trauma at the hands, so to speak, of his wife and friend. A return to Bulwer and his notion of the role of gesture in declarations of love illuminates the response of Leontes to Hermione and Polixenes’ hand play. Bulwer observes, “. . . the Hand is the Tongue of hearty goodwill. The minde of man naturally desirous by some symbole or sententious gesture to utter and disclose herself in the affections of love, doth manifestly set forth her disposition by this courtly declaration of the Hand. . .” (110). It is interesting to note the etymology of manifest(ly): manus (hand) and festus (struck). To be sure, in act one, scene two, hands stroke each other and, regarding Leontes’ witnessing of this physical interaction, strike in a way that unifies an emotional and physical reaction—thus the king’s tremor cordis. The observation of Roach that during this period “[passions] were presumed to have the power of utterly deflecting the psyche and physique from their natural course” provides a cultural context for this psychosomatic experience that drives Leontes to monstrous extremes (31).

Proving a more powerful force than the verbal rhetoric that prefaces it, Hermione and Polixenes’ physical embellishment of their verbal exchange—a silent conversation of “paddling palms and pinching fingers”—leads Leontes to feel discordant dancing within himself (tremor cordis) and choreographs an “entertainment /[Leontes’] bosom likes not, nor [his] brows” (1.2.115, 118-19). When Leontes complains that his brows are ill-affected by the spectacle (an obvious reference to cuckold’s horns), we can infer that the king’s mind is ill-affected as well. The ability of spectacle to elicit strong emotion in its observers was commonly understood, and since
the heart was believed to house the “biologic soul [spirit] which governed all vital functions,” any effect on the heart would certainly radiate to the rest of the body, including the brain (McMahon 2). Indeed, the “entertainment” that Leontes witnesses disturbs his heart and mind, the same parts affected by oratorical performance. As Caroline van Eck notes in *Classical Rhetoric and the Visual Arts in Early Modern Europe*, “[g]esture gave visual expression to what went on in the mind of the speaker and could thereby excite emotions in the audience” (3). As the audience to his queen and boyhood friend’s gestural dialogue, Leontes interprets a love affair in their visual expression and responds with tyrannical force.

The corporeal rhetoric of unity gestured between Hermione and Polixenes communicates destructively to Leontes. To be sure, their interaction brings discord to his world, since, in this physically intimate moment, Leontes perceives Hermione as engaging somewhat sexually with Polixenes. Similar instances of erotic, hand-to-hand contact may be found in other Shakespearean plays as well. In *Romeo and Juliet*:

**ROMEO:** If I profane with my unworthiest hand

This holy shrine, the gentle sin is this,

My lips, two blushing pilgrims, ready stand

To smooth that rough touch with a tender kiss.

**JULIET:** Good pilgrim, you do wrong your hand too much,

Which mannerly devotion shows in this:

For saints have hands that pilgrims’ hands do touch,

And palm to palm is holy palmers’ kiss. (1.5.93-100)

By suggesting that his touch may “profane” Juliet, to whom he refers as a religious temple, Romeo gives hand contact an erotic quality—an eroticism of a higher degree
than that of kissing, as he offers his kiss as an antidote to his defiling touch. The young lover adds to the sensual character of the touch of a hand in act two, scene two: “See how she leans her cheek upon her hand! / O that I were a glove upon that hand, / That I might touch that cheek!” (2.2.23-24). As Evelyn Welch explains, “In Italy, the poetry of Petrarch and Lorenzo de’ Medici played with a fixation on the glove of the beloved— where the woman’s hand entering the glove was presented as a highly sensual act” (22). In speaking these lines, Romeo imagines a sensual interaction with Juliet without moving beyond her cheek and glove. *Othello* likewise eroticizes hand contact. Following the witnessing of an interaction between Cassio and Desdemona, Iago offers the following interpretation:

IAGO: . . . Didst

thou not see her paddle with the palm of his hand?

Didst not mark that?

RODERIGO: Yes, that I did; but that was but courtesy.

IAGO: Lechery, by this hand: an index and obscure prologue to the history of lust and foul thoughts.

They met so near with their lips that their breaths embrac’d together. Villainous thoughts, Roderigo!

When these [mutualities] so marshall the way, hard at hand comes the master and main exercise, th’

incorporate conclusion. (2.1.253-63)

Here, Iago uses the same verb (“paddle”) that Leontes uses in *The Winter’s Tale* for the witnessed hand play. Moreover, Iago, like Romeo, speaks of lip contact in the context of hand contact. Iago ventures further, however, to indicate the inevitability of a sexual
end to such an encounter, and with the pun on the word *hand* in this indication, hand-to-hand contact is awarded erotic privilege. As Frances Teague observes, the eroticism of hands was a recurrence in Renaissance drama: “repeatedly plays mention a female character’s hand, sexualize it, introduce an inappropriate suitor for the woman, and then suggest that a male character’s body has been maimed” (219). The idea here is that the eroticized hand is dangerous to the male suitor, is indeed a weapon. To be sure, Hermione’s hands, in their “dance” with Polixenes’ hands, do significant harm to Leontes and lead him to thoughts of murder.

Much has been written on the jealousy of Leontes, and the consensus is that it is unmotivated—that a diminished mental state from the start causes his disturbed state of mind. However, Norman Nathan and Ros King recognize a tangible provocation for Leontes’ jealousy: the intimate banter between Hermione and Polixenes and their subsequent physical interaction. Although these critics identify the compounding force that hand holding and hand play bear upon Leontes’ jealousy, the primary focus in their studies remains language, specifically utterance and pun, thus affording the hand-to-hand interaction a mere mention, which Nathan refers to as one of a few “trifling actions” (23). Unfortunately, no in-depth study of hand gesture in *The Winter’s Tale* previously has been undertaken, despite the fact that the hand offering and the hand play are disruptive actions that elicit Leontes’ disquieting monologues and instigate his tyrannical response. To show that the hand play between Hermione and Polixenes plays a more significant role in the manifestation of Leontes’ jealousy than scholars have thus far recognized, a further look at John Bulwer’s treatise is necessary. In *Chirologia*, Bulwer cites the belief of Caelius Rhodiginus, a sixteenth-century Italian humanist, that the joining of hands has Pythagorical significance, that “the gesture flowers from a
secret and religious reverence to that comprehensive number *Ten,*” which is formed when the five fingers from each participant’s hand “move to the comprehension of each other” (101). This description conveys the communicative, intimate, and physically eloquent nature of this corporeal interaction. That joined hands comprehend each other and thus create an intimate discourse of affection is a notion that pulls us closer to recognizing the intimacy that Leontes interprets in Hermione and Polixenes’ corporeal banter.13 Certainly, hand gestures that reveal conjoined minds and desires, Hermione’s pregnancy, and Polixenes’ nine-month visit embrace for Leontes to enflame his suspicion of adultery.

While their palm paddling and finger pinching may not be synonymous with Bulwer’s hard presses and wringing of another’s hand, a “speaking touch” of passion and “covert courtship” (117), the queen and the king’s boyhood friend engage in an activity that, by definition, speaks quite seductively. *Paddle* is defined in a glossary of Shakespearean vocabulary as “to toy [with], play wantonly [with], fondle” (*bracketed words in original*) (Crystal and Crystal 313). Providing references for these uses of *paddle,* the editors cite the scene in question, as well as 3.4.186 of *Hamlet* and 2.1.247 of *Othello*—both dramatizing perceived sexual betrayal. In *The New Cambridge Edition* (2007), Susan Snyder and Deborah T. Curren-Aquino define *paddle* as “finger amorously” and also cite *Hamlet* and *Othello* as further evidence of the destructive perspective through which Shakespeare’s characters utter this word (92, n. 114). The pinching of fingers is not defined as an overt sexual gesture (“to take, squeeze, press”); however, Crystal and Crystal cite in their entry for *pinch* the provocative Hermione-Polixenes scene in *The Winter’s Tale,* as well as 4.6.44 of *The Merry Wives of Windsor,* in which Fenton uses the verb to describe how his beloved will be led away (“pinch her
by the hand”) to their marriage ceremony. In both instances, the act of pinching refers to the male-female union of hands in the context of male-female love and sexual union.14

To be sure, the union of hands in The Winter’s Tale produces a narrative of adultery for Leontes, with hands functioning as weapons against him—a theory of the hand found in Aristotle’s de Partibus Animalus. In this work, Aristotle defines the human hand as “talon, hoof, and horn at will. So too it is spear, and sword, and whatsoever other weapon or instrument you please; for all these it can be from its power of grasping and holding them all” (373.687b). This definition of the hand reveals its destructive capabilities, which we see at work in act one, scene two of The Winter’s Tale. Whether Leontes’ account of what he witnesses between Hermione and Polixenes is accurate or exaggerated, the friendly pair sharpens their innocent affection with their hand play, from Leontes’ point of view, into an adulterous “sword,” leading Leontes to declare the first of his famously cryptic lines: “Affection! thy intention stabs the centre” (1.2.138). With these words, the physical affection displayed is rendered weaponry of the fatal sort. For Aristotle, the hands create and destroy objects. For Leontes, the hands create and destroy realities.

In Renaissance drama the hand is the “body part most often associated with intentional, effective action . . .” (Rowe Dead Hands 3). As such, the words intention and stab spoken during Leontes’ observation of the hand play provide for an interpretation of the line that speaks to the dramatic and provocative significance of the gestural interaction. In Dead Hands, Katherine Rowe looks to de Partibus Animalus in order to argue the metaphorical power of hands in Renaissance drama. Citing Aristotle’s “seminal phrase,” Rowe refers to ‘instrument of instruments’ in her discussion of the hand as body part and object, reasoning that the hand “inhabits a
liminal space between the object world (the world of tools and weapons it employs) and (as the physical metaphor for those instruments) the world of interiority, intentions, and inventions of the self” (6). A turn from Bulwer and Aristotle to John of Salisbury may further clarify the way Leontes reads, hears, and interprets Hermione and Polixenes’ hand play. In Book III of *Policraticus*, Salisbury laments, “What can they do or endure who turn away from listening to the truth, who do not close their eyes off from admiration of those things which are corruptible and false, who open their hands and keep occupied with all manner of sensual activity?” (18). For Salisbury, the hands are instruments or tools for committing sinful acts. For Leontes, the hands speak proof of sinful acts.

While the Shakespearean tradition of eroticizing hand contact and the cultural history of the language of the hands provide useful contexts by which to understand Leontes’ jealous reaction to the hand play between Hermione and Polixenes, the speed in and degree to which Leontes’ jealousy grows to rage is predicated upon the power that this rhetorical spectacle holds over its observer. Charles Loyd Holt speaks to such a power when he suggests that “the elusive distance between reality and illusion involves the interpretive movement in the minds of men” (47). Like rhetoric, physical movement functions here as a source of knowledge, and, also true for rhetoric, the receiver’s mental acuity and strength of reason govern his ability to translate logically and ethically the received knowledge. The sender-receiver relationship in this scene functions just as such a relationship does in an oratorical performance.

The “interpretive movement,” to use Holt’s term, in Leontes’ mind leads him to believe that the intimacy Hermione and Polixenes display is the result of a sexual encounter. Thus, he accuses, “To mingle friendship far is mingling bloods” (1.2.109).
This comment can be read as a reaction also to Hermione’s spoken rhetoric that immediately precedes Leontes’ troubled aside. She has just said, “Why, lo you now! I have spoke to th’ purpose twice: / The one for ever earn’d a royal husband; / Th’ other for some while a friend” (106-08). Paired with the physicality of Hermione and Polixenes’ interaction, this comment, syntactically placing the two relationships in close proximity, enflames Leontes’ suspicion. Hermione’s two happy examples of her purposeful speech do not diminish, in the mind of Leontes, the provocative role of her corporeal rhetoric, her hand dancing, so to speak, with Polixenes. As Susan Leigh Foster describes in her discussion of cosmic and human dance, “[d]ancing by people offered a special version of this universal dance because it . . . commented on people’s lives, expressing ‘their most secret thoughts’” (105). Huston Diehl adds the second aspect to this performer/observer dichotomy when she points out that Renaissance men, who “based all knowledge on resemblance,” believed that “visual things functioned as signs of abstract truths” (191). An understanding of the Renaissance hand as messenger for the heart and mind allows us to recognize the rhetorical quality and force of the physical interaction between Hermione and Polixenes—an interaction that has been virtually ignored in discussions of Leontes’ jealousy.

Critical discussions of the play typically focus on the banter between Hermione and Polixenes. However, the corporeal exchange between Hermione and Polixenes holds a prominent position within their verbal exchange and thus merits critical inspection. Because hand contact is such a prominent feature in Hermione and Polixenes’ interaction, Leontes fixates on their gestural interaction to the point that it consumes his rational being. In turn, this spectacle creates a destructive observer response: Leontes’ questioning of his son’s parentage (twice while he observes the two),
the indictment and imprisonment of his wife for high treason (Leontes’ move to regain authority and control), and the abandonment of Hermione’s baby. A. D. Nuttall approaches Leontes’ jealousy through the Elizabethan audience—a medium that emphasizes the rhetorical character of the physical contact. He writes that, in describing the two kings’ lifelong friendship, Archidamus tells Camillo in act one, scene one, “. . . there is absolutely nothing in the relationship for malice to seize on” (346). The rhetorical strategy of occultatio, putting an idea “into the listener’s mind and then ostentatiously withdraw[ing] or minimiz [ing] it,” is certainly at work here (346). If Shakespeare’s audience saw what Leontes sees, indeed, if the verbal rhetoric of Leontes accurately signifies the corporeal rhetoric of Hermione and Polixenes, then upon observing first Hermione and Polixenes’ banter, the audience would have been nudged toward suspicion and then pulled closer to it by the ensuing physical spectacle. If we cannot be absolutely sure that what Leontes describes accurately portrays the action, then we cannot be absolutely sure that what he describes does not, as such flirtatious behavior was acceptable social intercourse, particularly in situations of hospitality (discussed later) and thus neither unlikely nor unusual interaction in court life. Despite this uncertainty, the occultatio in scene one, Hermione’s masculine rhetorical display, Hermione and Polixenes’ suggestive banter, and the touching that follows, all in scene two, add up to a rhetorically functional and provocative performance and scene.

This corporeal interaction and its effect on the observer speak to the Renaissance theories of gesture as a manual language and the classical theory of gesture as a necessary rhetorical device. Despite this theoretical history, critics have overlooked the significance of hands, creating a corresponding neglect of the eroticism of Hermione and Polixenes’ hand play. Hermione’s and Polixenes’ hands produce language that
undeniably speaks to Leontes’ eyes and heart, and, in the sense that Leontes is spectator to a performance, Thomas Wright’s notion of an actor’s ability to communicate diversely with his audience is relevant here. In The Passions of the Minde in Generall, Wright concludes that an actor’s gesture “speaketh with a silent voice to the eyes” (176). Regarding dance as language, Fabritio Caroso refers to dance as “pedalogue”; hence, Hermione and Polixenes’ gestural interaction can be understood as a manilogue to Caroso’s pedalogue. To connect these theories, Leontes’ eyes “hear” much, and he is thus wholly disturbed by Hermione and Polixenes’ manilogue.15 Concerning the latter theory, Quintilian asserts in Institutio Oratoria the persuasive quality of physical eloquence: “. . . signs take the place of language in the dumb, and the movements of the hands are frequently full of meaning, and appeal to the emotions without any aid from words” (11.3.6-7). Further, Quintilian instructs that gesture, like voice, “obeys the impulse of the mind” and that the importance of gesture in oratory “is sufficiently clear from the fact that there are many things which it can express without the assistance of words” (11.3.280). In The Dancing Body in Renaissance Choreography, Mark Franko, reading Quintilian, concludes that “[s]ometimes it seems the hands accomplish the proof” (16). In the case of Hermione and Polixenes, the hands perform a corporeal forensic oratory that leaves Leontes, in his mind, with unquestionable proof of a destructive truth. Indeed, hands achieve the rhetorical goals of persuadere and movere, for Hermione’s and Polixenes’ hands persuade Leontes of a particular truth and thus move him to an irrational state of mind. This dramatic trajectory points to the contextually evocative quality of the palm-paddling scene, for this corporeal moment figures quite compactly the play’s overall complication of observation and interpretation.
Not only do the above-mentioned theories join movement and language, but the
effect that this monologue has on Leontes also connects the physical and the verbal.
Neither Leontes’ passion nor his reason enjoys this entertainment, and this specification
furthers the rhetorical force of bodily movement, in that both arts were thought to affect
the heart and mind/soul of the observer/auditor.\(^{16}\) In this case, the corporeal
communication, which presents the possibility for misinterpretation, harmfully affects
the receiver. Furthermore, in keeping with the effect of Hermione’s and Polixenes’
earlier verbal rhetoric, it communicates a very clear message to Leontes, despite the
possibility that he misinterprets their gestural interaction. Continuing to observe his
wife and friend, Leontes notices that Hermione is “[s]till virginalling / Upon
[Polixenes’] palm” (1.2.125-26). By describing the physical contact between Hermione
and Polixenes with the word \textit{virginalling}, Leontes casts the two in a dancing situation, as
this verb makes reference to the virginals, a small keyboard instrument. By perceiving
their interaction as a dance, Leontes intensifies the inappropriate nature of Hermione and
Polixenes’ contact, since dancing between a man and a woman is a full-body gesture
understood to signify the virtues of matrimony, as Sir Thomas Elyot instructs in \textit{The
Boke Nam’d the Governour} (1531):

It is diligently to be noted that the associatinge of man and woman in
daunsing, they bothe observing one nombre and tyme in their movynges,
was nat begonne without a special consideration, as well for the
necessarye conjunction of those two persones, as for the intimation of
sondry vertues, which be by them represented. And for as moche as by
the association of a man and a woman in daunsinge may be signified
matrimonie, I could in declarynge the dignitie and commoditie of that
sacrament make intiere volumes. . . (233-34)

The hand dancing between Hermione and Polixenes represents an important part of social intercourse among the nobility. Julia Sutton explains, “it was universally assumed that joyous flirtation and the exhibition through dance of delightful feminine charms and lusty male prowess were vital to social intercourse” (21). In light of this fact, Elyot’s association of dance with marriage and its implications are tempered. Certainly, then, the argument can be made that Hermione and Polixenes’ physical interaction, their dancing of hands, is appropriate for the occasion. Still, the dancing is suspect because Hermione accentuates her masculine role by following her “lusty” display of rhetorical skill with this intimate corporeal summation. Carried out between Hermione and Polixenes, the marriage metaphor is considerably problematic, in that Hermione plays the masculine role, thus metaphorically and literally has the upper hand. Indeed, the queen leads this rhetorical dance, as she plays upon Polixenes’ palm and, in doing so, reverses the traditional metaphor of woman as instrument and man as musician. This gender reversal strengthens the threatening nature of their performance (which Leontes can neither bear nor turn away from), as well as Hermione’s earlier rhetorical triumph. Moreover, this socially accepted intercourse is tainted not only with Hermione’s masculine assertiveness but also with Leontes’ suspicious interpretation of it.

The power of the visual is a common heuristic in scholarship concerning Hermione’s pregnant body and Hermione as a statue brought to life at the end of the play. However, despite the manifest effect it has on Leontes, the visual is significantly lacking in critical discussion that seeks to make sense of his tyrannical jealousy, a jealousy that grows as he listens to and observes his queen and boyhood friend banter verbally and physically. Joan Hartwig affords a moment to this interaction in her study
“The Tragicomic Perspective of The Winter’s Tale.” She observes that Leontes “sees his suspicions harden into action” (14) while he witnesses the interaction between Hermione and Polixenes. Hartwig describes this interaction as simply the “charm and graceful actions” of a hostess, actions that Leontes perceives as “deceitful displays of vulgarity and lust” (13).

The king’s rant against the contact between his queen and his boyhood friend ultimately progresses to a statement that further links gesture and rhetoric. “Affection! Thy intention stabs the centre,” Leontes proclaims (1.2.138). The center is a phrase to be interpreted both narrowly and broadly as the center of one’s being and the center of one’s world. For the purpose at hand, the discussion will focus on the narrow interpretation. The affection Leontes witnesses between Hermione and Polixenes pierces the center of his being, for an obvious emotional and physical effect on his heart (jealousy and “tremor cordis”) takes place during his role as observer. Pathos, a rhetorical quality paramount to an orator’s relationship with his audience, is unquestionably then an element of Hermione and Polixenes’ corporeal rhetoric. The critical neglect that this physical interaction between Hermione and Polixenes suffers requires the use of not only cultural evidence but also primary textual evidence to validate the significant role this interaction plays, specifically concerning corporeality and pathos. A look ahead at act five, scene three—a very commonly examined scene—will aid in this validation, although it should be emphasized that substantiation of this claim depends upon the way in which this scene was and is acted.

Alexander Leggatt examines Hermione’s embracing of her repentant king and observes that when Leontes exclaims “O, she’s warm!” (5.3.109), he takes pleasure in the “body as an instrument of affection” (106). With this exclamation of relief, Leontes
also offers an ironic echo of his earlier suspicion (“too hot”), in that *warm* could signify sexual forwardness. Leontes’ embracing of Hermione provides the comic ending to a tragic beginning and thus provides a direct contrast to the coupled action in act one. As such, if Leontes understands the body as “an instrument of affection” in act five, then it is reasonable to conclude that he would view the hands as “instrument[s] of affection” in act one. This parallel, along with the cultural evidence already examined, minimizes the cryptic quality of the king’s pathetic reaction to the previously discussed “paddling [of] palms and pinching [of] fingers” in act one. A reaction prior to the “Affection” speech establishes the presence of *pathos* when Leontes recalls his experience of clasping hands with Hermione. The presence of this rhetorical element in Hermione and Polixenes’ mute rhetorical display and in Leontes’ passionate verbal and evident corporeal reaction is indeed unquestionable. *Pathos* in Leontes’ reaction originates with the king’s epideictic recollection of Hermione’s verbal and nonverbal vow of constancy to him (discussed earlier). In this scene, at once epideictic and judicial, the nonverbal rhetoric of the mute orators and the verbal and nonverbal response of the observer/auditor share this element of rhetorical performance. While not an auditor to Leontes’ aside, Hermione still hears, so to speak, her husband’s physical reaction to her and Polixenes’ physical oration. She keenly observes, “You look / as if you held a brow of much distraction. / Are you moved, my lord?” (188-90). Although Leontes assures her that he is not moved, the speech of his brow, along with his jealous aside, proves otherwise. Leontes’ disingenuity, like the hand-play scene, speaks to the observational and interpretational problems that afflict the play. Here, corporeal speech contains much *pathos*—a rhetorical element that sets in motion tragic actions for which further instances of corporeal rhetoric, addressed in chapters two and four, figure significantly
in resolving.17

The Rape of Lucrece

While gesture in The Winter’s Tale is the catalyst for the play’s various instances and types of trauma, gesture in The Rape of Lucrece and Titus Andronicus are responses to traumatic occurrences and thus communicate the sorrow that trauma breeds. Indeed, gesture becomes the only means of communication when trauma has impeded, in Lucrece’s case, or destroyed, in Lavinia’s case, the victims’ ability to speak. In The Rape of Lucrece, the first instance of gesture occurs, however, before the trauma happens and even before Lucrece is aware of Tarquin’s treacherous intentions. When Tarquin “stories to her ears her husband’s fame,” Lucrece heaves up her hand to express her joy and “wordless so greets heaven for his success” (ll. 106, 112). The next time Lucrece performs this gesture, it is to plead for Tarquin’s mercy: “‘To thee, to thee, my heav’d-up hands appeal’” (638). Yet the foul deed is performed, and Lucrece laments the absence of a partner with whom to perform gestures of mourning:

“Where now I have no one to blush with me,
To cross their arms and hang their heads with mine,
To mask their brows and hide their infamy,
But I alone, alone must sit and pine,
Seasoning the earth with show’rs of silver brine,
Mingling my talk with tears, my grief with groans,
Poor wasting monuments of lasting moans. (792-98)

With this mention of specific gestures, Lucrece allows the reader to witness a corporeal performance of grief, which David Bevington observes as “painfully eloquent,” that accompanies her lengthy verbal expression of it (83). This very brief ubi sunt to a
grieving partner is part of her apostrophe to night, which continues and leads to apostrophes to shame, opportunity, time, and her quivering hand. In 303 lines, Lucrece transforms herself from silent victim to grieving orator whose performance of grieving gestures lacks sympathetic observers. Even Lucrece’s tears can be understood as a gestural act, in that they accompany her speech and provide another form of physical/visual expression of her grief. 18 Bulwer’s chirology assists in forming the link between weeping and gesture by putting forth the theory that because sorrow causes the “wringing of the mind,” tears are the product of moisture being strained from the brain, and this “compression of the brain” causes hand wringing, “which is a gesture of expression of moisture” (32). Thus, Lucrece’s tears, like those profusely shed in Titus Andronicus (discussed later), are the biological equivalent of hand-wringing, a universally understood gesture of grief.

The gestural hand takes on a violent significance in two instances: prior to Lucrece’s loquacious apostrophes and again when she is exhausted of language. Before she grieves verbally, Lucrece “wakes her heart by beating on her breast, / And bids it leap from thence, where it may find / Some purer chest to close so pure a mind” (759-61). In its suggestion of moral stain and death, this gesture foreshadows the poem’s ultimate gesture: the act of suicide. Concerning the second instance of violent hand gestures, Lucrece determines that her “helpless smoke of words” is useless in easing her pain and thus pronounces that the only remedy “[i]s to let forth [her] foul defiled blood” (1027, 1029). She reasons the necessity for this solution through an apostrophe to her hand:

“Poor hand, why quiver’st thou at this decree?
Honor thyself to rid me of this shame,
For if I die, my honor lives in thee,
But if I live, thou liv’st in my defame.
Since thou couldst not defend thy loyal dame,
And wast afeard to scratch her wicked foe,
Kill both thyself and her for yielding so.” (1030-36)

In order to perform this act, she must figuratively/semantically detach her hand from her body by addressing it as if it were a hesitant and impotent soldier in need of the courage to slay an enemy. In this apostrophe, we see a literary example of Bulwer’s autonomous description of the hand, in which the hand communicates with the mind and “calls it selfe into a forme. . .” (110). Addressing her quivering hand, Lucrece personifies it as a soldier with the duty to protect his “loyal dame” but failing to do so (1034). Through this personification, Lucrece detaches her hand from herself and creates a ruler-subject relationship with it by referring to herself as her hand’s “loyal dame” and making honor or dishonor a shared status depending upon her “soldier’s” action or lack thereof.

Certainly, Lucrece masculinizes her hand in this personification and in this masculinization renders her hand an accomplice in her rape and likewise in her potential defamation if it is unable to restore its and her honor by carrying out the suicide. There is still a chance for the restoration of honor; however, to achieve this restoration, Lucrece’s quivering hand must perform a literal murder to remedy the figurative murder her “yielding” hand committed as a result of its inability to protect her against Tarquin (1036). To be sure, this act that Lucrece’s detached hand must perform is a mortal gesture that mutely cries out Lucrece’s shame, loyalty to her family’s honor, and desire for purification. Lucrece sees not only her helpless/guilty hand but also herself (attached to this hand) as the enemy; thus, it is shame in her female weakness and helplessness, as
well as discomfort in herself as an agent (via her helpless/guilty hand) of her rape and potential agent of her suicide that drives Lucrece’s need for manual detachment.

Katherine Rowe’s and Michael Neill’s discussions of the hand in “Dismembering and Forgetting in Titus Andronicus” and “Amphitheatres of the Body,” respectively, shed light on the issue of manual agency. Rowe explains that the “Renaissance tradition of manual semiotics” renders the hand the “preeminent sign for political and personal agency” (“Dismembering” 280). Neil illuminates this perspective by observing that the hand was associated with the head and heart and performed as a locus of agency representing the self. More specifically, the hand was identified as another self that could be perceived as responsible for (i.e. the principal actor, rather than the instrument, of) the errors and sins of the self and thus could be a scapegoat for the self (41). ¹⁹ Neil’s observation coincides with Rowe’s regarding the sixteenth-century usage of the word agency. Rowe notes that the term agency was used in the late sixteenth century to convey “contradictory senses of passivity and activity, of primacy and secondariness” (282). Indeed, Lucrece’s guilty-hand speech presents her hand as such a blame-worthy entity.

The tapestry depicting the Trojan War provides a visual metaphor of Lucrece’s current state of dismemberment. Lucrece studies the image of a hidden Achilles who appears as a woven synecdoche:

That for Achilles’ image stood his spear,

Grip’d in an armed hand, himself behind

Was left unseen, save to the eye of mind:

A hand, a foot, a face, a leg, a head

Stood for the whole to be imagined. (1424-28)
Achilles is a body in parts, dissected through skillful artifice, and in a reversal of the blazon tradition that leads to her victimization, Lucrece objectifies Achilles through her studied gaze of his fragmented likeness woven into the tapestry. Through Lucrece’s eyes, this gaze is empathetic, for Lucrece perceives herself likewise as a body in parts but dissected through Tarquin’s foul design and her attempt at purification. As a result of the rape, Lucrece no longer believes herself to be a paragon of nobility and chastity—a status that relies upon the unity of virtuous qualities and the ability to keep them unspoiled and intact. Instead, Lucrece perceives herself as a synecdoche of defiled blood and violated genitalia. Thus, she believes that the only way to purify herself is to purge the defiled blood from her body, a cleansing that will prevent Collatine from knowing “[t]he stained taste of violated troth” and will protect him from her stained sex and honor (1059). Once Lucrece detaches her guilty hand, as she judges it to be, from herself and masculinizes it as her subject-protector and potential redeemer, she is able to perform the gesture that physically articulates her shame and, with a violent, mute voice, ultimately moves the people to revolution. As Bethany Packard observes, suicide for Lucrece “represents and proves her rape” (288). Lucrece utters a brief prologue to the act, “‘He, he, fair lords, ‘tis he, / That guides this hand to give this wound to me’” (1721-22), that suggests she raises or holds out the hand she identifies. Either gesture would make sense, for the raised hand would partially execute the universal gesture of heaved up hands to convey grief, and the latter possibility, holding out her hand, is a gesture of unity. This movement would indicate the unifying nature of her suicide through which she seeks to purify her body, thus reunite it with chastity and, in turn, reunite her memory and family with honor.
Titus Andronicus

When the capacity for speech and gesture is muted, how can one respond to trauma? How can others bear witness to another’s trauma? Titus Andronicus (1594) answers these questions in its brutal and disturbing study of trauma, communal suffering, and revenge.

When Marcus sees his niece, Lavinia, following her vicious rape and dismemberment by Tamora’s sons, Demetrius and Chiron, he urges her to tell him who is responsible for hewing off “her two branches, those sweet ornaments” (2.4.18). Marcus’ reference to Lavinia’s hands as “sweet ornaments” presages the necessary role that gesture holds in the discovery of Lavinia’s attackers, as gesture was commonly held up as an ornament of language, if not as a language itself. The absence of hands renders Lavinia a cryptic corporeal text, thus complicating the role of gesture. Upon discovering that Lavinia is unable to speak the names of her attackers, Marcus laments her as a more sorrowful Philomela because she has no hands to “[sew] her mind” (39). The act of cutting off Lavinia’s hands provides, as in The Winter’s Tale, a forensic dimension to gesture, in that by performing this act, Demetrius and Chiron reveal their recognition of the rhetorical capacity, thus testimonial/forensic potential, of hands. This annihilation of the ability to communicate is underscored in the following scene in which Titus watches the judges and senators lead his bound sons to their execution and continues to plead for their lives even after their exit. With the intended auditors for his pleading gone, Titus’ speech fails at its rhetorical purpose. Titus’ rhetorical situation reflects that of Marcus and Lavinia, for Titus speaks in vain and is thus unable to communicate.

Emphasizing the prominent role of non-verbal rhetoric in the play is the
admission of Titus that he, who has “(never wept before),” spills “tears [that] are now prevailing orators” (3.1. 25-26).20 As noted above, rhetoric becomes an enfeebled entity, leaving “lachrymal discourse” as the only clear, thus effective, mode of communication (Giddens par. 6).21 Offering the possibility that Titus experiences anxiety about his gender identity, Eugene Giddens cites Titus’s tears as “visual reinforcement” of his effeminization (par. 6).22 I argue that Titus’ weeping serves also to reinforce the communal aspect of suffering in the play because it loosens the confines of gender identity and allows for gender neutrality in the tearful interactions between Titus and Lavinia. When Lucius stresses the fruitlessness of his father’s speech,23 Titus further foretells Lavinia’s traumatic and rhetorical circumstances by creating a sympathetic and communal situation from his rhetorical limitation:

Therefore, I tell my sorrows bootless to the stones.

Who, though they cannot answer my distress,

Yet in some sort they are better than the tribunes,

For that they will not intercept my tale.

When I do weep, they humbly at my feet

Receive my tears, and seem to weep with me, (3.1.37-42)

Certainly, Titus, Marcus, and Lucius suffer with Lavinia when, later in this scene, Marcus enters with Lavinia commanding Titus to “prepare thy aged eyes to weep” (59). In Titus’ response, gesture becomes more prominent in the play, not as a method for communicating suffering, but as the subject of sympathetic rhetoric, in which Titus threatens to chop off his own hands and questions how he, Lucius, and Marcus should grieve with Lavinia:

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Shall thy good uncle, and thy brother Lucius,  
And thou, and I, sit round about some fountain,  
Looking all downwards to behold our cheeks,  
How they are stain’d like meadows yet not dry,  
With miry slime left on them by a flood?  
And in the fountain shall we gaze so long  
Till the fresh taste be taken from that clearness,  
And made a brine-pit with our bitter tears?  
Or shall we cut away our hands like thine?  
Or shall we bite our tongues, and in dumb shows  
Pass the remainder of our hateful days?  
What shall we do? Let us that have our tongues  
Plot some device of further misery,  
To make us wonder’d at in time to come. (3.1.122-35)

With this sorrowful inquiry, Titus presents Lavinia not only as a “silent saying, demanding an ethical response,” indeed as a corporeal imperative, but also displays her as a spectacle of communal suffering in which Lavinia’s suffering will later be replicated through sympathetic gestures (Lawrence 61). The questions in the above passage are Titus’ own response to his request for Lavinia to “make some signs how [he] may do thee ease” (121). After Titus offers his own suggestions in the form of questions, Lavinia speaks neither “yes” nor “no” in the way that she is obviously capable; a simple gesture of the head. Instead she “sobs and weeps,” responding to the tears Titus sheds, rather than his questions, as he speaks (137).

Concerning communal suffering, tears continue to carry rhetorical significance,
in that they are the means by which Titus and Lucius bear witness to Lavinia’s trauma. Unlike Lucrece, weeping is the only mode of expression Lavinia has to express her grief, since her attackers have left her with neither hands nor tongue with which to speak. Despite this communicative lack, Titus claims to “understand her signs” (3.1.143). This parental awareness furthers the familial bond displayed through Lavinia’s earlier interaction with her father, in which she answers his tears with her own. Apparentlly, Lavinia is communicating through facial expressions and/or bodily movements, from which Titus interprets the futility of Lucius’ efforts, like his own, to soothe his sister:

Mark, Marcus, mark! I understand her signs.

Had she a tongue to speak, now would she say
That to her brother which I said to thee:
His napkin, with [his] true tears all bewet,
Can do no service on her sorrowful cheeks.
O, what a sympathy of woe is this,
As far from help as Limbo is from bliss! (3.1.143-49)

The sympathetic gestures prove futile, yet in their common futility, for neither Marcus’ nor Lucius’ tear-drenched handkerchiefs are useful, the gestures reveal the extent of the family’s mutual suffering. This suffering is given political relevance when Aaron the Moor enters with the news that the hand of one of the men is the only offering that will save Titus’ sons. Here, Lucrece’s rhetorical dismemberment becomes a literal one. A debate among Titus, Lucius, and Marcus concerning who should sacrifice his hand ends in Lucius asserting that he will “fetch an axe” and Marcus vowing to use it (185, 186). Upon their exit, Titus reveals his plan to deceive Marcus and Lucius by having his own

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hand taken. “Lend me thy hand,” he tells Aaron, “and I will give thee mine” (187).

Titus’ language provides a stark contrast to the violence of the situation and of the political agreement, and instead reveals Lavinia’s father at peace with this physical loss, for Titus experienced sympathetic dismemberment the moment his ravished and dismembered daughter was brought to his sight. Now, with this violent act, Titus can satisfy his parental need to suffer with Lavinia and, as he believes, save his sons. Despite these emotional reasons for offering his own hand, Titus has already come to terms with the truth that “[f]or hands to do Rome service is but vain” (80). 25 Titus’ sacrifice takes the trope of futile gesture to its tragic extreme when Aaron immediately reveals his deception:

I go, Andronicus, and for thy hand
Look by and by to have thy sons with thee.
Their heads, I mean. O, how this villainy
Doth fat me with the very thoughts of it!
Let fools do good, and fair men call for grace,
Aaron will have his soul black like his face. (3.1.200-05)

Aaron speaks the deception (202-05) as an aside, so Titus becomes aware of the futility of his sympathetic and political gesture only when, shortly after, a messenger enters carrying the heads of his sons and his hand. With the delivery of her brothers’ heads, Lavinia is shoved to the other side of tragedy, and in this position, she attempts to offer comfort by kissing her father’s head. This gesture, Marcus tells Lavinia, “is comfortless / As frozen water to a starved snake” (251-52). In yet another tragic situation, a gesture of comfort and sympathy is performed in vain.

In the following act, it is clear that Titus has grown weary of sympathetic
gestures and their futility. He is now obsessed with taking revenge upon those who caused their “bitter woes” and thus discourages gestures of sorrow (3.2.3). Titus demands Marcus to “unknit that sorrow-wreathen knot” because he and Lavinia “want [their] hands / and cannot passionate [their] tenfold grief / with folded arms” (4, 5-7). Because of Titus’ and Lavinia’s dismemberment, communal suffering is impossible; therefore, Titus forbids the gesture that would perform it. In its place, Titus encourages individual acts that he and Lavinia can perform to specific ends. Thus, Titus will “tyrannize upon [his] breast” when his heart begins to beat “all mad with misery” (8, 9). To still the “outrageous beating” (13) of Lavinia’s heart, Titus commands Lavinia to

Wound it with sighing, girl, kill it with groans;
Or get some little knife between thy teeth,
And just against thy heart make thou a hole,
That all the tears that thy poor eyes let fall
May run into that sink, and soaking in,
Drown the lamenting fool in sea-salt tears. (15-20)

Lavinia, unlike her father, is unable to beat upon her breast to perform a customary show of grief, and because of this inability, Titus suggests a more violent alternative, in which tears, Lavinia’s only possible expression of grief, are no longer orators but murderers.26 Indeed, the impossibility of customary gestures of grief—folded arms, raised hands, and beating upon one’s breast—leaves only a bizarre and more violent act as a way for Lavinia to express her grief and still her mournful heart, which Titus calls a “lamenting fool” possibly because her heart continues to grieve despite the lack of customary instruments through which to express its grief: a tongue and hands. This gestural division among Marcus, Titus, and Lavinia and the violent imagery foreshadow
the revenge scene (5.3), in which Titus kills Lavinia to end her and his sorrow and in which Saturninus kills Titus to avenge the murder of his wife and her sons. Suggesting Lavinia’s death is the first line of the above passage, for sighs were believed to drain, drop by drop, the heart of blood” (3.2. n.15).

Despite the impossibility of communal suffering and suggestions of Lavinia’s death, Titus yearns to understand his daughter.27 He claims to comprehend some of Lavinia’s “martyred signs” (3.2.36) and vows to learn her new language:

Thou shalt not sigh, nor hold thy stumps to heaven,
Nor wink, nor nod, nor kneel, nor make a sign,
But I, of these, will wrest an alphabet,
And by still practice learn to know thy meaning. (42-45)

Certainly, Titus is driven by the parental need to maintain as much communication as possible with his silenced daughter but also by the need to discover her attackers.28 Through the act of “wrest[ing] an alphabet,” Lavinia unquestionably is rendered a text to interpret, for, as Philip C. Kolin observes, “[f]lesh itself in Titus is often transformed into, or re-emblematized back to, word/text that must be read as any printed source” (250). Through the reading/interpretation of Lavinia, Titus “learns a new language of action,” which he will ultimately adopt in the form of self-wounding and revenge (Hulse 108).

To reveal the names of the attackers is the reason Lavinia struggles to communicate with neither tongue nor hands, leaving Titus and Marcus to, in a phrase that emphasizes the disabled condition of corporeal language in the play, “fumble toward her truth” (Fawcett 266). Act four, scene one opens with Lavinia running after young Lucius so that she can access the books he carries under his arms, for these books contain the information Lavinia needs to help her communicate her traumatic
narrative. The text of mutilated flesh requires a text to make her clear. Before going to the books, Lavinia lifts her arms in an ambiguous gesture that prompts Titus to question why she raises her arms and leaves Marcus to answer uncertainly that she means either to indicate more than one attacker or that she raises her arms in a gesture of revenge (4.1.38-40). This gestural ambiguity presents the possibility for misinterpretation; however, unlike this possibility in *The Winter’s Tale*, Lavinia is able to clarify her intentions by invoking the rapists’ Ovidian inspiration. Indeed, certain communication will have to be achieved via another’s tale, so Lavinia turns the pages of Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* and performs a decipherable examination of the story of Philomel to convey her rape to Titus and Marcus (47, 52). Lavinia’s gestures initiate a “complex process” of textual interaction, in that reading becomes a reciprocal act when Titus, Marcus and Lucius read Lavinia while she reads Ovid and a representational act when Lavinia’s family deciphers in her a more tragic Philomel (Kolin 252). Furthermore, by tossing the pages with her stumps, Kolin sees Lavinia “inscrib[ing] herself into Ovid’s tale of rape and revenge (252). Encouraged by their ability to interpret her gestural reading, Titus urges Lavinia to “give signs”; however, Marcus shows Lavinia how she can write the names of her attackers by holding a staff in her mouth and guiding it with her stumps (4.1.61, 68-70). Lavinia does so successfully and no longer must solely communicate with a vocabulary of nods, winks, and sighs. Titus can now read Lavinia’s signs of a different sort: words in the sand. Indeed, “[s]peech may be silenced, but as long as the body can move at all, writing will out” (Fawcett 266). Although Lavinia is now able to express herself through written language, her presence as a corporeal text remains sturdy. To be sure, Lavinia’s process of writing with her mouth and mutilated arms speaks to her
presence as a, to borrow Hulse’s term, “tableau vivant” (111) that narrates an
acquisition of power through the “redeploying” of body parts (Lamb 53). Such a
corporeal-based attainment of power is a trope that cuts through the whole of the
play.

Gesture as a communicative force is developed in Titus Andronicus through the
difficulty observed in the play with traditional modes of gesture. Lavinia’s inability to
perform customary gestures to communicate her tragic narrative, the futility of Titus’
and Marcus’ gestures of comfort, and the magnified grief that results underpin the
significance mute speech holds in human interaction. Indeed, in act five, scene two,
Tamora wishes to talk with Titus, but he refuses because he is unable to “grace [his]
talk / Wanting a hand to give[‘t] that accord” (17-18). This refusal to talk prompted by
the inability to gesture not only speaks to the importance of gesture to verbal
communication but also suggests further sympathetic suffering regarding the violent
silencing of Lavinia’s tongue and hands at the hands of Tamora’s sons. Lavinia’s vocal
and corporeal muteness makes it difficult for Titus and Marcus to bear witness to
Lavinia’s trauma and to offer her comfort. Tragically, and ironically, the only gesture
capable of ending Lavinia’s, and thus Titus’, sorrow is a fatal one, for Titus stabs
Lavinia after uttering these words: “Die, die, Lavinia, and thy shame with thee, / And
with thy shame thy father’s sorrow die!” (5.3.46-47).29 Commenting on the connection
between Lavinia’s condition and Titus’ suffering, Douglas E. Green notes that “[h]er
mutilated body ‘articulates’ Titus’ own suffering and victimization” and is also “the
occasion and the expression of his madness, his inner state” (322). As in The Rape of
Lucrece, the violent gesture of stabbing is set forth as the only option available to
achieve freedom from grief and shame. For this purpose, Titus does indeed possess the
hand to “grace his talk” with action, and with it, he severs shame’s and sorrow’s grip on Lavinia and himself.

In *Chirologia*, Bulwer asserts that the hand is an entity “invaded” by the soul and the “habits of the minde” (3). This idea of invasion underscores the generative and responsive connections between trauma and gesture that I seek to forge in my treatment of the literature thus far. In *The Winter’s Tale*, gesture articulates particular meaning to Leontes, causing trauma to invade his body and mind. In *The Rape of Lucrece* and *Titus Andronicus*, trauma directly and indirectly invades the bodies and minds of several characters, resulting in the necessity for corporeal reactions to the trauma. This necessity is predicated upon the early modern understanding that emotions govern the motions of the body, an understanding that insists upon a recognition of the involuntary nature of emotionally-laden gestures. This necessity is also predicated upon the existence of customary reactions to grief and shame—culturally recognized gestures that display both one’s personal and sympathetic grief and that accomplish the severing of trauma and its effects from the traumatized. These gestures range from folding one’s arms, to beating on one’s breast, to suicide, the latter recontextualized in *Titus Andronicus* as murder, specifically Titus’ murder of Lavinia.30

*Epicoene*

In response to Alan C. Dessen’s position that laughter is an “‘unwelcome response’” to the performance of *Titus Andronicus*, S. Clark Hulse argues that laughter “has been an appropriate and necessary response to the play since 1600” (107, n. 5). Hulse’s argument is grounded in two areas: the theater and human nature. First, he cites the “mingling [of] the tragic and absurd” in the play and explains that the absurdity is not the result of intentional dramaturgical design but rather “an inadvertent result of a
necessarily rhetorical style.” Second, Hulse reasons that “at a certain point, the only way to cope with pain is to laugh” (117-18). I introduce this analysis of laughter as an appropriate response to Titus Andronicus in an attempt to effectively transition to a comic treatment of trauma: Ben Jonson’s Epicoene (1609). In the character list of the play, Morose is described as “a gentleman that loves no noise” (98). Indeed, he presents himself as one who is traumatized by the noise of London, including the voices of others, and thus limits his servant, Mute, and attempts to limit his wife, Epicoene, to corporeal expression. In these actions, one hears agreement with the opinion of Theodore Adams who believed “[t]he eye, the eare, the foote, the hand, though wilde and unruly enough, have been tamed, but the tongue can no man tame” (qtd. in Mazzio 96). Morose’s traumatic relationship with noise has as its origin a rich philosophical discourse that delineates the differences between eloquence and chatter, a discourse to which Jonson contributes in Timber, Or Discoveries. Sixteenth- and seventeenth-century ideas on the distinction between eloquence and chatter, between speaking and talking (as Jonson denotes the dichotomy) have as their source Plutarch’s “De garrulitate” from Moralia, and the consensus is that chatter, as opposed to eloquence, lacks substance and, in its unbridled nature, opposes wisdom and virtue. As Jonson puts it, “too much talking is the indice of a fool” (Timber 28), and Plutarch tells us that “the babbler” is well-instructed when told, “Hush child: in silence many virtues lie” (2.1.400). Plutarch reinforces this maxim by equating silence with eloquence—a rhetorical expression of virtue—and Jonson takes up this idea when he proclaims, “Dum tacet indoctus, poterit cordatus haberi; Is morbos animi namque tacendo tegit” (“The dunce seems knowing whilst he conceals his ignorance by silence”) and “Echemuthia Pythag[orae] quam laudabilis!” (“How admirable is Pythagorean silence!”) (28, 29).
Jonson references Pythagorean silence, as well as Harpocrates, the god of silence, through Truewit, who enters Morose’s house and, when nobody immediately speaks to him, exclaims, “Fishes! Pythagoreans all! What say you, sir! nothing! Has Harpocrates been here with his club, among you?” (2.2.110). Through Morose’s demand for effective gesture and preference for silence, Epicoene displays the corporeal counterpart to the Plutarchian and Jonsonian distinctions between chatter/talking and eloquence/speaking and the notion that silence is also eloquence.

Like The Winter’s Tale and Titus Andronicus, Epicoene dramatizes the futility of language, showing it to be oftentimes absurd and paradoxical in the mouth of Daw, impotent through LaFoole, harmful (though eloquent) on the tongue of Truewit, and, except for his own, traumatic to the ears of Morose. Observing Morose’s hypocrisy, Huston Hallahan points out that Morose “makes empty and ineffective speeches” and “strives to impose silence on others while allowing his own tongue to ramble undisciplined” (120, 121). Morose assesses the situation thusly: “Let me see: all discourses but mine own afflict me; they seem harsh, impertinent, and irksome” (2.1.109). To put it bluntly, and to borrow from the tongue of Clerimont, Morose perceives everyone except himself as simply “a windfucker” (1.4.109). That language in the play can be perceived as inherently flawed is recognized also from the fact that rhetorical signification in the play proves fluid because its language is “manipulative and manipulated” (Jackson par. 8). Regarding language as a flawed entity, the distinction between Epicoene and The Winter’s Tale and Titus Andronicus is grounded in the era’s philosophical distinction between eloquence and chatter as outlined above. In The Winter’s Tale, the flaw with speech lies not with its quality but rather with the implications and effects of Hermione’s eloquence. In Titus Andronicus, the flaw
presents itself in the physical impossibility for speech, and insofar as Lavinia is able to reveal mutely the truth of her circumstance, her silence can be heard as Plutarchian eloquence. Morose’s condition prompts him to demand that his servant speak to him “by signs” (2.1.109). As in Titus Andronicus, signs and the hope of interpreting them are paramount to the ability of Morose and Mute to effectively communicate, for Morose asks, “Is it not possible that thou shouldst answer me by signs, and I apprehend thee, fellow?” (2.1.109).37 What follows is a series of questions, to which Morose “makes a leg” or bends a finger (to indicate time) in response (s.d.109). Mute has the ability to speak but is made necessarily mute and thus dependent upon gesture by his master’s traumatic relationship with the noise of others. This relationship with noise leads Morose to call The Turk’s ability to command his soldiers by signs and in complete silence “an exquisite art” (2.1.110) and the general practice of silence a “divine discipline” (109). The gestural demands made upon Mute and Epicoene and the ongoing commands for silence render the play a comic contribution to the classical and Renaissance discourses on chatter, eloquence, and silence.

Morose’s “disability” leaves him vulnerable to the trickery of Truewit, a friend who devises a plan to exploit the gentleman’s potential for language-induced trauma. Truewit claims to have found Morose the perfect wife: a dumb woman. However, when Epicoene is brought before Morose, he admits that “only the sweet voice of a lady has the just length of [his] ears” (2.5.120). However, instead of speaking, Epicoene curtsies, yet Morose reads her courteous gesture as “too courtless and simple” and chides that any woman who will be his wife “must be accomplished with courtly and audacious ornaments” (2.5.120). Here, as in Titus Andronicus, a gestural situation is coded as language with the word ornaments. Because Epicoene interacts with Morose through
flawed gesture, he encourages her to speak since he assumes she will speak sweetly as a lady should and not offend his ears with clamorous chatter. Although Morose first admits that he can abide the sounds that come from the “sweet voice of a lady,” it quickly becomes clear that he prefers silent communication through gesture, as long as it is eloquently performed. With this distinction, Epicoene’s first “courtless” curtsy can be interpreted as corporeal chatter, which compels Morose to encourage her to bend her tongue instead. However, Morose’s preference for silence and gesture immediately takes over, despite his praising of her speech as “divine softness”:

But can you naturally, lady, as I enjoin these by doctrine and industry, refer yourself to the search of my judgment, and—not taking pleasure in your tongue, which is a woman’s chiefest pleasure—think it plausible to answer me by silent gestures, so long as my speeches jump right with what you conceive?” (120)

The use of “jump right” to describe the agreement of Epicoene with the words of Morose emphasizes the corporeal treatment of language. Accordingly, Epicoene curtsies, apparently correctly this time, for Morose responds, “Excellent! divine! if it were possible she should hold out thus!” (120). Of course, she does not, and her later commanding talk, indeed her domestic noise, leads to Leontes-like complaints of impropriety and suffering. Morose exclaims, “O Amazonian impudence!” and “O my torment, my torment!” (3.5.132-33). Whereas Leontes expresses his emotional and physical trauma in response to gesture, Morose is emotionally and physically attacked by the lack of it.

In another glance toward The Winter’s Tale, Epicoene employs the trope of woman as musical instrument to be played by man (133). While Shakespeare reverses
this metaphor to reveal Hermione’s instigation and control of the gestural interaction with Polixenes, discussed earlier in the treatment of the play, Jonson uses the metaphor traditionally to reveal Epicoene as a harlot, upon whom men are free to play. In response to Epicoene’s loose and brazen tongue, Morose laments that he has married the barber’s “cittern, that’s common to all men” (3.5.133), indicating that his wife has been played upon as often as the guitar kept in barber shops for men to play while they waited (n.5). Morose accuses Epicoene of such looseness merely because she “take[s] pleasure in [her] tongue” (2.5.120). A similar indictment is launched against Hermione in The Winter’s Tale when she plays upon Polixenes’ palm, indeed is gesturally “loose” and thus assumed to be sexually loose, as well. While Morose and Leontes can be contrasted through the details of their situations, the husbands bear a similarity, in that the inappropriate masculine rhetoric their wives perform alienates them. Leontes perceives himself to be a cuckold and willingly isolates himself from his wife and friend through his tyrannical reactions, and Morose is made a dupe in his own home.

The noisy horror continues for Morose when Daw and Trusty enter his home with three ladies. His response is quite dramatic: “O, the sea breaks in upon me! another flood! an inundation! I shall be o’erwhelmed with noise. It beats already at my shores. I feel an earth quake in myself for’t” (3.6.134). This exclamation contains the metaphysical properties of Titus’ response to Lavinia’s sorrow:

When heaven doth weep, doth not the earth o’erflow?
If the winds rage, doth not the sea wax mad,
Threat’ning the welkin with his big-swoll’n face?
And wilt thou have a reason for this coil?
I am the sea; hark how her sighs doth [blow]!
She is the weeping welkin, I the earth: (TA 3.1.221-26)

While Morose is overwhelmed with noise, Titus is overcome with sorrow, a sorrow that has as its origin a lack of noise, verbal and corporeal. However, each lamenter finds expression in the noise and assaults of nature, ultimately internalizing that nature, for Morose “feel[s] an earthquake in [him]self” and Titus is the “mad” sea.39 In both plays, the need for yet lack of gesture produces a trauma that leaves the traumatized character in a such a state of overwhelming misery that it can be expressed only as a violent force of nature through which he identifies himself.

Conclusion

This study begins with an instance of gesture that plays a significant but critically neglected role in the tragic events of The Winter’s Tale. Hermione and Polixenes’ gestural interaction certainly has a prominent hand in the emotional trauma that Leontes experiences—a trauma for which discourses of inherent irrationality and dramaturgical flaw comprise its critical history. Attributing the source of such a critically problematic event to an instance of gestural interaction lays a solid foundation for developing the argument that gesture functions as, and in some cases, in place of rhetoric in less cryptic situations. To be sure, it is the work of literature to narrate and dramatize human passions in such a way as to penetrate the audience with these passions. With regard to the rhetorical capacity of gesture, stage performance has the benefit of observable physical movement. However, close textual analysis of apparent instances of gesture can reveal the same capacity. As a matter of fact, the playwrights’ embedding of gesture into their compositions reveals attention to the teaching of Aristotle: “‘So far as possible, the poet should even include gestures in the process of
composition: for, assuming the same natural talent, the most convincing effect comes from those who actually enter into the emotional states” (qtd. in Boegehold 15). Aristotle’s closing proclamation affirms the rhetorical capacity of gesture: to move one’s mind and soul.

Brownell Salomon defines gesture as “a signifying ‘dance,’ or a kinetic expression of an idea not fully stable in words alone” (154). Such defining of gesture as the helpmate of language incapable of forming “fully stable” ideas on its own encapsulates the gestural theories of the classical and Renaissance era. These theories assist us in recognizing the corporeal relevance of the texts studied here—a relevance that moves beyond gesture’s role as the helpmate of language. As this study reveals, gesture is, in certain situations, language itself. Indeed, it creates and reveals meaning when spoken language may be not only insufficient or undesirable but impossible.
Notes

1. The title quote is from *Chirologia* (1644) by John Bulwer. The phrase introduces a list of over two hundred verbs.

2. In “The Language of Gesture and Expression,” David Bevington notes that “[t]he language of gesture was thought to be universal, because any given passion was assumed to produce the same physical effect on all who experienced it” (69). *Action is Eloquence: Shakespeare’s Language of Gesture*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1984. 67-98.

3. For a thorough view of this rhetorical landscape, see *Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric*, in which Wayne Rebhorn translates and compiles treatises from twenty-five Renaissance writers.

4. “[B]etter purpose” allows for three interpretations: (1) extended visit; (2) additional time for Leontes to gather proof of an affair; and (3) proof of Leontes’ suspicion that Hermione and Polixenes are lovers, thus his giving in to her request.

5. Throughout this thesis, I cite *The Riverside Shakespeare* (1974). In a survey of nineteen additional collections of Shakespeare’s plays, with dates ranging from 1864 to 2005, eleven of them contain this stage direction.

6. As Norman Nathan observes, Hermione’s first speech in this scene “establishes her wit” and all speeches she makes in this scene display her “skill at repartee as well as the ability to phrase ambiguities” in a sexually forward manner (20). “Leontes’ Provocation.” *Shakespeare Quarterly* 19.1 (1968): 19-24.

7. With her use of forensic argument evident in the trial scene (not a part of this study), Hermione engages in the three forms of rhetoric that d’Arezzo lists (see pg. 4). Another study of gender and rhetoric is *Rhetoric Retold: Regendering the Tradition*
From Antiquity Through the Renaissance, in which Cheryl Glenn observes, “Since women were neither citizens nor public figures, Renaissance rhetors and teachers of rhetoric naturally carried forward another ancient practice: the exclusion of women from rhetorical study, as well as from the active and public life” (chap. 4, n. 48).

8. Roger J. Trienens outlines the scholarly debate concerning the origin of Leontes’ suspicion and jealousy in “The Inception of Leontes’ Jealousy in The Winter’s Tale.” He attests, “Most critics have assumed that Leontes is in a normal state of mind when this scene begins but that he suddenly becomes jealous when Hermione persuades Polixenes, the visiting king, to remain longer in Sicily” (321). Trienens contends that these critics explain away Leontes’ jealous reaction to the outcome of his own command (for Hermione to speak to the cause) through one of two views: (1) the manifestation of an inherent weakness in Leontes’ nature or (2) a dramaturgical flaw stemming from the improbability of Leontes’ reaction. My argument, however, accounts for the visual element of the situation, which compounds the effect of the verbal element. When considering how prominent the visual was in this era to the discovery and comprehension of truth, the suddenness of Leontes’ jealousy becomes more plausible, as Hermione and Polixenes’ physical interaction offers a visual rationale of Leontes’ suspicion. Their interaction also fortifies Trienens’ own argument that “Leontes has watched with increasing anxiety the familiarity that has grown up between Hermione and Polixenes during the latter’s long visit” (323). Shakespeare Quarterly 4.3 (1953): 321-26.

9. The following passage from Joseph R. Roach’s study of the seventeenth-century actor, The Player’s Passions, provides a theatrical interpretation of the effect that Hermione and Polixenes’ hand play has on Leontes:
[The actors’s] motions could transform the air through which he moved, animating it in waves of force rippling outward from a center in his soul. His passions, irradiating the bodies of spectators through their eyes and ears, could literally transfer the contents of his heart to theirs, altering moral natures. (27)

10. This article also appears in Renaissance Studies as “Art on the Edge: Hair and Hands in Renaissance Italy” [23.3 (2009): 241-68]. Upon looking at the electronic version of the article, I discovered that the article as a whole is not useful to my research. Therefore, I did not pursue the above-cited print version as a source, which omits the word hats from its title and may thus vary somewhat from the electronic version.

11. In the case of The Winter’s Tale, Leontes is emotionally, rather than physically, maimed. The effect of both verbal and corporeal rhetoric performed in this scene.


13. In a review of a performance of The Winter’s Tale at The Old Vic in London (May 29-August 15, 2009), directed by Sam Mendes, Michael J. Collins describes the staging of this scene: Hermione and Polixenes “reclined together on pillows at center stage: she rested her head on his shoulder and he put his arm around her. Their intimacy continued (‘paddling palms’ included) as the lights on them dimmed. . . . It was unclear whether the staging represented what was actually taking place between Hermione and Polixenes or only what Leontes imagined he saw” (634). Shakespeare Bulletin 27.4
14. Gordon Williams’ A Dictionary of Sexual Language and Imagery in Shakespearean and Stuart Literature includes pinching, referencing specifically this scene from The Winter’s Tale, in the entry for palm lechery (989). The word does not have its own entry, and this is the only reference to it in the Dictionary. Williams refers to pinch, however, in a sexual context in his entries for death [“The stroke of death is as a lover’s pinch, which hurts and is desir’d.” (Antony and Cleopatra, Cleopatra, 5.2.294)] and foot-treading [“an Ancient, Grave Man…giving me a tread on the Toe, and a pinch on my Arm, went out: I followed him.” (Payne’s Morning Ramble, a prostitute describing how she began her “career at the playhouse”)]. Like pinching, pinch does not have its own entry. London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2001. 371, 526.


16. The soul was thought to have cognitive abilities. For a compelling discussion of the cognitive and perceptive capabilities of the soul, see “Ficino’s Magical Songs” in Music in Renaissance Magic: Toward a Historiography of Others by Gary Tomlinson (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1993. 101-44).


18. In Titus Andronicus, tears function more prevalently as orators.

20. To connect words and tears, Mary Laughlin Fawcett explains that the characters often struggle with “competing impulses: to speak out or to weep” and that “words and tears compete for outlet” (264). “Arms/Words/Tears: Language and the Body in Titus Andronicus.” *ELH* 50.2 (1983): 261-77.

21. Eugene Giddens uses the phrase “lachrymal discourse” to describe the talk of weeping that occurs in Titus Andronicus. In light of my argument that weeping is a form of rhetoric, I find the phrase useful to define the weeping itself.

22. Giddens points out that “male crying does not necessarily effeminise in early modern culture”; rather, it can produce gendered anxiety or compel insult, as reflected in King Lear and Coriolanus, respectively (par. 6).


24. Their bond will grow macabre later in the play as they merge into a single revenge machine, with Lavinia carrying Titus’ hand in her mouth so that he can carry his son’s head and later holding a basin with her stumps to catch the blood of Chiron and Demetrius.


26. The beating on one’s breast as an act of grief and mourning is seen in *The Iliad*, Book 18. While Achilles mourns the killing of Patroclus, the women slaves that
the two warriors acquired encircle grieving Achilles and beat their breasts.


29. Marcus Nordlund cites the inordinate nature of Roman honor as the reason that Titus can so easily murder his children. “What could possibly inspire such callousness in a parent?” Nordlund asks. He finds the answer in a statistical analysis of language in the opening scene. First, Nordlund cites six variants of honor, including dishonor, in thirty-five instances, with each character in this scene referring to honor in some form at least once. Citing the work of Brian Boyd, Nordlund underscores the sense of honor in the play by providing the statistics for Rome and its variants: sixty-eight utterances in the first 495 lines or one usage every seven lines (65-66). Thus, not just honor but a culturally specific honor is privileged over parental love.

30. I characterize Titus’ murder of Lavinia as a recontextualization of Lucrece’s suicide because both mortal actions are responses to the shame of rape.

31. All references to the play are from the Norton Critical Edition of Ben Jonson’s Plays and Masques (edited by Robert M. Adams), which does not provide line numbers. Therefore, all citations indicate page numbers. In “Silence, Eloquence, and Chatter in Jonson’s Epicoene,” Huston D. Hallahan notes the comic irony, generated by

32. I agree with Hallahan who concludes that Morose brings the noise-induced trauma upon himself as a result of his reason for marrying Epicoene: simply to disinherit his nephew, Dauphine. “Silence, Eloquence, and Chatter in Jonson’s Epicoene,” page 124.


34. Hallahan cites sixteenth- and seventeenth-century documented ideas on silence, eloquence, and chatter (117).

35. Hallahan expands on this dichotomy by arguing that chatter in Epicoene is indicative of impotence and silence of power. This explains why Dauphine, who rarely speaks, is able to exert control, unlike the chatterers (including Morose), and ultimately triumph over Morose.

36. For a thorough discussion of silence in the play, see Hallahan, “Silence, Eloquence, and Chatter in Jonson’s Epicoene.”
37. Distinguishing between *apprehend* and *comprehend* allows for clarification of the link between the physical and the verbal as this link concerns the condition and subsequent demands of Morose. Earliest meanings in *OED*: “Comprehend: to lay hold of, to seize, to grasp; to catch, entrap; an illiterate blunder for APPREHEND (1599 SHAKES. Much Ado III.iii.25 and III.v.50)”. The referenced quotes refer to the physical action of seizing “two aspitious persons” (3.5.50). “Apprehend: to lay hold upon, seize, with hands, teeth, etc. Also said of fire, and fig. of trembling, fear, etc.” Thus, *apprehend* is a physical grasping, whereas *comprehend* is a mental, cognitive grasping. Morose’s use of *apprehend* rather than *comprehend* strengthens the connection between the physical and the rhetorical/verbal. If Morose’s use of *apprehend* is not to be interpreted as a blunder (see “Apprehend” above), then it can be interpreted as Morose’s assigning to his cognitive powers the physical/manual capability of grasping, thus collapsing the rhetorical and the physical.

38. *The Anatomy of a Woman’s Tongue, Divided Into Five Parts: a Medicine, a Poison, a Serpent, Fire, and Thunder: Whereunto is Added Divers New Epigrams Never Before Printed* (1638) describes the poisonous and sinful nature of the female tongue. The anonymous author proclaims that a woman’s tongue “is the devil’s seat” and “is set upon the fire of hell” (272, 275). The anonymous pamphlet is printed in *The Harleian Miscellany; or, A Collection of Scarce, Curious, and Entertaining Tracts*. Vol. IV. London: Dutton, 1809. 267-75.

Chapter Four
The Rhetoric of Dance in *Orchestra, Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue* and *The Winter’s Tale*

Shared discourse between Renaissance dance and rhetoric leads one to understand both arts equally as forms of ordered and measured language, indeed as arts equally capable of “expressing some pleaunant or profitable affectes or motions of the mynde” (Elyot 231). As Renaissance dance treatises make clear, choreography relies on some of the traditional parts of rhetorical performance: *inventio, divisio, memoria*, and *actio*. In “Memorable Movements: Rhetoric and Choreography in Early Modern Courtly Entertainment,” Barbara Ravelhofer connects courtly dance to rhetoric in no uncertain terms: “Courtly dances may be compared to rhetorical speeches divided into units and subunits. This principle of *divisio* is shared by both dancing masters and rhetoricians” (16). To support this link, specifically in reference to the memorization of speeches and dances, Ravelhofer looks to Quintilian’s discussion of long speeches in *Institutio Oratoria*. In Book XI.ii, Quintilian asserts,

If a speech of some length has to be committed to memory, it will be useful to learn it in parts, since it will suffer from being overburdened. . . .  
. . Certain limits have to be given, so that an order and continual and frequent preparation connect the context of the words—which is most difficult—and again unite subsequently the various sections into a whole when we go over them in order. . . . only those passages which tend to slip from the memory are repeated with a view to fixing them in the mind by frequent rehearsal. . . . Division and composition . . . can achieve much (except practice, which is most powerful), as he who
makes proper division will never err in ordering the things... That
which is well composed also guides the memory by its sequential order.

(27-39)

Words in speech are analogous to steps in dance, and effective arrangement of both is
necessary for the meaning and unity of the whole.

This chapter aims to build upon the classical and Renaissance characterizations
of dance as a form of mute rhetoric to reveal the rhetorical function of dance elements
in particular Renaissance literary works. Whereas classical and Renaissance treatises
focus on formal dance performance, my study explores the dance-as-rhetoric theory
through a textual approach. Taking dance from the stage to the page, one cannot ignore
the work of Barbara Ravelhofer, a frequently cited authority on Renaissance dance, on
whom I rely to support my overall argument with a modern perspective. However, I
believe that I am able to further Ravelhofer’s work, as she studies the rhetorical quality,
among other aspects, of dance in the context of court performance, while I study the
same quality of dance in the context of literature. Positioning dance on the page
underscores the universality of the dance-as-rhetoric concept, taking the theory beyond
the realms of rhetoric and choreography and placing it into the hands of poets and
playwrights. Furthermore, a literary approach to the study of Renaissance dance
expands the theory of rhetorically functioning dance to include dramaturgical and
compositional functions, providing for a new critical lens through which to view the
dance elements in Renaissance literature.

Just as words form sentences, steps form sections and the effective arrangement
of dance sections creates a unified choreographic “speech.” Considering this analogy,
dance can be understood as a corporeal rendering of an invented and logically arranged oration. Further defining the relationship between dance and rhetoric, Ravelhofer explains that repetitions and refrains are “formulaic elements” relevant to “choreographic divisio” and are “strikingly similar to what we find in oral literature” (17). These “elements provide the performer with a sense of continuity” (17). As forms that enhance order, repetitions and refrains in choreography and rhetoric aided the dancer and orator in the accurate memorization of the whole. As an art, memoria depends upon the division and arrangement of the subject matter, Quintilian instructs (XI.ii.36). In The Art of Memory, Frances Yates cites the observation of W. J. Ong that spatial visualization is a result of written order, which ultimately aids in memorization (233). Clearly, spatial visualization is significant to the memorization of choreography as well, and, as Yates continues, Quintilian advised student orators to make use of visualization of their page or tablet in order to achieve memoria (233). Also looking to rhetorical treatises, Ravelhofer adds, "... memory is only required as a tool to remember the increasingly difficult steps so that the performer can impress spectators by his skilled bodily oration" (10). To aid memory, and to further couple dance and rhetoric, dance masters divided their choreography into parts that aided in the memorization of the choreography, which, in turn, allowed for the internalization of the dance and thus allowed for a unified performance (Ravelhofer 7). For both dancers and orators, once memoria is achieved, actio can be gracefully executed.

Concerning rhetorical performance, actio, or delivery, should be influenced, Quintilian instructs, by the art of the stage. In his teaching, Quintilian turns to the art of the comic actor yet is careful to point out that students of rhetoric do not need to master
the imitation of certain character types (the drunkard and slave), certain voices, or emotions. Nor should he "adopt all the gestures and movements of the actor." Instead, the student of rhetoric should master both gesture and movement without developing "staginess" and extravagance of facial expression, gesture, and gait" (I.xi.1-3). Proper actio is dependent upon a level of physicality that does not overpower the rhetoric itself but rather enhances the rhetorical performance. The relationship between actio in a rhetorical performance and in a dance performance hinges on this concept of enhancing a properly-invented, arranged, and memorized entity. The term to consider here is sprezzatura. Being an element of court performance and performed by courtiers, the dancing in masques, for instance, was expected to reveal itself as an art form of perfection. However, a show of effort, of labor, stood to ruin the air of leisurely entertainment for the spectators. Thus, this display of perfection needed to appear effortless, despite the fact that "only regular exercise, years of practice and patience [would] procure the desired effects and lead to perfection" (Ravelhofer 3). Ravelhofer cites seventeenth-century illustrations that depict dancers leaning on means of support, such as tables and chairs, in an effort to learn and perfect "difficult caprioles in the air" (3). The laborious nature of preparation is apparent also in the fact that rehearsals lasted for several weeks at a time (3).

Despite this rigor, the dancers were expected to perform with effortless grace, a style that belied the effort involved in preparing for a performance. In Sprezzatura and the Absence of Grace, Harry Berger, Jr. animates sprezzatura as a dance style that communicates two messages: "Look how artfully I appear to be natural' and 'Look how naturally I appear to be artful'" (9). Berger is not content with Ravelhofer's definition of
this quality as simply the concealment of effort and thus clarifies, "Rather it is the ability to show that one is not showing all the effort one obviously put into learning how to show that one is not showing effort" (9). Sprezzatura, according to Berger’s understanding, required a concealment of effort that was recognizable to spectators and was thus a rigor and accomplishment in its own right. Looking to either definition, it stands that, for both rhetoric and choreography, enhancement of the performance relies upon a form of restraint, which Quintilian understood. He advises, “For if an orator does command a certain art in such matter [facial expression, gesture, and gait], its highest expression will be in the concealment of its existence” (I.xi.3). Indeed, sprezzatura of oration is the matter here, in that a concealment of physicality while speaking was preferred in order to create an aura of ease and natural grace, regarding the acquisition of knowledge and the ability to convey it. Certainly, exaggerated movements and an overabundance of them while thinking and speaking could have resulted in a level of exhaustion (a winded speaker would have been most unimpressive) and would have distracted the audience from the substance of the performance.

The importance of substance to seventeenth-century thinkers is unquestionable, as James H. Jensen explains: "The sixteenth-century Ramistic separation of invention and arrangement from rhetoric, leaving only elocution and style, is not convincing to seventeenth-century thinkers, . . . because of the low status of elocution" (59). Elocution concerns elements that appeal to the senses, and the inferior place of it in relation to inventio and dispositio in the hierarchy of rhetorical parts speaks to the primary goals of rhetoric: to appeal to reason and to instruct. The separation of that which appeals to
reason and to the senses is an issue of rhetorical performance that corresponds to the seventeenth-century concept of the mind. As Jensen explains, "[t]he mind (or soul) is usually divided into three parts (sometimes called separate souls): the reasonable (the highest), the sensible or concupiscible (the second), and the vegetable (the lowest)" (5). It was thus established that "the higher the faculties art expresses or appeals to, the higher and more important is the art or the work of art itself" (Jensen 5-6). Whether rhetorical, visual, or musical, the art (dance included) needed first and foremost to appeal to one's faculty of knowledge and reason. Yet classical and Renaissance rhetoricians knew that pleasing the listener's ear was pertinent to successful communication and persuasion.

This delight can be achieved first through elocutio. For rhetoric, this pertains to the way the rhetor expresses his ideas: types of phrasing, figures, and imagery. Quintilian attributes the pleasure to be gained to actio. He first outlines how the orator should articulate his words. They should not be "uttered from the depths of the throat or rolled out hollow-mouthed, or permit the natural sound of the voice to be over-laid with a fuller sound, a fault fatal to purity of speech" (I.xi.6). Furthermore, the movements of the orator should not be unbecoming to witness; therefore, Quintilian continues his instruction by insisting that

. . . the lips are not distorted nor the jaws parted to a grin, that the face is not thrown back, nor the eyes fixed on the ground, nor the neck slanted to left or right. For there are a variety of faults of facial expression. I have seen many, who raised their eyebrows whenever the voice was called upon for an effort, wore a perpetual frown, and yet others who
could not keep their eyebrows level, but raised one towards the top of the head and depressed the other till it almost closed the eye. (I.xi.9-10).

For Quintilian, these details "are of enormous importance, for nothing that is unbecoming can have a pleasing effect" (I.xi.11). Hence, pleasure is given significance in delivery, a fact that emphasizes the performance aspect of rhetoric. The artistic quality and physical significance of oration is established in Quintilian's defense of the use of gymnastic teachers to teach actio. While he denounces those who "kill the mind by over-attention to the body," Quintilian concedes,

But we give the same name [gymnast] to those who form gesture and motion so that arms may be extended in the proper manner, the management of the hands free from all trace of rusticity and inelegance, the attitude becoming, the movement of the feet appropriate and the motions of the head and eyes in keeping with the poise of the body. No one will deny that such details form a part of the art of delivery, nor divorce delivery from oratory. . . ." (X.xi.15-17)

Such insistence on corporeal eloquence as a part of rhetorical performance allows for the concept of a speaking body, even before considering the evidence Renaissance-era dance manuals bring to the polemic.

Orchesography (1588), a dance treatise written under the pseudonym Thoinot Arbeau, presents a dialogue between the author and his dancing pupil, aptly named Capriole. Early in the dialogue, Arbeau explains the dependence of dance upon music. It is "the virtue of rhythm" that creates this dependence (22). Arbeau insists that, without rhythm, "dancing would be meaningless and confused, so much so that it is
necessary that the gestures of the limbs should keep time with the musical instruments and not the foot speak of one thing and the music of another" (22-23). Rhythm becomes a language in this description, and Arbeau continues the metaphor to unquestionable ends: "But practically all the savants hold that dancing is a kind of dumb rhetoric by which the orator, without speaking a single word, can, by virtue of his movements, make the spectators understand that he is gay, worthy to be praised, loved and adored" (23). Similar to Quintilian's warnings against excessive gesture and movement, Arbeau advises Capriole that, even though he should "make [his] steps and movements according to the tabulation which [he] has committed to memory," he should "be modest" (23). Arbeau continues with counsel to his pupil on the ways to achieve modesty:

That is to say, to dance close to the ground, to make the five steps quietly, as if you were dancing the tordion, and, further, to make a circle round the room, holding your damsel the while. . . . For, if you spring too gaily at the beginning, it would seem as if you wished to break, as the proverb says, a chitterling across your knee. (82)

In Nobilità di Dame (1600), Fabritio Caroso also employs language and ideas of a rhetorical nature to speak of courtly dance. In order to explain the term stopped step, Caroso looks to rules of writing. He tells his pupil,

The immortal poet Ovid demonstrated this [joining of the feet] well in his verse (for one calls that joining of feet a caesura), so that when scanning one of his pentameter lines we find first a dactyl, then a spondee, and finally a caesura, and here we stop a little. Now from this stopping has come the term stopped step. (102)
Echoing the detailed instruction provided in rhetoric treatises, Caroso's manual details the rules for courtly dances in meticulous detail. For example, when the disciple, as he is labeled in the dialogue, inquires about the process of beginning to dance, Caroso explains that first he must raise his right arm, remove his hat "gently by its rim," and then straighten his arm such that his hat faces his right thigh. He proceeds to ensure the dance disciple that he will clarify this "in the rule wherein [he] treat[s] of doffing one's bonnet" (95). Caroso follows through thusly:

Among those accomplishments of the utmost importance, my dear Son, which occur at the beginning of dances (wherein one practices beautiful and courtly manners), the doffing of your bonnet (or hat) holds first place, for this is the means mankind has devised to honour and revere one another, . . . . Every day we see that various styles are in fashion, both in doffing one's bonnet, or in holding it in one's hand when doffed. Some are reprehensible, however, while some are praiseworthy. . . . For if a gentleman draws his arm back with the inside of his bonnet facing either front or back, he reveals to those in front of or behind him the perspiration which normally stains the rim of a bonnet . . . . Thus whichever of these methods [one follows] presents an indecent and repulsive sight to one's beholders. For a gentleman, then, to doff his bonnet (or hat) and hold it in his hand with that utter grace and beauty which may render him elegant, he shall do best to take his bonnet (or hat) gently by its rim (or hat by its brim), doffing it and dropping his arm straight down. (96)

Like Quintilian warning students of rhetoric against excessive gesture, Caroso also
instructs avoidance of movements that will betray one’s grace and destroy a praiseworthy performance. *Nobilità di Dame* is of particular relevance to the discussion of dance and rhetoric in *Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue* because, in comparison to French dance manuals, which had taken to offering "rather obscure instructions" by the seventeenth century, "[c]ontemporary Italian material comes closest to the standard required for the masque" (Ravelhofer 2).

Despite the evidence of the rhetoric-dance link that Renaissance-era texts and scholarship provide, this connection has been neglected in early modern literary scholarship. Instead, much Renaissance dance scholarship is positioned outside of the literature and concerns issues of politics, gender, training, and elements of performance, such as choreography (including forensic investigations), music, and costuming. In this chapter, I seek to enhance the understanding of the relevance and role of dance in Renaissance literature by casting dance as a mute rhetoric that not only complements verbal rhetoric but, at times, supplants it. My reliance primarily on classical- and Renaissance-era treatises and peripheral scholarship underscores the lack of attention given to the rhetorical capacity and function of dance in literature. In order to highlight the transgeneric quality of my argument, I explore the rhetoric of dance in *Orchestra*, *Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue*, and *The Winter’s Tale*—a poem, masque, and play, respectively.

**Orchestra: A Poem of Dancing**

The subject of dance in *Orchestra* has led Davies’ modern critics to study the poem in light of the Elizabethan world picture and notions of the body politic, thus creating a body of scholarship that renders the presence of dance in the poem a vehicle for illustrating these cultural ideologies.¹ However, the encompassing presence of
dance in *Orchestra* and the provocative status of dancing in the Renaissance beg for critical consideration of Davies’ use of dance beyond the metaphorical. Approaching dance in the poem with a more literal perspective renders the poem a rhetorical text through which to apprehend the shared characteristics of dance and rhetoric and casts dance as an undeniable figure of corporeal rhetoric.

Sir John Davies borrows the trope of weaving and unwrapping from *The Odyssey*, upon which his poem is based. However, the act of weaving and unwrapping is evidenced, not in Penelope’s hands (indeed, she only speaks of her art), but rather in the rhetorical ability and intent of Antinous. Davies presents Antinous as an able rhetor who weaves a tapestry of eloquent and theoretically-sound rhetoric, which is simultaneously unwoven by the suitor-rhetor’s base goal of seducing a married queen. Contrary to my claim that Antinous ultimately fails, E. M. W. Tillyard asserts in the introduction to his 1945 edition of the poem that Davies, if he had completed the poem, would have shown Antinous to be successful in his persuasion (12). Tillyard bases his conclusion on Penelope’s reaction to the image of a perfectly ordered, dancing body politic reflected in the mirror Love gives her. Penelope is “rapt with sweet pleasure” as a result of gazing at the spectacular vision, which leads her to see that her artful endeavor to preserve her chastity, that of weaving and unwrapping, is inferior to the art of dancing and is “on a mere ignoble subject wrought” (134.3, 6-7). However, the poem closes with observation, not action, and while it is possible that Davies may have shown Penelope to dance—and possibly even with Antinous—that success cannot be directly linked to the reasoning and eloquence of the poem’s suitor-rhetor. To be sure, the rhetorical situation, as opposed to the rhetorical performance, leads to an alternative conclusion. Although the Antinous of Davies’ poem is
characterized much differently than the Antinoos of Homer’s epic, it is clear that the
goal is the same: to take advantage of the king’s absence and seduce the queen. Despite
the fact that this Antinous is neither a “slimy” (Howard 60) nor outwardly “lustful and
bullying” villain who lacks verbal prowess (Lateiner 204, 226), nor a “deplorable” or
“outspokenly brutal” man (Bowra 64), Antinous still cannot embrace rhetorical
victory—or Penelope, for that matter. While he speaks articularly and politely and is
characterized as a “fresh and jolly Knight” with “[w]it to persuade” (Davies 5.2, 5),
Antinous, through his rhetorical goal and strategy, unfortunately aligns himself with
the realm of physical pleasure, a place where chaste Penelope refuses to go. Thus, the
rhetorical stage of Orchestra, including the complex nature of Antinous’ rhetorical
agency (described above) pre-empt any possibility of persuasive triumph for Antinous
and thus dooms him from the start. In such a position, this eloquent suitor speaks in
vain to an auditor who disassociates herself from his concept of Nature and the human
body’s connection to the earthly elements—a concept upon which Antinous depends to
move his unwilling listener’s mind and body.

Although Antinous’ rhetoric fails to persuade Penelope to embrace him in a
dance of love, the dancing that the queen observes at the end of the poem
undeniably pleases her and moves her to question the virtue of her own art: the
cunning preservation of her chastity. Dancing accomplishes, then, what verbal
rhetoric could not and thus functions as a visual rhetoric quite persuasive in its
silence. This mute ethos of dance performs upon a foundation that links rhetoric and
dance throughout the poem. Davies mounts this dais by providing Antinous with an
argument for dancing that contains specific rhetorical elements and that also
describes dance in terms of rhetoric. Despite the elemental union Davies creates, the
two arts do not share in triumph. Indeed, one succumbs to the other in that, ultimately, speech/rhetoric escapes Antinous while dance persuades Penelope of its own beauty and nobility.

Tellingly, Antinous uses one form of rhetoric to argue for another form of rhetoric: speech in favor of dance. During the Renaissance, dance was commonly held up as a mute rhetoric, and in stanzas forty-three through forty-five, Love adds to this perspective. First, the god defines speech, along with breath, echoes, music, and wind, as “dancings of the air in sundry kinds” (43.7). Love then focuses on the dance of breath and speech:

For, when you breathe, the air in order moves
Now in now out, in time and measure true:
And when you speak, so well the dancing loves
That doubling oft and oft redoubling new
With thousand forms she doth herself endue:
For all the words that from your lips repair
Are nought but tricks and turnings of the air. (44)

Finally, Love asserts that even the airy remnant of speech dances and does so without prejudice, for Echo “dances to all voices she can hear. / There is not sound so harsh that she doth scorn” (45.2-3).

Further into his argument, Antinous characterizes rhetoricians as dancing masters:

And those great Masters of their liberal arts
In all their several schools do dancing teach;
For humble grammer first doth set the parts
Of congruent and well-according speech,
Which rhetoric, whose state the clouds doth reach, And heavenly poetry do forward lead,
And divers measures diversely do tread. (92)

Here, Davies provides a poetic complement to the dance-as-rhetoric discourse, including Ravelhofer’s direct comparison of the elements and practices of each art. In the stanza following, poetry is shown to possess a nature of order that is easily “marr’d if she one foot misplace” (93). With the direct reference to the poetic foot and allusion to dancing feet, Antinous creates an unswerving parallel between dance and language that allows him to place dance in the same worthy position that Renaissance society afforded rhetoric. However, Penelope will have none of it. While she is a good woman remaining still, Antinous is certainly not “a good man speaking well.” His motivation to persuade a married queen to dance with him means that he is not an “orator who is in the main concerned with the treatment of what is just and honourable” (Quintilian 13.1.357, 361). The difference between what Penelope and Antinous deem “just and honourable” creates the moral tension of the poem. Caught in the middle, dance is both celebrated and condemned—a very humanist dialectic.

This ideological division provides Davies’ work with a learned translation of the tension that Homer’s vulgar Antinoos creates. The rhetorical element of invention illustrates this change, for Davies’ Antinous looks to nature, history, and mythology to inform his argument and attempt to persuade Penelope to his will. So that she will realize the value of dancing, Antinous desires for Penelope to subvert her understanding of the Nature that formed her in favor of his understanding. Indeed, it is paramount to Antinous’ rhetorical goal that Penelope embraces his perspective.
However, the queen refuses, and what results from this refusal is an eloquent argument in favor of dance that only *theoretically* exemplifies successful Renaissance rhetoric.

In “The Power of Persuasion,” Brian Vickers asserts that the general consensus of Renaissance rhetoricians was that “language is the gift of God to man” (412-13). Thomas Wilson puts forth this perspective in the preface to *Wilson’s The Arte of Rhetoric* (1553). The preface, entitled “Eloquence first given by God, and after lost by man, and last repaired by God againe,” affirms:

... God still tendering his owne workmanshipe, stirring up his faithfull and elect, to perswade with reason all men to societie. And gave his appointed Ministers knowledge both to see the natures of men, and also graunted them the gift of utterance, that they might with ease win folke at their will, and frame them by reason to all good order.

In *The Arte of English Poesie* (1589), George Puttenham likewise proclaims that language is a divine gift:

Speach is not naturall to man saving for his onely habilitie to speake, and that he is by kinde apt to utter all his conceits with sounds and voices diversified many maner of wayes, by meanes of the many & fit instruments he hath by nature to that purpose, as a broad and voluble tongue, thin and movable lips, ... besides an excellent capacitie of wit that maketh him more disciplinable and imitative then any other creature: ... (119)

Both writers not only assert the divine nature of the gift of language but also specify the ordering and disciplinary functions of language. Before Wilson and Puttenham, however, Cicero wrote of this rhetorical power in *De Oratore*:
. . . what other power could have been strong enough either to gather scattered humanity into one place, or to lead it out of its brutish existence in the wilderness up to our present condition of civilization as men and as citizens, or, after the establishment of social communities, to give shape to laws, tribunals, and civic rights? (L.viii.33)

Indeed, language has the power to create an orderly, lawful, and disciplined society. This notion of speech as God's gift enabling man to accomplish such a society is echoed in a corporeal inflection in *Orchestra* when Antinous explains to Penelope the harmonizing power of dance, doing so by recounting the reason Love (dancing master and original civilizer) taught man to dance:

*How doth Confusions Mother, headlong Chance*

*Put Reason's noble squadron to the rout?*

*Or how should you, that have the governance*

*Of Nature's children, heaven and earth throughout,*

*Prescribe them rules and live yourselves without?*

*Why should your fellowship a trouble be,*

*Since man's chief pleasure is society?* (32)

The above examples reveal that speech and dance are necessary for the shaping of a harmonious society, but before these gifts were bestowed upon man, “all things waxed savage, the earth untilled, societie neglected, Gods will not knowne, man against man, one against an other, and all against order” (Wilson, np). Puttenham concurs,

For it is written, that Poesie was th’originall cause and occasion of [man’s] first assemblies, when before the people remained in the woods
and mountains, vagrant and dispersed like the wild beasts, lawlesse and
naked, or verie ill clad, and of all good and necessarie provision for
harbor or sustenance utterly unfurnished: so as they little diffred for
their maner of life, from the very brute beasts of the field. (3-4)

Rhetorical treatises were not the only source for this didactic information, for in The
Pastime of Pleasure, Hawes observes,

Before the lawe, in a tumbling barge The
people sayled, without parfitnes,

Through the worlde all about at large;
They hadde none ordre nor no stedfastnes,

Tyll rethoricians founde justyce doubtless,
Ordeynynge kynges, of right hye dygnite,

Of all comyns to have the soverainte. (X.36)²

Davies also presents a vision of the savage man that existed before dance civilized
him. He writes that Love, after shaping the world,

A rude disorder’d rout he did espie

Of men and women, that most spitefully

Did one another throng and crowd so sore,

That his kind eye in pitty wept therefore. (29.4-7).

In both situations (the attainment of rhetorical and dancing ability), the supreme creator
realizes that a “civilizing force” given by a divine power and performed by humanity is
essential to humanity’s survival as a harmonious and productive entity (Vickers 414).

In Orchestra, Antinous speaks of this “civilizing force” of dance in order to
convince Penelope to dance with him. Certainly, as a suitor relying on his rhetorical
charms to persuade his royal and married auditor, Antinous must wholly prove that
dancing is a natural, noble, and virtuous activity. In an attempt to accomplish this feat,
Antinous follows certain rules of rhetoric when he speaks about dancing. First,
Antinous, in an Elyotean rhetorical maneuver, establishes the validity of dancing
through a discussion of dancing’s primal beginnings, indeed relies upon its history, to
prove that dance has an indelible place in human life:

Dancing, bright lady, then began to be,
  When the first seeds whereof the world did spring,
  The fire air earth and water, did agree
  By Love’s persuasion, nature’s mighty king,
  To leave their first disordered combating
  And in a dance such measure to observe,
  As all the world their motion should preserve. (17)

Stanzas seventy-six through ninety-six present the same notion, and this delayed
amplification of an idea shows Davies’ use of the rhetorical figure prolepsis (Manning
178). Following a common rhetorical strategy, Antinous develops his prolepsis with
mythological references. For instance, the Graces “hand in hand” dance “an endless
round;” thus, “there be no disgrace amongst them found” (75.2, 4). Further,
Musaeus, Amphion, Linus, and Theseus3 “[u]s’d dancing as the finest policy / To
plant religion and society” (79). The references to mythology help provide rhetorical
value to Antinous’ seduction attempt.

The above examples illustrate the idea proffered by Elyot and Wilson that man
should heed events and ideas from the past. Notably in The Boke Named the Governour
(1531), Elyot, writing of prudence, advises, “[a]nd therefore who advisedly beholdeth
the astate of mannes life, shall well perceive that all that ever was spoken or writen,
was to be by experience executed” (264). Furthermore, Wilson asserts that “. . .men are
in many things weak by Nature, and subject to much infirmitie,” yet man transcends
“all other creatures living” in his abilities of speech and reason (np). Thus, due to these
abilities, man can learn and profit from the past by using his gift of reason and can
disseminate these lessons through his gift of speech. Indeed, learning from the past and
using the gift of speech to teach history and its lessons enable humanity to grow and
place humanity in a superior position in the universe. Knowledge of history, it was
perceived, allowed for the maintaining of a productive and orderly society. Hence,
Davies’ incorporation of the history of dancing, albeit in mythological terms, is
one element that reveals Orchestra is more than A Poem of Dancing, as the
subtitle indicates. Instead, Orchestra is a text that, through its historical
exploration and persuasive intent, stands as a technically-sound representation of
Renaissance rhetoric.

Another Renaissance maxim of successful rhetoric is that rhetoric should
express one’s mind. Vickers puts forth this idea when he speaks of the psychological
function of rhetoric. He asserts, “Renaissance theorists held that rhetoric’s primary
purpose was to express thought or reveal the mind” (417). This mirror into the mind
can be achieved also through dancing. Davies illustrates this through Antinous’ lesson
concerning the dancing instruction that Love gave to original man. Love organized his
instruction according to the various states of man and began with “rounds and winding
hays to tread,” which were appropriate dances for those whom Love had just
“marshalled” (64.3.1). Love's instruction progressed to a serious lesson when, after
learning the rounds and hays, “men more civil grew;” thus, Love deemed it appropriate
to “... more grave and solemn measures frame; / With such faire order and proportion true” (65.1-3). Such order in movement reflects the progression of man to a civilized state. For instance, the rounds and hays reflect a social capability, as these dances form circles and patterns achieved through the cooperation of many, while the measures reveal a burgeoning sophistication of mankind. Once society and mental sophistication were achieved, Love, according to Antinous’ history lesson, saw the need for pleasure and thus invented the Galliard, a “swift and wand’ring dance” that, like rhetoric, possesses a “spirit and a virtue masculine” (67.2, 68.2); Corantos, “with best order can all orders shun” but requiring the dancer to “. . . turn and wind with unexpected change” (69.5,7); and the Lavolta, a “lofty jumping, or leaping round, / When arm in arm two Dancers are entwin’d” (70.2-3). Through his cataloguing of dances, Antinous not only proves the relevance of dance to humanity but also showcases his oratorical skill. However, this rhetorical maneuver still fails to move Penelope to participate.

This history provided Davies' audience with a familiar description of Elizabethan dance, as both courtly and country dances were popular during this period (Howard 46). However, the popularity of country dances did not mean that all aristocracy found this style of dancing acceptable. In The Politics of Courtly Dancing, Skiles Howard delineates the Renaissance controversy over dancing, which she defines as “a battle-line in various social struggles” (46). Howard explains that “. . . dancing signified in many ways, and therefore might be mobilized to promise control or threaten license, to confirm agency or enforce dependence, to consolidate or contest power” (46). In light of the social power of and moral debate over dance, Penelope's refusal to dance with Antinous can be understood as a critique against this pervasive entertainment that was deemed immoral by some, while winning its best performers
royal favors in the court of Elizabeth I (Ravelhofer 108). Much to Penelope's distaste, Antinous is well-versed in this activity. Penelope seems to possess an awareness of the inherent erotic nature of dance, despite the modesty that would characterize her part (downcast eyes; smaller, lower, and delicate steps), because, simply put, dance is “about the body” (Mirabella 426). Thus, Antinous’ knowledge forms a theoretical rhetorical success but results in a practical persuasive failure.

To support the parallel between dance and rhetoric, Vickers' understanding of the Renaissance perspective of rhetoric is useful here. Vickers explains that rhetoric was “a means to body forth thought. . .often as a simple dichotomy between the inward and outward man” (417). Certainly then, Love, according to Antinous’ narration, bettered human existence by teaching humanity to “body forth” its essence, indeed to communicate its civility and morality through corporeal means. Hawes, Wilson, and Puttenham address this psychological function of rhetoric. First, Hawes speaks of crude people who have corrupt minds to express:

Suche is theyr mynde, such is theyr folyshnes;
For they beleve in no maner of wyse
That under a colour a trouth may aryse.
For folysh people, blynded in a matter,
Will often erre whan they of it do clatter. (IX.32)

Wilson makes reference to the “inward and outward man” in his instruction concerning orators. He advises, “The tongue is ordeined to express the minde, that one may understand an others meaning. . .” (2). Thirty years later, Puttenham concurs:

And because this continuall course and manner of writing or speech sheweth the matter and disposition of the writers minde, more than one
or few words or sentences can shew, therefore there be that have called stile, the image of man... for man is but his minde, and as his minde is tempered and qualified, so are his speeches and language at large, and his inward conceits be the mettall of his minde... (123-24)

That dance shared a connection with rhetoric was a commonplace idea in the Renaissance, and what helped forge this connection is the understanding that dance allowed the body to express one’s mind.

Sarah Thesiger attends to this notion of the internal being exhibited through external presentation in her study of stanza eighty-two, which attributes the gender-shifting ability of Caeneus to dancing:

He the man’s part in measure did sustaine;
But, when he chang’d into a second straine,
He danc’d the woman’s part another space
And then return’d unto his former place. (4-7)

This stanza illustrates the truth that “each sex has his or her own place,” which is “closely linked with their own inner harmony or proportion of spirit and soul” (Thesiger 304). Gender is, to be sure, a significant factor in the Renaissance notion of dance. For instance, Elyot instructs that “the meuing of the man wolde be more vehement, of the woman more delicate and with lasse aduauncing of the body, signifieng the courage and strenthe that oughte to be in a man, and the pleasant sobrenesse that shulde be in a woman” (237-38). Elyot's use of the didactic ought and should emphasizes that this humanist's work on dance is to argue not for a dance aesthetic but for a dance morality that reinforces accepted expectations of gender. Ania Loomba provides a modern response to this morality in Gender, Race, Renaissance Drama (Cultural Politics):
“Patriarchal thought incorporates the possibility of female movement in order to control it, investing the woman's stability with moral values. . . . The good woman is still” (74). This is the context through which we understand Penelope's refusal to dance; her status as a married queen demands it, and patriarchal culture expects it. Yet, female dancing is not wholly condemned in the Renaissance. The belief courtesy books and dance treatises espouse is that courtly dancing, uniquely performed by men and women, serves virtue. Elyot describes dancing as that which creates and displays virtue in its combining of strong male and gentle female characteristics:

And in this wise fierenesse joyned with mildenesse maketh Seueritie;
Audacitie with timerositie maketh Magnanimity; willfull opinion and Tractabilitie (which is to be shortly persuaded and meued) maketh
Constance a vertue; Couairtise of Glorie, adourned with benignitie causeth honour; desire of knowlege with sure remembrance procureth Sapience; Shamfastnes joyned to Appetite of generation maketh Continence, whiche is a meane betwene Chastitie and inordinate luste.

These qualities, in this wise beinge knitte to gether, and signified in the personages of man and woman daunsinge, do expresse or sette out the figure of very nobilitie; whiche in the higher astate it is contained, the more excellent is the vertue in estimation. (238)

Further on the morality of dance, Elyot proclaims, “Wherefore allthey that haue their courage stered towardve very honour or perfecte nobilitie, let them approche to this passe tyme, . . .” (241). Likewise, Thoinot Arbeau honors dance as a performance of civility by calling it an art as opposed to a pastime. The pupil in Orchesography demands of his dance master to “[s]et these things down in writing to enable [him] to
learn this art” (15), and Arbeau asserts that dancing “becomes an essential in a well-ordered society” (12).

Combining these ideas in *The Dancing Body in Renaissance Choreography*, dance scholar Mark Franko concludes the following: “Dancing is that formalization of the civil act which makes the act no longer an index of manners but a predictable [of manners]. One might say that the dance in the Renaissance transforms conventional properties into essential ones” (34). Further addressing dance and civility, Franko cites an early-twentieth-century dance scholar:

“It seems,” writes John Shikowski, “that at that time [the Renaissance] one didn’t take pleasure in dancing, as if one didn’t want to express one's feelings and moods in the release of animated rhythmic body movement. The end of the dance was rather directed to the exhibition of one's own person. The effort of he who danced was to show dignity, gracefulness, and the exact knowledge of rules of decorum and propriety.” (qtd. in Franko 33)

While Shikowski asserts that there was no pleasure sought in dancing, Howard observes that physical pleasure was indeed a concern but a secondary one “to defenders and critics alike” (47), and in *Orchestra* Antinous proclaims that the need for pleasure compelled Love to invent particular dances, previously outlined (stanzas 67, 69, 70). Dance as a moving emblem of civility, however, enjoys a more consistent place in discourses on dance. Looking to Renaissance defenders of the art/pastime, Franko, throughout his discussion of civility and dance, calls dance “coded language,” a term that encompasses the notions that Renaissance expectations of gender governed dance movement and that dance was recognized as a form of communication. For Antinous,
this “coded language” speaks clearly of order and virtue, while for Penelope it clatters (to use Hawes’ term) of immorality, despite the fact that Antinous has sufficient historical and textual thread to weave his argument to the contrary. It may be that the unquestionable link Antinous establishes between dance and pleasure alarms Penelope and consequently works to unweave his argument.

Early in the poem, the speaker establishes Antinous’ connection to the sensual realm:

Only Antinous, when at first he view’d
Her star-bright eyes, that with new honour shin’d,
Was not dismay’d; but therewithal renew’d
The noblesse and the splendour of his mind;
And, as he did fit circumstances find,
Unto the throne he boldly ‘gan advance,
And with faire manners wooed the queen to dance: (11)

It is clear in this stanza that Penelope’s beauty compels Antinous to approach her quite boldly and functions as the force that enables him to form his argument quite eloquently. At this point, Penelope’s beauty has accomplished what rhetoric should: to move one’s affections, influence one’s judgment, and thus compel one to action. Speaking so intensely to Antinous, Penelope’s beauty creates an effect that clearly aligns Antinous with the sensual realm. R. J. Manning supports this thought in his assertion that “Antinous occupies the lowest rung on the Platonic scala” (188). No matter what hierarchical taxonomy one uses to distinguish Antinous from Penelope (Great Chain of Being or Platonic scala), the fact is that Antinous does not occupy a moral position that allows him to move Penelope’s mind and thus penetrate her sense
of virtue.

Strongly associated with the realm of the senses, Antinous exists, as dictated by The Great Chain of Being, in a position below Penelope, who is associated with Reason and the heavenly realm of the soul. Like the “fixity of each link ensures the stability of the chain” (Loomba 74), Penelope’s steadfastness ensures the stability of the hierarchical body politic that the Great Chain of Being governs. While Penelope may have been ultimately convinced that dancing, at least court dancing, is a virtuous pastime, the poem provides no textual foundation upon which to conclude absolutely that Davies would have shown Penelope agree to dance with Antinous, whose goal is to move not just her mind but also her body. Shielding herself against Antinous’ rhetorical arrows, Penelope establishes her association with the spiritual and the realm of reason:

What eye doth see the heaven, but doth admire
When it the movings of the heavens doth see?
Myself, if I to heaven may once aspire,
If that be dancing, will a dancer be;
But as for this, your frantic jollity,
How it began, or whence you did it learn,
I never could with reason’s eye discern. (26)

The suitor-rhetor’s first attempt in persuading Penelope to dance does include the heavens, however only for the purpose of complimenting Penelope’s physical beauty. Antinous insists that if Penelope were to dance, her “glorious ornaments” would prove “a sight more pleasing to behold” than the “gems in heaven above” (13.2, 6, 5) This praise certainly does not strengthen Antinous’ position with regard to Penelope, for, in his assertion that Penelope’s physical beauty could rise above heavenly beauty if she
danced, Antinous succeeds in positioning the physical above the heavenly—a faulty hierarchy in light of Penelope’s social and moral status as a virtuous queen.

Accordingly, Penelope responds,

Fair sir, you needs must fairly be denied,
Where your demand cannot be satisfied.
My feet, which only nature taught to go,
Did never yet the art of footing know. (14.4-7)

In this stanza, Penelope asserts her idea of Nature by claiming that the Nature that formed her did not equip her with the means to perform such movement, as Antinous suggests. Consequently, Penelope claims for herself a formative Nature different from that of Antinous—a Nature that, in forming the queen, elevated her above such human function. To further distance herself from the realm of pleasure, Penelope claims that what Antinous proposes is not a part of human history but is rather a modern barbarity:

But why persuade you me to this new
rage? For all disorder and misrule is new,
For such misgovernment in former age
Our old divine forefathers never knew;
Who if they liv’d and did the follies view,
Which their fond nephews make their chief affairs,
Would hate themselves, that had begot such heirs. (15)

Penelope’s refusal and disparagement of dancing does not discourage Antinous.

Indeed, her beauty has “. . . renew’d / The noblesse and splendour of his mind” (11.3-4). As a result, Antinous is unaffected by her words. As seen in stanza sixteen,
Antinous maintains his position on dancing in terms of her beauty: “Whence cometh it, Antinous replies, / That your imperious virtue is so loth / To grant your beauty her chief exercise?” (2-4). These lines characterize Penelope’s virtue as an impediment to her realization of her beauty’s potential, and since dancing would bring forth the full glory of her beauty, Penelope’s virtue is also an impediment to Antinous’ persuasive intention. The above lines bear out the conclusion of R. J. Manning that eloquence disguises Antinous’ Machiavellian opportunism (193). To convince Penelope of this boon that dancing can provide for her beauty, Antinous eloquently proclaims,

Let me the mover be, to turn about
Those glorious ornaments that youth and love
Have fixed in you, every part throughout;
Which if you will in timely measure move,
Not all those precious gems in heaven above
Shall yield a sight more pleasing to behold,
With all their turns and tracings manifold. (13)

Such eloquence is evident throughout the poem, but it ultimately yields no pleasure or reward for Antinous. As the unmovable auditor, Penelope may very well be, David Norbrook observes, the type of auditor defined by Davies’ contemporary John Hoskyns as one who “may take pleasure in [rhetors’] ingenuity but will not necessarily be impressed by the reasoning” (149).

Like any skilled Renaissance rhetor, as Davies recasts Homer’s character, Antinous sets out to prove the validity of his position on dancing via eloquent speech and lengthy, detailed examples. The concern, however, lies in the source of his details being the earthly realm, which automatically places his rhetoric beneath
Penelope’s own silent rhetoric of refusal: her virtue (why would she be moved to corrupt her virtue simply to dance with this voluptuary man?). In his argument, Antinous first describes the dancing of the elements—not of the heavens—to illustrate the power of dancing. Stanza seventeen provides the first example of this in its illustration of fire, air, earth, and water agreeing to observe “such measure” in order to eliminate their primal “disorder’d combating” (17.3, 5-6). Antinous follows this description with a comment on elemental change. He asserts that, in their dancing, the elements change places with each other, yet in this movement, fire, air, earth, and water do not invade each other’s space: “Yet do they neither mingle nor confound / But every one doth keep the bounded space / Wherein the dance doth bid it turn or trace” (18.3-5). These lines speak to the rhetorical situation in terms of power.

As an opponent of dancing, Penelope claims for herself a position on a moral plane higher than the one Antinous occupies. However, through his talk of the elemental dance, Antinous reveals that positions change in dancing, yet boundaries are not crossed. Through metaphor, he assures Penelope that her virtue will not be consumed by his desire for physical pleasure. Rather, it will simply move a bit. With this cosmic illustration, Antinous implies that Penelope can agree to dance without disturbing her virtue, in the same way that the elements change positions in their dancing without corrupting each other. The dilemma, however, is that dance determines the boundaries, as stanza eighteen reveals: “Wherein the dance doth bid it turn or trace” (5). Ultimately, then, dance would determine Penelope’s boundaries, which would in turn leave her virtue vulnerable to the effects and implications of this earthly pleasure.

To further emphasize his alignment with the physical, Antinous not only begins
his list of dancers with the elements of the earth but also illustrates their dancing in corporeal terms and in the voice of Love, a strategy that functions to maintain Antinous’ base position in relation to Penelope. In the same way that dancing can claim a spiritual and an earthly dancing round, so can Love claim a spiritual and an earthly heart. From Antinous’ position, Love speaks as a proponent of physical love, which is made clear when Antinous recites Love’s speech for Penelope, in which Love claims that he is man’s “senses’ master” (48.7). This speech encouraging men to dance illustrates with the use of bodily imagery the dancing of nature. Indeed, the earth has a waist, which the sea clasps “like a girdle” (49.2). The sea “kisses” the earth and reveals “his courtly love” by embracing her (50.3, 5). Continuing the list of examples and the emphasis on the sensual, Love, as Antinous recounts, describes the flowers, which “wave their tender bodies here and there” and, following the will of the music, kiss each other (55.5, 7). The description even penetrates this metaphorical body when Love describes the dancing rivers as “blue veins that through her body spread” (52.1). Here, Antinous alludes to the dance that takes place inside the human body, the desired result of which is Penelope’s enlightenment to and understanding of the dance that Nature choreographed within her. If Penelope embraces this knowledge, she will, to follow Antinous’ line of reasoning, come to the realization that their dancing together would serve to reflect and honor Nature and universal harmony.

To end Love’s speech, Antinous observes that man must imitate the stars in their cosmic dance, since “… pale death [their] vital twist shall sever, / [Their] better parts must dance with [the stars] forever” (60. 6-7). This connection that dancing manifests between man and the heavens moves the focus from the sensual to the celestial, yet Antinous does not stop there. Instead, he turns his argument to Love,
characterizing this god as the dancing master of mankind, a shift that brings his defense back down to the earthly realm. In his attempt to sway Penelope to dance, Antinous details Love’s choreographic history: “He taught them rounds and winding hays to tread” and led them in “solemn measures,” galliards that are “lofty” and require “lusty” music, “triple dactyl” corantos, and “lofty” anapestic lavolatas (64-65, 68-70). The descriptions of the dances speak to the emphasis that Antinous places on the body, making Antinous, in Penelope’s noble and virtuous perspective, a rhetor of base principle. As Kenneth Atchity characterizes her, Homer’s Penelope possesses a love for Odysseus that is intellectual and symbolic and not physical or sexual (3). As such, it can be assumed, since Orchestra contains no mention of change from Homer’s Penelope, that love for Davies’ Penelope exists on the same Platonic height.

Antinous’ success as a rhetor is further hindered by the fact that Penelope wishes to remain virtuously occupied in her waiting for Odysseus. Therefore, the wooer’s rhetoric of the body and his lauding of the sensual can be viewed as an assault against Penelope’s virtue. The rhetorical weapons Antinous wields, corporeal imagery and an emphasis on Love as the creator of dance, render his persuasive attempt more than a request for a dance. Instead, it is an argument for a physical declaration of love. This interpretation is strengthened by the sixteenth-century perception of dance, as explained by Thesiger: “In the sixteenth century, dancing, as seen in literature, came to be connected with the idea of marriage, both as a symbol and as a social force, just as it had been, and indeed remained, a symbol for, and a force towards, unmarried love” (280). She concludes that this disparate symbolism of dance created a divided attitude: “Dancing is good if you see it as leading to marriage, and bad if you see it leading to unmarried love or lust . . .” (280). This split stance grounds the posturing of Antinous
and Penelope. Whether Antinous’ goal for dancing is marriage or lustful satisfaction, Penelope’s goal is to maintain her virtue. Hence, Penelope speaks against dancing because neither end to dancing is an option for her. Penelope’s sensibilities lead her to perceive dancing, neither as a performance of civility and virtue, nor as a shadow of celestial order, but as the leaps and turns of immorality and disorder.

In order to present a valid performance of either rhetoric or dance, form is required. Stephen Hawes asserts as much in *The Pastime of Pleasure*: “[w]ythout ordre, without reason we clatter” (X.35). To be sure, speech without form would not please the listener’s ears and would, in turn, fail to move the listener. Certainly, Antinous’ speech is orderly and eloquent, yet it does not please Penelope because, through his orderly and eloquent performance, Antinous bears out his dishonorable intention in intricate detail. As a consequence, rhetoric fails to unarm Penelope, and the eloquent suitor-rhetor finally admits rhetorical defeat:

But if these eyes of yours (lodestars of love
Showing the world’s great dance to your mind’s
eye) Cannot with all their demonstrations move
Kind apprehension in your fantasy
Of dancing’s virtue and nobility,
How can my barbarous tongue win you thereto
Which heaven and earth’s fair speech could never do? (117)

The unbalanced rhythm in and overall rhetorical weakness of this passage accentuates its defeatist content. The passage opens in a slightly plodding rhythm, owing to the parenthetical clause, which slows one’s reading and contains a medial choppiness. As a whole, this passage lacks the rhetorical energy felt and eloquence heard in the rest of
the poem. Such mirroring of form and content gives representative form to language and representative language to form, thus contributing to the trope of dance as rhetoric that is developed through language and image in the poem. Despite his admission of defeat, Antinous refuses to give up completely and invokes “[his] king,” Love, to “[e]nd that persuasion which [he] erst began” (118.1, 5). Antinous is certain that Love, being the creator of dance, can move Penelope’s thoughts to the “virtue and nobility” of this civilizing art.

When Love arrives to assist Antinous, He comes equipped with his own rhetorical tool: a mirror that reflects “[t]he richest work in nature’s treasury” (120.5). The silence of Antinous and the spectacle reflected in Love’s mirror move Orchestra from the rigorous strategies of verbal rhetoric to the easy eloquence of visual rhetoric. Upon viewing this sight, Penelope is “stroken dumb with wonder quite,” and her “ravish’d mind” continues to dwell “in heavenly thoughts” (122.4, 6). At this point, the spectacle has not yet moved the chaste queen’s passions nor her reason to embrace Antinous’ argument for dancing. In fact, the vision in Love’s mirror causes Penelope to respond, not with submissive words or movement, but with transcendent thought:

Her winged thoughts bore up her mind so high

As that she ween’d she saw the glorious throne

Where the bright moon doth sit in majesty.

A thousand sparkling stars about her shone. (124. 1-4)

This response to the image of dancing reflects the transcendence that the Renaissance courtier, as a learned orator, experiences through his practice and teaching of rhetoric, a transcendence that Wayne A. Rebhorn terms “Neoplatonic ecstasy” (254). Davies completes this stanza by praising Penelope’s beauty in such a way that raises it to the
celestial realm:

But she herself did sparkle more alone

Than all those thousand beauties would have done

If they had been confounded all in one. (124.5-7)

This description of the queen’s beauty bears witness to the Renaissance understanding that motion, in Hobbesian terms, presses upon one’s senses a sensual and corporeal experience that pulls one toward the ideas embodied in the experience (Skantze 21). After witnessing a corporeal form of rhetoric, Penelope is obviously moved. Davies' description of her “wondrous thought,” this observation of an observation, further emphasizes the now privileged role of visual rhetoric in the poem (126.1).

Silence prevails, as rhetoric for Antinous proves useless and speech for Penelope is impossible, as the dancing has so fully captivated her. Even the poet himself wants for sufficient language to describe “this heavenly state” brought on by the corporeal eloquence:

O that I had Homer's abundant vein;

I would hereof another Ilias make;

Or else the man of Mantua's charmed brain,

In whose large throat great Jove the thunder spake.

O that I could old Geoffrey's muse awake

Or borrow Colin's fair heroic style

Or smooth my rhymes with Delia's servant's file. (128)

Davies laments his verbal deficiency in three more stanzas and then indicates below stanza 131, “Here are wanting some stanzas describing / Queen Elizabeth / Then follow
these.” Pressing ahead with his poetic invention, Davies describes the corporeal and mental reactions Penelope has to the vision of her dancing court. Laying aside her “brighter dazzling beams of majesty,” Penelope, “[w]ith gracious cheerful and familiar eye,” smiles upon the courtly revels (132.1, 3-4). Where Antinous fails, “[Penelope’s] barons brave and ladies fair” succeed (133.1). With their coupled measures of reverence to the queen, the court dancers move Penelope to rapture until she

Ween’d she beheld the true proportion plain
Of her own web weav’d and unweav’d again;
But that her art was somewhat less, she thought,
And on a mere ignoble subject wrought. (134.4-7)

When this “[b]eauty itself out of itself did weave” (135.2), Penelope sees in the linked paces of the dancers a corporeal figure of her looming art that opens her eyes and reason to the interconnectedness between it and dance and to its value in relation to dance. Penelope now understands that all does indeed move as in a dance and that her own dance of thread holds less value than the one she looks upon, as the former apparently has never raised her to “Neoplatonic ecstasy.” Davies’ phrase “the true proportion plain” articulates the queen's sensual awareness as well as her intellectual understanding of the spectacle (4). Because the poem ends without showing Penelope agreeing to dance with Antinous and because Penelope shows her admiration for dancing only after witnessing it, I argue that rhetoric fails Antinous. Ultimately, dancing itself proves the victorious persuader.

Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue

The rivalry between spectacle and rhetoric takes a foothold also in the world
of literary production. While this tension in *Orchestra* is fully evident through traditional textual analysis, the same conflict in *Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue* (1618) benefits from the added methodology of contextual analysis, as the aesthetic sensibility of its author regarding the masque genre (poetry versus spectacle/art, eye versus ear) is commonly cited in Jonsonian scholarship and addressed in poetry and prose by Jonson himself, thus setting a precedent for the author-centered approach used here.7 The competition between spectacle and rhetoric/poetry does not play out within the plot of *Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue* as it does in *Orchestra*. Instead, it occurs within the performance of a masque that dramatizes a different tension. To clarify, while Davies employs a spokesperson for dance, one whose words comprise the majority of the text of the poem, and devotes very little text to the described spectacle, Jonson makes use of a dancing master whose songs speak of the rhetorical capacity of dance, thereby narrating the movements of the dancers and effectively translating lyric into performed dance. The fact that the auditors of Jonson’s poetry-rhetoric and the observers of the dancing are an external audience and not characters in the masque further validates the attention afforded Jonson himself in the study of his masque, as he had strong opinions about the role of his audience in the performance of his texts. Generally speaking, however, the exploration of the connection between dance and rhetoric in *Pleasure* and *Orchestra* bear similarity in their illustrations of dance in rhetorical terms and in their uses of dance. In both works, dance corporealizes rhetoric. Although such corporealization is accomplished quite subtly in *Orchestra*, it is achieved in a more obvious manner by way of the narration of dance steps in *Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue*.

Although seventeenth-century masques combined poetry and image, “most of
a masque,” as Orgel and Strong point out, “was not literature” (1). Although Jonson defines poetry and the visual arts in terms of each other, he contends that poetry is ultimately superior: “[y]et of the two, the pen is more noble than the pencil; for that can speak to the understanding, the other but to the sense” (34). This hierarchy concerns value of effect on the audience/observer, as poetry appeals to reason and the mind, and picture provides carnal delight. The reality of masque performances was the bane of Jonson, in that the elements of the spectacle “could consume much of the night in a production whose text lasted barely an hour” (Orgel and Strong 1). Jonson’s poetry, then, was inferior performance-wise to the design, music, and choreography created for the masque. Despite this disparity (upon which the well-known quarrel between Jonson and Inigo Jones is based), the poet recognized the importance of the visual, which reflected the truth for Renaissance artists that “verbal statements and visual representations” possessed unquestionable relation (Orgel and Strong 1).

Jonson’s belief in the communicative power of both the verbal and the visual reveals his Neo-Platonic view in regard to the presentation of truth—the primary goal of his endeavors in masque writing. In the context of poetry and picture in masques, dance can be perceived as a living, flesh-and-bone visual art with similar and certain communicative power. Jonson seems to convey this truth about dance in Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue when he constructs two songs for Daedalus in such a way that image, movement, communication, and audience are all engaged to form a rhetorical performance in which pleasure and virtue create the heart of the matter.

As a major author of masques, Ben Jonson writes in Timber or Discoveries that “[t]he poet is the nearest borderer upon the orator, and expresseth all his virtues, though he be more tied to numbers: is equal in ornament and above him in his
strengths” (88). Jonson illustrates the parallel between orator and poet through the character of Daedalus, the dancing master who, very poetically, guides the dancers to clearly communicate the message of balancing pleasure and virtue in one’s life. It is this character and Jonson’s notion of the poet as rhetor that makes *Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue* an invaluable text through which to study dance as a rhetorical tool in the socially- and politically-charged courtly entertainment that is the masque.

As an art form of social and political import, the court masque is the ideal medium through which to create a rhetorical body. Moreover, Jonson's belief in the poet-as-orator, as noted earlier, as well as his use of Daedalus in *Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue* as such a figure and as a dancing master confirms the dancing body as a rhetorical body. *Pleasure* has as its occasion the Twelfth Night masque of Prince Charles, but the masque is also Jonson's poetic "attempt to reform the morals of the court" (Riggs 250). This moral design reflects the classical aspiration of rhetorical performance: to be an ethical man speaking persuasively to ethical ends. Success with this would have surely created permanence for the rhetoric and its teachings, a value that Jonson expected of his masques, as Enid Welsford notes. Welsford defines Jonson's goal for the poetry-rhetoric of his masques:

Ben Jonson, finding in poetry the only principle of permanence, aimed at giving to the masque an esoteric as well as an exoteric character. His composition was to be at one and the same time a poetic libretto suitable to the occasion and a dramatic poem independent of its accompaniments of dancing and scenery, and capable of surviving the Court performance for which it was primarily intended. The other arts in fact were the
mortal body of the masque, but poetry was its immortal soul. (251)

This expectation of poetry speaks to the seventeenth-century theory of the divisions of the mind (outlined in the introduction), in that an art form with such permanence would, or was intended to, appeal to the highest mind (the reasonable). A moral in the poetry was to be understood, learned, and internalized.

_Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue_ is a masque with such intentions, with such a concern for the minds of its spectators. To be sure, Jonson had very specific ideas about audiences and how writers should communicate with them. In "Essays" from _Timber or Discoveries_, Jonson outlines the diverse types of wits, and it is the

... juster men, [who] will acknowledge the virtues of his studies, his wisdom in dividing, his subtlety in arguing; with what strength he doth inspire his readers, with what sweetness he strikes them; in inveighing, what sharpness; in jest, what urbanity he uses: how he doth reign in men's affections, how invade and break in upon them, and makes their minds like the thing he writes. (24)

Before focusing on the audience factor in this passage, it is essential to point out that Jonson's description of "juster men" in the above passage helps to further exemplify the rhetoric-dance correlation. Jonson accomplishes two things in this passage: (1) he describes the rhetorical process by using the words _dividing, arguing, and inspiring_ and by implying an act of persuasion, and (2) he connects language and physicality by speaking of the success of rhetoric in physical terms: _strikes, invade, and break_.

Concerning the audience, Gabriele Bernhard Jackson explains that the observer was not an afterthought for Jonson. She explains that Jonson believed observers possessed the faculty of "moral and aesthetic responsiveness" (2). Also, Jonson was of the mind that
his audience, in possession of its own "ethical and aesthetic vision," was able to understand the vision presented and judge the characters and performers. Furthermore, the audience possessed the power to recognize the vision as it may have applied to themselves and thus "judge [their] own behavior against the perceived vision" (3). Since the perfect poet for Jonson, as Jackson points out, was one who was both "visionary and judge," both the creator of imitations of human truths and the illustrator of human faults (2), the above description of an audience as Jonson perceived it places the audience in an active position, one that reciprocates the position of the poet-orator.

While a give-and-take relationship seems to be created here, Jonson blamed the ineptness of his audience when his goal to "at once shame and inspire [the microcosm's] beholders" failed. Such a failure proved to Jonson the inability of his audience "to perceive truth," which he strove to make clear "by the best efforts of art" (Jackson 51). To Jonson, his "best efforts" were infallible; hence, Jonson assigns an inferior position to his audience in relation to the poet, despite the fact that he assigns the ability of vision and judgment to both. For Jonson, the faculties of the audience, not of the poet, are vulnerable to ineptness. Summarily, the audience plays an active role in the performances it witnesses, a fact that Jonson incorporates into the text of Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue. A direct reference to the observers of the masque occurs at an active place in the performance, which also contains language of the rhetorical arts. Thus, the first two songs of Daedalus encompass a link between dance and rhetoric by speaking of dance in communicative terms and by presenting a dance that speaks, through figures, of the moral dilemma contained in the masque: reconciling pleasure with virtue.

Before the dancing begins, Hercules questions Mercury about the presence of
Daedalus as the leader of the dancers who have descended from the "hill / Of skill" (lines 189-90). In response, Mercury characterizes him as "[a] guide that gives them laws / To all their motions: Daedalus the wise" (194-95). Acting as the dancing master, Daedalus provides arrangement (rhetorical dispositio) to the movements of the dancers so as to create a measured dance and thus render an orderly piece of corporeal rhetoric. Through this description, Mercury speaks of dance as an art of the body and mind, as is rhetoric when one considers actio. Jonson's hailing of Mercury as "the president of language" fortifies the relationship between dance and rhetoric in the masque (Timber 41). Indeed, Mercury brings Daedalus—personified language and dance, respectively—to Hercules in order to aid him in the task of reconciling pleasure and virtue.

In his first song, Daedalus urges his dancers to weave their steps together so perfectly that "ev'n the observer scarce may know / Which lines are Pleasure's and which not" (200-02). While the goal of an orator is clarity, scarcely knowing on the part of the observer in this performance reveals success since the weaving of a "curious knot" (200) is the goal of Daedalus' corporeal composition. Just as an orator looks to the "subject matter and imagery available to the age" in order to achieve inventio, Daedalus' dancers must do the same (Jensen 51). Because the task of the dancers is to speak of pleasure and virtue through movement, the subject matter to which they must turn is "all actions of mankind" (Pleasure 207). These human actions are accurately represented in the labyrinthine choreography, for the maze structure figures the entanglements of and potential dangers in life (Greene 1459). In doing so, the maze constructs the meandering coexistence of pleasure and virtue. Daedalus directs, "so let your dances be entwined" (209), a direction that is complicated by the simultaneous need for the dance to be simple
enough to be understood by the spectators yet complex enough to reflect life’s complications (Ravelhofer 246). If the dancers fail at achieving this choreographic feat, then they fail to achieve *dispositio*. Furthering this rhetorical perspective, Barbara Ravelhofer notes that a performance failure would result in the dancers’ failure to convey the “self-explanatory potential” of the dance (Ravelhofer 246).

Despite the necessity for entanglement, limitation of it is required, and Daedalus commands such when he warns the dancers not to "perplex men unto gaze" with their visually deceptive dance (210). This warning recalls Quintilian’s instruction against "staginess" and exaggeration of expression and gesture (I.xi.1-3). Such fear of causing observers to behold the dance in a trance-like nature speaks to the dance-rhetoric parallel. To be sure, if the dancers put the observers in such a state, they will be incapable of comprehending the poetry-rhetoric of the spectacle.

As the dancing master in *Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue*, Daedalus is as equally concerned with language as he is with dance. The fact that Daedalus is present with the support and praise of Mercury—ruler of language, to recall Jonson’s title for him—fortifies Daedalus’ concern with language. Immediately following his warning ("yet not perplex men unto gaze”), Daedalus undeniably links the partner arts:

> But measured, and so numerous too,
> As men may read each act you do,
> And when they see the graces meet,
> Admire the wisdom of your feet. (211-14)

An element of dance, music, and poetry, measure creates for these arts an orderly structure and rhythm, which, in turn, provides clarity and ease in the execution and comprehension of them. As sixteenth-century dance master Thoinot Arbeau explains to
his pupil, "I have already told you that dancing depends on music because, without the virtue of rhythm, dancing would be meaningless and confused, . . ." (22). Arbeau expounds on such "readability" of performance through his assertion that dance depends upon music "so much that it is necessary that the gestures of the limbs should keep time with the musical instruments and not the foot speak of one thing and the music of another" (22-23). The feet of dancers can convey wisdom when they achieve perfection in their performance. All should work in harmony to create a unified, pleasurable whole, just as the ideas, words, memory, and delivery of an orator should come together for a logical, coherent, and pleasurable oration.

In contrast to Ovid's Daedalus who designs and builds a labyrinth that "... tricks the eye / with many twisting paths that double back—one’s left without a point of reference" (237-39) and is entwined such that "... in fact the artifex / himself could scarcely trace the proper path / back to the gate—it was that intricate" (249-51), Jonson's designer of labyrinths seeks to create a maze of clarity. Indeed, its labyrinthine nature must shape a clear goal: the possibility of weaving pleasure into one's life of virtue or virtue into one’s life of pleasure. The task of Jonson's Daedalus is, without question, one of ethics instead of deceit, which figures quite nicely with the task of an orator. For Thomas M. Greene, "Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue, which for some readers represents the summit of Jonson's masque-writing, shifts its focus away from the metaphysical implications of its predecessors toward the ethical" (1453). Here enters the role of the spectator in Jonson’s masque.

The final four lines of Daedalus' first song speak to the communicative power of courtly dance and emphasize the cognitive effect of spectacle. Daedalus concludes,

For dancing is an exercise
Not only shows the mover's wit,
But maketh the beholder wise
As he hath power to rise to it. (215-18)

The verse previously discussed, in which Daedalus calls the observers readers of the dancing and describes the feet of the dancers as wise (211-14), affords the observers possession of an active role in a performance that is not only of the body but also of the mind. The verse presently at hand continues this portrayal but presents the performance in a stronger instructional sense. Not only can the beholder read the dance and admire the footed wisdom, indeed find delight in the spectacle, but he can also exercise his mind by witnessing "the mover's wit." The ability to perform this labyrinthine choreography stands as a corporal expression of mental dexterity. The spectator beholds this physical expression and, in turn, gains mental acuity. Like the relationship amongst dancers in a performance, both dancer and observer have a role that functions to support the other. As noted earlier, Jonson expected this of his audience; however, in light of Jonson's belief that a failed performance reveals the ineptness of the observer, this dancer-beholder relationship is not equal. The beholder may possess the "power to rise to it" (218), but he is neither socially nor physically fit to perform the dancing.

Although innately unequal, the relationship between dancer and spectator is a mutually beneficial one. The dancer is admired, and the spectator gains "moral improvement" through the dance by its "enlightening [of] his understanding and moving [of] his affections" (Meagher 265-66), as is seen in Orchestra when Penelope becomes entranced with the dancing and thus reconsiders her rigid opinion of dance as
a threat to her virtue (135.4-7). With regard to the power of the poet-orator, Meagher's observation echoes Jonson's: "... how he doth reign in men's affections, how invade and break in upon them, and makes their minds like the thing he writes" (Timber 24). For this dominance to occur, however, the one acted upon must possess the faculties to support such a desirable mental coup. Jonson says as much in his discussion titled "Of Language and Oratory." In this section of Timber, the author promotes clarity and logic of language through an orator's effective "translation" of words, which bears out their "just strength and nature" (42). Jonson then parenthetically offers, "(Nam temere nihil transfertur a prudenti)," which the editor translates as "[n]othing is rashly translated by a prudent man" (42, n. 11). It naturally and logically follows, then, that if the observer of the dance is a "prudent man," he will carefully translate the figures and forms before him to allow the meaning of the dance to reform/re-form his mind. Indeed, the dance, like rhetoric, possesses transformative power.

Transformation is the trope for the whole of Daedalus' second song. Here, he sings for more dancing after the first dance ends; the dancers are to transform their stillness into another composition of figures:

O more, and more! this was so well

As praise wants half his voice to tell;

Again yourselves compose;

And now put all the aptness on

Of figure, that roportion

Or color can disclose. (219-24)

Through Daedalus, Jonson immediately reaffirms dance as rhetoric by presenting in verse an idea from Timber: "Give me that wit whom praise excites, glory puts on, or
disgrace grieves” (37). If praise, personified in the above verse by his voice, lacks rhetorical ability to speak of the praiseworthiness of the dance just completed—a praiseworthiness that compels the dancing master to command more—then the dancers have succeeded in expressing their moral in a manner that excites personified praise to a transformed state of near speechlessness. In response to this success, Daedalus directs the dancers to recompose themselves. With this command, Daedalus wants the dancers not only to compose another dance but, again, to compose themselves. They are to be messengers and the message: pleasure and virtue reconciled as a goal bodied forth and as an embodied goal.

Furthering the notion of transformation, the dancing can also become "a newer ground" upon which "design and picture" can be created "if those silent arts were lost" (Pleasure 225-27). Thus, the art that the body can create of itself would be capable of functioning as visual art. For Jonson, this means that Daedalus' proclamation places dance on a dais, so to speak, when read in conjunction with Jonson's concept of image:

Whosoever loves not picture is injurious to truth and all the wisdom of poetry. Picture is the invention of heaven, the most ancient and most akin to nature. It is itself a silent work, . . . , yet it doth so enter and penetrate the inmost affection (being done by an excellent artificer) as sometimes it overcomes the power of speech and oratory. (Timber 34)

When one substitutes dance for picture in this passage (a logical semantic move given that dance is regarded here as a moving visual art), the rhetorical nature of dance in the songs explored in this study is undeniable. This mute rhetoric achieves its instructional ends via its "true motions,” which Daedalus asserts will instruct the beholder “to the
height'ning sense / Of dignity and reverence" (*Pleasure* 230, 228-29). These lines recall Jonson's perception of his audience as observers who possess the ability to aesthetically and ethically profit from his masques. Daedalus voices this concept directly to his dancers and indirectly to the observers so that, ultimately, the dancers function as orator and oration, while the spectators function as judge and judged. To be sure, the reactions of the spectators determine their ability and worthiness to function in these roles. Furthermore, if the spectators internalize the virtue of reconciling pleasure to virtue, indeed gain such "height'ning sense" through the observation of the dancing, they will be transformed individually into beings and collectively into a discerning entity in which pleasure and virtue harmoniously and productively coexist. As such, the spectators will themselves become the ethically-grounded dances that they have beheld.⁸

*Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue* ceremonializes the *Book of Sports* promulgated by King James I, a text that dictates a code of conduct through which the king hoped to achieve a balance between pastime activities and worship in order to engineer unity in a divided society. Dance, in its diverse functions in the masque, is paramount to the message of *Pleasure*. In this communicative capacity, dance animates pleasure and virtue, as well as the moral dilemma inherent in their coexistence. This study focuses only on the sections that choreograph the moral dilemma because the rhetorical properties included in the development of those sections are of immediate relevance to my argument. However, the performance of the anti-masque and the closing dance of achieved reconciliation provide moving emblems of pleasure and virtue, respectively. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to completely separate the two in these segments, for virtue is elemental to the anti-masque, as it is the ideal being danced against, and
pleasure invades during the closing dance, designing the truth that a virtuous life can contain pleasure. As our wise guide (to recall Mercury’s description) through this venture to an ethical balance, Daedalus reveals that the structure of the closing dance is where “[g]race, laughter and discourse may meet” (249)—an apt description of the expectations for a rhetorical performance, if one takes the passo piccolo to interpret Daedalus’ word laughter as delight, one of the defining terms of successful rhetoric.

_The Winter’s Tale_

Whereas Orchestra and Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue cast dance in ways that explicitly align its performance and effects with those of rhetoric, indeed present the rhetoric of dance as a trope of intentionality, The Winter’s Tale includes dance as an unintentional purveyor of meaning, in that dance is performed in the context of pastoral revelry (rather than in the context of rhetorical didacticism), yet still elicits rhetorical interpretation. Because of the nature of my argument, I should make clear that I proceed with an awareness of the problematic relationship between rhetoric and intention. However, I tread on such precarious ground in an effort to illustrate my argument that literary instances of dance possess a function beyond aestheticism and spectacle. With a Renaissance sensibility, I, therefore, claim for dance and dancers a rhetorical presence for which intention, albeit a problematic concept, is inherent. Within the above-mentioned difference in the use of dance in Orchestra Pleasure compared to that of The Winter’s Tale lies the element of virtue. In the previous works, we see virtue either as a barrier to dance (Orchestra) or as a subject of dance (Pleasure). In The Winter’s Tale, virtue governs the rhetorical function of dance, as Perdita’s noble virtue is the meaning inferred from it. The Winter’s Tale is a play commonly studied for its rhetorical features. However, attention to its instances of dance allows one to recognize the
rhetorically strategic presence of this corporeal art and enhances existing rhetorical studies of the play. Ben Jonson’s theory that spectacle can “penetrate the inmost affection” is well-served through the instances of dancing in act four, scene four of the play (*Timber* 34). With a greater presence of physicality than the earlier acts, act four progresses the play from its explosive tone and fractured state (explored in chapter three) toward its harmonious one, and this structural function allows dance to function increasingly as a form of virtuous rhetoric, a rhetoric of unity.10 Although this scene boasts a robust corporeal character, verbal rhetoric is also noteworthy in its connection to the dancing. Through references to Perdita’s character, Florizel, Polixenes, and Camillo render Perdita an orator in her speaking, singing, and dancing. Florizel praises the effectiveness of Perdita’s speech, and all three men praise her character through references to royalty. Florizel begins the epideictic rhetoric when he proclaims,

What you do
Still betters what is done. When you speak, sweet,
I’d have you do it ever; when you sing,
I’d have you buy and sell so; so give alms;
Pray so; and for the ord'ring your affairs,
To sing them too. … (4.4.135-40)

Certainly Perdita's grace is a resounding entity in this rustic setting to the degree that Florizel desires her to perform all of her speech acts through song. The young lover's praise then moves, quite naturally, as we see in the continuation of line 140, to his beloved's dancing ability:

. . . . When you do dance, I wish you
A wave o' th' sea, that you might ever do
Nothing but that; move still, still so,
And own no other function. . . . (140-43)

Here, dance creates awe in the observer, so much so that Florizel wishes for Perdita to dance always. Tellingly, dance supersedes Perdita's verbal eloquence and melodiousness, for Florizel wishes his beloved to "own no other function" than dancing. Interpreting this passage through the traditional discourse of Renaissance dance scholarship, we may recognize Perdita as a victim of the male gaze, through which Florizel identifies his ideal female and desires her only function to be one that confines her to his ideal and reifies female submission. Considering the overall meaning of the play, this moment points to the larger issues of gender, power, and domestic harmony. Reading this passage through the discourse of Renaissance rhetoric, we may recognize Florizel as an appropriately moved spectator, thus interpret Florizel’s response to Perdita’s dancing as the desired effect and ultimate end of a performance, physical or rhetorical. Speaking to this level of performance effect, the anonymous romance *Nova Solyma* (attributed to Milton) contains a passage about such rhetorical force:

As by a magic charm, [rhetoric] can alter and attract man’s very power of will. By the varied modulations of voice, and by the appropriate gestures which accompany it, it takes unobserved possession of our two most important senses. Nay, more, by the artful way of its fascination it can often lead a whole audience captive at its will. (3.2.253)

Spoken by a tutor of rhetoric, this passage describes the almost supernatural nature of rhetoric and emphasizes the role of physical movement in this magical and
captivating art.\textsuperscript{11}

With her dancing, Perdita leaves her observers awestruck, indeed takes them captive through her noble grace and eloquence. A starting point for such a focus is Castiglione’s \textit{The Book of the Courtier} (1528), in which the author explicates the noble person:

\ldots his person, his aspect, his words and all his movements are so disposed and imbued with this grace, that—although he is young—he exhibits among the most aged prelates such weight of character that he seems fitter to teach than to be taught. \ldots (23)

Castiglione continues by lauding the nobility as being

\ldots endowed by nature not only with talent and beauty of person and feature, but with a certain grace and (as we say) air that shall make him at first sight pleasing and agreeable to all who see him; and I would have this an ornament that should dispose and unite all his actions. \ldots (23)

Although Castiglione refers to men, the recognition of Perdita’s nobility by Camillo, Polixenes, and Florizel allows one to project this masculine characterization onto Perdita. The nobility of Perdita’s grace and eloquence is spoken of in the remainder of Florizel's praise, in which he admires "[each] her doing," calling her acts "[(s)ingular in each particular]" and proclaiming that each act "[c]rowns what [she] is doing in the present deeds / That all [her] acts are queens" (4.4.143-46). Essentially, Florizel lauds not only Perdita’s acts but also the manner in which she performs them. Indeed, \textit{actio}\textsuperscript{12} is relevant, and Perdita could be said to possess an unlabored character to the delivery of her dancing, which reveals an innate nobility,
as Perdita has not been trained in the art of courtly dancing and thus shows no evidence of training rigor. Her natural, rather than practiced, noble style of dancing contrasts the raucous performance that the shepherd earlier had hoped to elicit from his foundling:

Fie, daughter! When my old wife liv’d, upon
This day, she was both pantler, butler, cook,
Both dame and servant; welcom’d all, serv’d all;
Would sing her song, and dance her turn; now here,
At upper end o’ th’ table, now i’ th’ middle;
On his shoulder, and his; her face o’ fire (4.4.55-60)

Such performance is appropriate for the low-born, but Perdita is an aristocrat by birth, and although she is a peasant by upbringing, Perdita seems unable to perform a peasant’s vigorous and unbridled style of dancing. Instead, she displays a natural aristocratic demeanor through an apparent restrained and orderly dancing style. Her dancing conforms to the late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century expectation of aristocratic dancing style, which required decorum and etiquette (Sutton 22). In “Allegorical Dance in the Late Renaissance,” Foster explains that “[c]oarser, rowdier movements depicted the peasant class, while small, refined gestures denoted the aristocracy” (109). Without having benefitted from formal dance training, Perdita possesses an air of nobility that is truly natural. In this way, pastoral naturalness and courtly refinement (Nature and Art) are united in Perdita. A discussion of the flower debate that precedes the commentary about Perdita’s dancing provides a useful parallel.

During the festival, Perdita makes known the absence of and her refusal to grow
“streak’d gillyvors” in her garden (4.4.82). Referring to the flowers as “Nature’s bastards” (83), Perdita engages in a “quasi-philosophical” discussion about the value of Art to Nature that precludes the opportunity for “pastoral prettiness” in this moment (Kermode lxxiv). Although Polixenes seems to convince Perdita that “art itself is Nature,” for she responds “[s]o it is,” Perdita still resolutely refuses to “set one slip of them” in the ground (97, 98, 100). She has as little desire to plant these art stained flowers as she does to paint her face and wish for Florizel to “[d]esire to breed by [her]” (101-03). Just as Art and Nature are united in gillyvors, so are they in Perdita whose actions display a pastoral refinement, a “piedness,” so to speak, of status (86). The natural air of nobility that Perdita possesses is made evident not only through Florizel's praise of his beloved’s performance but also through her unschooled wit and the comments of her aristocratic audience, Polixenes and Camillo (further detailed below). Underscoring her natural aristocracy, Perdita, without advantage of an education in her father's court, recognizes the rhetorical quality of Florizel's praise and responds in accordance with her instinctive faculty to her lover's "too large" praises: "With wisdom I might fear, my Doricles, / You woo’d me the false way" (147, 150-51). Flattery, she perceives, motivates and thus taints his epideictic speech, and Perdita's perception of this contemporary concern with rhetoric speaks to a natural wit that complements her natural performance ability. With a response that denies such a deceitful purpose (and a move that Antinous would envy), Florizel nimbly leads her away from such thinking and into a dance with him:

I think you have

As little skill to fear as I have purpose

To put you to 't. But come, our dance, I pray.

186
Your hand, my Perdita. So turtles pair

That never mean to part (4.4.152-54)

To be sure, a possible breach in harmony is hastily avoided by a bit of rhetoric and an event of dance. The young lovers’ rejection of spoken rhetoric—Perdita through a criticism of it and Florizel through a redirection to physical interaction—anticipates the rejection of spoken rhetoric that occurs in the play’s closing scene.¹⁵

With his own argument for harmony, Florizel encourages his graceful lover’s movements and the unity they convey. In this joined state, harmony occurs through both verbal and physical means. Thus, their unity offers a pastoral representation of Quintilian’s teaching that an orator achieves harmony when he accompanies his speech with corporeal articulation (I.ii.3). This union between the young lovers recalls the pairing of Hermione and Polixenes in act one, regarding the way both sets of characters partner rhetoric and dance. Such partnering is stronger in act four because the coupled dancing of the young lovers is the subject of Florizel’s rhetoric, whereas the physical interaction between Hermione and Polixenes functions as a corporeal conclusion to Hermione’s rhetoric. The more direct association of dance and rhetoric in act four, scene four allows dance to perform in a stronger communicative way than in act one, a strength that also leads the play toward its corporeal and harmonious peak in act five.¹⁶

Acts one and five take place at Leontes’ court, a setting that emphasizes the aristocratic world that envelops the play, including the rustic setting of act four. Contributing to the aristocratic atmosphere of act four is Perdita’s natural ability with the noble arts, which Polixenes and Camillo are quick to notice. While watching the couple dancing, Polixenes observes:

This is the prettiest low-born lass that ever
Ran on the green-sord. Nothing she does, or seems,
But smacks of something greater than
herself, Too noble for this place. (156-58)

This observation evokes Elyot’s teaching that a display of nobility could be best achieved through dancing (241). Camillo concurs with Polixenes’ observation of Perdita’s “[t]oo noble” presence by adding, “good sooth she is / The queen of curds and cream” when he notices that Florizel “tells her something / That makes her blood look on’t” (160, 159-60). Amplifying Perdita’s noble presence is her blushing in response to her beloved’s words—a quality that suggests both a noble virtue (“queen”) and a pastoral innocence (“curds and cream”). Or perhaps Camillo’s observation of Perdita’s blushing invokes the oblique representation of blushing explored in Alison Findlay’s book Women in Shakespeare: A Dictionary. Through the study of various plays, Findlay finds that “the maid’s blush or ‘virgin crimson of modesty’ (HV 5.2.296) was not a reliable signifier” (421), for it could be an untrustworthy outward sign not wholly convincing, thus “invit[ing] scrutiny” (422). The blushing of Florizel that Perdita says shows him to be an “unstain’d shepherd” complicates the issue (4.4.149). On the one hand, “unstain’d shepherd” can reinforce Perdita’s own innocent blushing, revealing her equally aristocratic and rustic virtue. On the other hand, in light of Findlay’s research and the fact that Florizel is only playing a shepherd, it can call the certain interpretation of blushing into question. Further, Polixenes observes that Perdita “dances fealty” (176), a description with a specific definition in its reference to dancing: “with a graceful agility, nimbly” (OED). These men observe an aristocratic nature in Perdita, from the way she speaks, sings, and dances to her presumably coy reaction to her lover’s words.
Perdita's natural ability with the aristocratic dancing style recalls the debate in Cicero's *De oratore*, in which Crassus proclaims, “that in the first place natural talent is the chief contributor to the virtue of oratory” (1.25.113). He further asserts, “. . . if there be anyone disposed to think that these powers [invention, exposition, embellishment, and recollection] can be derived from art, a false belief—for it would be a glorious state of things if art could even kindle or waken them into life; . . . for they are all gifts of nature. . .” (114). Fifteenth-century dance master Ebreo de Pesaro Guglielmo espouses the virtue of natural ability, as it regards dance:

And first I say and confirm that this science is serious and virtuous, as you have more fully seen above, proving by true reasoning that it is both innate and learnt (as you will understand below). And as regards your first point about dancing without music, I answer that if eight or ten people are dancing without music, [but] with steps that are harmonized and measured together, then it is a natural thing. (qtd. in Nevile 73)

Conveying how fundamental the art-versus-nature debate is to discussions of dance, dance treatises divide steps into the “‘natural’ or ‘innate’ steps, and the ‘man-made’ or ‘learnt’ steps” (Nevile 74). Perdita embodies this humanist theory, for she has no knowledge of dance as “‘an acquired skill’” that is “‘both innate and learnt’” (73). Yet her wholly natural ability, her pure innate ability, possesses a measured aristocratic quality—indeed, she does not oblige the shepherd’s chiding call for raucous entertainment—and her natural ability possesses this quality to the extent that Polixenes and Camillo recognize her nobility in a performance that takes place far from the artificial confines of the court.
Perdita is admired for her natural ability, and as natural ability is paramount to the success of the rhetorician’s and dancer’s performances, so is audience admiration. The following statement on the function and effect of oratory further bears out, with a focus on observer admiration and an emphasis on the body, the shared character of rhetoric and dance acts:

... the aim of rhetoric is threefold: not only to persuade and move the audience’s minds (the direct emotional approach), but also to recommend the orator to his audience. This is done by the orator’s creating a favourable impression on his public—by general outward signs and in particular by gestures. (Graf 40)

Through Perdita’s corporeal performance, gesture/dance speaks to its beholders and succeeds in casting Perdita in a favorable light. Unlike such performance in act one, scene two, this bodied oratory speaks to positive effect and is thus evocative rather than provocative.

Even though the tone of harmony increases in act four, scene four, Shakespeare’s microcosm is still vulnerable to chaos, a situation revealed by the intrusion of the satyric upon the idyllic. Twelve “men of hair” that call themselves “Saltiers” enter, and they perform, as the stage direction notes, a dance of Satyrs (4.4.326, 327). As wooly herdsmen, these dancers bring to the festivities a dance of “Dionysian discord” (Brissenden 92)—an “antic hay,” Walter Sorrell presumes (380). This physical discord is reflected in the nature of the speech that occurs during the dance of the Satyrs, when Polixenes speaks to Camillo of separation: “Is it not too far gone? ‘Tis time to part / them” (344). He then turns to Florizel with a comparison between himself and the young lover that attempts to cast Florizel in an
unflattering light:

Your heart is full of something that does take
Your mind from feasting. Sooth, when I was young,
And handed love as you do, I was wont
To load my she with knacks. I would have ransack’d
The pedlar's silken treasury, and have pour’d it
To her acceptance; you have let him go,
And nothing marted with him. If your lass
Interpretation should abuse, and call this
Your lack of love or bounty, you were straited
For a reply, at least if you make a care
Of happy holding her. (346-356)

Polixenes' attempt to reveal Florizel as a lover lacking basic wooing skills proves unsuccessful when Florizel assures his father that Perdita has no interest in such material displays of love. Within a mere eight lines, Florizel’s certainty leads to a directness that ushers in a physical and verbal rhetoric of unity: “I take thy hand, this hand, / As soft as dove’s down and as white as it” (362-63). Like Leontes, Polixenes receives knowledge from Florizel and Perdita’s physical interaction and responds thusly: “What follows this?” (365). Polixenes recognizes their hand contact as the opening gesture of a handfasting ceremony, in which a couple’s clasping of hands and exchanging of vows constitute a legal marriage ceremony. Polixenes encourages this union by prompting Florizel to persuade him of his love for Perdita, after which Polixenes and Camillo, respectively, answer Florizel's profession of love with “fairly offered” and “sound affection” (378, 379). The young lover’s corporeal proclamation
of his love leads, according to ceremony, to the requirement of the verbal proclamation, which prompts the demand for another corporeal vow. In this display, verbal and physical maneuvers seem to reciprocate each other and thus carry equal rhetorical weight.

With unity being the present tone, the shepherd has them take hands so that the “bargain” may be sealed (384). With this request, the shepherd fortifies the young lovers’ state of unity and recalls the meeting of Polixenes’ and Hermione’s hands in the first scene. Indeed, the grammatical structure of the shepherd’s line conveys the direct relation between holding hands and sealing bargains: “Take hands, a bargain” (384). Victoria Hayne tells us that “. . . the couple’s joining hands symbolized their union” and “may have been the most socially significant part of the [wedding] process” (qtd. in Spotswood 108). The shepherd continues with an oath to give Perdita and her dowry to Florizel, who is eager to move on with the ceremony. He urges, “But come on, / Contract us ‘fore these witnesses” (388-89). The shepherd obeys: “Come, your hand; / And, daughter, yours” (390). The strength behind hand holding with regard to sealing verbal oaths is proven undeniable when Polixenes immediately interrupts the ceremony by asking Florizel if he has a father. This disguised father’s intention of disrupting the contracting that Florizel eagerly requests is palpable, especially in light of the fact that Polixenes prefaces his question with “[s]oft, swain, awhile, beseech you” (391). He obviously desires to redirect Florizel’s attention for a time and ultimately halt the bargain sealing.

The verbal discord that follows has as its corporeal partner the performance of the Satyrs. Although there is no stage direction to specify either the exit or the continuing presence of the Satyrs, the fact that discord looms allows for an assumption
that they continue to be a disruptive and corruptive force. To be sure, the looming presence of discord and the precedent set by previous instances of physical acts reflecting verbal expressions allow for the argument that the Satyrs remain on stage in full disorderly force. The inquiry of Polixenes concerning Florizel’s father introduces the verbal element of the discord that the Satyrs physically express. Florizel speaks to this conflict when he asserts, "I not acquaint / My father of this business" and continues his refusal in response to two more attempts by Polixenes and one by the shepherd (411). “Mark your divorce, young sir” accompanies Polixenes’ act of revealing himself to the detriment of this harmonious event (417). Polixenes continues his response to Florizel’s declaration:

Whom son I dare not call. Thou art too base
To be [acknowledg’d]. Thou, a sceptre's heir,
That thus affects a sheep-hook! Thou, old traitor,
I am sorry that by hanging thee I can
But shorten thy life one week. . . . (418-22)

With this disruption to the ceremony following so quickly behind the herdsmen’s physical cacophony, “a gallimaufry of gambols” (328), the satyric performance dramaturgically functions as a corporeal preface to the verbal discord, a trope that conversely reflects the linked verbal and physical instances of unity occurring earlier in this scene and in act one, scene two. As such, these physical and verbal outbursts can be understood to function, as with the previous instances of physical and verbal harmony, hand-in-hand. Perdita’s reply, “Even here undone!” (442), vocalizes this unraveling and emphasizes the unforeseen nature of the undoing. “Even here” in this pastoral setting can discord, to recall the ominous
phrase from Leontes’ jealous monologue, “stab the center.” This episode
dramatizes one function of the antimasque, which is to provide the ruling class
with the opportunity to enforce order during court performances. As such,
Polixenes attempts to enforce order during the Satyr’s dance/antimasque by
halting the marriage between his noble son and Perdita, a supposed peasant, and
thus putting a stop to a perceived discordant act.

While the dancing is done in act four, the call for healing speech is not. Similar
to Polixenes’ request for Florizel to profess his love for Perdita, Camillo demands the
shepherd to speak in regard to Perdita's demand for Florizel to leave, “ere [he] diest”
(450). The shepherd “cannot speak” to this dilemma and subsequently repeats the
word “undone” (451):

You have undone a man of fourscore three,
That thought to fill his grave with quiet,
yea, To die upon the bed my father died.

That knew'st this was the Prince, and wouldst adventure
To mingle faith with him! Undone, undone! (453-60)

Rhetoric fails and all indeed seems undone, from Florizel and Perdita’s union to the old
shepherd’s life. Yet, corporeal harmony endures, and, despite a brief discordant
interruption, upholds the sturdy and triumphant presence of nonverbal rhetoric
throughout the remainder of the play.

Besides Florizel and Perdita’s dancing, the group of satyric-dancing herdsmen
also body forth concord. Before the Satyrs’ dance takes place, the servant introduces
the men as four groups made up of three of a kind: “...three carters, three shepherds, /
three neatherds, three swineherds. . .” (324-25). Although the “four threes of herdsmen,” as Polixenes calls them, represent various pastoral characters, the herdsmen are grouped in numbers significant to cosmological notions of order and harmony (336). Twelve men comprise the group, which is divided into four groups of three men. Each of these numbers is relevant to the order of the universe and its harmonious workings: twelve months in a year, four seasons in a year, three months in each season, four elements of the earth, and four ages of man (Heninger 156). Such numerical order is also relevant to order in dancing. As Jennifer Nevile notes, “[t]he fundamental principles of order and measure, geometric forms, and the construction of the whole out of small compartments are clearly seen in the . . . contemporary [fifteenth century] collections of choreographies” (123). Susan Foster’s study of allegorical dance illustrates the meaning of typical dance patterns, which routinely created basic and intricate geometric shapes that spoke to spectators of the earthly and cosmic realms, as well as of emotions and desires (107). Moreover, Quintilian’s requirement that rhetors study geometry (1.10.34-38) adds another dimension to the theoretical and practical space that dance and rhetoric share. Focusing on order, Quintilian reasons, “Order, in the first place, is necessary in geometry, and is it not also necessary in eloquence? Geometry proves what follows from what precedes, what is unknown from what is known, and do we not draw similar conclusions in speaking?” (37). With regard to the Satyrs’ dance, the single group of twelve is comprised of smaller units of four, themselves made up of groups of three. In terms of harmonious structure, the “saltiers” add up, yet their physical performance speaks otherwise (327). This physical dispositio and the pervasive influence of the dancers’ discordant elocutio help to establish the privileged status of corporeal unity and communication in act five.
Conclusion

The study of Renaissance rhetoric, dance, and the rhetoric of dance are not novel pursuits. Renaissance (and classical) recognition and perspectives of dance as a form of rhetoric contribute much to our understanding of the culture’s awareness and economy of nonverbal communication and of its notions of gender and power. To be sure, cultural and critical attention to these arts—consideration of them individually and mutually—ground a considerable portion of the Renaissance studies landscape. Despite this cultural and critical attention to rhetoric and dance as individual and reciprocal arts, the rhetorical use of dance by Renaissance writers remains a fertile landscape of study. It seems that the attention thus far afforded rhetoric and dance has, in turn, created a critical void regarding the dance-adorned literature of the period, in that recognition of potential rhetorical motives for the inclusion of dance arises from such attention. It has therefore been my goal in this chapter to begin to fill this void with studies of three works unique in genre but common in corporeal device. The presence of dance provides each of the works with an additional means of formulating meaning and engaging as a reader and observer in the interaction between and among the characters. It is my contention that Davies, Jonson, and Shakespeare included instances of dance in their works with a cultural awareness of the rhetorical quality of dance, thus providing for the possibility to interpret the moments of dance as rhetoric’s helpmate.

James H. Jensen observes that rhetorical theory and practice ground all the arts of the period (47). It is thus paramount to Renaissance studies to cast a critical eye on the instances of dance in the literature of the period to discover its rhetorically strategic
presence and thus engage in a novel approach to its study.
Notes


2. The edition cited does not number stanzas or lines, only pages.

3. Musaeus, son of Orpheus; Amphion, player of the lyre and king of Thebes whose playing had the ability to make stones move on their own to create a fortifying wall for Thebes; Linus, music instructor of Hercules; Theseus, succeeded in uniting various tribes of Attica and instituted the festival of Panathenaei. I infer that his movements as a warrior and the procession of the festival are by what Davies associates Theseus with dancing. Myths of Greece and Rome by Thomas Bulfinch (1985).

4. In chapter 34, section 120 of De Oratore, Cicero warns, “To be ignorant of what occurred before you were born is to remain always a child.” Antinous may perceive Penelope’s distaste for dancing as a perspective based on ignorance—in a manner of speaking, a childish perspective.


6. David Norbrook notes that the original subtitle was, according to Davies’
contemporary John Hoskyns, “Judicially proving the true observation of time and measure,” which suggests a more cosmic, universal, and erudite perspective than the published subtitle: *A Poem of Dancing*.


Tallahassee: Florida State UP, 1981.


A scientific approach to rhetorical agency comes from Manfred Pfister in The Theory and Analysis of Drama. Pfister provides a thorough examination of communication models, in which he defines and diagrams the roles involved in dramatic (versus narrative and epic) communication and interaction. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1988.

10. In Shakespeare the Thinker (New Haven: Yale, 2007), A. D. Nuttall cites the clown’s description of the shipwreck and bear attack in act three, scene three as a passage that begins to move the play toward happiness. Nuttall refers to the irrational “comic tempo” of the description of such a savage event and characterizes the attack as a “lurching, earthy rustic dance, with a bear and a gentleman that seem to have stepped straight out of a nursery-rhyme book.” “This dance,” he says, “is afoot before the ascent into happiness has properly begun” (350).

11. Until the eighteenth century, magic was understood to be a form of rhetoric, and rhetoric was believed to have magical effect. See “Magic and/as Rhetoric: Outlines of a History of Phantasy” by William Covino (accessed online), in which he states, “Through the Renaissance, words possess actual (rather than symbolic) power as agents
of magic, and their effects are understood to vary with changing contexts” (par. 3).


12. According to Linda Pui-ling Wong in “Rhetorical Performance: Performing the Rhetoric,” actio “defines the meanings of movements, gestures, appearances, and the passions they are supposed to elicit” (in The International Journal of the Humanities 6.1 (2008): 185-93). As the play moves forward, we see this rhetorical element more prominently, to the point that it consumes language and mutely speaks toward reconciliation.

13. Julia Sutton’s introduction to Nobilità di Dame by Fabritio Caroso provides a list of printed dance treatises from the late sixteenth century to the early seventeenth century.

14. The ambiguity of the grammatical function of the opening phrase with wisdom (does it modify I or my Doricles, Perdita’s fear or the implementation of Florizel’s rhetorical strategy?) provides a semantic rendition of the failings of rhetoric evident throughout the play.

15. Perdita and Florizel’s youthful rejection of rhetoric reflects the critical view that, in Shakespeare’s romances, the behavior of the younger characters influences the behavior of the elder ones. In the case of The Winter’s Tale, this tutoring occurs
indirectly, since the young and old are separated until the final scene, yet Polixenes witnesses the young couple in act four and, thus, functions as a cipher for this influence.

I thank my thesis supervisor, Dr. Eugene Giddens, for this insight.

16. While not directly connected to my dance-as-rhetoric argument, rhetoric and sculpture are further linked by the Classical and Renaissance notion that rhetoric and sculpture possess a magical quality, as conveyed in the Pygmalion myth and in the rhetorical writings of Gorgias and Ficino.

17. Polixenes invites disorder when he tells the servant who tries to send away the Satyrs that it is the servant, not the Satyrs, who are wearisome and encourages the dancing by urging, “[p]ray let’s see these four threes of herdsmen” (4.4.335).
Conclusion

“Medicine is my lawful wedded wife, and literature my mistress. When one gets on my nerves, I spend the night with the other. Neither loses anything by my duplicity.” Anton Chekov

This thesis seeks to give the textual body its due. I analyze stasis, gesture, and dance through original literary contexts, rather than through performance adaptations, as the goal for my research is to substantiate the magnitude with which the physical body, mobile or immobile, performs within the pages of a literary text and how that performance functions rhetorically. My concern with the textual body over the stage body allows for an alternate approach to the study of literature composed during an era that recognized the rhetorical capacity and force of the body. Attending to the rhetorical body as it is manifested on the page adds another critical lens through which to study issues of Renaissance corporeality. While I do not ignore the staged body, that body is read within a wider context of literary corporeal rhetoric.

Framed in trauma theory, the examination of stasis (chapter two) reveals the rhetorical nature and force of the immobile body. For Penelope in Orchestra, stasis is a defense against the attempted assault on her virtue, as well as a corporeal rebuttal to Antinous’ defense of dancing. In Davies’ lyrical rendering of a classical seduction attempt, stasis is an easy and convenient, yet influential, stance against a relatively harmless moral attack. The severity of trauma and its corporeal response are heightened in The Winter’s Tale. In this romance, stasis is the delayed and uncertain condition in which Hermione reappears following an accusation of infidelity and treason, subsequent imprisonment, abandonment of her infant, and the death of her son. Despite the depth and scope of the trauma Hermione suffers, the presentation of the queen in an immobile state proves powerful, majestic and ultimately magical. These effects allow Hermione’s
stasis simultaneously to produce and heal trauma for Leontes, as upon observing
Hermione in her statuesque state, the king is overcome with guilt, displays repentance,
and enjoys a reunion with his queen. Confirming that Hermione’s physical presence
possesses rhetorical function, I end my analysis of *The Winter’s Tale* with a look at the
reconciliation scene. This closing scene epitomizes the results of an effective rhetorical
performance: to stir passions and move toward virtuous action. With *The Rape of
Lucrece*, stasis is witnessed first as a cause of and then a response to a physical attack.
Lucrece’s sleeping form mutely proclaims the inordinate virtue Lucrece’s husband has
bragged of, which proves too tempting to Tarquin and leads him to rape. Following the
attack, Lucrece figures her distress through an immobile state that signifies death, a
condition revealed through narration and later realized through suicide. Like the stasis
of Hermione, the final form of stasis in which we see Lucrece persuades right action, as
the parading of her corpse through the streets compels the people to banish Tarquin
from Rome.

The chapter moves from examples of trauma inflicted upon women and the
stasis that generates and/or results from the trauma to an example of the same regarding
a celebrated soldier. With the tragedy *Coriolanus*, we observe a situation similar to that
in *Orchestra*. For both Penelope and Coriolanus, an undesirable interaction and
ideology, respectively, threatens their value systems, and in both characters’ situations,
moral stasis manifests itself as physical stasis. By refusing to bend to the ceremonial
requirements and expectations of the tribunes and the plebeians, Coriolanus exerts his
sense of personal autonomy—a rejection of traditional gestures and bodily display that
can be understood as a corporeal shield against political “slings and arrows.” Unlike
Penelope and Hermione, Coriolanus finds no victory in this exercise of moral and physical stasis, and, like Lucrece, ultimately succumbs to trauma. Weary of the violence against his value system, Coriolanus acts out of character and, following a consequential chain of events, is ultimately killed. Like Lucrece, Coriolanus is a victim of personal honor.

Also working within the context of trauma theory, the chapter on gesture (chapter three), investigates the rhetorical quality and power of corporeal signification in *The Winter’s Tale, The Rape of Lucrece, Titus Andronicus,* and *Epicoene.* My investigation reveals that gesture concerns more than physical movements and can include a biological manifestation of emotion: weeping. John Bulwer’s inclusion of weeping in his text on manual speech, which I cite in this chapter, supports this claim. Centering on the hand play between Hermione and Polixenes in act one, scene two, my study of *The Winter’s Tale* establishes for this chapter the diverse ways in which gesture speaks to and impacts upon its literary auditors. The fact that Leontes is so emotionally traumatized upon witnessing the hand play between his queen and boyhood friend provides evidence that the hands are mute and, at times destructive, tongues. In this play, gesture generates trauma, while in *The Rape of Lucrece* gesture is a mute response to it. I found it helpful to establish the gestural presence in the poem by first examining the gesture Lucrece enacts prior to her rape. Twice she raises her hands to the heavens: once to express joy and once to plead for mercy. Following Tarquin’s attack upon her, Lucrece performs the traditional gestures of grief and mourning, including weeping. I end the gestural study of the poem with an examination of Lucrece’s suicide—her final gesture that reifies the feeling of living death she expresses after her rape. *Titus*
Andronicus furthers my exploration of gesture as a response to trauma. While it may appear to offer the least to this topic, Titus provided the most intriguing and rewarding analytical experience. Rather than impeding my study of gesture, the condition of oral and manual dismemberment in the play encouraged a nuanced analysis of gesture, namely what constitutes gesture in the absence of traditional corporeal efficacy. As in The Rape of Lucrece, the gestural capacity of weeping presents itself effusively in this tragedy.

Weighed down by tragedy and thus, in terms of genre, by a myopic investigation of the rhetoric of gesture, the chapter ends with an analysis of gesture in Epicoene. Despite its humor, Epicoene allows this chapter to maintain the central connection between gesture and trauma, as gesture is the means by which Morose prevents himself from suffering chatter-induced trauma. Along with the presence of a gesture-trauma connection, the relevance of Epicoene to this chapter is fortified by the comparisons I am able to flesh out between the gestural and rhetorical situations and conditions of Morose and Leontes and Titus.

Closing this study of corporeal rhetoric is a chapter on the rhetoric of dance (chapter four). Involving multiple body parts, containing gesture, and communicating various ideals, dance reveals corporeal rhetoric in its most vigorous, visceral, and rhetorically diverse state. This chapter offers a second analysis of Orchestra and a third of The Winter’s Tale. Regarding Orchestra, my analysis centers on the rhetorical descriptions of dance that Antinous uses in his attempt to persuade Penelope to engage in this recreation with him. Despite the eloquent descriptions of the central role of dance in the cosmos, the natural world, and civilized society, the spectacle of dance is what
ultimately wields persuasive power over Penelope. This suggests that the physical practice, rather than the rhetorical rehearsal, of dance carries the most, if not the only, persuasive power in the poem. Enlarging the scope of spectacle in this chapter, I turn critical attention to the trope of dance in *Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue*. Daedalus, the dancing master, voices his perspective of dance through two songs, in which he narrates the choreography of his dancers and defines dance as a form of speech. These songs bring to the forefront Neo-platonic ideas regarding the communicative power of images and spectacle and the awareness of the rhetorical potential of dance possessed by Renaissance rhetoricians. In this section of the chapter, I am able to forge direct connections between rhetoric and dance in the first song Daedalus composes, which contains choreographic evidence of *inventio* and *dispositio* and articulates the dancers’ goal of moving their spectators toward a recognition of wisdom and toward a wisdom of their own. This example of rhetorical *movere* extends to the trope of transformation illustrated in Daedalus’ second song, in which the dancers are directed to transform their stillness into a second dance that will have the strength to render personified praise speechless. Conclusively, rhetorical awe is achieved via dance.

Further concerning the rhetorical capacity of dance, *The Winter’s Tale* presents this pastime as an unintentional medium for rhetoric. In contrast to the instructional function dance possesses in *Orchestra* and *Pleasure Reconciled to Virtue*, dance appears in *The Winter’s Tale* as part of a pastoral celebration but develops a rhetorical quality with the presence of trespassers upon the celebration. Addressing the epideictic rhetoric Perdita’s dancing inspires, the reverent effect it has on the observers, and the natural dancing ability displayed, I am able to substantiate the rhetorical nature of
Perdita’s dancing, as it communicates particular ideals, stirs passions, and signifies an innately noble character. Through attention to the dance of the Satyrs, the link between rhetoric and dance takes on a reflective quality, for the dance of the Satyrs reflects the discord surrounding the problematic marriage ceremony between Florizel and Perdita. In this scene, verbal rhetoric is examined as a supporting element, as the interaction between Florizel and his father, an uninvited guest and one of Perdita’s observers/admirers, provides a rhetorical rendering of the discordant performance of the Satyrs.

The performing body analyzed in its textual origins reveals the various modes and functions of corporeal rhetoric. The fact that such modes and functions can be teased out of non-dramatic, as well as dramatic, texts, as accomplished in this thesis, speaks to the viability and relevance of a textual approach to corporeal rhetoric. This is the academic curiosity and aesthetic interest with which I began and progressed through this project. However, the goal of any research project is to emerge from it with substantial new insight and a plan for realizing its further academic potential. Indeed, the concluding information of one research project should hold the potential to function as introductory material for another. As a result of the serendipitous discovery of a burgeoning field of study, the medical humanities, I have emerged from this project with a new perspective through which to investigate the communicative strength of the textual body. The framework of trauma in which I developed the chapters on stasis and gesture provides the foundation for a medical humanities approach in this chapter as a means to inform potential further study of corporeal rhetoric in Renaissance literature.
While it is not the primary aim of this thesis to advance a study of trauma in Renaissance literature, it is clear that the works most suited to critical study of corporeal elements in the literature possess some degree and form of trauma, including superficial and humorous, as the inclusion of *Epicoene* reveals. Because my predominant goal in this thesis is, instead, to investigate the rhetorical function of the literary body in particular Renaissance poems and dramatic works, trauma theory functions as an ancillary theoretical component of the thesis. This is not to say, however, that some of the works studied in this thesis would not benefit from an analysis grounded in trauma theory. Indeed, since the “central claim” of literary trauma theory is that “trauma creates a speechless fright that divides or destroys identity,” such a critical approach would require rigorous attention to the rhetorical/communicative capacity and force of the literary body, as the psychology of characters commonly manifests itself in the body’s appearance, actions or lack thereof (149).³

While a medical humanities approach extends beyond the aims of contemporary literary trauma theory by advancing the relevance of literary study to medical training, trauma theory provides a useful underpinning for such scholarship. As Rita Charon recognizes, medicine “has found sustenance from such fields as trauma studies, oral history, and testimony work” (191).⁴ Concerning the broadening of my research, literary trauma theory can be understood as a means to a larger end. Indeed, one needs only to cite the continued growth of the medical humanities and the inclusion of literature-based articles in such journals as *The Journal of the Medical Humanities, Medical Humanities*, and *Hektoen International: A Journal of the Medical Humanities* to make a case for this approach to investigating provocative corporeality, as well as the trauma it
creates and to which it responds in Renaissance (and other) literature. Articles such as “Lost in Translation: Homer in English; the Patient’s Story in Medicine,” “The Death of Hector: Pity in Homer, Empathy in Medical Education,” and “Doctors and Illness in Boccaccio’s Decameron” prove the capacity for literature to inform the medical field and influence its competencies, particularly empathetic observation and listening and patient interaction. To be sure, there is sufficient theoretical precedent for suggesting such a method and a sturdy foundation upon which to pursue it.

The attention the medical humanities gives to bearing witness and interpreting “the self-telling body,” a practice Charon calls “narrative medicine,” offers a unique and valuable methodology for extending my research in corporeal rhetoric. The work currently undertaken foregrounds a medical humanities approach, in that it attends to the role trauma plays in the interpretation of corporeal events in the literature and examines the ways in which bearing witness occurs. While Orchestra, The Winter’s Tale, and Coriolanus satisfy primarily the psychological aim of trauma theory, The Rape of Lucrece and Titus Andronicus offer the strongest potential to further the study of corporeal rhetoric through a medical humanities approach. The intense physical trauma, resulting emotional trauma, and instances of bearing witness afford The Rape of Lucrece and Titus Andronicus such potential. With regard to academic relevance, a medical humanities methodology is an appropriate and organic next step, as the poem and play have been the subjects of recent criticism grounded in trauma theory. Extending the work of trauma theory by examining the corporeal telling of trauma will allow for scholarship that further and rightly contours victims with a form of power, in that detailed attention to the physicality of the victims endows them with authorial
power. For instance, Lucrece’s body helps to tell the tale when she suffers from speechless fear, and she ultimately writes her own ending, leaving behind a body of revolutionary power. Analyzing the corporeal telling of trauma may also reveal a victim’s adaptive strength, as is seen in Lavinia’s situation. After suffering rape and dismemberment, Lavinia ultimately proves herself quite capable in her disabled condition. To be sure, Lavinia wholly, though differently, functions in violent fragmentation. At this point, it is useful to take a more focused look at an article central to the goal of this chapter.

In “The Self-telling Body,” Rita Charon asserts the necessity for narrative in medical education and practice and examines the various ways in which narrative is implemented in healthcare professions. Charon observes that about the time that the qualitative social sciences brought medicine into the “narrative realms,” literary texts were recognized for their usefulness in helping healthcare workers “enter the worlds of patients, see others’ experience from their perspectives, greet the metaphorical as well as the factual power of words, and be moved by what we hear” (191). This correlation allowed the practice of medicine to bridge sociological discourse analysis and literary creation, allowing “ethereal theorizing” to become “practical and concrete and earthy” because it becomes “about somebody’s body—particularly somebody’s ailing body” (191). These observations lead Charon to define narrative medicine as “a heady, brainy, compassionate, corporeal practice that can heal the patient and nourish the doctor at the same time—by virtue of the talk” (192). She asserts that the emergence of narrative practices in medical professions reveal “how narratives of the world work” (192). It’s worth emphasizing that such practices, therefore, also reveal the relevance of literature
outside the parameters of literary scholarship. In the sense that narrative medicine attends to the experience of illness and its verbal and corporeal representation (Charon 192), a medical humanities approach to the literary study of corporeal rhetoric will allow my research to be informed by and contribute to the study and practice of narrative medicine.

By exploring the corporeality involved in the causes and consequences of trauma in literature, my research can contribute to an emerging academic discourse that seeks to correct what Charon sees as the “wholesale refusal to take into account the human dimensions of illness and healing” (193). To be sure, the “self-telling,” hence rhetorical, body is a vital and articulate dimension of trauma. As mentioned above, The Rape of Lucrece and Titus Andronicus are works examined in this thesis best suited for such study. Both works present the means by which to extend relevance of corporeal analysis from a rhetorical hermeneutic to a medical humanities one, namely narrative medicine, for both “self-telling” bodies share stories of trauma to listeners who feel an obligation not only to bear witness but also to respond with words and culturally-informed actions intended to promote healing. Both Lucrece and Lavinia struggle to tell their stories to willing witnesses who not only deeply empathize with the victims but who also possess an inordinate desire to correct the system that caused the trauma, in order to purge grief and promote healing.7

With a medical humanities approach to studying traumatized bodies in literature, corporeal rhetoric is refined to corporeal narrative. This change is not simply a semantic one, for the word narrative speaks to temporality, in that it emphasizes the historical and cultural contexts in which the victim has suffered, preventing modern ideology and
knowledge from intruding upon and altering the historical and cultural truth of the victim’s experience. Such potential retrodiagnosis is a danger involved in applying a medical humanities hermeneutic to the examination of literary trauma—a danger that would result in such scholarship inflicting its own violence upon the literature and literary victim.\textsuperscript{8} To avoid retrodiagnosis, use of the medical/healing knowledge of the era under consideration will prove a necessary addition to ensure that my future research accurately and justly attends to corporeal narrative and its elements of bearing witness, empathy, and compelled response. The goal of a medical humanities/narrative medicine methodology to studying the corporeality of trauma in literature is to broaden critical perspective of victimization. While the corporeality of victims may seem to address just one side of the trauma equation, bodily reaction to trauma, however, is a corporeal manifestation of its emotional and psychological effects. Thus analyzing corporeal rhetoric/narrative allows one to attend to the physical and the psychological effects and implications of trauma. The desired result is critical recognition of victim strength and authority—a perspective that could mitigate the potential for trauma-centered scholarship to further weaken or fragment the victims studied.

To echo the close of the introduction to this thesis, I aim to give the Renaissance literary body its due, and I think that this has been accomplished through the fleshing out of the rhetorical character, capacity, and power of bodies central to the literature studied here. To achieve this and also to attempt to contribute an original piece of scholarship to Renaissance literary criticism, I focus my study on the performance of the body as observed in original contexts rather than in their theatrical renderings. Doing so reinforces the rhetorical capacity of the body, as this textual approach to
studying corporeality proves fruitful outside of performance studies and emphasizes the cultural awareness of the body as a communicative medium. To echo the opening of this conclusion chapter, one should emerge from major academic endeavors with new insight and recognition of further implications of one’s research. Embracing the medical humanities as a hermeneutic for the study of trauma and victimization in Renaissance literature allows for both of these academic pursuits to be realized.

While the above information offers an academically generative reason to pursue a medical humanities approach, there is also an academically threatening motivation. As a consequence of the rising cost of obtaining a degree and the financially vulnerable place the cost leaves many students upon their graduation, the relevance of the humanities to the pursuit of a non-humanities degree and the usefulness of a humanities degree itself has been recently called into question.9 I find it appropriate to address this threat here because of the opportunity it provides me to expand a bit further upon the potential of my research and upon the potential of the methodology itself—indeed to address the potential value of the medical humanities to literary studies and to the humanities in general. First, however, a brief overview of the current perspective will provide a useful foundation.

A response to the attack on the humanities comes from Rosanna Warren. Appropriately published in the Panic section of The New Republic and titled “The Decline of the Humanities—and Civilization,” Warren’s article affirms that “[s]ome now propose to do away with higher education in the liberal arts and replace it with specialized courses giving certificates in particular skills, as suggested by Walter Russell Mead—a darkly utilitarian view of what human beings are and are for.” Warren
makes the death knell of the humanities audible when she cites the grave truth that “state universities are abolishing departments of literature and foreign languages, and fewer and fewer teaching jobs are available to students graduating with Ph.D.s in the humanities.” The recent debate surrounding the humanities begs the question: can the medical humanities save the humanities? Or to put it in less histrionic terms, can the medical humanities revive the relevance of university humanities programs? While this question is too broad and complex to be appropriately and sufficiently addressed here, it is a useful question to have in mind when exploring further possibilities for studying issues of trauma, such as illness and victimization, in literature, as well as in other humanities disciplines. A definition and overview of the medical humanities will help to clarify this claim.

The Wellcome Trust defines the medical humanities as a discipline “comprise[ing] a variety of disciplines that explore the social, historical and cultural dimensions of scientific knowledge, clinical practice and healthcare policy. They investigate and give meaning to the experiences, narratives and representations of health and illness that are often ignored by the biomedical sciences alone.” As the curriculum for many medical humanities programs reveal, the disciplines referred to above include literature, visual art, film, philosophy, history, and sociology. Through the study of these disciplines, medical education is humanized in a way that a purely science-based education cannot achieve. By implementing the above-mentioned disciplines in medical training, empathetic observation and listening are perceived as necessary skills in patient care. Ineffective communication and observation in healthcare are problematic issues, and, as described above, it is one concern that the medical humanities seeks to
redress via the study of medical issues through humanities-based disciplines. Poor clinician-patient and healthcare team member communication and weak observational skills create their own victims;\textsuperscript{13} thus, the clinical benefit of engendering empathetic and attentive observational and communication skills in healthcare workers cannot be disregarded. According to the Institute for Healthcare Communication,

Most diagnostic decisions come from the history-taking component of the interview. Yet, studies of clinician-patient visits reveal that patients are often not provided the opportunity or time to tell their story/history, often due to interruptions, which compromise diagnostic accuracy. Incomplete stories/history leads to incomplete data upon which clinical decisions are made.\textsuperscript{14}

Because literature affords the opportunity for detailed and nuanced readings of characters and situations, the analysis of tragic figures in literature is a useful medium for refining communication, listening, and observational skills for use in medical settings.

While the implementation of such a methodology in the study of Renaissance literature speaks to the potential for a distinctive expansion of the research conducted for this project, it also points to a useful direction for literary studies (and the humanities) in general. In this current academic climate of immediate concern and potential decline, it is not only wise but also responsible to move forward in one’s research with such an awareness guiding one’s steps. To be sure, the process of completing this thesis has equipped me with the knowledge and resources to proceed
as a scholar of Renaissance literature, not only in the service of the discipline but also in the service of the medical humanities and narrative medicine.
Notes

1. Both quotes are taken from “Literature and Medicine” by Robert A. Norman, *Dermatologies* 3.2 (September 2005).

2. Because I encountered the medical humanities only two months before completing this thesis, such an approach could not have been conceivably implemented for the entire project.


7. Admittedly, these are mild words for the nature of Titus’ revenge. However, they allow me to speak to the situation in terms that emphasize the relevance of this work to be examined through the lens of the medical humanities, specifically narrative medicine. In *The Wounded Storyteller*, sociologist Arthur W. Frank categorizes illness narratives according to their narrative purpose. He categorizes as manifestos the stories that, in response to an illness experience, call for action. Of the two narratives in question, *The Rape of Lucrece* more closely fits into this category, allowing the poem to have relevance to the sociological study of the ethics of trauma.

8. I thank Dr. Alison Williams of Swansea University for introducing me to the problem of retrodiagnosis in medical humanities research. Dr. Williams specializes in various areas, including Medieval and Renaissance French literature and medical humanities. During the course of my research for this chapter, I was led to her
university webpage. Via email correspondence, Dr. Williams emphasized the need for literary medical humanities researchers to avoid retrodiagnosis: “the tendency to diagnose conditions of the past using modern parameters.”


13. A ten-year (1995-2005) study of communication in the healthcare industry demonstrates that ineffective communication is the “root cause for nearly 66 percent of all medical errors during that period” (“Impact of Communication in Healthcare”).

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